

# Political Party Performance Index

## Nigeria

2025

# Copyright and Disclaimer

**All rights reserved.** No part of this research may be reproduced, stored, or transmitted in any form without prior written permission from the authors. Proper citation is required for any references to this study.

© **2025 Disclaimer:** The Political Party Performance Index (PPPI) Research is an independent, data-driven assessment conducted to evaluate the inclusivity, legal compliance, and public outreach of political parties in Nigeria. The research is based on publicly available data, official party documents, structured surveys, and stakeholder engagements. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information presented, the findings, analyses, and conclusions are intended for informational, advocacy and research purposes only and should not be construed as an endorsement or critique of any specific political party. The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) and its partners bear no responsibility for any direct or indirect errors, omissions, or consequences resulting from the use of the information provided.

# Acknowledgement

This research work was conducted by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and Kimpact Development Initiative

## Author

Kimpact Development Initiative

## Database Management

Auta Gideon—Research Assistant, KDI

Tolulope Afun—Research Assistant, KDI

## Contributing Author and Editor

Oluwafemi John Adebayo—Head, Research and Strategy, KDI

Bukola Idowu—Team Lead, KDI

Olorunmola Adebawale - Country Representative, WFD Nigeria

Sola Folayan - Program Manager, WFD Nigeria

The author would like to express their deepest appreciation to the 37 state enumerators engaged in this project (*See the list of enumerators in Annex 1*). Your unwavering dedication and diligence in the face of considerable challenges have been integral to the successful completion of this work, especially the data collection phase on which the work rests.

We also thank the peer reviewers:

- Prof. John Oluwole A. AKINTAYO (Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, University of Ibadan.
- Prof., Adetunji Ogunyemi (Lecturer, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife, Lawyer and Political Economic Historian)
- Dr Sheidu Comfort (Political scientist, gender specialist and lecturer at Baze University Abuja)

We express our sincere appreciation to colleagues at the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, London office (*Duncan Wall, Adele Poskitt, Michael Nevin, Zoe Clack*) for the supportive role played in this initiative and for providing substantial support at every stage of the PPPI.

# Contents

Copyright and Disclaimer .....	2
Acknowledgement .....	3
Contents .....	4
Definition of Terms .....	5
List of acronyms .....	6
Executive Summary .....	8
The state of Political Parties "On paper" .....	9
The state of Political Parties: Party members' perspective ("In reality A") .....	9
The state of Political Parties: Citizen perception ("In reality B") .....	10
Cross-comparative analysis: Where disconnect lies .....	10
Public Outreach (On Paper → Party Members → Citizens): .....	10
Conclusion and recommendations .....	11
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background .....	12
Chapter 2: About the PPPI .....	18
The PPPI Pillars - Explained .....	18
Why these three dimensions? .....	20
Why the PPPI matters? .....	21
Scope of the PPPI Pilot Phase .....	21
PPPI Methodological Approaches .....	22
Limitations to the study .....	29
Chapter 3: The performance: State of the Political Parties in Nigeria .....	32
State of Political Parties – “On Paper” .....	32
State of Political Parties-Legal Compliance .....	33
State of Political Parties (Perspective of Party Members) – “In Reality A” .....	35
State of Political Parties (Citizen Perception on Public Outreach) – “In Reality B” .....	36
Chapter 4: Comparative Analysis: What Political Parties Claim vs What Actually Exists .....	38
Pillar 1: Inclusivity Practices .....	38
Pillar 2: Legal Compliance .....	49
Pillar 3: Public Outreach .....	57
Chapter 5: Overall Conclusion of the Comparative Analysis .....	68
Chapter 6: Recommendations .....	69

Annex 1. List of state-based Enumerators.....	72
Annex 2: PPPI Indicators .....	74

