## Representation of women in local government in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 2020 elections



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## Foreword

2020 was a difficult year for everyone. It was especially so for women. All over the world, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered both a massive health crisis and devastation of the global economy, especially in developing countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. With schools and day-care facilities closed, and movement restricted, women found themselves again bearing the increased burden of caretaking responsibilities. The funding for many services was cut, including support for victims of domestic violence, while we saw an extremely worrying increase in domestic violence. The crisis has shown that, now more than ever, we need effective leadership and an inclusive response to the crisis.

Despite these challenging circumstances, women in BiH made gains in the local elections in 2020 and this report shows a small, incremental increase in the number of women elected in local councils across BiH . Even in the face of adversity, we still see progress. Some trends presented in this analysis are particularly encouraging, such as an increase in the number of women leading lists, as well as the electoral success of young women. Of 67 women from 17 political parties involved in our 'More than a Quota' programme, nearly half were elected.

While these trends are encouraging, more needs to be done to ensure that women's voices are included in political decision-making. Global research shows that women as policy makers think more broadly, identifying often neglected problems in healthcare, welfare and education and as such, contribute to more equal and caring societies. Their presence raises the overall quality of decision-making.

The UK Government and WFD champion the importance of women's political leadership and representation. Supporting and encouraging women to enter politics and compete for public office has been a long-term priority, implemented through mentoring, building alliances with civil society, tackling harmful stereotyping and calling out violence against women in public life. Prior to the election, the campaign "I Vote for Women" invited voters to elect more women in legislative bodies. Given the crucial role played by the media in how female candidates are perceived, we actively engaged with new and traditional media outlets to underline their responsibility in shaping positive and fair representation.

Tackling gender disparities and getting more women in the decision-making process remain a work-in-progress. Everyone, especially political parties in BiH , have a role to play to bring women into the rooms where decisions are made, and to allocate party resources more equitably. As this analysis clearly indicates, when political parties trust women as leaders, so do the voters. It is only then that women are able to fully contribute to the wellbeing and success of their communities and demonstrate that they are, in fact, more than a quota.

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## Introduction

Although they make up half of the population, women in Bosnia and Herzegovina $(\mathrm{BiH})$ are underrepresented in local councils and municipal mayoral posts. Past research devoted to this issue locates the reasons for this inequality primarily in the lack of confidence citizens have in female candidates running in both local and higher-level elections, as well as in the practice of favouring men in the managing bodies of political parties and in the compiling of election lists.

This study aims to analyse the results of the 2020 local elections from a gender equality angle, and to map key trends in the representation of women in local government. In order to draw a comparison and gain insight into the electoral success of women, this document begins by presenting past electoral results achieved by female candidates and presents basic observations from research on the representation of women in Bosnian-Herzegovinian politics. After that, the results of the last, 2020, local elections are analysed, and the changes which took place over the course of one electoral cycle are identified. In quantitative terms, the study gives the number of elected female candidates for municipal mayor and local council, and the total number of elected female candidates from each municipality and each party relative to the total number of elected councillors. In qualitative terms, this data is interpreted taking into account the main obstacles faced by women in politics which have been identified in the literature. Compared to previous studies, however, this research brings new information to light, which has not been taken into account before, such as the increasing competitiveness of female candidates on the lists, the results achieved by female list leaders, and the share of young women in the ranks of the political parties and in the elected under-30 candidates. The analysis concludes that, in spite of substantial prejudice towards women amongst the electorate, the main obstacle to greater participation of women in politics is political party leadership structures, that is, a lack of political subjects which offer equal opportunity to men and women to run in the elections. This is not to downplay the existence and impact of other factors such as widespread prejudice, sexism, unpaid housework and care for the family, the design of the electoral system, etc.; rather, the study offers arguments which explain why the behaviour of the political parties is an important, at times decisive, variable causing low rates of representation of women in Bosnian-Herzegovinian politics.


## 01.

# Women and the results of local elections in BiH 

The share of women in elected local-level posts is not commensurate to the share of women in politics, and is greatly disproportionate to the share of elected men. In 2012, women were elected for only four out of the 140 mayoral and municipal mayoral posts which are filled directly via the ballot; ${ }^{1}$ in 2016 the number was six. ${ }^{2}$ In the local councils, the percentage rose to $18.36 \%^{3}$ in 2016 . This represents incremental progress compared to the trend which started as far back as 1990 when only $2.42 \%$ of women were elected into legislative bodies ( $5 \%$ at the local level) in the first multi-party elections after the fall of communism, compared to $24.2 \%$ in the single-party Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in $1986 .{ }^{4}$ In the 1998 elections, which saw the introduction of a $30 \%$ gender quota, $26 \%$ of women were elected into the supreme legislative body of BiH , the Parliamentary Assembly, whilst $15 \%$ and $22.8 \%$ of women were elected into the FBiH Parliament and the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska respectively. ${ }^{5}$ However, when open lists were introduced in 2000, which enabled the voters to support individual candidates with preferential votes, not just the

[^0]In UK Government
list of a particular political party, the number of elected female candidates dropped in the next elections. From 2000 to 2018 we saw a slow incremental increase at all levels of government.

It was only in 2018 that the percentage of women elected into legislature rose to $27.5 \%,{ }^{6}$ and BiH surpassed the rate of representation of women in legislature it had had in 1986. With this result, BiH would have ranked 59th on the Inter-Parliamentary Union's list. ${ }^{7}$ However, the Inter-Parliamentary Union's methodology takes into account only the representation rate in the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH which, in accordance with the results of the 2018 General Elections, stands at $21.4 \%,{ }^{8}$ placing BiH 92 nd. If we take the combined rate of representation of women in the state, entity and cantonal assemblies, which is a methodologically more sound approach taken by the Agency for Statistics of BiH , we get a sum total of $27.5 \%,{ }^{9}$ which places BiH in a much more favourable position on the list. Without a doubt, the modification of the gender quota ${ }^{10}$ in the Election Law of BiH which was raised from $30 \%$ in 1997 to $40 \%$ in 2013 , helped reach this percentage. Under the supervision of the Central Election Commission, political parties implemented these legal provisions, which can be seen from the fact that women made up 41.18\% of all candidates on the local election lists in $2016,{ }^{11}$ whilst in the last local elections in 2020 they made up $42.27 \%$ of the candidates on the local council lists. ${ }^{12}$

However, there is a considerable discrepancy between the number of women running for local council seats and the number of women elected (18.36\% in 2016). Research devoted to this phenomenon lists different factors which have contributed to such a result. One of them is the attitude of the electorate, which prefers male to female candidates. Analyses of election results from the introduction of open lists in 2000 to the 2020 elections support this conclusion. In the 2016 elections female candidates faced a probability of being elected between 2.3 and 1.6 times less than the male candidates. As the voting in the local and general elections alike is based on open lists whereby each voter has the right to back with their preferential vote a particular candidate's rise on the list, the results support the arguments of those who see electorate attitudes as the main reason for underrepresentation of women in politics. Female candidates fare just as poorly in the elections for mayoral positions which have been conducted according to a single-round first-past-the-post system since 2004: of the 140 mayoral offices

