



# Anti-corruption and gender: the role of women's political participation

WFD anti-corruption and integrity series, 4

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The *WFD anti-corruption and integrity series 2021* brings together the applied research on aspects of corruption and anti-corruption. The following policy briefs are scheduled:

1. Rethinking strategies for an effective parliamentary role in combatting corruption, Phil Mason, April 2021.
2. Doing anti-corruption democratically, Heather Marquette, April 2021.
3. Comparative analysis of the UK Bribery Act 2010 and anti-bribery legislation in Ukraine, Indonesia and Kenya, Rob McCusker, July 2021.
4. Anti-corruption and gender - the role of women's political participation, Ortrun Merkle, January 2022.

## Executive summary

Higher levels of political participation have been linked to lower levels of corruption across the world. This policy brief will explore this relationship in more detail. It will show that while much remains to be explored, there are clear linkages that are important to understand for politicians, anti-corruption advocates, and those working on increasing women's representation in political office. To show how political participation and corruption are related, this brief will look at several questions: firstly, how do women influence corruption at different levels of government? Here, a number of possible explanations have been identified, such as women simply being more honest than men, being more risk averse, being treated differently by voters, or being excluded from networks of power. Secondly, the brief will look at the question of how corruption hinders the political participation of women. A particular focus here is put on the role of clientelistic networks in preventing women from actively participating in the political sphere. Lastly, the brief will look at the important role women can play in the fight against corruption, focusing on the way women highlight different policy areas and break up male-dominated corrupt networks. The brief then highlights three case studies showcasing the relationship: Ukraine, Kenya, and Indonesia. After giving an overview of corruption and the political participation of women in each country, each case study will discuss the relationship between the two in more detail.

The prevalence of corruption in Ukraine is often seen to be rooted in its history as part of the Soviet Union, and despite the importance of anti-corruption for the electorate, corruption is still rampant in the country. Ukraine also faces challenges in gender equality, and only 20.8% of national members of parliament (MPs) are women. There seems to be a clear connection between the participation of women and corruption in the country. The two large anti-corruption elections in the country have also resulted in higher numbers of women MPs, yet gender stereotypes still create a hostile environment. The same gender stereotypes, however, also lead to possibilities for women to bring about change. Where women typically focus on sectors related to women's and children's needs, this has been shown to bring about greater transparency and accountability in these sectors. Hence, the increase in women parliamentarians can be expected to lead to more transparency in certain sectors. Lastly, as the political landscape is largely dominated by oligarchic structures, an increase of women in political positions can also lead to a breakup of corrupt male-dominated networks.

The second case study, Kenya, reflects similar problems with high levels of corruption and low levels of women's political participation. A study shows that corruption in the country not only hinders the participation of women, but also that of young people. Male-dominated patronage networks still dominate the political sphere, and while the number of women in politics has been slowly increasing, they seem not to have succeeded in breaking up these networks, as parties often include opportunistic women and exclude those who want to bring about change. A study of political participation in Nairobi highlights that while views on corruption do not differ much between men and women, their experiences with corruption differ substantially. Here higher levels of women's participation could lead to an improvement in transparency and accountability in sectors where women are especially affected by corruption. The same study also highlights that while much can be improved in regard to women's political participation in Kenya, women are already active anti-corruption champions, sitting in crucial committees addressing corruption.

The third case study country, Indonesia, also faces large challenges with high levels of corruption and low levels of women's political participation. Indonesia is dominated by rent-seeking patronage networks, which on the one hand restrict the participation of women but also are an opportunity for women to break up corrupt structures. However, not all networks in the country are dominated by men. In the 2017 election in North Aceh, candidates who used women-centred networks of brokers were particularly successful. This example shows the importance of focusing not only on women at the highest level of politics but also of remembering the important role women can play at lower levels. Also, women already play an active role in anti-corruption efforts in Indonesia, with multiple initiatives being aimed at involving more women in those efforts.

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# 1. What is the link between women's political participation and corruption?

Over the last decades an interesting pattern has emerged, showing a strong correlation between higher levels of women's political participation and lower levels of corruption.<sup>1</sup> Corruption is a complex and multi-layered phenomenon which is most commonly defined as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain".<sup>2</sup> A distinction is often made between corruption which involves the highest political decision makers, so-called political or grand corruption, and bureaucratic or petty corruption, which takes place at the policy implementation level.<sup>3</sup> Since 2001, research analysing data from different parts of the world has found that higher levels of female representation in political leadership positions are linked to lower levels of both types of corruption.<sup>4</sup> This paper will discuss in more detail how corruption and the political representation of women are linked. It will show that while much remains to be explored, there are clear linkages that are important to understand for politicians, anti-corruption advocates and those working on increasing women's representation in political office.

The question of if and how women's political participation and corruption are connected first received attention at the turn of the century when two research teams, Dollar, Fisman and Gatti<sup>5</sup> and Swamy, Knack and Lee<sup>6</sup> published ground-breaking papers, which for the first time explored how levels of corruption might be influenced by gender. They presented results showing that higher numbers of women in national parliaments seem to be linked to lower levels of corruption. This finding that there is a correlation between women's political participation and corruption was quickly noted by the World Bank, which identified gender equality as an important tool to curb corruption.<sup>7</sup> The prospect of reducing corruption by increasing the rates of political participation of women was eagerly picked up by anti-corruption and gender equality initiatives.<sup>8</sup> Since then, a multitude of studies have confirmed that this relationship holds true for women in elected office at

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1. For example, David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti, "Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex? Corruption and Women in Government", *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 46, no. 4 (December 2001): 423-29; Chandan Kumar Jha and Sudipta Sarangi, "Women and Corruption: What Positions Must They Hold to Make a Difference?", *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 151 (July 1, 2018): 219-33; Anand Swamy et al., "Gender and Corruption", *Journal of Development Economics* 64, no. 1 (February 2001): 25-55; Lena Wängnerud, "The Link between Gender and Corruption in Europe", August 2015, [http://anticorrupt.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/D5.3-Case-studies-on-gender-and-corruption\\_Lena-W%C3%A4ngnerud.pdf](http://anticorrupt.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/D5.3-Case-studies-on-gender-and-corruption_Lena-W%C3%A4ngnerud.pdf).

2. Transparency International, "Transparency International - What Is Corruption?," Transparency International, accessed 6 March 2021, <https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption>.

3. Jens Chr Andvig et al., "Research on Corruption A Policy Oriented Survey" (Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) & Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), December 2000).

4. Monika Bauhr, Nicholas Charron, and Lena Wängnerud, "Exclusion or Interests? Why Females in Elected Office Reduce Petty and Grand Corruption", *European Journal of Political Research* 58, no. 4 (2019): 1043-65.

5. "Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex?"

6. "Gender and Corruption".

7. Elizabeth M. King and Andrew D. Mason, "Engendering Development through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice" (The World Bank, 31 January 2001), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/01/891686/engendering-development-through-gender-equality-rights-resources-voice>.

8. Justin Esarey and Gina Chirillo, "'Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth? Corruption, Gender, and Institutional Context", *Politics & Gender* 9, no. 04 (December 2013): 361-89.

both national and regional level<sup>9</sup> as well as at cabinet level<sup>10</sup> and in local councils.<sup>11</sup> The relationship, particularly at the local council level, has also been confirmed in different regions of the world, from Europe, to Asia, and Africa.<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, Stensöta et al,<sup>13</sup> when analysing European Commission data from 30 European countries, found that there is no relationship between the number of women in public administration and levels of corruption; however, in the same study they do find that the higher the number of women in parliament, the lower the perceived level of corruption. This highlights the importance of continuously studying this relationship between corruption and women's political participation, and shows that different norms and gender processes in different political organisations within the same country can determine what correlation exists between the involvement of women and levels of corruption.<sup>14</sup> A recent study looking at French mayors also showed that women, when they are newly elected as mayors, reduce corruption risks; however, when they are re-elected, the effect disappears.<sup>15</sup> What these studies clearly show is that the "link between women's representation and lower level corruption is context dependent, and the effects of women representatives may therefore differ depending on the positions and platforms that women gain access to, and thereby potentially also vary over time."<sup>16</sup>

Identifying the link between low levels of corruption and higher rates of women's participation quite naturally raised questions about the direction of the causality. While several studies indicate that higher gender equality - and in particular, higher rates of women's participation in decision-making - leads to lower corruption,<sup>17</sup> others assert that the relationship goes from corruption to

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9. For example, Elin Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Marcia Grimes and Lena Wängnerud, "Curbing Corruption Through Social Welfare Reform? The Effects of Mexico's Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Good Government", *The American Review of Public Administration* 40, no. 6 (1 November 2010): 671-90; Marcia Grimes and Lena Wängnerud, "Good Government in Mexico: The Relevance of the Gender Perspective", QoG Working Paper Series (Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, 2012); Jha and Sarangi, "Women and Corruption"; Daniel Stockemer, "Women's Parliamentary Representation in Africa: The Impact of Democracy and Corruption on the Number of Female Deputies in National Parliaments", *Political Studies* 59, no. 3 (1 October 2011): 693-712; as an exception V. Vijayalakshmi, "Rent-Seeking and Gender in Local Governance", *The Journal of Development Studies* 44, no. 9 (October 2008): 1262-88; Wängnerud, "The Link between Gender and Corruption in Europe".

10. Daniel Stockemer and Aksel Sundström, "Corruption and Women in Cabinets: Informal Barriers to Recruitment in the Executive", *Governance* 32, no. 1 (2019): 83-102.

11. Aksel Sundström and Lena Wängnerud, "Corruption as an Obstacle to Women's Political Representation Evidence from Local Councils in 18 European Countries", *Party Politics* 22, no. 3 (2016): 354-69.

12. Bauhr, Charron, and Wängnerud, "Exclusion or Interests?"; Thavy Chhoeun, Panha Sok, and Clodagh Byrne, "'Citadel of Women': Strengthening Female Leadership in Rural Cambodia", *Gender and Development* 16, no. 3 (2008): 535-47; Anne-Marie Goetz, "No Shortcuts to Power: Constraints on Women's Political Effectiveness in Uganda", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 04 (December 2002): 549-75; Niraja Gopal Jayal, "Engendering Local Democracy: The Impact of Quotas for Women in India's Panchayats", *Democratization* 13, no. 1 (1 February 2006): 15-35; Sundström and Wängnerud, "Corruption as an Obstacle to Women's Political Representation Evidence from Local Councils in 18 European Countries".

13. Helena Stensöta, Lena Wängnerud, and Richard Svensson, "Gender and Corruption: The Mediating Power of Institutional Logics", *Governance* 28, no. 4 (1 October 2015): 475-96.

14. UNODC, "The Time Is Now- Addressing the Gender Dimension of Corruption" (Vienna, 2020), [https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2020/THE\\_TIME\\_IS\\_NOW\\_2020\\_12\\_08.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2020/THE_TIME_IS_NOW_2020_12_08.pdf).

15. Monika Bauhr and Nicholas Charron, "Will Women Executives Reduce Corruption? Marginalization and Network Inclusion", *Comparative Political Studies* 54, no. 7 (1 June 2021): 1292-1322.

16. Bauhr and Charron, 1293.

17. For example, Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti, "Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex?"; Esarey and Chirillo, "'Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth?"; Justin Esarey and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, "Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies", *British Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (July 2018): 659-90; Jha and Sarangi, "Women and Corruption".

gender inequality.<sup>18</sup> A recent study even indicates that both effects are true at the same time.<sup>19</sup> One, therefore, has to explore if indeed women's participation in politics reduces corruption (and if yes, how) or rather if corruption prevents women from seeking and gaining political office. This policy brief will explore this in more detail. In doing so it will look at several questions: 1) how do women influence the level of corruption at different levels of government? 2) how does corruption hinder the political participation of women? and 3) when can women be an anti-corruption force?

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18. Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*; Grimes and Wängnerud, "Good Government in Mexico: The Relevance of the Gender Perspective"; Sundström and Wängnerud, "Corruption as an Obstacle to Women's Political Representation Evidence from Local Councils in 18 European Countries".

19. Justin Esarey and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, "Estimating Causal Relationships Between Women's Representation in Government and Corruption", *Comparative Political Studies* 52, no. 11 (1 September 2019): 1713-41.



## 2. How do women influence the level of corruption at different levels of government?

The majority of the existing research focuses on the fact that more women being included in politics often leads to lower corruption levels.<sup>20</sup> As will be discussed in more detail below, these findings hold true at different levels of government from national parliament to local councils; however there are some clear trends: the relationship is particularly strong in contexts of high accountability, especially consolidated democracies,<sup>21</sup> and many of the studies focus either on global data sets, on the European Union, or on Latin America. Fewer studies can be found exploring this relationship in other parts of the world. In addition, the mechanisms through which this relationship manifests are still being debated.<sup>22</sup> A number of possible explanations have been identified, such as women simply being more honest than men, being more risk averse, being treated differently by voters,<sup>23</sup> or being excluded from networks of power.<sup>24</sup> The following sections will take a closer look at each of these arguments.

### 2.1.1 Differences between men and women in attitudes toward corruption

The first studies in this area focused on women being less likely to engage in corrupt activities as the main explanation as to why higher numbers of women in parliament lead to lower levels of corruption in the country overall. Dollar et al.<sup>25</sup> focused on women being more likely to sacrifice personal gains for the common good, which would also make them less likely to engage in corrupt behaviour. These arguments are in large parts based on previous behaviour studies, showing that women have higher scores on integrity tests<sup>26</sup> and showcase higher norms of ethical behaviour.<sup>27</sup> This was corroborated by Swamy et al.<sup>28</sup>, who however focused on differences in self-control between men and women. Other studies make similar arguments by focusing on differences in willingness

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20. Amy C. Alexander and Andreas Bågenholm, "Does Gender Matter? Female Politicians' Engagement in Anti-Corruption Efforts", in *Gender and Corruption - Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, ed. by Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud, Political Corruption and Governance (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 176.

21. Monika Bauhr, Nicholas Charron, and Lena Wängnerud, "Close the Political Gender Gap to Reduce Corruption", U4 Brief (Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, 2018).

22. For an overview of the current state of the art of gender and corruption research see Ortrun Merkle, "Gender and Corruption: What We Know and Ways Forward", in *A Research Agenda for Studies of Corruption*, ed. by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Paul M. Heywood (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2020), 75-89.

23. Vivi Alatas et al., "Gender, Culture, and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis", *Southern Economic Journal* 75, no. 3 (January 1, 2009): 663-80; Esarey and Chirillo, "'Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth?"; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, "Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies".

24. Tiffany D. Barnes, *Gendering Legislative Behavior: Institutional Constraints and Collaboration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Anne-Marie Goetz, "Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption Force?", *Development and Change* 38, no. 1 (1 January 2007): 87-105; Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, *Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America* (Oxford University Press, 2010); Aili Mari Tripp, "The Politics of Autonomy and Cooptation in Africa: The Case of the Ugandan Women's Movement", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 1 (2001): 101-28.

25. "Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex?"

26. Deniz S. Ones and Chockalingam Viswesvaran, "Gender, Age, and Race Differences on Overt Integrity Tests: Results across Four Large-Scale Job Applicant Datasets", *Journal of Applied Psychology* 83, no. 1 (1998): 35-42.