## Definition of Terms

Term	Definition
Political Party Performance Index (PPPI)	A multi-dimensional framework developed to assess the performance of political parties based on inclusivity, legal compliance, and public outreach. It uses a triangulated data approach involving party executives, party members, INEC officials, and citizens.
Inclusivity Practices	The structures, policies, and practical efforts of political parties to promote the participation of under-represented groups, particularly women, youth, and persons with disabilities, in party activities and decision-making.
Legal Compliance	The degree to which political parties adhere to the regulatory requirements of electoral laws, including those on party registration, finances, congresses, and internal governance. This is assessed both "on paper" and in practice.
Public Outreach	The capacity and commitment of political parties to engage, communicate with, and educate the public about their ideologies, programmes, and activities. This includes both traditional and digital outreach strategies.
On Paper	The documented commitments, policies, structures, and legal standards that political party executives reported to have in place; the legal compliance pillar of this was aligned with the INEC compliance report.
In Reality A	The practical experiences and perceptions of grassroots party members, reflecting how party policies and commitments are implemented at the operational level.
In Reality B	The perception of the public (non-party members) regarding the party's visibility, public engagement, transparency, and responsiveness.
Vertical Disconnect	A gap between the national party structures (and their official reports) and the actual experiences of grassroots members, signalling internal communication or implementation failure.
Horizontal Disconnect	A gap between the political parties and the public, often reflecting poor visibility, engagement, or misalignment with citizen expectations.

Variance Analysis	A comparative method used in the report to measure the difference between reported (on paper) and actual (in reality) performance across key indicators, identifying gaps and inconsistencies.
Triangulation	The methodological use of multiple perspectives (party executives, members, citizens, and INEC) to validate the data and provide a 360-degree view of party performance.
Insider-Outsider Perception Divide	The difference between how party insiders (members) and the public perceive the same political party, which can reflect trust deficits, communication failure, or branding issues.
Implementation Weakness	A situation where policy or legal commitments exist on paper but are not translated into meaningful actions or experiences at the grassroots level.
Tokenism	Symbolic or superficial efforts at inclusion (e.g., appointing one woman or youth) without real structural power or decision-making capacity given to the group.
Internal Party Democracy	The systems and practices that ensure fair decision-making, leadership selection, and member participation within political parties.

## List of acronyms

PPPI	Political Party Performance Index
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
CSO	Civil Society Organization
PWD	Persons with Disabilities
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
A	Accord
AAC	African Action Congress
ADC	African Democratic Congress
ADP	Action Democratic Party
APC	All Progressives Congress

APGA	All Progressives Grand Alliance
APM	Allied Peoples Movement
AA	Action Alliance
APP	Action Peoples Party
BP	Boot Party
LP	Labour Party
NNPP	New Nigeria Peoples Party
NRM	National Rescue Movement
PRP	Peoples Redemption Party
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
YPP	Young Progressive Party
YP	Youth Party
ZLP	Zenith Labour Party
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy
KDI	Kimpact Development Initiative

# Executive Summary

Since the return to democracy in 1999, political parties in Nigeria have faced enormous challenges in building institutional resilience, internal cohesion, public credibility, and democratic legitimacy<sup>1</sup>. From the early 1920s transition era to the Fourth Republic, parties have frequently been marked by ethnic division, weak internal democracy, elite capture, erratic ideological commitments, and a lack of inclusivity in their structures<sup>2 3</sup>. These gaps have weakened the foundational purpose of political parties as vehicles for political participation, issue-based representation, and democratic governance. Despite constitutional and electoral reforms over the years, Nigeria's political party ecosystem has largely remained transactional, with limited engagement between national party structures, grassroots members, and the public.

It is against this backdrop that the PPPI was conceived. The PPPI is an evidence-based framework designed to assess and benchmark the internal and external performance of all 19 registered political parties in Nigeria. It aims to deepen democratic practice by holding parties accountable to the ideals they profess, and the expectations they owe both their members and the public. Through this tool, the Index provides a pathway for improved transparency, internal accountability, strategic reform, and citizen engagement in political party development. It is not an audit but a developmental tool for political parties and those who seek to support democratic institution-building.

The Index is built on three critical performance pillars:

1. **Inclusivity Practices:** Examining how parties promote the participation of women, youth, and persons with disabilities within their structures.
2. **Legal Compliance:** Evaluating party adherence to regulatory obligations, including financial reporting, constitutional conformity, membership structures, and operational mandates.
3. **Public Outreach:** Assessing how parties communicate their ideology, engage the media, conduct voter education, and build visibility at the grassroots.