[^1]filled in this manner, only three were won by women in 2004, four in 2008, five in 2012, ${ }^{13}$ and six in 2016 - one in the Federation of BiH (FBiH), five in the Republika Srpska (RS). It is difficult to assess accurately the impact of voter preference on the results achieved by female candidates, seeing that it has to be combined with other factors such as the general popularity of a party as well as issues specific to different local communities, so in the available literature we may come across the fact that voter preference explains between 6 and $32 \%$ of women's total loss of seats. ${ }^{14}$ It seems that electoral preference for men exists in both sexes; research shows that the belief that men make better political leaders exists in voters of both sexes. ${ }^{15}$ This attitude of the electorate, as well as the slow rise in the representation of women (approximately $2 \%$ per electoral cycle, if we look at the results of the local elections in the period 2012-2020) leads to the estimate that BiH will have to wait till 2060 to reach the $40 \%$ representation rate. ${ }^{16}$

The position of women within their political parties is the second most important reason for their underrepresentation. A lot of indirect empirical data testifies to pronounced inequality in BiH political parties. First and foremost, it is obvious that women are generally in a less favourable position than men in the process of drafting election lists, which can be seen from the fact that in the 2016 local elections only 100 of 1000 lists (which crossed the electoral threshold) were led by women. Those elections saw a rather low percentage of female candidates for municipal mayors, just above $6 \%$ of the total number of candidates for these posts. ${ }^{17}$ This choice dictates the way women in politics are presented in the media. TV and radio programmes, as one of the primary ways to familiarise the public with the candidates, in most cases give more air time to list leaders and candidates for mayoral posts. As a result, voters do not learn enough about the female candidates, which is confirmed by research stating that female candidates do not win votes because, amongst other things, they are "not familiar" to voters. ${ }^{18}$ Since they are nine times less likely to be frontrunners, female candidates are especially rarely invited to TV debates which, in spite of the substantial influence of social media, remain the primary source of information for middle-aged and elderly voters. ${ }^{19}$ It is reasonable to assume that this exacerbates the generally low visibility of women in political campaigns, and the findings of the monitoring of election programmes in the media during the 2016 local elections support this assumption, showing that female candidates' visibility was proportionate to the share of female list leaders and stood at a mere $10 \% .^{20}$ This may force female candidates to invest more time and effort in their

[^2]campaigns (canvassing, creating their online identity, distributing leaflets) than their male colleagues, which may in turn discourage them from campaigning. This contributes to the low numbers of competing candidates.

The position of the list leader is important not only for media exposure. It comes with a high probability of (re)election to a local council seat. The results of the 2020 local elections back the claim that leading the list virtually guarantees a seat; of 114 female list leaders, 99 won a seat. This makes up $85.84 \%$ of contestants, and by far exceeds the $19.62 \%$ share of women in elected councils.

Changing the gender quotas from $40 \%$ to $50 \%$ has been proposed as a solution to this problem, ${ }^{21}$ as well as building up female candidates' capacities, ${ }^{22}$ amending the Law on the Financing of Political Parties so as to reward the parties that achieve gender-balanced election results ${ }^{23}$ and raising public awareness so as to make it less hostile to female candidates. ${ }^{24}$

Although essentially correct, existing analyses neglect a few facts. First, although severely underrepresented in general, female candidates in BiH are much better represented in the younger age category than in the total number of elected candidates. According to the Central Election Commission's data, $45 \%$ of candidates under the age of 30 elected in the 2014 General Elections were women. In contrast, women make up only $16.10 \%$ of the over-30 cohort. This is also backed by the findings of a study on the participation of women in social organisations which claims that women from the younger age groups join political parties as much as men, if not more. ${ }^{25}$

The electorate is not always biased towards male candidates. In the 2016 local elections, voters gave preferential votes to 87 female candidates in the FBiH and 73 in the RS, helping them to move up the list. This phenomenon is widespread in the developed and underdeveloped municipalities and in urban and rural communities alike. ${ }^{26}$ Therefore, although it is true that the electorate prefers male candidates, it is also true that they put their trust in female candidates who are not frontrunners as well. Empirical research is necessary to determine whether this progress is the result of investing personal resources into the campaign, or the reputation these female candidates enjoy in their communities and political parties, and if so, to what extent. What we can say with certainty is that, seeing that some candidates run on independent local lists or national minority lists, where in the absence of strong party infrastructure the result depends more on personal reputation, voters see women as reputable candidates, not merely persons whose names ended up on the list just because gender quotas gave them that right. ${ }^{27}$

[^3]> For this reason the problem of integrating the gender equality principle into political parties seems just as significant a cause of underrepresentation of women in legislature, if not more so.

The results achieved by women front runners leads us to this conclusion. Only 10\% of list leaders who crossed the threshold in the 2016 elections were women. However, $79 \%$ of them won a seat on the council. In 2020, the percentage rose to $86 \%$, and the percentage of women list leaders to $11.5 \%$. If we connect these figures with the previous analyses which offer a range of seat loss of between 6 and $32 \%$, we see that voter preference is not a dominant or decisive factor determining the representation of women in politics; an electorate hostile to women would not have supported $86 \%$ of women list leaders. It seems that a systematic promotion of women to list leaders or even incentivising such a course of action, could prove an effective measure to increase the number of women and exert influence on the party leadership at the same time.

> Attitudes of voters towards female candidates as well as the lack of enforcement of gender equality within political parties are not the only reasons for underrepresentation of women in legislative and executive bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Women candidates are often victims of targeted attacks on social media in which they are threatened, intimidated and insulted. Although male candidates experience a similar level of abuse, there is an important difference: insults directed to female candidates much more often have to do with their gender identity, which is to imply that it makes them less worthy of a certain post. ${ }^{28}$

Codes of conduct of most legislative bodies in BiH do not lay down specific sanctions for sex or gender-based abuse, which is widespread in BiH and the rest of the world. Local, entity and state-level gender equality commissions are not doing enough to promote change to these practices. ${ }^{29}$ Rules of procedure of legislative bodies do not provide special mechanisms of considering legislative initiatives which aim to analyse bills and motions from a gender equality angle. ${ }^{30}$ In this way they not only fail to provide quality parliamentary monitoring of the activities of the executive branch, but they also contribute to preventing any change in the present situation in which women are not equal to men, or at least slow changes down. In the context of election results, proceeding in this manner has the indirect effect of making legislative bodies less desirable work environments for women, which in turn may discourage women from (re)standing as candidates to participate in the work of these bodies.

Finally, the last variable causing underrepresentation of women candidates at the local level is the design of the election system. Here we refer to two of its features: first-past-the-post election of mayors and the low electoral threshold of $3 \%$ combined with the Sainte-Lague method of seat allocation.