27. Sandra H. Glover et al., "Re-Examining the Influence of Individual Values on Ethical Decision Making", in *From the Universities to the Marketplace: The Business Ethics Journey*, ed. by Marilynn Fleckenstein et al. (Springer Netherlands, 1997), 109-19; Michelle C. Reiss and Kaushik Mitra, "The Effects of Individual Difference Factors on the Acceptability of Ethical and Unethical Workplace Behaviors", *Journal of Business Ethics* 17, no. 14 (1 October 1998): 1581-93.

28. Swamy et al., "Gender and Corruption".

to engage in interactions with criminal or corruption officials,<sup>29</sup> risk aversion<sup>30</sup> or in arguing that women are simply less likely to engage in criminal behaviour.<sup>31</sup> An apparent gender difference in attitudes towards corruption especially has been confirmed in a number of experimental studies.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, women might feel greater pressure to conform to existing norms about corruption, as they are more likely to be punished for corrupt behaviour.<sup>33</sup>

While the argument that women are inherently less corrupt than men was briefly popular as the “fairer-sex hypothesis” and led to a new focus on women as the “new anti-corruption cleaner force”,<sup>34</sup> more recent research is moving away from the understanding that women are more favourably viewed as being more honest and ethical than men.<sup>35</sup> Different studies have shown that women are equally or even more willing to take risks if they are in the more dominant position<sup>36</sup> and that women’s likelihood to commit crimes is increasing, which likely is linked to the fact that social norms for women have changed, allowing them more participation everywhere, including in crime activity.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, the argument that women are more honest or risk averse has been criticised for reinforcing gender stereotypes,<sup>38</sup> where “[t]he very traits that traditionally branded women as deficient in moral development, their concern to help and to please, are now seen as a functional for good governance reforms in developing and transitional societies”.<sup>39</sup> Hazarika<sup>40</sup> continues this argument and notes that “traits ascribed to women once viewed as making for moral weakness are now seen as cornerstones of moral strength, that is, the definition of morality has changed. It may make little sense to consider women morally superior if notions of morality are mutable. Perhaps it is more useful to speak of honesty than morality” (p.8).

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29. Björn Frank, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, and Frédéric Boehm, “Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments”, *European Journal of Development Research* 23, no. 1 (February 2011): 59-71.

30. James P. Byrnes, David C. Miller, and William D. Schafer, “Gender Differences in Risk Taking: A Meta-Analysis”, *Psychological Bulletin* 125, no. 3 (1999): 367-83; Catherine C. Eckel and Sascha C. Füllbrunn, “Thar SHE Blows? Gender, Competition, and Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets”, *American Economic Review* 105, no. 2 (February 2015): 906-20; Christine R Harris, Michael Jenkins, and Dale Glaser, “Gender Differences in Risk Assessment: Why Do Women Take Fewer Risks than Men”, *Judgment and Decision Making* 1, no. 1 (2006): 48-63.

31. Bo Rothstein, “Corruption, Gender Equality and Feminist Strategies”, QoG Working Paper Series (Gothenburg: Quality of Government Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, 2016).

32. Ananish Chaudhuri, “Chapter 2 Gender and Corruption: A Survey of the Experimental Evidence”, in *New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption*, vol. 15, 0 vols., Research in Experimental Economics 15 (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012), 13-49; Tiffany D. Barnes and Emily Beaulieu, “Gender Stereotypes and Corruption: How Candidates Affect Perceptions of Election Fraud”, *Politics & Gender* 10, no. 03 (September 2014): 365-91; Frank, Lambsdorff, and Boehm, “Gender and Corruption”; M. Fernanda Rivas, “An Experiment on Corruption and Gender”, *Bulletin of Economic Research* 65, no. 1 (1 January 2013): 10-42; Günther G. Schulze and Björn Frank, “Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility”, *Economics of Governance* 4, no. 2 (1 August 2003): 143-60.

33. Esarey and Chirillo, “‘Fairer Sex’ or Purity Myth?”

34. Goetz, “Political Cleaners”.

35. Tiffany D. Barnes, Emily Beaulieu, and Gregory W. Saxton, “Restoring Trust in the Police: Why Female Officers Reduce Suspicions of Corruption”, *Governance* 31, no. 1 (2018): 143-61.

36. Uri Gneezy, Kenneth L. Leonard, and John A. List, “Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence From a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society”, *Econometrica* 77, no. 5 (1 September 2009): 1637-64.

37. Nadia Campaniello, “Women in Crime”, *IZA World of Labor*, 31 July 2019.

38. UNDP, “Seeing Beyond the State: Grassroots Women’s Perspectives on Corruption and Anti-Corruption”, October 2012, <https://www.undp.org/publications/seeing-beyond-state-grassroots-womens-perspectives-corruption-and-anti-corruption>.

39. Goetz, “Political Cleaners”, 91.

40. “The Plough, Gender Roles, and Corruption”, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, December 27, 2016).

So, while most agree that women are not inherently less corrupt than men, women have an important role to play in the fight against corruption. However, more information about their contribution, as well as the factors which can support or hinder their contribution, need to be explored further.

## 2.1.2 Institutional factors

Increasing the number of women in parliament has not been found to have a consistent effect on corruption;<sup>41</sup> therefore, it seems likely that there are a number of other factors that affect if and when an increase in the number of women will lead to lower levels of corruption.

Functioning institutions decrease corruption and allow more women to participate in politics.

It could simply be that functioning liberal institutions allow more women to participate in the process and at the same time also lead to lower levels of corruption.<sup>42</sup> This was confirmed in a 2013 study that showed that women's participation only affected corruption levels when the country already had strong political institutions.<sup>43</sup> It might even be the case that only less corrupt governments are actually willing to include women in decision-making roles;<sup>44</sup> for example, because they are less based on tight networks but rather on merit. Looking at gender differences in attitudes toward corruption, Alhassan-Alolo<sup>45</sup> showed that male and female public servants in Ghana have similar attitudes toward corruption and are equally likely to engage in it. He hypothesises that the question of whether or not an individual engages in corruption is a question of opportunity, networks and social norms, rather than one of gender differences. Alatas et al.<sup>46</sup> came to similar conclusions. Using an experimental study in India and Indonesia, the authors find that there are no significant gender differences in attitudes toward corruption. Vijayalakshmi<sup>47</sup> also finds that there is no difference in rent-seeking attitudes or actual levels of corruption between male and female elected representatives in India.

Wängnerud<sup>48</sup> shows that women's participation in electoral politics has a larger impact on corruption than women in high administrative positions do. Similarly, a study by Stensöta, Wängnerud and Svensson<sup>49</sup> argues that institutional characteristics matter in determining the role gender plays. Interestingly, they find that stronger bureaucratic principles decrease the effect of gender both on corruption behaviours and attitudes. They show that public administrations in their sample in Europe, which typically have very strictly standardised procedures, are less affected by gendered norms. However, they show that in the same sample of 30 European countries, the number of women in parliament does indeed have an impact on the levels of perceived corruption.

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41. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, "Estimating Causal Relationships Between Women's Representation in Government and Corruption"; Sabrina Karim, "Madam Officer: Peru's Anti-Corruption Gambit", *Americas Quarterly*, 2011.

42. Hung-En Sung, "Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited", *Social Forces* 82, no. 2 (1 December 2003): 703-23.

43. Esarey and Chirillo, "'Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth?"

44. Lena Wängnerud, "Gender and Corruption", in *Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption*, ed. by Paul M. Heywood (Routledge, 2014), 288-98.

45. "Gender and Corruption: Testing the New Consensus", *Public Administration and Development* 27, no. 3 (1 August 2007): 227-37.

46. "Gender, Culture, and Corruption".

47. "Rent-Seeking and Gender in Local Governance".

48. "The Link between Gender and Corruption in Europe".

49. "Gender and Corruption".

Women in parliament play a bigger role in reducing corruption than in bureaucratic positions; however, the better functioning the institutions are, the smaller the effect gender has.

Women might also simply have less access to corrupt opportunities.<sup>50</sup> It is well known from studies on the role of women in politics that women do not often have the same access to power positions as men do.<sup>51</sup> By definition this makes the “abuse of power” that is corruption more difficult. In addition, a network is an essential aspect of corruption<sup>52</sup> and these networks must be built on “strong within-group trust” in order to also to engage in activities that are illegal.<sup>53</sup> Women often do not have access to these clientelistic networks,<sup>54</sup> as this corruption relies on “homosocial” capital, a type of social capital which is built on the relationships between men. Patronage networks are frequently dominated by men and exclude women from participating<sup>55,56</sup>. Similar findings have been made in Iceland.<sup>57</sup> One can therefore assume that an increase in the number of women in politics could break up existing networks and therefore reduce corruption. As women have been largely excluded from power and therefore also corrupt networks, they are more likely to criticise corrupt behaviour when they see it.<sup>58</sup> At the same time, however, it might be the case that even with higher numbers of women representatives, that the corrupt networks continue to exist, or include more women in those networks once they have achieved positions of power.<sup>59</sup>

Women have less access to corrupt opportunities as they are excluded from many positions of power and networks. When more women gain access to political office they can break up existing networks which leads to reductions in corruption.

50. For example, Alhassan-Alolo, “Gender and Corruption”; Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*; Goetz, “Political Cleaners”; Grimes and Wängnerud, “Good Government in Mexico: The Relevance of the Gender Perspective”; Stockemer, “Women’s Parliamentary Representation in Africa”.

51. Barnes, *Gendering Legislative Behavior: Institutional Constraints and Collaboration*; Roseanna Michelle Heath, Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, “Women on the Sidelines: Women’s Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures”, *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (2005): 420-36; Schwindt-Bayer, *Political Power and Women’s Representation in Latin America*.

52. Susan Carol Stokes, “Political Clientelism”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. by Carles Boix and Susan Carol Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 604-27.

53. UNODC, “The Time Is Now - Addressing the Gender Dimension of Corruption”, 36.

54. Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*.

55. Leonardo R. Arriola and Martha C. Johnson, “Ethnic Politics and Women’s Empowerment in Africa: Ministerial Appointments to Executive Cabinets”, *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 2 (2014): 495-510; Linda J. Beck, “Democratization and the Hidden Public: The Impact of Patronage Networks on Senegalese Women”, *Comparative Politics* 35, no. 2 (2003): 147-69; Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*.

56. Interestingly, Bjarnegård in her work also argues that men who do not fit the traditional understanding of masculinity expected in these networks, are also excluded from them.

57. Janet Elise Johnson, Þorgerður Einarsdóttir, and Gyða Margrét Pétursdóttir, “A Feminist Theory of Corruption: Lessons from Iceland”, *Politics & Gender* 9, no. 02 (2013): 174-206.

58. Boris Branisa and Maria Ziegler, “Reexamining the Link between Gender and Corruption: The Role of Social Institutions”, 2011, <http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/48324>; Goetz, “Political Cleaners”; Vijayalakshmi, “Rent-Seeking and Gender in Local Governance”.

59. Justin Esarey and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, “Estimating Causal Relationships between Women’s Representation in Government and Corruption”, Manuscript, 30 January 2019, <http://www.justinesarey.com/gender-corruption-and-causality.pdf>.

More recently, the role of culture has also been explored as a mediating factor. A study by Debski et al.<sup>60</sup> finds that underlying cultural factors explain much of the relationship between participation of women and corruption which should be explored further in future research.

Women are often judged more harshly for mistakes, especially when oversight is rare. Therefore women might be less likely to engage in corruption when the risk is very high.

Women in politics also face other risks and voters are frequently less forgiving of missteps when they are taken by women. This therefore significantly increases the risk for women of getting involved in corruption, as exposure would likely lead to more severe punishment. Therefore, especially when the risks associated with corruption are high, women are less likely to get involved.<sup>61</sup> Yet, the evidence on this is not clear.<sup>62</sup> Interestingly, multiple research studies have shown that increased women's political representation does indeed reduce corruption levels if it is especially risky to be involved in corrupt activities.<sup>63</sup> Žemojtel-Piotrowska et al.<sup>64</sup> find that women are evaluated more negatively in corruption and sex scandals. At the same time, it might also be that women are simply less likely to be suspected of participating in corruption;<sup>65</sup> for example because they are seen as political outsiders. Barnes and Beaulieu<sup>66</sup> therefore argue that women are only likely to be judged differently in terms of corrupt behaviour in settings where oversight is rare and poorly institutionalised.

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60. "Gender and Corruption: The Neglected Role of Culture", *European Journal of Political Economy* 55 (1 December 2018): 526-37.

61. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, "Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies".

62. Tiffany D. Barnes and Emily Beaulieu, "Women Politicians, Institutions, and Perceptions of Corruption", *Comparative Political Studies* 52, no. 1 (1 January 2019): 134-67; Lindsay J. Benstead and Ellen Lust, "Why Do Some Voters Prefer Female Candidates? The Role of Perceived Incorruptibility in Arab Elections", in *Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, ed. by Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud, Political Corruption and Governance (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 83-104; Andrew C. Eggers, Nick Vivyan, and Markus Wagner, "Corruption, Accountability, and Gender: Do Female Politicians Face Higher Standards in Public Life?", *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 1 (25 October 2017): 321-26; Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Justin Esarey, and Erika Schumacher, "Gender and Citizen Responses to Corruption among Politicians: The U.S. and Brazil", in *Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, ed. by Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud, Political Corruption and Governance (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 59-82; Magdalena Anna Žemojtel-Piotrowska et al., "Corruption and Sexual Scandal: The Importance of Politician Gender", *Anales de Psicología / Annals of Psychology* 33, no. 1 (2017): 133-41.

63. Esarey and Chirillo, "'Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth?"; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, "Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies".

64. "Corruption and Sexual Scandal".

65. Schwindt-Bayer, *Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America*; Stacy G. Ulbig, "Gendering Municipal Government: Female Descriptive Representation and Feelings of Political Trust\*", *Social Science Quarterly* 88, no. 5 (1 December 2007): 1106-23, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2007.00494.x>; David Watson and Amy Moreland, "Perceptions of Corruption and the Dynamics of Women's Representation", *Politics & Gender* 10, no. 03 (September 2014): 392-412.

66. "Women Politicians, Institutions, and Perceptions of Corruption".

## 2.2 The impact of corruption on women's political representation

As policies that increased women's representation in government have not shown consistent effects on corruption,<sup>67</sup> it might rather be that corruption has a negative impact on the political participation of women. A study by Norris<sup>68</sup> confirms that high levels of political corruption and political violence lead to a lower number of women elected to parliament. She finds that where corruption is common women constitute roughly 3.9% of the legislatures, while when no corruption is present, the number of women in parliament triples to 13.6%.<sup>69</sup> As has been widely researched, pursuing a political career is full of opportunities, but also obstacles, especially for women.<sup>70</sup> While it can be argued that the position of women has improved significantly over the last decades, the gender gap in economic and political participation continues to exist and in recent years has often even increased.<sup>71,72</sup> Many different approaches have been taken to explain the underlying gendered dynamics such as attitudes, experiences, (socio-economic) resources and political socialisation, that have led to the gender gap in political participation<sup>73</sup>. Recently, there has also been more focus on the role corruption can play as an obstacle to women's political participation.