To deliver a well-rounded and grounded analysis, a three-layered methodology was employed. First, data was collected from national and subnational party documents and self-assessments, referred to as the “On Paper” evaluation. Second, party members across the 36 states and the FCT

---

<sup>1</sup> Academia.edu. (n.d.). Brief history on the evolution of political parties in Nigeria. Available at [https://www.academia.edu/92640607/Brief\\_history\\_on\\_the\\_evolution\\_of\\_political\\_parties\\_in\\_Nigeria](https://www.academia.edu/92640607/Brief_history_on_the_evolution_of_political_parties_in_Nigeria)

<sup>2</sup>ResearchGate. (n.d.). The role of ethnic identity in political mobilization: An analytical review. Available at [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/385207980\\_The\\_Role\\_of\\_Ethnic\\_Identity\\_in\\_Political\\_Mobilization\\_An\\_Analytical\\_Review](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/385207980_The_Role_of_Ethnic_Identity_in_Political_Mobilization_An_Analytical_Review)

<sup>3</sup> Afrobarometer. (2023). Explaining the experience of political violence in Nigeria (Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 197). Available at <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/WP197-Explaining-the-experience-of-political-violence-in-Nigeria-Afrobarometer-working-paper-9march23.pdf>



provided their assessments through surveys and scorecards, which form the basis of the “In Reality A” findings. Finally, citizens evaluated their perceptions of each party’s visibility and public engagement, representing the “In Reality B” layer. These datasets were triangulated to expose gaps, inconsistencies, and areas of alignment.

## The state of Political Parties "On paper"

On the face of it, most political parties present a strong image of structure and commitment to democratic norms. Across all 19 political parties, the average self-reported score for **inclusivity practices** was 82.4%, suggesting that nearly all parties claim to have internal mechanisms to promote gender, youth, and PWD participation. The highest score came from the Zenith Labour Party (ZLP) and African Democratic Congress (ADC), both at 95%, while the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) posted the lowest at 55%.

On **legal compliance**, parties reported an average score of 86.4%, indicating near-universal claims of regulatory alignment. Parties such as the All-Progressives Congress (APC), Zenith Labour Party (ZLP), New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP), and ADC all scored 93% or above, while Action Alliance (AA) and Action Peoples Party (APP) were among the lowest at 74% and 76%, respectively.

In the dimension of **public outreach**, self-reported scores averaged 81.7%. Parties like the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (100%), African Action Congress (AAC) (97%), and Boot Party (BP) (95%) presented themselves as highly engaged. However, parties such as the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) (45%) and Action Peoples Party (APP) (65%) rated themselves much lower, suggesting internal recognition of poorer public visibility.

## The state of Political Parties: Party members’ perspective ("In reality A")

When party members were asked to evaluate inclusivity, legal compliance, and outreach, the story changed dramatically. The average inclusivity score from party members dropped to 67.6%, revealing a 15% implementation gap between official claims and reality. Parties such as ADC (52.9%), Boot Party (BP) (52.9%), and Action Democratic Party (ADP) (50%) recorded sharp declines. In contrast, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) (88.2%) and the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) (85.3%) scored consistently high, showing internal alignment with their stated inclusivity objectives.

On legal compliance, the gap was even starker. The average score among party members was 72.4%, with parties like ADP (58.8%), BP (57.4%), and National Rescue Movement (NRM) (58.8%) underperforming dramatically compared to their "on paper" claims. Conversely, PDP (91.2%) and PRP (86.8%) again demonstrated strong internal consistency and perceived compliance.

For public outreach, party members gave an average score of 62.1%, highlighting a disconnect from the robust image parties projected. While AAC (70.3%), PDP (84.9%), and PRP (79.7%)

maintained high internal confidence, parties like ADC (47.9%), BP (54.2%), and ZLP (56.3%) performed poorly in the eyes of their members.

## The state of Political Parties: Citizen perception ("In reality B")

From the broader public's view, political parties suffer significant credibility and visibility challenges. The average citizen score across the Public Outreach pillar was 45.9% — the lowest across all three assessment layers. While AAC stood out with a perfect 100% score, suggesting strong external engagement, parties like ZLP, BP, and AA all scored 6.1%, effectively indicating invisibility or total disconnect from the general populace. PDP (75.5%) and Labour Party (LP) (63.3%) were among the few other parties perceived to have strong public engagement.

## Cross-comparative analysis: Where disconnect lies

**Inclusivity (On Paper vs In Reality A):** The variance between party leadership claims and what members experience averaged -14.8%, exposing a widespread implementation deficit. ADC, ZLP, and BP posted variances of over -30%, while PDP, PRP, and AAC remained aligned. These gaps imply that while parties are increasingly including inclusivity policies in their manifestos, practical delivery remains weak or symbolic.