28 For data on BiH see Miftari, E.:Violence Against Women in Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2019.
29 See study Sexism, harassment and violence against women in parliaments in Europe, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018, which states that $85 \%$ of female MPs Europe-wide have been subjected to this type of harassment.
30 Making Laws Work for Women and Men: A Practical Guide to Gender-Sensitive Legislation, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Warsaw 2017, pp. 16-22.

Direct voting for municipal mayors was introduced during the 2004 elections. The use of this system, rather than having the council elect the mayor or using the second ballot system, results in relatively common consecutive or multiple mayoral terms, as well as a strong incentive for the political parties to field the same candidate over and over again. As mayors themselves benefit from this in the sense that it puts them in a position of considerable power, they often abandon their parties or establish new ones. Therefore the explanation for the low number of female candidates as well as women in mayoral posts lies not only in electorate bias or internal party policies, but also in the fact that once elected, a mayor or municipal mayor is difficult to replace in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian election system. ${ }^{31}$

A considerable number of small parties that have a certain presence in a few municipalities yet little or none at the state or entity level do not have woman councillors or have only one and do not field them as list leaders. ${ }^{32}$ Seeing that most such parties do not exist for the sake of coming into power at higher levels but in order to represent partial interests of parts of local communities, this phenomenon tells us that the low electoral threshold of $3 \%$ used in our system makes it possible for some political actors to not even consider including women in their ranks. In addition to the low threshold, one of the specificities of our election system is the use of the Sainte-Lague seat allocation method. This method facilitates an allocation of seats that leads to greater representation of small and medium-sized parties compared, for instance, to the d'Hondt method used by many countries. ${ }^{33}$ As a result, parties that win the most votes in BiH within one constituency, whether it be a municipality, canton or entity, often win fewer seats than they would have if the d'Hondt or some other method were used. For this reason, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political scene is more fragmented than others, and unlike other countries in the region that have two or three dominant political parties, BiH has, depending on election results, six or seven such parties. ${ }^{34}$ This is certainly not a decisive variable which contributes to the underrepresentation of women in BiH , but the 2016 results show that we cannot dismiss its impact completely. In at least four municipalities the use of the d'Hondt instead of the Sainte-Lague method would have led to a rise in the representation of women in the local council. ${ }^{35}$

[^4] VINUSU Government

## Results of the 2020 local elections and the representation of women

The 2020 local elections were a continuation of the trend of a slow increase in the rates of female representation in local politics．Unlike in 2012，when there were no women on seven local councils in BiH ，or in 2016 when there were none on three， after the 2020 elections only one municipality，Bužim，has no women on the council． A double－digit number of women，as in 2016，were elected in only four municipali－ ties．Women still have a majority on only one council（Kupres，RS），and only in six municipalities is their representation on the council higher than the $40 \%$ quota according to the Election Law of BiH ，in comparison with 2016，when that was the case on only two councils．

FBiH－number of elected female councillors

| Municipality／city | 2012． | 2016． | 2020. |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Mostar | The elections <br> were not held | The elections <br> were not held | $8(22,85 \%)$ | － |
| Kladanj | 0 | 0 | $2(11,16 \%)$ | 人 |
| Novi Travnik | 0 | $4(16 \%)$ | $4(16 \%)$ | － |
| Tomislavgrad | 0 | $4(16 \%)$ | $5(20 \%)$ | 人 |
| Kakanj | 0 | $3(10 \%)$ | $6(20 \%)$ | 人 |
| Kiseljak | $1(4,34 \%)$ | $6(26,04 \%)$ | $10(43,40 \%)$ | 人 |
| Busovača | $1(4 \%)$ | $4(16 \%)$ | $4(16 \%)$ | － |

FBiH－number of elected female councillors

| Municipality／city | 2012. | 2016. | 2020. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Olovo | 1 （5，88\％） | 1 （5，88\％） | 6 （35，29\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Bužim | 1 （5，88\％） | 1 （5，88\％） | 0 | $\checkmark$ |
| Prozor－Rama | 1 （4，76\％） | 2 （9，66\％） | 3 （14，28\％） | ヘ |
| Neum | 1 （5，88\％） | 2 （11，76\％） | 4 （23，52\％） | ヘ |
| Sapna | 1 （4，76\％） | 4 （19，04\％） | 4 （19，04\％） | － |
| Doboj Jug | 1 （7，69\％） | 2 （15，38\％） | 1 （7，69\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Domaljevac | 1 （9，09\％） | 2 （18，18\％） | 3 （27，27\％） | ヘ |
| Jablanica | 2 （10，52\％） | 4 （21，04\％） | 4 （21，04\％） | － |
| Glamoč | 2 （13，33\％） | 2 （13，33\％） | 3 （19，98\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Kalesija | 2 （7，40\％） | 3 （11，11\％） | 1 （3，70\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Ilijaš | 2 （8\％） | 2 （8\％） | 7 （28\％） | ヘ |
| Teočak | 2 （13，33\％） | 2 （14，28\％） | 3 （19，98\％） | ヘ |
| Donji Vakuf | 2 （9，52\％） | 3 （14，28\％） | 4 （19，04\％） | ヘ |
| Kupres | 2 （11，76\％） | 1 （5，88\％） | 4 （19，04\％） | ヘ |
| Doboj Istok | 2 （11，76\％） | 3 （17，64\％） | 4 （23，52\％） | ヘ |
| Gradačac | 2 （7，40\％） | 1 （3，33\％） | 4 （14，30\％） | ヘ |
| Čelić | 2 （11，76\％） | 3 （17，64\％） | 2 （11，76\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Živinice | 3 （9，68\％） | 2 （7，44\％） | 2 （7，44\％） | － |
| Srebrenik | 3 （10，34\％） | 4 （13，45\％） | 5 （16，57\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Grude | 3 （12\％） | 8 （32\％） | 8 （32\％） | － |
| Fojnica | 3 （14，28\％） | 5 （23，80\％） | 6 （28，56\％） | ヘ |
| Posušje | 3 （12\％） | 8 （32\％） | 9 （36\％） | ヘ |
| Kreševo | 3 （19，98\％） | 3 （19，98\％） | 4 （26，66\％） | ヘ |
| Odžak | 3 （12\％） | 3 （12\％） | 4 （16\％） | ヘ |
| Vitez | 3 （12\％） | 8 （32\％） | 9 （36\％） | ヘ |
| Tešanj | 3 （12\％） | 2 （8\％） | 1 （4\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Usora | 3 （23，07\％） | 3 （23，07\％） | 2 （15，38\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Konjic | 4 （14，81\％） | 4 （14，81\％） | 5 （18，51\％） | ヘ |
| Gornji Vakuf－Uskoplje | 4 （17，39\％） | 6 （26，08\％） | 6 （26，08\％） | － |
| Vareš | 4 （21，05\％） | 6 （31，56\％） | 4 （21，05\％） | $\checkmark$ |