Many researchers find that electoral systems have an impact on the political participation of women,<sup>74</sup> and corruption can be an additional barrier for women seeking to actually run and be elected into public office, when, for example, illicit funds are used in elections.<sup>75</sup>

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67. For example, Carrie Kahn, "Mexican State's Anti-Corruption Plan: Hire Female Traffic Cops", *NPR.Org* (blog), 28 September 2013, <https://www.npr.org/2013/09/28/226903227/mexican-state-s-anti-corruption-plan-hire-women-traffic-cops>; Karim, "Madam Officer: Peru's Anti-Corruption Gambit"; Molly Moore, "Mexico City's Stop Sign to Bribery", *Washington Post*, 31 July 1999, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/07/31/mexico-city-stop-sign-to-bribery/61254d72-5f5b-438e-8df6-3ee55688a3ec/>.

68. "Silver or Lead? Why Violence and Corruption Limit Women's Representation," *HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP19-011* (1 March 2019), <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/silver-or-lead-why-violence-and-corruption-limit-womens-representation?platform=hootsuite>.

69. Norris, 12.

70. For an overview see for example Pamela Paxton and Melanie M. Hughes, *Women, Politics, and Power A Global Perspective*, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2017).

71. Ricardo Hausmann et al., "The Global Gender Gap Report 2014" (Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2014), <http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2014>.

72. Karim, "Madam Officer: Peru's Anti-Corruption Gambit".

73. For example, Arla G. Bernstein, "Gendered Characteristics of Political Engagement in College Students", *Sex Roles* 52, no. 5-6 (1 March 2005): 299-310; Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba, *The Private Roots of Public Action* (Harvard University Press, 2001); Hilde Coffé and Catherine Bolzendahl, "Same Game, Different Rules? Gender Differences in Political Participation", *Sex Roles* 62, no. 5-6 (March 2010): 318-33; Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless, "Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office", *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 2 (1 April 2004): 264-80; Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless, "Uncovering the Origins of the Gender Gap in Political Ambition", *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 03 (August 2014): 499-519; Laura Sartori, Dario Tuorto, and Rossella Ghigi, "The Social Roots of the Gender Gap in Political Participation: The Role of Situational and Cultural Constraints in Italy", *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society* 24, no. 3 (1 September 2017): 221-47.

74. Richard E. Matland and Deborah Dwight Brown, "District Magnitude's Effect on Female Representation in U. S. State Legislatures", *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (1 November 1992): 469-92; Pippa Norris, "Women's Legislative Participation in Western Europe", *West European Politics* 8, no. 4 (1 October 1985): 90-101; Wilma Rule, "Women's Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems", *Political Science and Politics* 27, no. 04 (December 1994): 689-92.

75. Norris, "Silver or Lead? Why Violence and Corruption Limit Women's Representation".



Political parties are considered to be gatekeepers for women politicians<sup>76</sup> and party structures play an important role in deciding women's chances for office.<sup>77</sup> Kunovich and Paxton<sup>78</sup> argue that women have to pass two filters to become public officials; first, they must be selected to run by the parties and then, they must be favoured by the electorate. It has been widely discussed that for the latter, cultural norms relating to the role of women can be a severe hindrance.<sup>79</sup> Interestingly, in the case of anti-corruption, the stereotypes surrounding women might play a positive role for the electorate (see section 3.1).

For the selection within the parties, however, research shows that corruption can severely hinder women's access to political office. Clientelism can be an effective gatekeeper and hinder women from entering formal politics.<sup>80</sup> Bjarnegård<sup>81</sup> argues that "whereas democracy has often been viewed as enabling participation, clientelism is here seen as constraining genuine political participation for the majority of people". A study looking at elections for the federal Congress in Argentina showed that women members of Congress are more likely to represent political parties that are less associated with clientelistic networks.<sup>82</sup> In the case of Mexico, a study found that women frequently start their careers in civil society organisations, and not in established clientelistic networks.<sup>83</sup> The exclusion of women from clientelistic networks also means that their support base is often different. Women in politics have often started their careers in civil society, which then is also where they build their support network.<sup>84</sup> As corruption typically undermines the relationship between civil society and government, "female politicians have a rational incentive to refrain from corruption in order not to alienate their supporters and jeopardize their political careers".<sup>85</sup> Therefore, it is important to study in more detail what makes "corruption systems prone to inclusion of already corrupt men while effectively excluding outsiders such as women".<sup>86</sup>

Often, access to political office also requires access to informal, and frequently male-dominated, networks that exclude women.<sup>87</sup> Stockemer,<sup>88</sup> analysing data on Africa, finds that "By reinforcing

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76. Pippa Norris, "Conclusions: Comparing Legislative Recruitment", in *Gender and Party Politics*, ed. by Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1993), 309-30.

77. Miki Caul, "Women's Representation in Parliament The Role of Political Parties", *Party Politics* 5, no. 1 (1 January 1999): 79-98; Lena Wängnerud, "Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation", *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2009): 51-69.

78. "Pathways to Power: The Role of Political Parties in Women's National Political Representation", *American Journal of Sociology* 111, no. 2 (September 1, 2005): 505-52.

79. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, "Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation", *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 3 (2001): 126-40; Pamela Paxton and Sheri Kunovich, "Women's Political Representation: The Importance of Ideology", *Social Forces* 82, no. 1 (1 September 2003): 87-113.

80. For example, Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation* on Thailand; Susan Franceschet and Jennifer M. Piscopo, "Sustaining Gendered Practices? Power, Parties, and Elite Political Networks in Argentina", *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 1 (January 2014): 85-110.

81. *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*.

82. Franceschet and Piscopo, "Sustaining Gendered Practices?".

83. Grimes and Wängnerud, "Curbing Corruption Through Social Welfare Reform?".

84. Grimes and Wängnerud.

85. Rothstein, "Corruption, Gender Equality and Feminist Strategies."

86. Elin Bjarnegård, "Focusing on Masculinity and Male-Dominated Networks in Corruption", in *Gender and Corruption - Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, ed. by Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud, Political Corruption and Governance (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 257.

87. Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*; Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament* (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Stockemer and Sundström, "Corruption and Women in Cabinets".

88. "Women's Parliamentary Representation in Africa", 705.

human rights violations, preventing the institutionalization of party structures and strengthening traditional power networks, high levels of corruption appear to be a major barrier against women's efforts to gain office." Furthermore, Sundström and Wängnerud,<sup>89</sup> analysing data on European local councils, argue that the selection process is affected by corruption and women are likely to be excluded from corrupt networks which are typically dominated by and designed to privilege men.

Grimes and Wängnerud<sup>90</sup> also corroborate these findings, showing that in Mexico corruption also hinders women's representation. Bjarnegård and Kenny<sup>91</sup> show that when formal rules are weak or not properly enforced, the informal practices of patronage and clientelism disadvantage women. In addition, several studies have identified the existence of male-dominated patronage networks as an obstacle for women to enter formal politics, which then also limits the possibilities for women to enter in corrupt exchanges.<sup>92</sup>

Research has also shown that candidates challenging incumbents are often disadvantaged because they do not have access to the resources needed for clientelism such as patronage networks and campaign funds.<sup>93</sup> This is very likely to be a challenge, especially for women who are trying to break into "old boys' networks".<sup>94</sup>

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89. "Corruption as an Obstacle to Women's Political Representation Evidence from Local Councils in 18 European Countries".

90. "Good Government in Mexico: The Relevance of the Gender Perspective".

91. "Comparing Candidate Selection: A Feminist Institutional Approach", *Government and Opposition* 51, no. 3 (July 2016): 370-92.

92. Alhassan-Alolo, "Gender and Corruption"; Goetz, "Political Cleaners"; Stockemer, "Women's Parliamentary Representation in Africa"; Sundström and Wängnerud, "Corruption as an Obstacle to Women's Political Representation Evidence from Local Councils in 18 European Countries".

93. Athanassios Gouglas, Bart Maddens, and Marleen Brans, "Determinants of Legislative Turnover in Western Europe, 1945-2015", *European Journal of Political Research* 57, no. 3 (2018): 637-61; Stokes, "Political Clientelism".

94. Norris, "Silver or Lead? Why Violence and Corruption Limit Women's Representation".



### 3. What conditions are required for women to be a force for anti-corruption?

There is no shortage of empirical evidence finding that greater gender equality is associated with various desirable social outcomes. For example, giving women basic rights and entitlements has a significant positive effect on economic development.<sup>95</sup> Research finds that societies with more equality and women's political representation tend to have better human rights protection<sup>96</sup> and are less likely to fall into civil war.<sup>97</sup> Once involved, women also bring other issues to the policy agenda, especially those concerning women<sup>98</sup> and children.<sup>99</sup> This also plays an important role for anti-corruption initiatives.

Research has shown that men and women are affected differently by corruption;<sup>100</sup> hence one could expect that women are likely to specifically focus on those aspects of corruption where they are disproportionately affected. While more research is still needed in this area, Ellis, Manuel and Blackden<sup>101</sup> for example show that even though more men work in the Ugandan private sector, women are targeted more frequently by corruption. Corruption in public services disproportionately affects women as they more frequently rely on these services. In addition, women in many countries often do not have the financial resources to pay for bribes, as the control over household resources lies with the men and women are therefore frequently denied services.<sup>102</sup> As women spend more time in the health care system, during pregnancy and childcare, they are also more exposed to corruption in this sector than men.<sup>103</sup> Women are also more often exposed to atypical forms of corruption such as sextortion.<sup>104</sup> As women politicians have been shown to bring different issues to the table, one can hypothesise that they will also be more likely to focus on areas where women are especially affected by corruption. While evidence on this is still scarce, recent research has discussed that this focus of women on policies targeting the wellbeing of women and children also leads to an improvement in the delivery and monitoring of public services, and therefore to

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95. Bridget Byrne, "Gender, Conflict and Development, Volume I: Overview", BRIDGE Report, 1995; Bridget Byrne, "Towards a Gendered Understanding of Conflict", *IDS Bulletin* 27, no. 3 (1 July 1996): 31-40; Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford University Press, 2001).

96. Erik Melander, "Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse", *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 2 (1 March 2005): 149-66.

97. Mary Caprioli, "Gendered Conflict", *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (1 January 2000): 51-68.

98. For example, Lakshmi Iyer et al., "The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4, no. 4 (2012): 165-93; M Marit Rehavi, "Sex and Politics: Do Female Legislators Affect State Spending?", *Unpublished Manuscript, University of Michigan* 78 (2007).

99. For example, Sonia Bhalotra and Irma Clots-Figueras, "Health and the Political Agency of Women", *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 6, no. 2 (2014): 164-97; Fernanda Brollo and Ugo Troiano, "What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil", *Journal of Development Economics* 122 (2016): 28-45.

100. For example, Marie Chêne, Ben Clench, and Craig Fagan, "Corruption and Gender in Service Delivery: The Unequal Impacts", *Transparency International Working Paper*, no. 02/2010 (2010); Amanda Ellis, Claire Manuel, and Mark C. Blackden, "Gender and Economic Growth in Uganda: Unleashing the Power of Women", *Directions in Development* (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2006); Fiona Leach, Máiréad Dunne, and Francesca Salvi, "School-Related Gender Based Violence", *Background Research Paper for UNESCO*, January 2014.

101. "Gender and Economic Growth in Uganda: Unleashing the Power of Women".

102. Celestine Nyami Musembi, "Gender and Corruption in the Administration of Justice", in *Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption and Judicial Systems* (Berlin: Transparency International, 2007), 121-28, [http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global\\_corruption\\_report\\_2007\\_corruption\\_and\\_judicial\\_systems](http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_report_2007_corruption_and_judicial_systems).

103. Chêne, Clench, and Fagan, "Corruption and Gender in Service Delivery: The Unequal Impacts".

104. Transparency International, "Sextortion: Undermining Gender Equality", *Transparency International News Feature*, Sextortion: undermining gender equality, 3 July 2016, [http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/sextortion\\_undermining\\_gender\\_equality](http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/sextortion_undermining_gender_equality).

lower levels of corruption.<sup>105</sup> Women also are more likely to have more female voters as their support base,<sup>106</sup> which usually expect the female candidate to focus on women's interests,<sup>107</sup> which often are linked directly to public service delivery as noted above. A recent study confirms that the mechanisms through which women reduce levels of corruption also differ depending on the type of corruption one is looking at. They find that the involvement of women has reduced both petty and grand corruption, but for very different reasons.<sup>108</sup> The authors argue, for example (and as discussed by previous scholars), that they focus on sectors that are important traditionally for women and reduce petty corruption in them. Grand corruption, on the other hand, is fought by breaking up male-dominated networks, which, as discussed above, often exclude women and are necessary for corruption to persist. They find that both of these mechanisms play a role in European data at the regional level.

It is important to keep in mind that sometimes the increased presence of women might, however, not have the desired effect, but might merely be a measure to camouflage issues that arise in the country. "Pervasive corruption and the failure of many authoritarian rulers to address developmental challenges faced by their countries make women's promotion to senior bureaucratic positions a relatively cheap way to counteract threats to the regime emanating from these problems."<sup>109</sup>

### 3.1 Mitigating factors

Recent research on the impact of corruption on the political participation of women identifies several factors that play an important role.

How candidates are selected to stand for election is important to understand and is fundamentally different for men and women. Discrimination against women candidates often leads to them having to work extra hard and be exceptionally talented to actually succeed in their run for office.<sup>110</sup> This might be one explanation as to why women who successfully run for office have different views on corruption than their male counterparts. This also highlights an area where more research taking a non-binary and intersectional approach to gender is needed. Research also shows how stereotypes about sexual, ethnic, or racial minorities have also influenced the opportunities for political participation for members of these groups and how different intersecting group memberships lead to different evaluations by the voter.<sup>111</sup> While no studies have yet discussed if and how belonging to another minority group might shape views on corruption, one could assume that similar mechanisms play a role.

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105. Alexander and Bågenholm, "Does Gender Matter? Female Politicians' Engagement in Anti-Corruption Efforts", 173; Jha and Sarangi, "Women and Corruption".

106. Rosie Campbell and Oliver Heath, "Do Women Vote for Women Candidates? Attitudes toward Descriptive Representation and Voting Behavior in the 2010 British Election", *Politics & Gender* 13, no. 2 (June 2017): 209-31; Kathy Dolan, *Voting For Women: How The Public Evaluates Women Candidates* (Routledge, 2018).

107. UNODC, "The Time Is Now- Addressing the Gender Dimension of Corruption".

108. "Close the Political Gender Gap to Reduce Corruption", *U4 Brief*, no. 2018:13 (2018): 13.

109. Marina Nistotskaya and Helena Stensöta, "Is Women's Political Representation Beneficial to Women's Interests in Autocracies? Theory and Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia", in *Gender and Corruption - Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, ed. by Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud, Political Corruption and Governance (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 160.

110. Sarah F. Anzia and Christopher R. Berry, "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?", *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 3 (1 July 2011): 478-93.

111. Alesha E. Doan and Donald P. Haider-Markel, "The Role of Intersectional Stereotypes on Evaluations of Gay and Lesbian Political Candidates", *Politics & Gender* 6, no. 1 (March 2010): 63-91.

It has also been shown that women might be less corrupt in high accountability contexts, as they are expecting to be more likely to be held accountable by voters<sup>112</sup> or because voters are more attentive to misconduct by women politicians.<sup>113</sup> Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner<sup>114</sup> find that female voters respond more to corruption of women politicians than that of men, which adds another layer to the literature discussing how men and women are held accountable differently. Once again, it would be important to explore if this also is the case for other minority groups.