**Legal Compliance (On Paper vs In Reality A):** The legal gap averaged -14%, with parties like ADC (-34.7%) and ADP (-31.2%) showing substantial breakdowns in operational compliance at the grassroots. However, PRP, AA, and APP registered positive variance, indicating that in some parties, internal processes might exceed the leadership's claims.

## Public Outreach (On Paper → Party Members → Citizens):

Data Source	Overall Average Public Outreach Score (%)	Variance
On Paper (Party Executives)	81.68%	
In Reality A (Party Members)	62.07%	-19.6 (Vertical disconnect)
In Reality B (Citizens)	45.91%	-16.2 (horizontal disconnect)

**Table 1** PPPI Public outreach overall average scores

The vertical disconnect (On Paper to Party Members) was around -19.6%, and the horizontal disconnect (Party Members to Citizens) was -16.2%, while the gap from On Paper to Citizens stood at -35.8%. These numbers reveal a possible triple crisis: overestimation by leadership, disengagement of party members, and alienation from citizens. Parties like ZLP, BP, and AA

consistently appear across all layers as deeply disconnected. Conversely, PDP, PRP, and AAC show strong cohesion across internal and external perception layers.

## Conclusion and recommendations

The Political Party Performance Index paints a sobering but necessary portrait of Nigeria's political party system. While most parties have adopted formal frameworks that promise inclusivity, compliance, and public engagement, the reality across party members and citizens reflects underperformance, disconnection, and, in some cases, reputational collapse. The wide variances across all pillars underscore the urgent need for implementation of reforms, capacity building, and public accountability.

To move forward, political parties must move beyond optics. Inclusivity must be institutionalised, not idealised. Compliance must be operationalised, not merely documented. Public engagement must be relational, not occasional. Strengthening internal democracy, building trust with citizens, investing in digital engagement, and establishing robust party monitoring systems will be critical.

The PPPI does not point to issues, it provides a roadmap for renewal. It gives political parties the data and insight they need to evolve into truly democratic institutions. For civil society, media, INEC, donors, and citizens, the PPPI offers a tool for engagement, dialogue, and accountability. This executive summary offers only a glimpse into the deep insights captured in the full report. The real story, the nuances, and the actionable intelligence await within.

---

The future of Nigeria's democracy rests not just in elections, but in the health of the political parties that contest them.

---

# Chapter 1: Introduction and Background

Political parties are the bedrock of democratic governance. They serve as platforms for political participation, leadership recruitment, articulation of public interests, and oversight of governance processes<sup>4</sup> <sup>5</sup>. However, in Nigeria, the historical evolution and structural realities of political parties have been deeply shaped by colonial legacies, military rule, weak institutional frameworks, and elite dominance—factors that have combined to undermine the maturity and democratic character of the country's party system.

## Historical Trajectory of Political Parties in Nigeria

The formation of political parties in Nigeria dates back to the colonial era, with the emergence of regional interest groups like the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) in 1923<sup>6</sup> and later in the late 1940s and early 1950s, more structured entities such as the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), the Action Group (AG), and the Northern People's Congress (NPC) had emerged<sup>7</sup> <sup>8</sup>. These parties, although more organised, were largely regional and ethnic-based, reflecting both Nigeria's diverse social fabric and the fragmentation engineered by British indirect rule<sup>9</sup>.

Following independence in 1960, party politics became even more regionally entrenched. The NCNC dominated the Eastern Region, while the AG and NPC controlled the West and North, respectively<sup>10</sup>. However, allegations of electoral malpractice, most notably in the 1965 elections,

---

<sup>4</sup> International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR). (2022). [The role of Political Parties in Democratic Governance ]. Available at <https://ijrar.org/download.php?file=IJRAR22B3865.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Inside Political Science. (n.d.). What is the purpose of a political party? Available at <https://insidepoliticalscience.com/what-is-the-purpose-of-a-political-party/>

<sup>6</sup> ResearchGate. (n.d.). The role of ethnic identity in political mobilization: An analytical review. Available at [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/385207980\\_The\\_Role\\_of\\_Ethnic\\_Identity\\_in\\_Political\\_Mobilization\\_An\\_Analytical\\_Review](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/385207980_The_Role_of_Ethnic_Identity_in_Political_Mobilization_An_Analytical_Review)