FBiH－number of elected female councillors

| Municipality／city | 2012. | 2016. | 2020. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ilidža | 4 （14，81\％） | 7 （25，92\％） | 10 （37\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Pale－Prača | 4 （36，36\％） | 3 （27，27\％） | 4 （36，36\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Široki Brijeg | 4 （16\％） | 5 （20\％） | 6 （24\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Bosansko Grahovo | 4 （26，66\％） | 1 （6，66\％） | 3 （19，88\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Stolac | 4 （23，53\％） | 6 （35，29\％） | 5 （29，41\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Vogošća | 4 （16\％） | 3 （12\％） | 4 （16\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Trnovo | 4 （26，66\％） | 4 （26，66\％） | 7 （46，82\％） | ヘ |
| Lukavac | 4 （12，90\％） | 5 （16，10\％） | 4 （12，90\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Bugojno | 4 （16\％） | 4 （16\％） | 4 （16\％） | － |
| Bosanska Krupa | 4 （16\％） | 5 （20\％） | 4 （16\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Drvar | 4 （23，53\％） | 4 （23，53\％） | 7 （41，17\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Bosanski Petrovac | 4 （23，52\％） | 3 （17，64\％） | 3 （17，64\％） | － |
| Ključ | 5 （20\％） | 5 （20\％） | 5 （20\％） | － |
| Ljubuški | 5 （20\％） | 3 （12\％） | 5 （20\％） | ヘ |
| Foča－Ustikolina | 5 （45，45\％） | 4 （34，36\％） | 4 （27，27\％） | － |
| Sanski Most | 5 （16，12\％） | 5 （16，12\％） | 5 （16，12\％） | － |
| Ravno | 5 （33，33\％） | 5 （33，33\％） | 5 （33，33\％） | － |
| Čitluk | 5 （20\％） | 5 （20\％） | 6 （24\％） | ヘ |
| Zavidovići | 5 （17，24\％） | 4 （13，79\％） | 2 （6，88\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Čapljina | 5 （20\％） | 9 （36\％） | 6 （24\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Cazin | 5 （16，66\％） | 6 （20\％） | 7 （23，33\％） | ヘ |
| Dobretići | 5 （45，45\％） | 1 （9，09\％） | 5 （45，45\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Maglaj | 5 （20\％） | 7 （28\％） | 2 （8\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Hadžići | 5 （18，50\％） | 8 （29，62\％） | 10 （37，03\％） | ヘ |
| Goražde | 5 （20\％） | 6 （24\％） | 2 （8\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Jajce | 6 （24\％） | 8 （32\％） | 5 （20\％） | $V$ |
| Bihać | 6 （20\％） | 6 （20\％） | 9 （30\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Zavidovići | 6 （20，64\％） | 4 （13，79\％） | 2 （6，88\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Tuzla | 6 （19，35\％） | 11 （35，42\％） | 8 （25，77\％） | $\checkmark$ |


| FBiH |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | number of elected female councillors |  |  |  |
| Municipality／city | 2012. | 2016. | 2020. |  |
| Visoko | $6(24 \%)$ | $7(28 \%)$ | $4(16 \%)$ | V |
| Novi Grad Sarajevo | $7(22,59 \%)$ | $9(29,03 \%)$ | $9(29,03 \%)$ | - |
| Žepče | $7(28 \%)$ | $6(24 \%)$ | $6(24 \%)$ | - |
| Zenica | $7(22,58 \%)$ | $5(16,10 \%)$ | $3(9,66 \%)$ | V |
| Banovići | $7(30,43 \%)$ | $7(30,43 \%)$ | $7(30,43 \%)$ | - |
| Gračanica | $7(23,33 \%)$ | $3(13,04 \%)$ | $2(8,68 \%)$ | V |
| Centar Sarajevo | $7(22,58 \%)$ | $8(25,80 \%)$ | $10(32,25 \%)$ | 人 |
| Travnik | $7(22,58 \%)$ | $6(19,36 \%)$ | $7(22,58 \%)$ | 人 |
| Orašje | $7(28 \%)$ | $6(24 \%)$ | $6(24 \%)$ | - |
| Breza | $8(38,09 \%)$ | $4(19,04 \%)$ | $4(19,04 \%)$ | - |
| Velika Kladuša | $9(32,14 \%)$ | $10(35,71 \%)$ | $6(21,42 \%)$ | V |
| Livno | $9(29,03 \%)$ | $11(35,42 \%)$ | $7(22,54 \%)$ | V |
| Novo Sarajevo | $10(32,25 \%)$ | $8(25,76 \%)$ | $10(32,25 \%)$ | 人 |
| Stari Grad Sarajevo | $10(32,25 \%)$ | $6(19,35 \%)$ | $5(16,12 \%)$ | V |
| TOTAL FBiH | $311(17,11 \%)$ | $359(19,75 \%)$ | $394(21,4 \%)$ |  |


|  | BRČKO DISTRICT－number of elected female councillors |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | 2016． | 2020. |  |
| 2012． | $2(6,44 \%)$ | $4(12,88 \%)$ | 人 |
| $5(16,12 \%)$ |  |  |  |

Republika Srpska－number of elected female councillors

| Municipality／city | 2012． | 2016． | 2020. |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Stanari | Municipality did <br> not exist | $\mathbf{3 ( 1 7 , 6 4 \% )}$ | $1(5,88 \%)$ | 人 |
| Rudo | 0 | 0 | $1(5,88 \%)$ | 人 |
| Donji Žabar | 0 | 0 | $2(15,38 \%)$ | 人 |
| Ribnik | 0 | $1(5,88 \%)$ | $3(17,64 \%)$ | 人 |
| Milići | $1(5,26 \%)$ | $2(10,52 \%)$ | $1(5,26 \%)$ | V |
| Brod | $1(4 \%)$ | $6(24 \%)$ | $7(28 \%)$ | 人 |