The institutional and political context also plays a role in determining whether women are a likely anti-corruption force. Women are more likely to oppose corruption in democratic settings than in authoritarian ones, which supports the argument that democracy is a mediating factor in the relationship between the political participation of women and corruption.<sup>115</sup> The relationship is even stronger in democracies with high electoral accountability.<sup>116</sup> When electoral accountability and democratic institutions are improved, an increase in women's political participation can reduce corruption further.<sup>117</sup>

Stereotypes play a large role in political life and have also been linked to views on corruption. Much of the discussion of what the necessary traits are for engaging in formal politics is indeed related to gender stereotypes. Straight men are assumed to be suitable for public office because of their "masculine traits - such as aggression and competition" which are widely considered necessary for succeeding in the political sphere.<sup>118</sup> On the other hand, feminine traits such as nurturing and softness are ascribed to women and gay men and they are considered to be mostly concerned with people's welfare and are more ethical and honest.<sup>119</sup> Schwindt-Bayer<sup>120</sup> has linked women's participation in government to decreased perceptions of government corruption by citizens, and a study by Barnes and Beaulieu<sup>121</sup> shows that suspicions about election fraud are reduced when a female candidate is present, even though the circumstances are suspicious. This can be linked to the gendered stereotype that women are more trustworthy and honest politicians. Along the same lines, increasing the number of women in the police force has been shown to have a positive impact on the reduction of corruption in the police force; yet as Barnes, Beaulieu and Saxton<sup>122</sup> find, this is likely the result of stereotypes of women being political outsiders, more risk averse and more honest, rather than actual gender differences. Similarly, the fact that voters hold women and gay men to higher standards related to integrity<sup>123</sup> is likely based on gender stereotypes. In a more recent paper Barnes and Beaulieu<sup>124</sup> continue the discussion of stereotypes about women and show that "perceptions of risk aversion help to explain why female politicians reduce suspicions of corruption". At the same time, stereotypes about the marginalisation of women also lead to lower suspicions of corruption, at least among female participants in the study; however, this suspicion of

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112. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, "Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies".

113. Valentino Larcinese and Indraneel Sircar, "Crime and Punishment the British Way: Accountability Channels Following the MPs' Expenses Scandal", *European Journal of Political Economy* 47 (1 March 2017): 75-99.

114. "Corruption, Accountability, and Gender".

115. Esarey and Chirillo, "'Fairer Sex' or Purity Myth?"

116. Justin Esarey and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, "Gender, Corruption, and Accountability: Why Women Are (Sometimes) More Resistant to Corruption", 2014.

117. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, "Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies".

118. Franceschet and Piscopo, "Sustaining Gendered Practices?", 87.

119. Barnes and Beaulieu, "Gender Stereotypes and Corruption", 367.

120. *Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America*.

121. "Gender Stereotypes and Corruption".

122. "Restoring Trust in the Police: Why Female Officers Reduce Suspicions of Corruption", *Governance* 31, no. 1 (2017): 143-61.

123. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, "Gender, Corruption, and Accountability: Why Women Are (Sometimes) More Resistant to Corruption", 2014.

124. "Women Politicians, Institutions, and Perceptions of Corruption", 25.

marginalisation at the same time might lead to a lack of faith in the ability of women to manoeuvre the political sphere.<sup>125</sup> Barnes and Beaulieu's<sup>126</sup> research shows how these stereotypes can be useful but also difficult to navigate successfully. Additionally, more research is needed to see how reports of corrupt behaviour of women politicians might influence these stereotypes and potentially have negative effects, not only on the fight against corruption but also for women's participation in politics. Similarly, while no research has discussed this yet in the context of corruption, it would be interesting to see how other factors such as sexual orientation and the stereotypes surrounding individuals belonging to these groups lead to changes in perception of corrupt behaviour.

## 3.2 Quotas

Importantly, while research shows that including a small number of women in political decision making can already create positive outcomes for women, a "critical mass" of female politicians seems to be needed to achieve lasting societal impact.<sup>127</sup> To have an impact on policy, the presence of women is not enough. Rather, it depends on their and their party's ideology, the time spent in office and the importance of the position.<sup>128</sup> This is one of the rationales behind gender quotas, which have become increasingly important to ensure a faster increase in the number of women in parliament.<sup>129</sup>

Quotas have been a good measure to increase the number of women on the political stage and if one follows the argument that higher numbers of women in parliament reduce corruption, one can expect that they can - at least indirectly - be a tool to curb corruption.<sup>130</sup> Not only do quotas "fast-track" the inclusion of women in formal politics,<sup>131</sup> it has also been shown that quotas can be a signal for a wider societal change of attitudes.<sup>132</sup> Yet, they have not guaranteed substantive representation of women.<sup>133</sup> "Quotas did not put an end to resistance to women within the party or to associated fears that only "tame" women loyal to male-controlled factions would ever benefit",<sup>134</sup> and parties

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125. Barnes and Beaulieu, "Women Politicians, Institutions, and Perceptions of Corruption".

126. Barnes, Tiffany D., and Emily Beaulieu. "Women Politicians, Institutions, and Perceptions of Corruption."

127. Kathleen A. Bratton and Leonard P. Ray, "Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway", *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 2 (1 April 2002): 428-37; Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler, "An Integrated Model of Women's Representation", *Journal of Politics* 67, no. 2 (1 May 2005): 424.

128. Sandra Grey, "Numbers and Beyond: The Relevance of Critical Mass in Gender Research", *Politics & Gender* 2, no. 4 (December 2006): 492-502.

129. Gretchen Bauer and Jennie E. Burnet, "Gender Quotas, Democracy, and Women's Representation in Africa: Some Insights from Democratic Botswana and Autocratic Rwanda", *Women's Studies International Forum*, Democratization and gender quotas in Africa, 41, Part 2 (November 2013): 103-12.

130. Elin Bjarnegård, Mi Yung Yoon, and Pär Zetterberg, "Gender Quotas and the Re(pro)DUCTION of Corruption", in *Gender and Corruption - Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research*, by Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud, Political Corruption and Governance (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 105-24.

131. Drude Dahlerup and Lenita Freidenvall, "Quotas as a 'Fast Track' to Equal Representation for Women", *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7, no. 1 (1 March 2005): 26-48.

132. Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, eds., *The Impact of Gender Quotas*, 1 edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

133. For a detailed overview of arguments for and against gender quotas see for example Dahlerup and Freidenvall "Judging Gender Quotas: Predictions and Results", *Policy & Politics* 38, no. 3 (2010): 407-25.

134. Marian Sawer, "Parliamentary Representation of Women: From Discourses of Justice to Strategies of Accountability", *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 21, no. 4 (2000): 371.

are likely to continue to promote women who are either reliable allies or inexperienced.<sup>135</sup> Goetz<sup>136</sup> shows how in the case of Uganda, quotas were rather used as a way to “control women in politics” and how elites can use quotas to select compliant women to political office who are unlikely to challenge the male-dominated status quo.<sup>137</sup> Additionally, women elected through quotas in some countries have been shown to be more dependent on party lines and less able to vote independently, due to the nature of how women were selected into the quota systems.<sup>138</sup> As Nistotskaya and Stensöta<sup>139</sup> show for the case of Russia, “women are ‘boxed in’ to roles that suit the needs of the regime and tightly controlled in their ‘boxes’ by their male patrons”. And Devlin and Elgie<sup>140</sup> show that in the case of Rwanda, “increased women’s representation has had little effect on policy outputs”. Bjarnegård et al.<sup>141</sup> discuss the case of Tanzania and find that “[p]olitical parties and their internal logic generally play a large role in guiding the behaviours and agendas of elected representatives - regardless of whether or not they are elected through quotas”. This is likely to play a role also for the fight against corruption. If only “malleable” women are picked to fill the spots provided<sup>142</sup> by a quota, one can expect that women will not lead to a change in the status quo of corruption. Along similar lines, Watson and Moreland<sup>143</sup> find that the descriptive and substantive representation<sup>144</sup> of women is correlated with lower perceptions of corruption. However, they also find that gender quotas are correlated with higher perceptions of corruption.

This is in line with findings of research on quotas in other contexts. Beauregard,<sup>145</sup> for example, finds that gender quotas decrease gender gaps in some political activities within countries but at the same time she shows that countries with quotas still have larger gender gaps in political participation than those without. Much of the success, however, depends on - amongst other things - the question of whether party elites actually implement and enforce those quotas.<sup>146</sup> Additionally, even with quotas, political careers are still fundamentally shaped by gender and high-status

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135. For example, Jos Chathukulam and M. S. John, “Empowerment of Women Panchayat Members: Learning from Kerala (India)”, *Asian Journal of Women’s Studies* 6, no. 4 (1 January 2000): 66-101, <https://doi.org/10.1080/12259276.2000.11665894>; Archana Ghosh, “Women’s Reservations and Electoral Politics in Urban Local Bodies: An Analysis of Chennai Municipal Corporation Elections, 2001”, *Indian Journal of Gender Studies* 10, no. 1 (March 2003): 117-41; Georgina Waylen, “Gender and Democratic Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Consolidation in Argentina and Chile”, *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, no. 3 (October 2000): 765-93.

136. “No Shortcuts to Power” (p. 573).

137. Anne-Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim, eds., *No Shortcuts to Power: African Women in Politics and Policy Making* (Zed Books, 2003).

138. Chathukulam and John, “Empowerment of Women Panchayat Members”; Philip Cowley and Sarah Childs, “Too Spineless to Rebel? New Labour’s Women MPs”, *British Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 3 (July 2003): 345-65; Ghosh, “Women’s Reservations and Electoral Politics in Urban Local Bodies”; Anne-Marie Goetz, “Women’s Political Effectiveness: A Conceptual Framework”, in *No Shortcuts to Power: African Women in Politics and Policy Making*, ed. by Anne-Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim (Zed Books, 2003), 29-80.

139. “Is Women’s Political Representation Beneficial to Women’s Interests in Autocracies? Theory and Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia” (p. 160).

140. “The Effect of Increased Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Case of Rwanda”, *Parliamentary Affairs* 61, no. 2 (1 April 2008): 237-54, (p. 237).

141. “Gender Quotas and the Re(pro)DUCTION of Corruption”, 118.

142. Mona Lena Krook, “Candidate Gender Quotas: A Framework for Analysis”, *European Journal of Political Research* 46, no. 3 (2007): 371.

143. “Perceptions of Corruption and the Dynamics of Women’s Representation”.

144. Descriptive presentation refers to who a representative is; that is, a female representative is expected to “stand for” women. Substantive representation on the other hand is looking at the action of a representative and if what they do benefits women. (Hayes, Matthew, and Matthew V. Hibbing. “The Symbolic Benefits of Descriptive and Substantive Representation”. *Political Behavior* 39, no. 1 (1 March 2017): 31-50.

145. “Quotas and Gender Gaps in Political Participation among Established Industrial European Democracies: Distinguishing Within- and Across-Country Effects”, *Political Research Quarterly* 70, no. 3 (1 September 2017): 657-72.

146. Dahlerup and Freidenvall, “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to Equal Representation for Women”.

political roles are often reserved for men.<sup>147</sup> Echazu<sup>148</sup> argues that differences in corruption are much more rooted in power imbalances. Where one group is dominant, the other group will be much more intolerant to this group's misbehaviour. Without changing the system, simply increasing the number of women might therefore even have the opposite effect and lead to more corruption. This shows that in order to increase the political participation of women, and through this, to potentially lead to a decrease in corruption, it is not enough to know how women are disadvantaged in the system. It is also important to understand how the dominance of men in politics is maintained,<sup>149</sup> and it is necessary to understand how women are selected pre-quota to see what issues need to be addressed, with and without quotas, to ensure women's holistic participation. Therefore, it seems to be an important step in researching the relationship between women's political participation and levels of corruption to not only look more at the number of women, but also at how the women who came into office gained access to power.

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147. Franceschet and Piscopo, "Sustaining Gendered Practices?"

148. "Corruption and the Balance of Gender Power", *Review of Law & Economics* 6, no. 1 (2010): 59-74.

149. Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*.



## 4. Corruption and women's political participation: the highlights

The evidence clearly shows that there is a connection between higher levels of women in elected office and lower levels of corruption in a country. While this relationship is neither linear nor static and influenced by a number of mitigating factors, the existing evidence clearly highlights why gender empowerment and anti-corruption initiatives should be closely linked:

- Increasing the numbers of women in political office has been shown to have a positive impact on reducing corruption at national, regional, council and cabinet level. While the relationship is complex, having more women actively participating in the political sphere often helps curb political and bureaucratic corruption.
- The effect women have on lowering corruption is context dependent. Studies show that the effect of women's substantive empowerment on lowering corruption is particularly high when the level of gender inequality is high, and when bureaucratic principles are weak.
- Women often do not have access to the same networks as men, which are essential in allowing corruption to continue. Increasing the number of women politicians is a good way to break up existing clientelistic networks and foster anti-corruption initiatives.
- Women's substantive representation can be improved by cutting corruption. Where clientelistic networks exclude women, breaking up these networks not only reduces corruption but also improves women's participation. Quotas can be an important tool to increase the number of women, but for the purpose of anti-corruption initiatives, it is important that women that are not part of existing clientelistic networks benefit from these quotas.
- Gender stereotypes and the roles assigned to women in society play a large role in hindering the political participation of women and in allowing corruption to persist.
- Women play an important role in anti-corruption. For one, they often focus on topics that men are less likely to prioritise, in particular service delivery, where fighting corruption is an essential element of guaranteeing delivery. For another, women are typically not part of the same clientelist networks as men, but focus on a support base of civil society members and women, which often demand a clearer focus on anti-corruption work and would punish digressions harder.

## 5. Country case study: Ukraine

### 5.1 Brief political history: Ukraine

Ukraine, located in Eastern Europe and bordering Russia in the east, has faced much political and economic turmoil since its independence in 1991. A new democratic constitution and a new currency were introduced in 1996. Historically Ukraine has been divided into an eastern part, which is traditionally closer to the Russian Federation, and the western part, which is predominantly Ukrainian speaking and linked closely to Europe.<sup>150,151</sup> Much of the heavy industry of Ukraine is located in the eastern part of the country.

Since its independence Ukraine has seen significant political turmoil. Following the elections in late 2004, the so-called Orange Revolution, incited by suspicions of rigged presidential elections, challenged the current government. Despite Viktor Yanukovich, the government-backed candidate, being indicated as the winner based on voting counts, Viktor Yushchenko was sworn in as president in 2005. Yushchenko was recognised in the West for his fight against corruption but was unpopular among powerful Ukrainians in business for his measures. During his presidency, Ukraine's constitution was changed (2006), limiting the power of the president and transferring it to the parliament. However, this change was annulled by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in 2010. The 2008 global financial crisis hit Ukraine's steel industry and export market, leading to a sharp decline in the value of the Ukrainian currency.

As the Ukrainian government decided to halt its plan of signing the EU Association Agreement in 2013 in favour of closer ties with Russia, a series of demonstrations and civil unrest followed, the so-called Euromaidan. The protesters argued that the government was corrupt, unaccountable, and following Russian leads. Major police brutality and other human rights violations further fuelled the protest. As a result, an interim government took over in February 2014. In March 2014, Russia annexed the Crimea peninsula, an act that is heavily criticised by Western states and the UN. It has led to heavy fighting between Ukrainian and separatist forces, which is still ongoing as several ceasefires, which had been negotiated, have failed. In May 2014, businessman Petro Poroshenko won the presidential elections. In the 2019 election he was defeated by Volodymyr Zelensky who ran an anti-corruption campaign, with large support from the public.