<sup>7</sup> FCTEMIS. (n.d.). The Development of Political Parties in Nigeria. Available at [https://fctemis.org/notes/16974\\_The%20Development%20of%20Political%20Parties%20in%20Nigeria.pdf](https://fctemis.org/notes/16974_The%20Development%20of%20Political%20Parties%20in%20Nigeria.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Afrobarometer. (2023). Explaining the experience of political violence in Nigeria (Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 197). Available at <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/WP197-Explaining-the-experience-of-political-violence-in-Nigeria-Afrobarometer-working-paper-9march23.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> Semantic Scholar. (n.d.). [The evolution and pattern of Political Party formation and the search for national integration in Nigeria]. Available at <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/591e/f8ef3793641b133fcc736e98b1929caae3e0.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Oxford University Press. (n.d.). Political Parties in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, 1999–2019, Chapter 24. Available at <https://academic.oup.com/book/58013/chapter/479034155>

intensified political tensions and ultimately triggered the military coup of January 1966, which brought an abrupt end to the First Republic<sup>11</sup>.

The return to civil rule in 1979 saw a more regulated approach to the party formation process. The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) introduced national spread and internal democracy as requirements. Key parties like the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) emerged<sup>12</sup>, aiming to foster national integration. Yet, these parties often still mirrored Nigeria's ethnic and regional divisions, reflecting the challenges of governance in a diverse society. Another military coup in 1983 again halted democratic progress<sup>13</sup>  
<sup>14</sup>.

The political party's pre-independence and the initial post-independence decade faced significant challenges, including weak regulatory frameworks, lack of internal party democracy, and high rates of defections, which hindered their effectiveness<sup>15</sup>. Ethnic cleavages contributed to a competitive environment where different groups vied for control over resources and political power, often leading to what has been described as "democratic paralysis"<sup>16</sup>.

The Third Republic in Nigeria was established in 1989 as part of a transition from military rule to civilian governance. It was characterised by the emergence of political parties that aimed to participate in democratic elections. Two significant political parties were formed during this period: the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The NRC was positioned as a right-of-centre party, while the SDP took a left-of-centre stance, reflecting a polarised political environment<sup>17</sup>.

A cursory look at the political context of the Third Republic showed that the transition followed years of military dictatorship, and the political landscape was fraught with challenges. In June 1993, a presidential election was held in which Moshood Abiola of the SDP was believed to have won a decisive victory. However, the military government, led by General Ibrahim Babangida, annulled the election results amid allegations of corruption, leading to widespread unrest and political

---

<sup>11</sup> Taylor & Francis Online. (2024). Party politics, dearth of political ideology, and the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. Available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2024.2410544>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid

<sup>13</sup> University of Canterbury Repository. (2017). Contending issues in political parties in Nigeria: The candidate selection process. Available at <https://repository.canterbury.ac.uk/item/8v2y0/contending-issues-in-political-parties-in-nigeria-the-candidate-selection-process>

<sup>14</sup> SAGE Journals. (2023). Negotiating Access and Privilege: Politics of Female Participation and Representation in Nigeria. Available at <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00219096221084253>

<sup>15</sup> Academic Excellence Society. (2008). Political parties and electoral outcomes in Nigeria. Available at [https://www.academicexcellencesociety.com/political\\_parties\\_and\\_electoral\\_outcomes\\_in\\_nigeria.pdf](https://www.academicexcellencesociety.com/political_parties_and_electoral_outcomes_in_nigeria.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> Encyclopædia Britannica. (n.d.). Action Group (political party, Nigeria). Available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Action-Group-political-party-Nigeria>

<sup>17</sup> Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development. (2016). Ethnicity and Development of Political Parties in Nigeria. Available at <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/234695678.pdf>

turmoil<sup>18 19</sup>. The failure to secure a stable democratic environment resulted in the suspension of all political activities and the re-establishment of military rule under Abacha. The events of this period set a precedent for future political developments in Nigeria, emphasising the critical need for robust political parties and a commitment to democratic principles<sup>20 21</sup>.

### **The Fourth Republic: Democratic Longevity, Institutional Fragility**

The inauguration of the Fourth Republic in 1999, marked a significant period in the evolution of Nigeria's political parties and the longest democratic stretch. It also saw the formal establishment of a multi-party system. From just three parties in 1999, the number rose to over 90 by 2019 before the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) deregistered many for failing to meet constitutional requirements. Yet this proliferation has not yielded the expected deepening of democracy.

---

More than two decades into Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the proliferation of parties has not translated into pluralism of ideas or deepened accountability. Instead, many political parties remain platforms for elite negotiations, not democratic consolidation.