Republika Srpska－number of elected female councillors

| Municipality／city | 2012. | 2016. | 2020. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Osmaci | 1 （6，66\％） | 1 （6，66\％） | 1 （6，66\％） | － |
| Novo Goražde | 1 （7，69\％） | 1 （7，69\％） | 2 （15，38\％） | ヘ |
| Han－Pijesak | 1 （6，66\％） | 4 （26，66\％） | 3 （19，64\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Srebrenica | 1 （4，76\％） | 2 （9，52\％） | 3 （14，28\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Banja Luka | 2 （6，44\％） | 4 （12，98\％） | 6 （19，32\％） | ヘ |
| Istočno Novo Sarajevo | 2 （10，52\％） | 2 （10，52\％） | 6 （31，57\％） | ヘ |
| Lopare | 2 （8，68\％） | 5 （21，70\％） | 2 （8，68\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Kostajnica | 2 （11，76\％） | 3 （17，64\％） | 2 （11，76\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Vlasenica | 2 （10，52\％） | 2 （10，52\％） | 3 （15，78\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Višegrad | 2 （9，52\％） | 3 （14，28\％） | 2 （9，52\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Ugljevik | 2 （8，72\％） | 1 （4，34\％） | 1 （4，34\％） | － |
| Petrovo | 2 （11，76\％） | 2 （11，76\％） | 4 （23，52\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Trnovo | 2 （15，38\％） | 3 （23，07\％） | 3 （23，07\％） | － |
| Pelagićevo | 2 （13，32\％） | 0 | 0 | － |
| Bijeljina | 2 （6，44\％） | 1 （3，22\％） | 3 （9，66\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Gacko | 2 （11，76\％） | 3 （16，64\％） | 3 （16，64\％） | － |
| Vukosavlje | 2 （13，32\％） | 2 （13，32\％） | 2 （13，32\％） | － |
| Čajniče | 2 （13，32\％） | 2 （13，32\％） | 4 （26，66\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Bileća | 2 （10，52\％） | 1 （5，26\％） | 2 （10，52\％） | ヘ |
| Berkovići | 2 （15，38\％） | 4 （30，76\％） | 1 （7，69\％） | $V$ |
| Istočni Mostar | 2 （18，18\％） | 3 （27，27\％） | 2 （18，18\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Teslić | 3 （10，32\％） | 3 （10，32\％） | 3 （10，32\％） | － |
| Prijedor | 3 （9，66\％） | 4 （12，98\％） | 6 （19，88\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Kneževo | 3 （15，78\％） | 2 （10，52\％） | 1 （5，26\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Oštra Luka | 3 （20\％） | 1 （6，66\％） | 2 （13，32\％） | ヘ |
| Srbac | 3 （12\％） | 10 （40\％） | 8 （32\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Nevesinje | 3 （14，28\％） | 4 （19，04\％） | 3 （14，28\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Rogatica | 3 （15，78\％） | 4 （21，05\％） | 2 （10，52\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Krupa na Uni | 3 （23，07\％） | 2 （15，38\％） | 3 （23，07\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Doboj | 3 （9，66\％） | 5 （16，10\％） | 3 （9，66\％） | $\checkmark$ |


| Republika Srpska－number of elected female councillors |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Municipality／city | 2012. | 2016. | 2020. |  |
| Derventa | 3 （10，34\％） | 4 （13，79\％） | 2 （6，88\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Kotor－Varoš | 3 （12\％） | 5 （20\％） | 4 （16\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Sokolac | 3 （14，28\％） | 3 （14，28\％） | 3 （14，28\％） | － |
| Šekovići | 3 （17，64\％） | 2 （11，66\％） | 2 （11，66\％） | － |
| Prnjavor | 3 （10，34\％） | 4 （13，76\％） | 4 （13，76\％） | － |
| Ljubinje | 4 （26，66\％） | 5 （33，32\％） | 2 （13，32\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Istočna Ilidža | 4 （17，39\％） | 5 （21，73\％） | 5 （21，73\％） | － |
| Foča | 4 （20\％） | 2 （10\％） | 4 （20\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Šipovo | 4 （21，05\％） | 2 （10，52\％） | 2 （10，52\％） | － |
| Petrovac | 4 （30，76\％） | 5 （38，45\％） | 4 （30，76\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Dubica | 4 （14，81\％） | 5 （18，51\％） | 4 （14，81\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Trebinje | 4 （14，81\％） | 4 （14，81\％） | 4 （14，81\％） | － |
| Istočni Stari Grad | 4 （30，76\％） | 4 （30，76\％） | 6 （46，14\％） | ヘ |
| Bratunac | 4 （16\％） | 5 （20\％） | 1 （5\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Čelinac | 4 （17，39\％） | 3 （13，05\％） | 5 （21，70\％） | ヘ |
| Pale | 4 （16\％） | 4 （16\％） | 3 （12\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Istočni Drvar | 4 （36，36\％） | 3 （27，27\％） | 3 （27，27\％） | － |
| Zvornik | 4 （12，88\％） | 2 （6，44\％） | 7 （22，54\％） | ヘ |
| Mrkonjić－Grad | 4 （20\％） | 5 （25\％） | 5 （25\％） | － |
| Kalinovik | 5 （38，46\％） | 3 （23，07\％） | 5 （38，46\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Gradiška | 5 （16，10\％） | 3 （9，66\％） | 5 （16，10\％） | ヘ |
| Jezero | 5 （38，46\％） | 5 （38，46\％） | 3 （23，07\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Novi Grad | 5 （18，51\％） | 7 （25，90\％） | 4 （14，8\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Modriča | 6 （22，22\％） | 8 （25，90\％） | 7 （25，90\％） | $\checkmark$ |
| Šamac | 6 （24\％） | 6 （24\％） | 8 （32\％） | ヘ |
| Kupres | 6 （54，54\％） | 6 （ $54,54 \%$ ） | 7 （63，63\％） | $\wedge$ |
| Laktaši | 8 （27，58\％） | 8 （27，58\％） | 9 （31，03\％） | ヘ |
| TOTAL RS | 189 （14，91\％） | 211 （16，64\％） | 220 （17，35\％） |  |
| TOTAL BiH <br> （FBiH，BD，RS） | 505 （16，2\％） | 572 （18，36\％） | 618 （19，62\％） |  |



[^5] This UK Government


#### Abstract

The total share of elected women has risen slightly; from $14.91 \%$ in 2012 and $16.64 \%$ in 2016, it rose to $17.35 \%$ in the RS, or, expressed in numbers, from 189 to 220. In the FBiH the number rose from 311 (17.11\%) to 394 (21.4\%). ${ }^{37}$ The number of elected female list leaders rose from 100 to $116 .{ }^{38}$ The number of women mayors has stagnated; while in 2016 six women mayors were elected (one in the FBiH , five in the RS), in 2020 it was five ${ }^{39}$ (two in the FBiH and three in the RS) out of 140 mayoral or municipal mayoral posts filled directly.


It is a discouraging fact that, going by the results their parties achieved in their respective municipalities, only two of the female candidates who lost the race had stood a chance to win it. We observed no substantial variation in this across administrative units. In terms of representation of women, their advancement in the lists and the number of women list leaders who won a seat, the situation is somewhat better in the FBiH , especially in Sarajevo Canton, but the number of women mayors is higher in the RS. Apart from Sarajevo Canton, the number of women on local councils in most cantons in the FBiH has stagnated, except in the Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian Podrinje and Una-Sana canton, where it dropped slightly. In the RS, the regions of Semberija, Majevica and Birče stand out in terms of extreme underrepresentation of women.