Today Ukraine has a population of 44 million (2020) of which 70% live in urban areas. The population has grown at negative rates since 1994.<sup>152</sup> Ukraine has an official unemployment rate of about 9%; however, this does not take into consideration the large number of unregistered unemployed or underemployed citizens.<sup>153</sup>

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150. Vasil Bedzir, "Migration from Ukraine to Central and Eastern Europe", in *Patterns of Migration in Central Europe*, ed. by Claire Wallace and Dariusz Stola (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2001), 277-92.

151. Bedzir.

152. World Bank, "Ukraine | Data", 2021, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/ukraine>; World Factbook, "Ukraine - The World Factbook," 2021, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/#people-and-society>.

153. World Factbook, "Ukraine - The World Factbook".



**Table 1: Development indicators for Ukraine**

Indicator	Ukraine
Surface Area, sq km <sup>b</sup>	603,500 (including Crimea)
Population (2020), millions <sup>b</sup>	43,734
Urban population (2020), % of total <sup>a</sup>	69.5
Human Development Index (2020) <sup>c</sup> Country Rank, out of 188	0.779 79
Gender Inequality Index (2019) <sup>c</sup>	0.234
Corruption Perception Index Rank(2020) <sup>d</sup>	117/180
Life expectancy at birth (2020) <sup>a</sup>	71.6
Unemployment (2020), % of labour force <sup>b</sup>	8.9
GDP per capita (2019), USD <sup>a</sup>	3,659
<i>Source:</i> <sup>a</sup> World Bank, <sup>154</sup> ; <sup>b</sup> UN Data, <sup>155</sup> ; <sup>c</sup> UNDP, <sup>156</sup> ; <sup>d</sup> Transparency International <sup>157</sup>	

## 5.2 Corruption in Ukraine

### 5.2.1 History

The prevalence of corruption in Ukraine is often seen to be rooted in its history as part of the Soviet Union. According to USAID (2015), Soviet legacy plays a large part in determining the state-society relations operating in Ukraine today. While corruption is not a concept unique to post-Soviet societies, the extent to which it is “widespread, systemic, and conducted by the state itself”<sup>158</sup> is noteworthy in this part of the world. During Soviet times, political loyalty to the state was rewarded, while political opposition, freedom of speech and civic engagement were restrained. The strict economic structures existing in the Soviet Union were seen as a hindrance by people, and thus frequently circumvented. Bribes were common; however, they were mostly in the form of material gifts rather than cash. When transitioning from the Soviet socialist system to capitalism in the 1990s, corruption practices were reinforced. Mass privatisation of state assets produced a new elite built on Soviet power. The rapid mass privatisation, coupled with institutional collapse and weak rule of law, gave elites (“nomenklatura”) the opportunity to capture immense wealth.<sup>159</sup> In addition, new democratic state structures were built on weak foundations, favouring the powerful to the detriment of accountability, transparency and rule of law. Thus, anti-corruption mechanisms were weak to non-existent, and corruption practices became even more entrenched in society. People started to demand and pay favours by means of cash exchanges, and corruption continued to be seen as the solution to one’s problems, rather than a problem itself. Nowadays, studies show how civilians have accepted state corruption and arbitrary rule of law and have written off any ideal of meritocracy (USAID, 2015).

154. World Bank, “Ukraine | Data”.

155. UN Data, “UNData - Ukraine”, 2020, <http://data.un.org/en/iso/ua.html>.

156. UNDP, “Ukraine - Human Development Indicators”, 2020, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/UKR>.

157. Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2020”, Transparency.org, 2021, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020>.

158. Keith A. Darden, “Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma Focus: Intrigue and Dissimulation in Kuchma’s Ukraine”, *East European Constitutional Review* 10 (2001): 70.

159. Patrick Hamm, Lawrence P. King, and David Stuckler, “Mass Privatization, State Capacity, and Economic Growth in Post-Communist Countries”, *American Sociological Review* 77, no. 2 (1 April 2012): 295-324.

## 5.2.2 Current situation and trends

The revolutions that occurred in Ukraine over recent years have led to genuine attempts to create more accountability and integrity in the country. The Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014) was mainly caused by systemic corruption and impunity,<sup>160</sup> and the 2019 election was won on a strong anti-corruption platform. However, the situation is still far from good. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index ranked Ukraine 117 out of 180 in the 2020 Global Corruption Perception Index.<sup>161</sup> Despite a slight improvement of three points on the previous year, corruption is still rampant in the country. The executive director of Transparency International Ukraine accredited this improvement to the "launch of the High Anti-Corruption Court and the reboot of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention".<sup>162</sup> The High Anti-Corruption court is gender balanced and currently chaired by a woman. He continues, however, that he expects these improvements to be short-lived, as at the end of 2020 the Constitutional Court ruling dismantled "key features of the country's anti-graft architecture".<sup>163</sup> The ruling caused a serious rift with international partners as it was challenging some of Ukraine's international commitments. The European Parliament, for example, released a statement calling for swift action and threatening serious consequences, such as the suspension of the Visa Free Regime if anti-corruption efforts were not taken seriously. On 4 December 2020 Ukraine's Parliament restored the anti-corruption legislation that had been annulled by the court.<sup>164</sup>

The last Global Corruption Barometer (2016) shows that citizens rank corruption as one of the three largest challenges facing their country.<sup>165</sup>

In recent years Ukraine has made an unprecedented push for electoral, healthcare and decentralisation reform, reforming the gas sector, increasing security and defence capacities and creating an anti-corruption infrastructure. The fight against political corruption has also been at the forefront. In 2015 the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) was established.<sup>166</sup> Ukraine has an integrated electronic declaration system for the declaration of assets and income for government officials and public procurement is done via the open electronic procurement system ProZorro.<sup>167</sup> However, the judiciary has not been able to fully enforce anti-corruption laws, as cases that independent anti-corruption agencies have brought against politicians have been frequently obstructed and delayed. Ukrainian society has very limited trust in the judiciary, and it is frequently seen as a significantly corrupt institution.<sup>168</sup>

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160. Olga Halushka et al., "Anticorruption Reform", Sectoral Briefs on Reforms in Ukraine (Kyiv: Reanimation Package of Reforms, 2019), [https://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Brify\\_ENdlya\\_vebu.pdf?fbclid=IwARONDveeQn12zPD2WTfwlCJa8M9L3xuHNi-A4bFBIT3FWzAlfnhu33m9Hi9g](https://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Brify_ENdlya_vebu.pdf?fbclid=IwARONDveeQn12zPD2WTfwlCJa8M9L3xuHNi-A4bFBIT3FWzAlfnhu33m9Hi9g).

161. The country scores 33 out of 100 (100 being very clean and 0 highly corrupt).

162. Mark Raczkiewicz, "Watchdog: Ukraine Makes Slight Improvement on Corruption Front", *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 29 January 2021, <https://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/watchdog-ukraine-makes-slight-improvement-on-corruption-front/>.

163. Raczkiewicz.

164. RadioFreeEurope, "Ukraine's Parliament Restores Anti-Corruption Legislation Annulled By Highest Court", RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 4 December 2020, <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-s-parliament-restores-anti-corruption-legislation-annulled-by-highest-court/30984592.html>.

165. Coralie Pring, "People and Corruption: Europe and Central Asia 2016", Global Corruption Barometer (Berlin: Transparency International, 2016), <https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/people-and-corruption-europe-and-central-asia-2016>.

166. As of April 2021 NABU has reported 50 convictions, 300 cases in course and 805 proceedings under investigation <https://nabu.gov.ua/en>.

167. Mathias Bak, "Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine" (Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, 4 July 2020), <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/>, <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-armenia-azerbaijan-belarus-georgia-moldova-and-ukraine>.

168. BTI. "BTI 2020 Ukraine Country Report." BTI Blog, 2020. [https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country\\_report\\_2020\\_UKR.pdf](https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_UKR.pdf).

Despite the importance of corruption in the recent elections, a recent opinion poll reveals that citizens' involvement in anti-corruption activities is very limited, and only a few individuals reported on corruption cases.<sup>169</sup> According to the same poll 83.9% of Ukrainians find the government ineffective or not effective at all in fighting corruption.<sup>170</sup>


45.2% of Ukrainians do not condone giving bribes and 84.4.% agree that corrupt officials should be removed from office.<sup>171</sup> Another 2020 survey by NDI revealed that 375 of respondents said that the situation regarding corruption since the 2019 election has become worse, while only 12% answered that it had improved.<sup>172</sup>

### 5.3 Political participation of women in Ukraine

Ukraine is in particular facing serious challenges in terms of gender equality in high-level decision making and politics. The country has ratified all major national agreements on women's rights and gender equality, and the Constitution guarantees equal rights and opportunities for women.<sup>173</sup> However, violence against women is still very prevalent and domestic violence was only criminalised in 2019.

Worldwide, 25.4% of parliamentarians are women. In Europe, 30.5% of MPs are women.<sup>174</sup> Ukraine is far below the world and regional average; currently there are 20.8% women in the Ukrainian national parliament (88 women, 335 men). However, the 2019 parliamentary election saw a large increase in women MPs (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Percentage of women in parliament - Ukraine 1990 to today**



Source: Parline database on national parliaments (<https://data.ipu.org>) (accessed 14.03.2021)

169. USAID/ENGAGE, "Self-Help Nation: Ukrainians Disappointed in Reforms, but Ready to Support Each Other and Their Communities", USAID/ENGAGE, 9 October 2020, <https://engage.org.ua/eng/self-help-nation-ukrainians-disappointed-in-reforms-but-ready-to-support-each-other-and-their-communities/>.

170. USAID/ENGAGE.

171. USAID/ENGAGE.

172. NDI, "NDI Poll: Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine's Democratic Transition", Text (Kyiv, 30 September 2020), <https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-opportunities-and-challenges-facing-ukraine-s-democratic-transition-0>.

173. Teresita Kelly Lopez-Treussart, "Advancing Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Ukraine through Effective Development Co-Operation and Finance" (UN Women, 2021), <https://eca.unwomen.org//digital-library/publications/2021/4/advancing-gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-in-ukraine>.

174. <https://data.ipu.org/women-averages?month=4&year=2021> (as of April 2021)

The percentage of parliamentary candidates was similar, where 22.54% of the 5,830 candidates were women. The 2015 election law introduced a quota system where at least 30% of candidates of each sex have to be included in the party lists.<sup>175</sup> This quota was later increased to 40%, “where parties must ensure the presence in every five seats of each electoral list at least two candidates of each gender”.<sup>176</sup> In 2020, 20% of cabinet ministers and 15% of members of regional councils were women.<sup>177</sup>

Ukraine ranks 74 out of 155 in the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index,<sup>178</sup> which measures the progress towards parity and the gender-based gaps in access to opportunities and resources in four dimensions: health and survival, educational attainment, economic participation, and opportunity and political empowerment. In the political empowerment index Ukraine ranks 103rd out of 155. Gender gaps in education and economic participation on the other hand have improved significantly. A recent study on women in leadership positions in the private sector shows that 40.48% of leadership positions are filled by women, which is above the European average (35%); however, on average women still have lower incomes than men.<sup>179</sup>

## 5.4 What is the link between women’s political participation and corruption in Ukraine?

Over the last decades a clear pattern occurred, indicating that there is a strong link between corruption and the political participation of women, even though the link might not always be straightforward. Taking a closer look at the data in Ukraine also shows that the two large anti-corruption elections have also resulted in higher numbers of women MPs. In particular, the 2019 election, which was won largely on an anti-corruption platform, has also almost doubled the number of women in parliament. While it still remains to be seen if the increased number of women leads to lower levels of corruption, when looking at the current situation, certain elements can be highlighted that do influence the role women play in anti-corruption.

Gender stereotypes persist that make the system more hostile to women; but they also offer opportunities for women to be anti-corruption champions. On 17 March 2020, Iryna Venediktova was appointed as the Prosecutor General, making her the first woman in the history of Ukraine to chair the Prosecutor’s General’s Office. While this appointment is too recent to establish if it has been a successful anti-corruption push, the agenda setting has been ambitious. Venediktova’s development strategy focuses on establishing “a modern European prosecution service marked by integrity, professionalism, and independence”.<sup>180</sup>

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175. IDEA, “Gender Quotas Database - Ukraine”, accessed 23 May 2021, <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/292/35>.

176. V. Hlushchenko, central election commissioner in IFES, “Gender Equality in Elections: Q&A with Ukrainian Central Election Commissioner Viktoriia Hlushchenko,” 4 March 2020, <https://www.ifes.org/news/gender-equality-elections-qa-ukrainian-central-election-commissioner-viktorii-hlushchenko>.

177. UN Women Ukraine, “COVID-19 Exacerbates Vulnerabilities and Heightens Economic, Social and Health Risks for Women and Girls | United Nations in Ukraine” (UN Women, 2020), <https://ukraine.un.org/en/86277-covid-19-exacerbates-vulnerabilities-and-heightens-economic-social-and-health-risks-women-and>.

178. World Economic Forum, “Global Gender Gap Report 2021” (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2021), [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_GGGR\\_2021.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf).

179. UNDP, “Women and Men in Leadership Positions in Ukraine: 2017-2020” (Kyiv: UNDP Ukraine, 6 April 2021), [https://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/library/democratic\\_governance/women-and-men-in-leadership-positions-in-ukraine-2017-2020.html](https://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/library/democratic_governance/women-and-men-in-leadership-positions-in-ukraine-2017-2020.html).

180. Iryna Venediktova, “A New Vision for Ukraine’s Prosecution Service”, Atlantic Council (blog), 13 May 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/a-new-vision-for-ukraines-prosecution-service/>.

Merit-based hiring is one of the cornerstones of this new strategy, and is in line with what academic literature shows to be one of the central elements not only of successful anti-corruption reform but also of the successful involvement of women. Among those initiatives are, for example, the re-attestation of prosecutors, to ensure the integrity of those in office; in addition, parliament is currently reviewing legislation that would ban those who fail this process from returning as prosecutors.<sup>181</sup> Recently, the Prosecutor General stated that she did face open hostility as the first woman in this position. In an interview with *The Independent*, she stated: “There is not such a strong separation in Ukrainian society in work. Maybe some people could not understand me being there. But I don’t mind working in what may be a male environment.”<sup>182</sup> However, it seems that this experience is not necessarily typical for Ukraine, where gender stereotypes play a fundamental role in Ukrainian society:

There is a persistence in political discourse, in the media and in society **of deep-rooted patriarchal attitudes and discriminatory stereotypes concerning the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family**, which perpetuate women’s subordination within the family and society and are reflected in, among other things, women’s educational and professional choices, their limited participation in political and public life, their unequal participation in the labour market and their unequal status in family relations.<sup>183</sup>

This also leads to women having less support for their electoral campaigns. In 2017 respondents in a poll agreed that political parties are more likely to nominate men, and that less resources are available to women. In 2018, a poll showed that 53% of respondents agreed that Ukrainians are less likely to vote for women, 42% stated that women are less interested in politics than men and 55% argued that women could not equally participate in politics due to family commitments.<sup>184</sup> The same stereotypes lead to women being the main caregivers in the families and earning less, which means that that they are not only more reliant on the health sector but also on the fair distribution of social guarantees.<sup>185</sup> These are sectors where corruption is rampant. Interestingly, research has widely shown that women in politics tend to bring different issues to the forefront, particularly those that affect women and children. This focus on sectors that have not received that much attention before then leads to an improvement in the delivery and monitoring of these public services and therefore to lower levels of corruption.<sup>186</sup> Hence, the sharp increase in female representation in the Ukrainian parliament can be expected to have a positive impact on increasing levels of corruption in service delivery.