---

However, the rise in numbers has not been matched by institutional development. Parties have continued to operate without clearly defined ideologies, policy programs, or sustainable membership structures<sup>22</sup>. Party organisation has been found to be typically weak, decision-making centralised around a few powerful individuals, and internal democracy routinely flouted in candidate selection processes<sup>23 24</sup>. This has led to high levels of intra-party conflict, mass defections, and a culture of personality-driven rather than principle-based politics<sup>25</sup>.

Despite legal frameworks like the Electoral Act 2022, INEC's guidelines on political parties and party constitution compliance are minimal. Financial disclosures are largely absent. Delegate conventions are either stage-managed or non-existent. Gender inclusion remains tokenistic, and

---

<sup>18</sup> Wikipedia. (n.d.). Politics of Nigeria. Available at [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Nigeria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Nigeria)

<sup>19</sup> Country Studies. (n.d.). Nigeria: Political parties. Available at <https://countrystudies.us/nigeria/68.htm>

<sup>20</sup> Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review. (2016). Political Parties and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Available at [https://www.arabianjbm.com/pdfs/NGJSD\\_VOL\\_5\\_2/15.pdf](https://www.arabianjbm.com/pdfs/NGJSD_VOL_5_2/15.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> Borgen Magazine. (2024). Women's political participation. Available at <https://www.borgenmagazine.com/womens-political-participation/>

<sup>22</sup> Journal of Africa Elections. (n.d.). Building democracy without democrats? Political parties, threats & democratic reversal in Nigeria (Journal of African Elections, Vol. 6 No. 2). Available at <https://www.eisa.org/storage/2023/05/2007-journal-of-african-elections-v6n2-building-democracy-without-democrats-political-parties-threats-democratic-reversal-nigeria-eisa.pdf?x15448>

<sup>23</sup> Ibid

<sup>24</sup> Academic Excellence Society. (n.d.). Political parties and electoral outcomes in Nigeria. Available at [https://www.academicexcellencesociety.com/political\\_parties\\_and\\_electoral\\_outcomes\\_in\\_nigeria.pdf](https://www.academicexcellencesociety.com/political_parties_and_electoral_outcomes_in_nigeria.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> ACLED. (2023). Political violence and the 2023 Nigerian election. Available at <https://www.acleddata.com/2023/02/22/political-violence-and-the-2023-nigerian-election/>



party platforms rarely address the needs of women, youth, and marginalised communities in a meaningful way<sup>26</sup>.

The challenges confronting political parties in Nigeria are multifaceted. At the structural level, the high cost of politics continues to exclude women, youth, and persons with disabilities, deepening the elitism of political spaces. At the cultural level, perceptions of clientelism and godfatherism remain entrenched, weakening merit-based leadership recruitment and policy consistency. Institutionally, regulatory oversight by INEC is constrained by several challenges, including limited capacity, lack of prosecutorial ability, and political interference. Party financing is opaque, accountability mechanisms are weak, and electoral outcomes are frequently contested due to internal party violations and pre-election crises.

---

The democratic weakness of Nigeria's political parties is not simply a product of poor leadership, but a systemic outcome of legal gaps, cultural practices, and regulatory inertia.

---

On the part of inclusion, expert reviews have overwhelmingly shown that the state of inclusivity in Nigeria's political party system remains underwhelming, with women, young people, and persons with disabilities (PWDs) facing systemic barriers to full participation. While political parties serve as gateways to leadership and governance, their internal structures and practices often entrench exclusionary norms.

Women's political participation remains low, both in nominations and electoral success. Despite nominal gestures such as waiver of nomination fees by parties like the PDP, ADC, AA, NRM, APM, AAC, APC, and SDP, structural and financial constraints continue to hinder meaningful participation. Political parties such as PDP, ADC, AA and NRM, SDP, ADP, LP, NNPP, ZLP have clear provisions in their constitutions as well as manifestos that are supposed to enhance the participation of women in the activities of political parties, but there are widespread beliefs within the political elites that women do not seem to have interest in politics and political activities. In 2023, women constituted only 10.1% of the 15,307 total candidates, and most of these nominations came from less dominant political parties. Larger parties with more influence, APC, PDP, and LP, presented fewer women candidates. Patriarchal party cultures, high costs of internal politics, and weak implementation of gender policies undermine efforts to address these gaps, with no legal or party-level sanctions for non-compliance<sup>27</sup>.