Also encouraging are trends in the breakdown of elected women councillors by party affiliation and age. Amongst the parties that are considered new players in the FBiH, such as Narod i pravda (People and Justice - NiP) and Pokret demokratske akcije (Democratic Action Movement - PDA) we see that the share of elected female candidates in the total number is higher than average. Similarly, parties contesting in the RS for the first time have a significant number of women amongst their councillors (DEMOS - six, Socialist Party of Srpska - nine). Among the parties that have continually achieved good results in both entities, such as Stranka demokratske akcije (Party of Democratic Action - SDA), Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata (Union of Independent Social Democrats - SNSD) and Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (Croatian Democratic Union - HDZ BiH ), the share of elected women candidates continues to rise. SNSD had 78 in 2012, 87 in 2016, and in 2020 it had 96 female councillors ( $22.22 \%$ of the total number of SNSD councillors); SDA went from 67 in 2012 to 108 in 2016, and to 96 women councillors (23.52\% of total SDA councillors) in 2020. Especially impressive is the increase in the number of HDZ BiH women councillors; from 41 in 2012 to 88 in 2016, and to 91 in 2020, increasing the share of women in the ranks of this party's councillors from $16.6 \%$ to $28.66 \%$. If we add the fact that three parties have splintered off from SDA since 2016 (NiP, Independent Bloc-Nezavisni blok and PDA) and had 45 elected candidates between them in the last elections, the data shows a general rise in the rates of representation of women in large political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These parties' candidates did not become councillors just because of the quotas applied in the drafting of the lists. In many constituencies where big parties reign supreme the rise happened precisely

[^6]within these lists. This also supports the conclusion that the electorate, as well as the membership of the parties, recognises the value of women candidates as it gives them preferential votes which enable them to rise on the lists.

The parties whose results have either stagnated or dropped slightly retain significant rates of representation of women, which testifies to the citizens' confidence in women candidates, as well as to the fact that their parties' bodies do not neglect them. ${ }^{40}$ We see a significant drop in the number of elected female candidates, i.e. their share in the total number of the party's councillors, in the parties Demokratska fronta (Democratic Front DF) and Narodni demokratski pokret (People’s Democratic Movement - NDP). However, the reason for this should be sought in the loss of voter support as well as the internal and organisational problems these parties have faced. SDP, as the only party that makes open reference to feminist politics in its programmes, ${ }^{41}$ had a mere $19 \%$ of women among its elected councillors in the last elections. Naša stranka (NS), as the only party that strives to maintain a $50 \%$ female representation rate in its bodies, experienced a drop in the number of votes compared to 2016, but has retained an above-average share of female elected candidates.

The number of female candidates who have moved up the list has increased substantially in comparison to 2016, going from 87 to 123 in the FBiH , and in the RS from 73 to 88 , which testifies to their competitiveness among the electorate. Many women who started their political careers as local councillors and are now entity- or state-level MPs, appeared on council lists in order to support their parties with their popularity. ${ }^{42}$ This illustrates a trend of rising competitiveness of women candidates among the electorate as well as in their parties' internal dynamics. Rather interesting are the results achieved by under-30 female candidates. According to the Central Commission data, ${ }^{43}$ this age cohort has a share of $13.32 \%$ in the total number of seats, but the share of women in this cohort is $35.42 \%$, almost twice as good as the overall electoral performance of female candidates. This further supports our hypothesis that the electorate is not the only or most important reason for the underrepresentation of women in municipal councils.

[^7]/in UK Government

| FBiH |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Party | Share of women in total no. of councillors 2016 | No. of female councillors $2016$ | Share of women in total no. of councillors 2020 | No. of female councillors $2020$ |
| SDA | 20,88\% | 108/517 | 23,52\% | 96/408 |
| PDA | - | - | 23,80\% | 10/42 |
| SBB | 16,94\% | 20/118 | 20,31\% | 13/64 |
| DF | 23,4\% | 22/94 | 17,02\% | 8/47 |
| NS | 42,42\% | 14/33 | 34,37\% | 11/32 |
| SDP | 17,43\% | 34/195 | 19\% | 38/200 |
| Independent and local lists | 16,91\% | 23/166 | 16,04\% | 26/162 |
| SBiH | 17,39\% | 12/69 | 10,86\% | 5/46 |
| PzP | - | - | 31,81\% | 7/22 |
| NBL | - | - | 11,11\% | 4/36 |
| BPS | 0 | 0/34 | 28,28\% | 2/7 |
| SD |  | - | 6,89\% | 2/29 |
| A-SDA | 18,64\% | 11/59 | 16,66\% | 10/60 |
| NBlok |  | - | 26,31\% | 5/19 |
| NiP |  | - | 29,41\% | 30/102 |
| HDZ BiH | 28,57\% | 88/308 | 28,98\% | 91/314 |
| HKDU | 10\% | 1/10 | 25\% | 2/8 |
| HDZ 1990 | 18,75\% | 15/80 | 29,41\% | 15/51 |
| HSS | 0 | 0/10 | 30,76\% | 4/13 |
| HDU | 33\% | 1/3 | 50\% | 2/4 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { HSP BiH - HSP } \\ & \text { AS } \end{aligned}$ | 4,76\% | 1/21 | 10\% | 2/20 |
| HRS | 100\% | 1/1 | 9,09\% | 1/11 |
| SNSD | 17,64\% | 3/17 | 36,36\% | 6/21 |
| PDP | 33\% | $1 / 3$ | - | - |
| SP | 33\% | 1/3 | 66\% | 2/3 |
| GS | 11,11\% | 1/9 | 0\% | $0 / 3$ |
| SNS | 0 | 0/10 | 10,52\% | 2/19 |
| DNS | 33\% | 2/6 | 0\% | 0/6 |


|  | RS |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Share of wom- <br> en in total no. <br> of councillors <br> Party | No. of female <br> councillors <br> 2016 | Share of wom- <br> en in total no. <br> of councillors <br> 2020 | No. of female <br> councillors <br> 2020 |
| SNSD | $21,89 \%$ | $87 / 379$ | $22,22 \%$ | $96 / 432$ |
| SDS | $18,49 \%$ | $51 / 265$ | $16,59 \%$ | $39 / 235$ |
| Demos | - | - | $10,29 \%$ | $7 / 68$ |
| DNS | $12,90 \%$ | $20 / 155$ | $14,81 \%$ | $20 / 135$ |
| PDP | $11,92 \%$ | $13 / 109$ | $15,66 \%$ | $13 / 83$ |
| US | $14,14 \%$ | $2 / 14$ | $15,87 \%$ | $10 / 63$ |
| SPS | - | - | $21,05 \%$ | $8 / 38$ |
| SP | $12,79 \%$ | $12 / 86$ | $10,12 \%$ | $8 / 79$ |
| Independent | $16,66 \%$ | $10 / 60$ | $23,40 \%$ | $11 / 47$ |
| and local lists | $11,86 \%$ | $7 / 58$ | $7,40 \%$ | $2 / 27$ |
| NDP | $5,88 \%$ | $2 / 17$ | - | - |
| SNS | $12,5 \%$ | $1 / 8$ | $50 \%$ | $1 / 2$ |
| SBB | $12,19 \%$ | $5 / 41$ | $5,55 \%$ | $2 / 38$ |
| SDA | 0 | 0 | $100 \%$ | $2 / 2$ |
| DF | $7,14 \%$ | $1 / 14$ | 0 | $0 / 7$ |
| SDP | 0 | $0 / 4$ | 0 | $0 / 4$ |
| SBiH | 0 | $0 / 10$ | 0 | $0 / 5$ |
| HDZ | 0 | $0 / 4$ | 0 | $0 / 1$ |
| HDZ 1990 | 0 | $0 / 17$ | 0 | $0 / 2$ |
| SRS RS | 0 | $0 / 23$ | $9,09 \%$ | $1 / 11$ |
| SRS | 0 |  |  |  |