Another major problem identified related to political security is the dominance of oligarchic structures in Ukraine. Despite pledges of the post-Euromaidan government to get rid of this system,

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181. Venediktova.

182. Kim Sengupta, “Ukraine’s Chief Prosecutor on Task of Tackling Country’s Corruption”, *The Independent*, 23 February 2021, sec. Independent Premium, <https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/ukraine-corruption-biden-iryna-venediktova-b1806356.html>.

183. Lopez-Treussart, “Advancing Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Ukraine through Effective Development Co-Operation and Finance”, 31.

184. Ganna Gerasymenko, “Corruption in the Eyes of Women and Men” (UNDP Ukraine, 2018), <https://rm.coe.int/gender-corruption-report-en-11-/168098f7e7>.

185. Ganna Gerasymenko, “Gender Analysis of Anti-Corruption Policy: Case Study of Ukraine”, *International Journal of Civil Service Reform and Practice* 5, no. 1 (29 February 2020), <https://www.astanahubjournal.org/index.php/ijsrp/article/view/145>.

186. Alexander and Bågenholm, “Does Gender Matter? Female Politicians’ Engagement in Anti-Corruption Efforts”; Jha and Sarangi, “Women and Corruption”.

nothing much has changed. Halling and Stewart<sup>187</sup> identify three strategies through which oligarchs influence the political sphere. Firstly, oligarchs secure funding and political support for politicians, who in return make sure that the oligarchs have the desired environment to make economic profits. These forms of nepotism go through the entirety of the state apparatus and are almost impossible to circumvent.<sup>188</sup> The second strategy is that oligarchs repeatedly get involved in politics themselves. And last but not least, they control large parts of the mass media in Ukraine.<sup>189</sup> 2017 survey data suggests that women are “less inclined to accept remuneration from unscrupulous candidates in support of their candidature for elections, at least at the local level”.<sup>190</sup> Therefore, women might also be less willing to accept bribes or money from questionable sources at a higher level to support their candidacy, or to buy their support for certain initiatives. This leads to another important way for women to decrease corruption, in particular grand corruption: breaking up male dominated networks<sup>191</sup> which are essential for corruption to persist. A 2014 focus group agreed that women are not necessarily less corrupt, but simply have less access to corrupt opportunities.<sup>192</sup> However, research has also shown that for women to join the political sphere they often have to be better than men and meet stricter criteria - therefore, having these women join the political arena is very likely to break up networks that allow for grand corruption to be rampant.

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187. Die “Deoligarchisierung” in der Ukraine: vielversprechende Visionen, trübe Realitäten, SWP-Aktuell 69/2016 (Berlin, 2016), <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-49353-2>.

188. Ortrun Merkle, Julia Reinold, and Melissa Siegel, “A Study on the Link between Corruption and the Causes of Migration and Forced Displacement” (Maastricht: GIZ Anti-Corruption and Integrity Programme, 29 March 2017), <https://i.unu.edu/media/migration.unu.edu/publication/4597/A-Study-on-the-Link-between-Corruption-and-the-Causes-of-Migration-and-Forced-Displacement.pdf>.

189. Halling and Stewart, *Die “Deoligarchisierung” in der Ukraine*.

190. Gerasymenko, “Corruption in the Eyes of Women and Men”, 27.

191. Bauhr, Charron, and Wängnerud, “Close the Political Gender Gap to Reduce Corruption”, 2018.

192. Gerasymenko, “Corruption in the Eyes of Women and Men”.



## 6. Country case study: Kenya

### 6.1 Brief political history: Kenya

The Republic of Kenya is located in East Africa, covering 580,370 square kilometres and holding a total population of more than 52 million people in 2020.<sup>193</sup> The Berlin Conference of 1885 marked the beginning of the colonial history of Kenya, when European powers divided East Africa into territories of influence. In the same year, the British government founded the East African Protectorate and opened the fertile highlands to white settlers.<sup>194</sup> Kenya was officially made a British colony in 1920, but even before this, the settlers had a voice in government, and Africans were barred from direct political participation until 1944.<sup>195</sup> By 1952, there was great discontent among the Kikuyu population in Kenya, and the Mau Mau rebellion posed a threat to the British government who declared Kenya under a state of emergency from October 1952 to December 1959. The origins of the unrest were related to the differences between the settlers and the local population. These differences concerned religious beliefs, economic, social and educational practices, and particularly the different views regarding land ownership and farming practices which lead the members of local tribes to start the fight for national sovereignty.<sup>196</sup> During the following years, the British government implemented several programmes to return the colony to the previous status quo. These programs included widespread detention, mandatory registration of the Kikuyu population, livestock seizure, taxes related to additional costs of insurgency, educational reforms, the use of detained Mau Mau and local troops for the combatting insurgency, and the capture and execution of Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi in 1956.<sup>197</sup>

Even though the state of emergency was officially continued into 1960,<sup>198</sup> the counter-insurgency efforts were showing results and by 1955 the formation of new African political parties was approved. African political participation increased rapidly and by 1957 the first direct elections for Africans to the Legislative Council took place.<sup>199</sup> In 1963, Jomo Kenyatta, a member of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) seized a majority of the vote and became Prime Minister of the now autonomous government of Kenya.<sup>200</sup> In 1964, the minority party Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) dissolved itself voluntarily and joined KANU.<sup>201</sup> Kenya People's Union (KPU) was formed in 1966 as a leftist opposition party; however, it was banned shortly after and its leader was imprisoned. KANU became the sole political party in Kenya and after Kenyatta died in 1978, Vice President Daniel Arap Moi stepped in as President. In 1982, the National Assembly officially declared Kenya to be a one-party state.<sup>202</sup> And even though in 1991 the Parliament amended the one-party clause of the constitution and new parties were formed, divisions in the opposition kept KANU in control of the legislative power. By 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was formed from joined opposition forces and a faction that broke away from KANU, and Mwai Kibaki was elected as Kenya's third President in December 2002, receiving 62% of the vote.<sup>203</sup> In addition, a largely unexpected political crisis almost brought the country to a civil war in 2008.

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193. World Bank, *World Bank Country Overview* (Kenya, 2021).

194. A. Boddy-Evans, *A Brief History of Kenya*. ThoughtCo, 2009, <https://www.thoughtco.com/brief-history-of-kenya-44232>.

195. Boddy-Evans.

196. J.A. McConnell, *The British in Kenya (1952-1960): Analysis of a Successful Counterinsurgency Campaign* (Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA, 2005), 6.

197. McConnell, 5.

198. McConnell, 41.

199. Boddy-Evans, *A Brief History of Kenya*. ThoughtCo.

200. McConnell, *The British in Kenya (1952-1960): Analysis of a Successful Counterinsurgency Campaign*, 42.

201. Boddy-Evans, *A Brief History of Kenya*. ThoughtCo.

202. Boddy-Evans.

203. Boddy-Evans.

The officially declared victory and re-election of President Kibaki in the presidential elections of December 2007 were disputed by the opposition leader, Raila Odinga, civil society, and domestic and international observers, who claimed that the election results were rigged.<sup>204</sup> Swift and violent protests erupted across the country, the government banned public gatherings, and the abuse of power by the police led to excessive use of force, murder, looting, and sexual abuse.<sup>205</sup> The post-election protests left around 1,000 dead and 350,000 displaced, mostly in the Rift Valley.<sup>206</sup> The international community was rapidly involved and the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan intervened to successfully push the two contenders to sign a power-sharing deal on 28 February 2008. Additionally to the power-sharing arrangements, four commissions were created to examine the electoral process, the violence and to make recommendations for constitutional changes.<sup>207</sup>

The government of Kenya is divided into three main arms, the National Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary. Each arm of the government is independent and has different roles, responsibilities, and functions.<sup>208</sup> In October 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta was sworn in for a final five-year term. Between 2015 and 2019, the economy in Kenya grew by 5.7%, placing the country as one of the fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>209</sup> Kenya has also made major improvements in areas of social development, including child mortality, achieving near-universal primary school enrolment, and decreasing gender gaps in education. Moreover, the President has established the “Big Four” development priority areas, where manufacturing, universal healthcare, affordable housing, and food security are outlined as main priorities.<sup>210</sup>

**Table 2: Development indicators for Kenya**

Indicator	Kenya
Surface Area, sq km <sup>b</sup>	580,370
Population (2020), millions <sup>a</sup>	52,573.97
Urban population (2020), % of total <sup>a</sup>	28
Human Development Index (2020) <sup>b</sup>	0.601
Country Rank, out of 188	143
Gender Inequality Index (2019) <sup>b</sup>	0.518
Corruption Perception Index Rank(2020) <sup>c</sup>	124/180
Life expectancy at birth (2020) <sup>a</sup>	66
Unemployment (2020), % of labour force <sup>b</sup>	3.0
GDP per capita (2019), USD <sup>a</sup>	1,816.5
Source: <sup>a</sup> World Bank, <sup>b</sup> UNDP; <sup>c</sup> Transparency International <sup>211</sup>	

204. A. Harneit-Sievers and R.M. Peters, “Kenya’s 2007 General Election and Its Aftershocks”, *Africa Spectrum* 43, no. 1 (2008): 133.

205. J.G. Cooke, “Background on the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya,” in *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (CSIS, 2009, <https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya>).

206. Harneit-Sievers and Peters, “Kenya’s 2007 General Election and Its Aftershocks”.

207. Harneit-Sievers and Peters.

208. *The President, Republic of Kenya* (n.d). *The Constitution*, n.d., <https://www.president.go.ke/the-constitution/>.

209. Bank, *World Bank Country Overview*.

210. Bank; *The President, Republic of Kenya* (n.d). *The Constitution*.

211. Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2020”.



## 6.2 Corruption in Kenya

Despite the efforts of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EAC) and other measures against corruption, Kenya is still known as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. Corruption plays a key role in politics in Kenya. Corrupt political financing, especially campaign financing, is a prevalent corruption practice in Kenya since the restoration of multi-party politics in 1991.<sup>212</sup> Corruption has also manifested in political policy decisions in return for favours, policy formulation aimed at gaining personal wealth, nepotism, misappropriation of state property, outright theft, granting favours to friends, and abuse of public position.<sup>213</sup> Corruption scandals such as the Goldenberg<sup>214</sup> and the Anglo-Leasing,<sup>215</sup> in which the government lost billions of Kenyan shillings (KSH) in fraudulent and false business contracts, also showed the close relationship between corrupt political financing and democracy in Kenya.<sup>216</sup> Centralised power, the absence of strong and effective institutions, a lack of public accountability, and impunity are some of the factors influencing the persistence of corruption in Kenya.<sup>217</sup> The primary cause is related to Kenya's basic institutions being undermined or neglected to the point of not being able to uphold the rule of law or act on behalf of the best interests of the nation. The rule of law was systematically undermined by personalised, centralised presidential power during the twenty-four year rule of Daniel Arap Moi from 1978 to 2002.<sup>218</sup> The result of this was a lack of ethical leadership and public accountability among public officials in Kenya. Another secondary cause contributing to corruption in the nation is the high incidence of bribery. In Kenya, bribery can be identified as the "systematic exploitation of illegal income-earning opportunities by public officials and the enhancement of rent-seeking opportunities".<sup>219</sup> According to Transparency International surveys conducted in Kenya between 2008 and 2012, between 30-56% of respondents encountered bribery while interacting with public and private organisations. The mean size of a bribe was around 48 US dollars. Kenya Police was identified as the most corrupt Kenyan organisation.<sup>220</sup>

In addition to the existence of an Anti-Corruption Commission, established in 2003 and reformed in 2011 as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), there are other measures designed to tackle the issue of corruption. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes (ACEC) Act, 2003, the Public Officer Ethics (POE) Act, 2003, the Government Financial Management (GFM) Act, 2004, the Public Procurement and Disposal (PPD) Act, 2005, the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (PCAML) Act, 2009 and the Public Finance Management (PFM) Act, 2012, are some of the legal frameworks and control measures tackling corruption in Kenya.<sup>221</sup> However, corruption is still

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212. O.G. Mwangi, "Political Corruption, Party Financing and Democracy in Kenya", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2008, 267.

213. Wong (2009) in J.O. Osamba, "A Review of the Changing Nature of Corruption in Post-Independent Kenya", *African Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* (AJHSS, no. N:2307-2164 Volume 1 Issue 1 (2019): 1.

214. The Goldenberg scandal in the 1990s refers to a political scandal where the government of Kenya subsidised gold exports. The "scandal involved the payment of massive cash subsidies for fictitious exports of gold and diamonds by a firm called Goldenberg International" and is estimated to have cost the Kenyan taxpayers £400m. (Jeevan Vasagar, "Charges in Kenya Corruption Scandal," *The Guardian*, 16 March 2006, sec. World news, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/16/kenya.jeevanvasagar>.)

215. The Anglo-Leasing Scandal was revealed in 2004 and refers to contracts being awarded to phantom firms. Anglo-Leasing Finances received about £21m "to supply the Kenyan government with a system to print new high-technology passports; other fictitious companies involved in the scam were given money to supply naval ships and forensic laboratories". ("Letter from Africa: Are Kenyans Still Scandalised by Scandals?", *BBC News*, 14 March 2019, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47554326>.)

216. Mwangi, "Political Corruption, Party Financing and Democracy in Kenya", 267.

217. K. R. Hope Sr, "Kenya's Corruption Problem: Causes and Consequences", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 52, no. 4 (2014): 493-512.

218. Mueller (2008) in Hope Sr.

219. Hope Sr, 497.

220. TI Kenya (2009, 2012) in Hope Sr, "Kenya's Corruption Problem: Causes and Consequences".

221. K.R. Hope, "Tackling the Corruption Epidemic in Kenya: Toward a Policy of More Effective Control", *Journal of Social, Political, and*

a major challenge for Kenya's socio-economic and political development.<sup>222</sup> In 2020, Kenya ranked 124 out of 180 countries on Transparency International's (TI) corruption index<sup>223</sup> (Transparency International, 2021). According to the Global Corruption Barometer, in 2019 67% of people thought that corruption had increased in the previous 12 months and 45% of public service users had had to pay bribes in the previous 12 months.<sup>224</sup>

### 6.3 Political participation of women in Kenya

Women in Kenya have witnessed oppression and intimidation, and have been left behind due to several societal norms and cultural beliefs that are usually biased towards men.<sup>225</sup> Despite the reformulation of the 2010 Constitution which set a milestone in the fights towards gender equality in the country, and aimed to guarantee spaces for political participation of women and representation in decision-making processes, the gender gap in Kenya is far from being closed and women face numerous challenges in the quest for elective and appointed positions in government.<sup>226</sup> Kenya is a predominantly patriarchal society with a rooted resistance to women's leadership.<sup>227</sup> Even though women supported the Mau Mau movement and risked their lives during the struggle for independence, engaging in peaceful protests and even going to the forest to fight,<sup>228</sup> there was no political room for women during the independence negotiations.<sup>229</sup> Pricilla Abwao was elected the first African woman in the Legislative Council, yet she was "not allowed" to speak during the Lancaster House Conference in 1962 which aimed to discuss the constitutional arrangements for independence.<sup>230</sup> After independence there were only a few women serving in political leadership positions such as Parliament, yet the 1991 move to a multi-party system also opened spaces for more women to join the political sphere.<sup>231</sup>

By 1997, women represented only 3% of the National Assembly. It was in the same year that Hon. Phoebe Asiyo introduced a motion to increase women's participation in leadership and decision-making processes in the Parliament and local bodies to at least 33%, yet the motion was quickly defeated.<sup>232</sup> By 2000, Hon. Beth Mugo introduced another motion with the support of women's

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*Economic Studies* 38, no. 3 (2013): 287.