This research is quantitative in nature, which is why its scope is limited in terms of predicting or understanding the intentions of the political parties' leadership. Yet, in the light of the quantitative data, it seems important to point out that most parties with less than $10 \%$ of votes at the local level less frequently field women, that is, female candidates who enjoy significant voter support, as front runners. The low electoral threshold of $3 \%$, in conjunction with the specificities of local politics as well as with voter preference, leads to the fact that parties that represent local interests rather than broader party policies in a particular community as a rule, do not have women candidates who win the support of the electorate. We see that from the fact that women candidates who won council seats in 17 municipalities in the RS and 12 in the FBiH exclusively come
from parties that won $10 \%$ of vote or more, and in the fact that women running on independent, regional and local lists achieve lower results on average than those on the lists of most parties.

This brings us to the question of whether female candidates' competitiveness stems from their parties' good results and their own reputation and commitment, and if so, to what extent. It seems that there can be no unambiguous answer to this, and that results vary from party to party, and in some cases from community to community. For instance, the share of women in the case of new players on the political stage such as NiP and Platform for Progress is significantly above average. On the other hand, the rise in the number of HDZ councillors in the period from 2012 to 2020 is impressive indeed, but it was by and large achieved in communities where the party enjoys over $50 \%$ support. Almost half of the women councillors elected on HDZ's lists in 2020 come from these communities (Orašje, Čitluk, Ljubuški, Široki Brijeg, Posušje, Neum, Ravno, Čapljina and Grude). As a result, it seems that women candidates do not bring votes to HDZ, but the popularity of this party brings votes to them. This is not to downplay the significance of the fact that voters support some women candidates with their preferential votes in these communities, too, but we consider that an additional analysis which would combine quantitative and field research is necessary to illuminate the mechanisms governing the interaction of these factors.

Consistently good results of big parties such as HDZ, SNSD and SDA correlate with the increase in the number of women elected on these parties' lists. In contrast to that, the presence of a large number of small parties in a local community may correlate negatively with the number of women on legislative councils. This can be partly explained by voter bias, but we need case studies to explain, for instance, the reasons for the fall in the representation of women in the municipalities where it was higher in 2012 than in 2020 (for example Gračanica, Maglaj, Novi Grad, Bratunac, Zenica). Additionally, such an analysis could determine whether the candidates who retain their seats are men while women do not last long in politics, and whether parties adequately replace women candidates who advance on the party ladder and run for offices at higher levels of government.

## Conclusion

Bosnian-Herzegovinian voters prefer men to women in local elections. This preference is statistically relevant, but its full impact cannot be quantified as the existing empirical research into this does not offer sufficient data that would make quantification possible. There is no doubt that the introduction of quotas in the run-up to the 1998 and 2014 elections helped overcome this hurdle to women's participation in politics. However, the results of the 2020 election show that no political party with a significant share of women, whether it be a large, stagnating or newly established party, was punished by voters anywhere in BiH for the inclusion of women. The rise in the number of women candidates who have moved up on the list and the number of women mayoral candidates, the success and the rise in the number of women list leaders, the representation of under- 30 women candidates, which is almost twice as high as that of women candidates from other age groups, as well as the fact that the most momentous political changes took place in Sarajevo Canton, which is also the region with the highest participation rate of female candidates, proves that women are much more than a quota. Their competitiveness is not rising at the desired pace, but it cannot be dismissed either. Likewise, the challenges to their competitiveness, which lie in political party structures and the fact that patriarchal norms can pose a significant obstacle to women's participation in politics, also cannot be dismissed. The latter factor seems especially important if connected to the rise in the number of female members of political parties. ${ }^{44}$

The number of women in local-level legislatures could be increased with more commitment on the part of political parties. A rise in the number of women in legislative bodies must be understood as a strategic and developmental goal of political parties. In that regard, it is very important to use the high percentage of women who win seats as list leaders as an argument. The progress achieved in this area from 2016 to 2020 leads us to the conclusion that an increase in this number would not only boost the number of elected female candidates, but would also contribute to better general visibility of women because of the connection between front runner status and media access. In connection with this, we also welcome any suggestion aimed at connecting party financing and

[^8] NU UK Government
the percentage of women list leaders or the general level of representation of women in legislatures, not least because public funds remain the key source of financing for all political parties in $\mathrm{BiH} .{ }^{45}$

The impact of the specificities of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian election system, such as direct voting for mayors and the seat allocation system, is not decisive, but it does affect women's representation. Consecutive terms served by mayors, as well as large numbers of small and local parties in the elections, reduce the number of women elected into local councils. There is a glass ceiling in our politics, in the sense that the highest party and state offices remain out of women's reach, and at the local level there is also something we might call a "lower threshold" which narrows the manoeuvring space for female candidates. Low numbers of women list leaders and (municipal) mayoral candidates consistently lead to lesser representation of women in the media and the public sphere in general, and also creates the perception among researchers that female members of political parties matter less than males. One gets the impression that political parties do not count on a significant part of their female membership in the long run.

Political parties would do well to continue or start implementing policies leading to more equal representation of women, especially by having them lead election lists, because such policies not only contribute to gender equality, but also guarantee voter support. In this regard, we think that parties also need expert support. It is necessary to widen our knowledge based on existing opinion polls ${ }^{46}$ and not only research the reasons for the underrepresentation of women, but also look into the situation of elected candidates, especially those from younger age groups, in order to gain more insight about their position in their parties and possible ways to keep as many of them as possible in their parties.

Conversely, stressing voter preference as the decisive factor determining the currently poor representation of women on local councils is dangerous not only because it is not completely true but also because it provides an alibi to party leaderships to neglect women's participation as a factor contributing to the party's success in representing the will and interests of the electorate. Activities aimed at raising public awareness are certainly more than necessary, but they must be designed so as to avoid creating the perception of women as less worthy candidates than men.

[^9] TMU UK Government


[^0]:    1 Žene na pozicijama političkog odlučivanja u Bosni i Hercegovini: aksiom ili oksimoron? Policy Brief 02, USAID, Council of Europe, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology
    2 Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiH, Akcioni plan za implementaciju UNSCR 1325 "Žene, mir i sigurnost" u Bosni i Hercegovini za period 2018-2022.
    3 Unless noted otherwise, the data used in this analysis was collected from the website of the Central Election Commission www.izbori.ba. It is possible that the data listed here will not correspond with the actual composition of the local councils, as some of the elected candidates may not accept their seats. However, we decided not to use the data presenting the actual composition of the local councils, but the data that illustrates the voters' inclinations on the election day.
    4 Edita Miftari, Politička participacija žena u Bosni i Hercegovini, analiza učešća žena na stranačkim listama i konačnih rezultata općih izbora 2014, Sarajevski otvoreni centar, Sarajevo 2015, p. 17
    5 Id. 18.