222. Osamba, "A Review of the Changing Nature of Corruption in Post-Independent Kenya", 1.

223. Transparency International, *Corruption Perception Index 2020 Country Overview* (Kenya, 2021).

224. Coralie Pring and Jon Vrushu, "Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019: Citizen's Views and Experiences of Corruption" (Berlin: Transparency International, 2019), [https://www.transparency.org/files/content/pages/2019\\_GCB\\_Africa.pdf](https://www.transparency.org/files/content/pages/2019_GCB_Africa.pdf).

225. E.A. Polo, "Gender and Politics: The Role and Influence of Women Representatives in Promoting Gender Equality and Political Participation of Women in the Kenyan Parliament" (Doctoral dissertation, United States International University-Africa, 2019), 20.

226. M.P. Opoku, B. Anyango, and B.A. Alupo, "Women in Politics in Kenya: An Analysis of Participation and Barriers", *Multidisciplinary Journal of Gender Studies* 7, no. 1 (2018): 1508.

227. Y. Bouka, M.E. Berry, and M.M. Kamuru, "Women's Political Inclusion in Kenya's Devolved Political System", *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 13, no. 2 (2019): 4.

228. Bouka, Berry, and Kamuru, "Women's Political Inclusion in Kenya's Devolved Political System"; J. Biegon, "Towards the Adoption of Guidelines for State Reporting under the African Union Protocol on Women's Rights: A Review of the Pretoria Gender Expert Meeting, 6-7 August 2009", *African Human Rights Law Journal* 9, no. 2 (2009): 615-43.

229. Biegon, "Towards the Adoption of Guidelines for State Reporting under the African Union Protocol on Women's Rights: A Review of the Pretoria Gender Expert Meeting, 6-7 August 2009", 10.


230. Biegon, "Towards the Adoption of Guidelines for State Reporting under the African Union Protocol on Women's Rights: A Review of the Pretoria Gender Expert Meeting, 6-7 August 2009".

231. Wilhemina A. Oduol, "Kenyan Women in Politics: An Analysis of Past and Present Trends", *Transafrican Journal of History* 22 (1993): 166-81.

232. W. Kanyi, *Kenyan Women's Journey In Their Quest For Affirmative Action*. Heinrich Böll Stiftung, East and Horn of Africa and the African Women's Studies, 2016.

organisations and the Committee on Affirmative Action.<sup>233</sup> These two motions constitute the basis for women’s engagement and advocacy regarding the gender principle during the following constitutional process. Even though the constitutional draft of the latter motion was rejected in a referendum in 2005, the women’s movement continued to lobby for the increase of political participation, and in 2010 a reformulation of the 2010 Constitution extended rights of special interest groups (including women and persons with disabilities (PWDs)) in regard to equal opportunities in the social, economic and political spheres of the country. The 2010 Constitution recognises women’s equality and states that all elected or appointed bodies must have no more than two-thirds of the same gender. This Gender Principle limits the maximum representation of the majority gender and aims for gender equality in the political sphere.<sup>234</sup> However, the gender quota has not been fully achieved at the national and county level. When there is compliance, it is at the bare minimum for appointed positions, and it is through nomination rather than an election for the elective positions. There have been many court cases from 2012 to 2017 in regard to the government’s non-compliance.

**Figure 2: Percentage of female representation in the National Parliament, Kenya**



Source: IPU Parline data (2021)

Despite the 2017 elections showing the highest proportion of women in governmental bodies in Kenya, many political entities still failed to comply with the new gender rule.<sup>235</sup> The societal order and cultural practices in Kenya influence the ability of women to enjoy their economic, social, and political rights. The patriarchy and reverence of the elder are strongly affecting women’s empowerment, and they currently have limited resources and influence in Kenyan society. Kenyan women historically have been assigned to the domestic role which dissuades them from being involved in political activities,<sup>236</sup> a barrier that has now been overcome, with women candidates in numerous political offices. However, women still face significant hurdles in accessing and working in the political sphere. A woman’s decision to seek a political career is influenced by many factors.

233. Bouka, Berry, and Kamuru, “Women’s Political Inclusion in Kenya’s Devolved Political System”, 5.

234. Y. Bouka et al., *Strengthening the Leadership and Influence of Women in Politics in Kenya*, 2018.

235. Bouka, Berry, and Kamuru, “Women’s Political Inclusion in Kenya’s Devolved Political System”.

236. Opoku, Anyango, and Alupo, “Women in Politics in Kenya: An Analysis of Participation and Barriers”, 1509.

Political parties, campaign financing, social and gender norms, and violence<sup>237</sup> are some of the barriers faced by women which hinder the possibility of participating in political spheres. Kenyan women lack the financial power to compete for public bodies. Without financial support, women aiming to be candidates of political parties are more likely to lose out to men who are part of patronage networks.<sup>238</sup> Despite the fact that the government has ratified many international human rights instruments, especially regarding women's rights, political participation and representation does not appear to be a priority for the Kenyan political elite.<sup>239</sup>

## 6.4 What is the link between women's political participation and corruption in Kenya?

While participation rates of women have been slowly increasing, corruption in the country is still rampant. However, this does not mean that there is no link between anti-corruption and women's political participation.

The case of Kenya also shows how important it is to carefully design comprehensive measures that empower women and promote anti-corruption efforts. A 2018 study shows that political parties often hinder the participation of women and youth. In regard to corruption, the study highlights that vote buying and bribery excludes women as they tend to have less financial means than men.<sup>240</sup> This is in line with research from other countries that identifies corruption as a barrier to women's political involvement.

While the introduction of a gender quota has led to an increase in women in parliament, Kenyan society is still dominated by patriarchal gender norms that prevent full participation. Women are often included by political parties only as window dressing and not seen as fit for leadership,<sup>241</sup> despite being elected as governors, senators and MPs, and therefore being deemed fit for leadership by the wider electorate. Male-dominated patronage networks in the country therefore tend to only include women that are amenable "that may not attempt to advance a women's rights agenda and threaten men's position of power".<sup>242</sup> This is one of the clear limitations of gender quotas as an anti-corruption tool. Women's participation itself is not enough; it needs women who are willing to change the status quo and fight existing structures to lead to lower levels of corruption.

A recent study<sup>243</sup> took a closer look at the role of women's leadership in Nairobi City County in the fight against corruption. It finds that perceptions about corruption do not significantly differ by gender; however, men's and women's experiences of corruption differ, as they are dependent on different government resources. This is an area where women's involvement in politics could lead to decreasing levels of corruption. If women are elected for an office that pushes for women's

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237. Bouka, Berry, and Kamuru, "Women's Political Inclusion in Kenya's Devolved Political System", 8.

238. Bouka, Berry, and Kamuru, "Women's Political Inclusion in Kenya's Devolved Political System"; Opoku, Anyango, and Alupo, "Women in Politics in Kenya: An Analysis of Participation and Barriers".

239. Bouka, Berry, and Kamuru, "Women's Political Inclusion in Kenya's Devolved Political System".

240. The Carter Center, "Youth and Women's Consultations on Political Participation in Kenya: Findings and Recommendations" (The Carter Center, December 2018), [https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace\\_publications/democracy/kenya-youth-and-women-political-participation-report.pdf](https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/democracy/kenya-youth-and-women-political-participation-report.pdf).

241. Sarah Hewitt, "The Struggle for Women's Participation in Kenya - AllA", *Australian Institute of International Affairs* (blog), 9 January 2018, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-struggle-for-womens-participation-in-kenya/>.

242. Hewitt.

243. Kadamu Joan Khakali, "The Contribution of Women Leaders in the Fight against Corruption in Nairobi County, Kenya" (Master Thesis, Kenya, University of Nairobi, 2020).

issues, this often will lead to an improvement in the delivery and monitoring of public services, and therefore to lower levels of corruption.<sup>244</sup>

The same study also highlights that while much can be improved in regard to women's political participation, women are already active anti-corruption champions, sitting in crucial committees addressing corruption.<sup>245</sup> The study highlights that women, in the public but also the private sector, have played an important role in the fight against corruption, "including contribution to development of corruption related legislation, informing corruption related policies, activism on corruption prevention and training and empowerment of citizens on corruption and its effects and their rights and responsibilities in curbing corruption in the country".<sup>246</sup> However, given the pervasive violence of Kenyan elections, the power of political parties and campaign financing,<sup>247</sup> more reforms will be needed to truly benefit from women as an anti-corruption force.

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244. Alexander and Bågenholm, "Does Gender Matter? Female Politicians' Engagement in Anti-Corruption Efforts".

245. Khakali, "The Contribution of Women Leaders in the Fight against Corruption in Nairobi County, Kenya".

246. Khakali, 40.

247. Bouka, Berry, and Kamuru, "Women's Political Inclusion in Kenya's Devolved Political System".

## 7. Case study: Indonesia

### 7.1 Brief political history: Indonesia

Covering more than 1.8 million square kilometres, Indonesia is the largest country in the South-East Asia (SEA) region.<sup>248</sup> The archipelagic country, spanning over 17,000 islands, has enjoyed its advantageous position in the sea through international trade even prior to its independence. In the interest of extracting precious spices and participating in the major international spice trade, Indonesia, like many other SEA countries, has had an extensive history of colonisation. The Portuguese first arrived in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, followed the Dutch who established the Dutch-East India Company (VOC) in 1602 which facilitated exports of spices such as cloves and nutmeg. Colonisation and control slowly extended outwards from the mainland under Dutch rule, whereby the colonies were termed the Dutch East Indies. By the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Dutch colonial regime had consolidated the collection of islands now termed as Indonesia. Following the Japanese occupation that ended in 1945, native leaders called for and declared independence from the Dutch on 17 August 1945 and announced a Constitution of 1945 on the following day proclaiming Indonesia as a unitary state. The post-occupation period was plagued with violence and unsuccessful diplomacy as the Dutch tried to re-establish their rule in the face of rising nationalism and anti-colonialism.<sup>249</sup> After four years of struggle, the sovereignty of Indonesia was finally recognised by the Dutch in December 1949, with a condition that Indonesia adopted a federal system recognising several Dutch sponsored states. Indonesia adopted a new Constitution and turned into United States of Indonesia. This federal system lasted only less than a year, as the Indonesian leaders decided to scrap the federal constitution in 1950 and introduced a Provisional Constitution which changed Indonesia back into a unitary state, but this time with parliamentary democracy.

The post-independence state of civil and political society in Indonesia was largely fragmented due to the difficulties of consolidating national interests and governance across the multitude of islands and regions that held their own languages, power structures, and experiences of colonialism. The 1950 provisional constitution that established a parliamentary democracy, largely modelled on that of the Dutch, witnessed a series of weakly formed coalition parties and a high turnover of cabinets between 1945-1958.<sup>250</sup> In 1959, during the search for an alternative to the inherited Western modernity, President Soekarno issued a Presidential Decree to revoke the Provisional Constitution 1950 and to declare the use of the Constitution of 1945. Soekarno ended the parliamentary democracy and replaced it with an autocratic, “guided democracy”. While Sukarno’s rule was relatively effective in maintaining balance in the fragmented political scene, a coup in 1965 effectively shifted political power towards General Suharto, who subsequently moved Indonesia towards authoritarianism. Suharto’s New Order saw depoliticisation through the merging of political parties into Islamic and non-Islamic parties, and the formation of Golkar, Suharto’s party that campaigned as a non-ideological vehicle for development. Formed by a federation of unions, organisations, and military factions, Golkar dominated politics in Indonesia from 1971 to 1997. Under Suharto’s rule, the military became increasingly involved in politics – military leaders served a dual function (*dwifungsi*) and were appointed as regional heads – and violent suppressions were used to secure domestic security. At the same time, the opening of economic sectors for foreign investments and investment in national projects led to economic growth and decline in inflation.<sup>251</sup> Poverty levels decreased from 40.1% to 11.3% between 1976 to 1966.<sup>252</sup> However, in the 1990s,

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248. World World Bank, *Country Overview Indonesia* (Indonesia, 2021).

249. Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

250. A. Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Routledge, 2018).

251. R. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 200).

252. A. Suryahadi, G. Hadiwidjaja, and S. Sumarto, *Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction in Indonesia Before and After the Asian*



concerns grew around the rising prices of fuel, human rights concerns, and ethnic tension that questioned Indonesia's system of authoritarianism. The loss of public confidence was amplified by the Suharto's handling of the 1997 Asian financial crisis - delayed closure of insolvent banks and resistance to IMF-proposed economic restructuring further worsened the economic crisis in Indonesia.<sup>253</sup> Between 1997 and 1998, demonstrations, price riots, and violence broke out across different regions in Indonesia. The loss of support for Suharto extended from the civil society to his former allies in the military, as his re-election for a new term in March 1998 was met with protests and riots throughout the country, along with existing dissent within the Golkar party.<sup>254</sup> Under pressure from multiple sides, Suharto eventually resigned from his position in May 1998.

The transitional period after Suharto's rule is commonly known as Reformasi. This period in Indonesian politics was characterised by stronger shifts towards liberal democracy, mainly pushed for by civil society. Currently, Indonesia follows a presidential representative democracy, with the elected president as the head of both the state and the government who can serve up to two five-year terms.<sup>255</sup> Joko Widodo has been the current president since 2014, with his party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle being the largest political party in the House of Representatives. Unlike the House of Regional Representatives (DPD), the House of Representatives (DPR) enjoys stronger legislative roles in debating and passing legislation, appropriating and approving government annual budget proposals and conducting oversight of the government in implementing the legislation and budgets.<sup>256</sup>

As of 2020, Indonesia has moved from a lower-middle to upper-middle income country (World Bank, 2021) but lost this status amid the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>257</sup> Unemployment has been reduced over the past decade, remaining low in 2020 at 4.1%. However, the country is still facing multiple social and political issues, such as the rise of radical Islamism,<sup>258</sup> human rights violations, and gender inequality.<sup>259</sup>

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*Financial Crisis* (Jakarta: The SMERU Research Institute, 2021), <http://www.smeru.or.id/sites/default/files/publication/econgrow2.pdf>.

253. L. Martinez-Diaz, "Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Indonesia", *Global Governance* 12, no. 4 (2006): 395-412.

254. Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*.

255. B.A. King, *Constitutional Tinkering: The Search for Consensus Is Taking Time*, 2001.

256. D.P.R., Rights and Obligations, 2021, <https://www.dpr.go.id/tentang/hak-kewajiban>.

257. Claire Jiao and Grace Sihombing, "Indonesia Loses Upper-Middle Income Status Amid Pandemic," *Bloomberg.Com*, July 8, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-08/indonesia-loses-prized-upper-middle-income-status-amid-pandemic>.

258. R McLoed, "Soeharto's Indonesia: A Better Class of Corruption", *Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform* 7, no. 2 (2000): 99-112.

259. L. Van Putten, *How Radical Islam Gained A Foothold in Indonesia*, 2019, <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/news/2019/09/how-radical-islam-gained-a-foothold-in-indonesia>.

**Table 3: Development indicators for Indonesia**

Indicator	Indonesia
Surface Area, sq km <sup>a</sup>	1,916,862
Population (2020), millions <sup>a</sup>	270,625.57
Urban population (2020), % of total <sup>a</sup>	56
Human Development Index (2020) <sup>b</sup>	0.718
Country Rank, out of 188	107
Gender Inequality Index (2019) <sup>b</sup>	0.480
Corruption Perception Index Rank(2020) <sup>c</sup>	102/180
Life expectancy at birth (2020) <sup>a</sup>	72
Unemployment (2020), % of labour force <sup>a</sup>	4.1
GDP per capita (2020), USD <sup>a</sup>	3,869.6
Source: <sup>a</sup> World Bank, <sup>260</sup> <sup>b</sup> UNDP, <sup>261</sup> <sup>c</sup> Transparency International <sup>262</sup>	

## 7.2 Corruption in Indonesia

Indonesia has had a history of political and economic corruption after its independence. During the New Order, electoral competition was restricted to three parties after 1973 and elections were often carried out with pre-determined results - a series of rewards, punishments and threats were meted out to local (or emerging) leaders, according to their efforts in meeting Golkar's vote quotas from their region.<sup>263</sup> Holding a large state enterprise sector, Suharto also practiced a form of cronyism that extended from senior governmental officials down to local leaders in rural villages.<sup>264</sup> This helped with the consolidation of power and ensured loyalty to the head of the franchise, Suharto, no matter the governance method. Granting of concessions to (favoured) private companies in order to encourage monopolies and thus rent extraction also further damaged the economy - which foreboded the particularly devastating effects of the Asian financial crisis on the Indonesian economy. For lower-level bureaucrats, low salaries have been suggested as a driver in continued corruption.<sup>265</sup> In part, collection of bribes and other forms of rent extraction from local businesses function as indirect taxes that are used to compensate for insufficient direct taxes.<sup>266</sup> In 1999, when Indonesia entered a period of transition from previous authoritarianism, the country was ranked one of the most corrupt countries in the world.<sup>267</sup> During the transition period, popularly known as the "reformasi" era, Indonesia recorded significant progress in the fight against corruption. Indonesia passed an anti-corruption law. In 2002, Indonesia established an independent Anti-Corruption Agency or the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) which has been endowed with three main mandates: to enforce anti-corruption laws, to prevent corruption and to educate the

260. "Ukraine | Data".

261. UNDP, "Indonesia | Human Development Reports", 2021, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IDN>.

262. Transparency International, "Corruption Perception Index 2020".

263. Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*.

264. McLoed, "Soeharto's Indonesia: A Better Class of Corruption."

265. D. Filmer and D. Lindauer, "Does Indonesia Have a 'Low Pay' Civil Service?," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 37, no. 2 (2001): 189-205.

266. J. Henderson and A. Kuncoro, "Corruption in Indonesia," *NBER. NBER Working Paper Series*, 2004.

267. With a Corruption Perception Index of 1.7 (out of 10) in 1999, ranking 96th out of 99th countries from least corrupt to most corrupt. (Transparency International, 1999).



public on anti-corruption. As a law enforcement agency, KPK plays combined roles being both police and prosecutor, with in-house seconded police and civilian investigators as well as seconded prosecutors of the Attorney General's Office.<sup>268</sup> Since 2002, Indonesia has also formed special anti-corruption courts within its criminal court system, in which an independent ad-hoc judge is appointed in each anti-corruption court proceeding. Since 2004, Indonesia has also consistently launched five yearly National Strategies on Prevention and Eradication of Corruption. All of these have significantly contributed to reducing corruption in Indonesia, indicated by the CPI of Transparency International moving Indonesia from the status of the most corrupt country in the world listed in the bottom of the list in 1999, to rank 85 in 2019 and slightly down again to rank 102 in 2020.

Corruption is still a large problem in Indonesia. Previously built political and economic structures facilitate corruption through centralised power, discretion, and the lack of accountability. Through the reform era, attempts were then made to tackle these issues with various measures. Despite those, the entrenched institutional culture of cronyism and patronage structures built around these practices, as well as the extremely high cost of politics,<sup>269</sup> have caused corruption to remain a serious problem in Indonesia. As of 2020, 92% of Indonesians surveyed by Transparency International (2020) think that government corruption is a big problem. Indonesia held a Corruption Perception Index of 37 (out of 100) in 2020. A 2019 reform of the KPK Law likely plays a large role in these very negative views on the state of corruption in the country and Transparency International Indonesia has reported that the reforms have weakened the KPK significantly.<sup>270</sup>

### 7.3 Political participation of women in Indonesia

Though there has been a slight increase in the percentage of women in the parliament, Indonesian politics is still largely dominated by male politicians. In 2020, 21.20% of all parliamentary members in the House of Representatives were women (Figure 3 below). In 2008, the government passed legislation requiring a 30% quota for women legislative candidates and party leadership.<sup>271</sup> However, the legislation only increased women's participation slightly within the national parliament, increasing from 11.27% to 18.21% from 2008 to 2009 (Figure 3 below). In the 2020 general election the number of female MPs increased to 20.9% (120 out of 575 MPs are female), thus, the quotas had not been achieved as of 2020. On the local level the picture is more mixed but also shows that progress has been made. While some of the provincial and district parliaments have much lower numbers of women than the national parliament, some have exceeded the quotas (for example, Aceh Tamiang (36.67%), Indramayu (34.69%), Temanggung (33.33%), Kediri City (36.67%), and South Barito (40%)).<sup>272</sup> In addition, levels of women's political participation in local provinces are lower than that of the national parliament - women often have little representation at district levels. The 2021 Global Gender Gap places Indonesia at 101st position out of 153 countries (where 1st is most equal and 153rd is least equal). (World Economic Forum, 2021). One question that should be

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268. UNODC, "Final Independent Project Evaluation of 'Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions in Indonesia,'" April 2018, [https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent\\_Project\\_Evaluations/2018/INDA03\\_Final\\_Independent\\_Project\\_Evaluation\\_Report\\_April\\_2018.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2018/INDA03_Final_Independent_Project_Evaluation_Report_April_2018.pdf).

269. Laode Muhammad Syarif and Faisal Faisal, "Addressing the Root of Political Corruption in Indonesia," *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 5, no. 2 (2019): 191-98.

270. Transparency International, "Dismissals Following Controversial Civics Test Further Weaken...," *Transparency.Org* (blog), April 6, 2021, <https://www.transparency.org/en/press/dismissals-controversial-civics-test-further-weaken-indonesia-anti-corruption-agency-kpk>.


271. E. Rhoads, "Women's Political Participation in Indonesia: Decentralisation, Money Politics and Collective Memory in Bali," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 31, no. 2 (2012): 35-56.

272. <https://www.bps.go.id/indicator/40/464/1/keterlibatan-perempuan-di-parlemen.html>

explored further is also which women do make it into the political arena. As previously discussed, the success of including women, does not only depend on the number of women included but also on which women are included in the political sphere. While no data is available that analyses to what extent the women that currently are in office are representative of the female population as a whole, the electoral system makes it hard for those that are not already (politically) connected and financially well off to access political office. The Indonesian political system relies on individual campaigns with limited support by the political parties, which means that candidates do not only have to bring their own finances but also rely on their existing social network to gather support. This is especially difficult for women to navigate. A recent article identifies:

Due to entrenched patriarchal structures in Indonesian society, women candidates often face disadvantages when it comes to mobilising the material resources and networks required to win elections: they often have fewer material resources at their disposal than men, and they are less deeply embedded in dominant informal political networks at the local level.<sup>273</sup>

**Figure 3: Percentage of female representation in the Indonesian House of Representatives from 1950 to 2020**



Source: (<https://data.ipu.org>) (accessed 22.04.2021)


Major factors contributing to low rates of women's political participation are education, labour participation and socio-economic status differences between the genders. In addition, only 55% of all women were participating in the labour force in 2019 - a figure largely unchanged since 2000 (Table 4 below). This is not surprising, given that a 2015 study found no evidence that education improves women's decision-making authority within households or community participation.<sup>274</sup> Perceptions that the public sphere is reserved for men, and that women's political participation is inappropriate are not uncommon.<sup>275</sup>

273. Aspinall, White, and Savirani, 5.

274. R. Parinduri and S. Samarakoon, "Does Education Empower Women? Evidence from Indonesia," *World Development* 66 (2015): 428-42, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.09.002>.

275. K.I. Parawansa, *Obstacles to Women's Political Participation in Indonesia* (International IDEA, 2002), <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/chapters/women-in-parliament/perempuan-di-parlemen-bukan-sekedar-jumlah-EN-case-study-indonesia-2>.

**Figure 4: Labour force participation of women compared to men in Indonesia from 2000 to 2019.**



Source: World Bank (2020)<sup>276</sup>

Despite the fact that the Reformasi (1999~) period was largely characterised by movement towards liberal democracy and greater civilian political participation, local governance witnessed a shift towards traditional power structures. Renewed emphasis of local identity and the resurgence of traditional patriarchal values led to the empowerment of male leadership and encouragement of women to stay within private spheres.<sup>277</sup> A study in 2017 further found that marital status and presence of young children have a significant negative impact on women labour force participation.<sup>278</sup> Marital property and inheritance are usually registered and delivered through men and their male heirs,<sup>279</sup> restricting women's ownership and bargaining power even within private spheres. The prevalence of unpaid care work (domestic work) is also substantially higher for females compared to males, at 85.7% compared to 27.8% in 2015.<sup>280</sup> This significantly decreases the amount of time that can be committed to other activities in the public sphere such as community and political participation.

## 7.4 What is the link between women's political participation and corruption in Indonesia?

Women's participation in politics is low, while corruption is continuing to be a major problem in Indonesia. This is in line with the existing research which shows that higher levels of women's participation are clearly linked to lower levels of corruption. However, as has been discussed in the literature review, the link is not direct and several factors play a role in understanding how and when women in political office decrease corruption levels. Something that is especially important to keep in mind in a country as diverse as Indonesia is that women are also not a homogenous group and therefore their interests and roles will differ. Indonesia is dominated by rent-seeking patronage

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pdf.

276. World Bank, *Country Overview Indonesia*.

277. Rhoads, "Women's Political Participation in Indonesia: Decentralisation, Money Politics and Collective Memory in Bali".

278. AIPEG, "Women's Economic Participation in Indonesia. Monash University", 24.

279. AIPEG, 35.

280. V.Y. Utari, *Unpaid Care Work in Indonesia: Why Should We Care?* Forum Kajian Pembangunan (Jakarta: The SMERU Research Institute, 2017), [http://www.smeru.or.id/sites/default/files/events/24102017\\_fkp\\_ucw.pdf](http://www.smeru.or.id/sites/default/files/events/24102017_fkp_ucw.pdf).

networks,<sup>281</sup> which as research in other countries has shown is both a risk and an opportunity for the involvement of women. On the one hand, patronage networks have been identified as severely restricting the political participation of women; on the other hand, a higher number of women in the political sphere disrupts and breaks up existing patronage networks and thereby reduces corruption.

Patriarchal gender roles also play an important factor in Indonesia. As in most countries, patronage networks rely on group trust that is frequently built on homosocial capital; that is, networks of men who share a common understanding and therefore exclude women as they are not trusted.<sup>282</sup> Younger men are also expected to follow the lead of senior men, which reinforces these networks.<sup>283</sup> However, not all networks in the country are male-dominated.<sup>284</sup> Darwin<sup>285</sup> shows that in the 2017 election in North Aceh, candidates who used women-centred networks of brokers were particularly successful. These brokers not only developed their own networks, but then used this power they had garnered to pressure candidates to campaign for more women-friendly policies. This is essential also for anti-corruption efforts, as it has been shown that often a focus on policies focused on the wellbeing of women and children leads to an improvement in the delivery and monitoring of these public services and therefore to lower levels of corruption.<sup>286</sup> This example shows the importance of focusing not only on women at the highest level of politics, but also of remembering the important role women can play at lower levels.

Women do play an active role in anti-corruption efforts in Indonesia, and multiple initiatives have been aimed at involving more women in anti-corruption efforts. While this might not immediately translate into the political involvement of women, it shows a) the importance of women in anti-corruption and b) likely will also lead to more active political participation of women with a focus on anti-corruption. For example, the Working Group “Women in Integrity” created by the Alliance for Integrity is a platform for “female entrepreneurs and professionals to discuss key challenges related to corruption in day- to-day business”.<sup>287</sup> While this initiative is aimed at businesswomen, one can expect that these discussions also translate into political activism for some. The potential long-term results of initiatives like this should be researched in more detail. Another important initiative is the “I am a women against Corruption” (Saya Perempuan Anti-Korupsi (SPAK)) Initiative of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), which is a network of women committed to fighting corruption.<sup>288</sup> Originally designed to empower women in anti-corruption education, the project has since then also encouraged female law enforcement officers to suggest internal reform. The SPAK trainings focus on different groups of women as agents of change; for example, women

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281. Ward Berenschot, “The Political Economy of Clientelism: A Comparative Study of Indonesia’s Patronage Democracy”, *Comparative Political Studies* 51, no. 12 (October 1, 2018): 1563-93, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018758756>; Deasy Simandjuntak, “Gifts and Promises: Patronage Democracy in a Decentralised Indonesia”, *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 11, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 99-126, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-20120008>.

282. Bjarnegård, *Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation*; UNODC, “The Time Is Now- Addressing the Gender Dimension of Corruption”.

283. UNODC, “The Time Is Now- Addressing the Gender Dimension of Corruption”.

284. UNODC.

285. “The Power of Female Brokers: Local Elections in North Aceh”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 39, no. 3 (2017): 532-51.

286. Alexander and Bågenholm, “Does Gender Matter? Female Politicians’ Engagement in Anti-Corruption Efforts”.

287. Alliance for Integrity, “Women in Integrity: Women as Important Actors in the Fight Against Corruption - Alliance for Integrity”, 30 September 2020, <https://www.allianceforintegrity.org/en/news/messages/women-in-integrity-women-as-important-actors-in-the-fight-against-corruption.php>.

288. UNODC, “Final Independent Project Evaluation of ‘Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions in Indonesia’”.

with disabilities.<sup>289</sup> While this project does not directly focus on women's political participation, the consequences of these initiatives are likely to be seen in different spheres of life. By training women on anti-corruption, it is likely that their expectations of politicians about what is or is not acceptable will change, and that these women will also get interested in fighting for political change.

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289. AIPJ, "Yogyakarta Women With Disabilities Working Together To Spread Anti-Corruption Messages", accessed 23 May 2021, <http://archive.aipj.or.id/en/spak/detail/success/yogyakarta-women-with-disabilities-working-together-to-spread-anti-corruption-messages>.

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## **Annex - About the author**

Dr. Ortrun Merkle is a researcher at UNU-MERIT/Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, in Maastricht in the Netherlands. Her research focuses on the relationship between corruption and gender, with a particular focus on the role of gender norms and sextortion. Her current research focuses on the experiences of sextortion during migration journeys and the role of gender norms in the relationship between corruption and the political participation of women. She regularly writes, teaches, and supervises on topics around gender and corruption. She holds a Ph.D. from Maastricht University, a MA in Economics, a MA in International Relations and a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Security Studies from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, NY.



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