[^1]:    6 According to the data from the Agency for Statistics' publication titled "Žene i muškarci 2020", available at http://www.bhas.gov.ba/data/Publikacije/Bilteni/2020/FAM_00_2019_TB_0_BS.pdf, p. 82.
    7 Inter-Parlamentary Union. Ranking of women in national parliaments, https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=10\&year=2020
    8 In the meantime the number of women in the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH rose from nine to eleven, that is, from 21.4 to $26 \%$. This rise is not an expression of the citizens' will; rather, it was due to two elected MPs taking up executive posts, with their seats passing on to female candidates who were placed below them on the list.
    9 Agency for Statistics BiH, footnote 7, p. 82.
    10 The term gender quota refers to the share of candidates of the less represented sex on the list of a political party in order for the party to be allowed to run in the election.
    11 Razlika u razvojnim prioritetima između političara i političarki, i glasača i glasačica: dokazi iz Bosne i Hercegovine, Projekat podrške monitoringu i evaluaciji u BiH, Sarajevo, 2017.
    12 Aljazeera. Žene su i dalje dekor bh. politike. https://balkans.aljazeera.net/teme/2020/9/30/zene-su-i-dalje-dekor-bh-politike

[^2]:    13 According to the data of the Central Election Commission from the document "BiH Izborni pokazatelji 2002-2014."
    14 Polazna studija o barijerama političkom učešću žena u Bosni i Hercegovini, Lucid Linx Sarajevo
    15 See Projekat podrške monitoringu i evaluaciji u BiH, footnote 9.
    16 Hasanbegović, D.: Lokalni izbori u BiH 2016. i politička participacija žena - ni blizu 40\%, https://6yka. com/novosti/lokalni-izbori-u-bih-2016-i-politicka-participacija-zena-ni-blizu-40, 2017.
    17 It is important to point out that the gender quotas do not apply in the election of mayors and municipal mayors, and that political parties are at liberty to field candidates of their choosing.
    18 Projekat podrške monitoringu i evaluaciji u BiH, footnote 9 .
    19 According to the data of the Agency for Statistics $\mathrm{BiH}, 30 \%$ of BiH citizens do not have internet access, of which 33\% are women http://www.bhas.gov.ba/data/Publikacije/Bilteni/2020/FAM 002019 TB 0 BS.pdf
    20 Centar za izborne studije (CIS): Učešće politički angažiranih žena u predizbornoj kampanji za lokalne izbore 2016.

[^3]:    21 Cf. Zagorac, M.: Politička participacija žena u BiH - rodna perspektiva rezultata Opštih izbora 2018, Sarajevski otvoreni centar 2018.
    22 Cf. Kadribašić, A.: Strateški pristup uspjehu kandidatkinja u kampanjama, United Nations Development Programme Sarajevo, 2019.
    23 Zagorac, footnote 21, Miftari footnote 4.
    24 Kadribašić et al., footnote 11.
    25 Babović, M., Stanojević, D., Milinović, J.: Rodne nejednakosti u Republici Srpskoj iz perspektive životnih tokova, Gender Centar Vlade Republike Srpske, Banja Luka 2017.
    26 For instance, in the 2016 local election, most examples of this were recorded in the urban municipalities of Sarajevo, and the towns of Modriča, Posušje, Trnovo, Ljubinje and Srbac.
    27 According to the results of the 2016 election, there were 17 such candidates in the FBiH .

[^4]:    31 Out of the 140 directly elected (municipal) mayors in BiH , as many as ten have held the post for 20 years or longer. See: Infografika: Najdugovječniji načelnici i gradonačelnici u BiH, Al Jazeera Balkans, https:// balkans.aljazeera.net/interactives/2020/11/13/infografika-najdugovjecniji-nacelnici-i-gradonacelnici -u-bih
    32 In the 2016 election these parties were: Serbian Radical Party of the Republika Srpska, Serbian Radical Party, Civic Democrats, Liberal Democrats, Serbian Progressive Party, BOSS - Bosnian Party, Regional Democratic Party, Union of Croatian Catholics and Democrats, Croatian Party of Rights, Croatian People's Union, Patriotic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The total share of council seats won by these parties in the 2016 election was slightly above 4\%.
    33 Gallagher, M.: Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems, British Journal of Political Science, 1992, p. 495
    34 Kovačević, D.: Institucionalizacija partija i partijskih sistema u zemljama na prostiru bivše SFRJ, 2019, p. 35
    35 These are the municipalities of Bužim, Glamoč, Han Pijesak and Ugljevik, where a large number of political parties entered the council.

[^5]:    36 Note: the data refers to the number of list leaders of the political parties that crossed the threshold in their constituencies, not to the total number of lists.

[^6]:    37 This calculation takes into account election results as published on the Central Election Commission's website, www.izbori.ba.
    38 This number includes only the candidates of the parties that won council seats.
    39 Dušica Runić (SNSD) Drvar, Milka Ivanković (ZSD) Istočni Drvar, Snežana Ružičić (SNSD) Jezero, Mila Petković (SNSD) Novo Goražde, Nada Ćulap (HDZ) Odžak.

[^7]:    40 This is the case with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Democratic Progress Party (PDP), Alliance for a Better Future (SBB), Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990), Naša stranka (NS) and People's Democratic Union (DNS).
    41 SDP BIH. Pedeset posto žena na izbornim listama SDP BiH je ravnopravnost na djelu. https://www.sdp. ba/pedeset-posto-zena-na-izbornim-Listama-sdp-bih-je-ravnopravnost-na-djelu/
    42 For instance, Ljubica Milinović in Trebinje, Dajana Čolić in Lukavac, Jelena Trivić in Banja Luka.
    43 The data was presented by Central Election Commission member Suad Arnautović on 23 December in his talk at a public gathering devoted to the results of local elections in BiH from a gender perspective. We expect the data to be included in the document "Izborni pokazatelji", to be prepared by the Commission and published on its website.

[^8]:    44 Babović, Stanojević and Milinović, footnote 25.

[^9]:    45 See Klix, 2021. Ovako se finansiraju političke stranke u BiH: Za 14 godina iz budžeta dobile 282 miliona KM https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ovako-se-finansiraju-politicke-stranke-u-bih-za-14-godina-iz-budzeta-dobile-282-miliona-km/210108065 The article gives the Central Election Commission's figures which show that the share of budget financing for these political subjects is no lower than $65 \%$.
    46 Projekat podrške monitoringu i evaluaciji u BiH , footnote 9 , Centar za izborne studije