---

<sup>26</sup>International Journal of Innovative Research & Development. (2024). [Ethnicity and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. Available at [https://www.internationaljournalcorner.com/index.php/ijird\\_ojs/article/download/173904/119112/418492](https://www.internationaljournalcorner.com/index.php/ijird_ojs/article/download/173904/119112/418492)

<sup>27</sup> Westminster Foundation for Democracy. (2023). Study: Inclusive practices in Nigeria's political parties. Available at <https://www.wfd.org/what-we-do/resources/study-inclusive-practices-nigerias-political-parties-2023>

Chamber / Cabinet	1999–2003	2003–2007	2007–2011	2011–2015	2015–2019	2019–2023	Average Percentage (1999–2023)
Senate	3 (2.8%)	4 (3.7%)	8 (7.3%)	7 (6.4%)	8 (7.3%)	7 (6.4%)	5.7%
House of Representatives	12 (3.3%)	21 (5.8%)	26 (7.3%)	19 (5.3%)	14 (3.8%)	11 (3.0%)	4.8%
Federal Cabinet (Ministers)	7 (14.89%)	7 (16.89%)	12 (30%)	12 (30%)	8 (16%)	7 (16%)	20.63%

**Table 2** Elected and appointed women in the National Assembly and Federal Cabinet (1999-2023)

Source: Table obtained from the WFD study on inclusive practices of Nigeria's political parties (2023)

Similarly, while young people appear actively involved in campaign mobilisation, rallies, and voter engagement, their representation in decision-making roles remains marginal. Most political parties have constitutional roles such as Youth Leader, yet only a few, like the APP, YPP, NRM, SDP and ZLP, have committed to affirmative quotas or youth-inclusive appointment policies. Notably, the APP, ZLP, NRM, AND YPP constitution reserves 40%, 60%, 15% and 51% of elective and appointive positions for young person's respectively, equally shared between male and female members. However, the broader party system shows reluctance in translating youth engagement into real political leadership, despite landmark reforms like the Not-Too-Young-To-Run Act<sup>28</sup>.

Party Instrument	APP	ADC	APC	APGA	APM	ADP	Boot	LP	ZLP	SDP	PDP	NNPP	NRM	YPP
Constitution	√	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Manifesto	√	X	X	X	X	X	X	√	√	√	X	X	√	√

**Table 3** Youth inclusivity provisions in political party constitutions and manifestos (√ = Yes, X = No)

Source: Table obtained from the WFD study on inclusive practices of Nigeria's political parties (2023)

The inclusion of persons with disabilities reflects a gloomier reality. Only six of the parties reviewed had explicit constitutional or manifesto commitments to PWD inclusion. Where slots are reserved,

<sup>28</sup> ibid



they are either unfilled or filled symbolically without meaningful engagement. The long-standing social exclusion of PWDs, compounded by financial marginalisation and societal stigma, continues to restrict their active political participation.

Moreover, public trust in political parties remains critically low<sup>29</sup>. Many citizens view parties as disconnected from everyday realities and driven more by electoral survival than public service delivery. This erosion of trust undermines voter turnout, civic engagement, and democratic legitimacy.

---

<sup>29</sup> Premium Times Nigeria. (2023). Nigeria Decides 2023: Campaign promises and the issue of trust by Dakuku Peterside. Available at <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/558834-nigeria-decides-2023-campaign-promises-and-the-issue-of-trust-by-dakuku-peterside.html?>

# Chapter 2: About the PPPI

The Political Party Performance Index (PPPI) is a groundbreaking initiative aimed at strengthening democratic governance in Nigeria by enhancing accountability, inclusivity, and transparency within the country's political party system. Developed by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), and with the pilot phase implemented by the Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI), the PPPI offers a structured, objective, and data-driven mechanism to assess the performance of political parties beyond electoral cycles and campaign rhetoric. It is not an audit, but a developmental tool for political parties and those who seek to support democratic institution-building.

In a political environment where parties are often judged solely on electoral success or leadership popularity, the PPPI introduces a more holistic framework—one that evaluates parties based on how well they function as democratic institutions, their adherence to laws and regulations, and the extent to which they promote inclusion and citizen engagement.

Nigeria's democracy is still evolving, and political parties play a central role in shaping its direction. Yet, gaps persist in how parties govern themselves, include diverse voices, and engage with citizens. The PPPI responds to these gaps by:

- Promoting evidence-based performance evaluation of political parties
- Creating incentives and recommendations for internal reforms and improved democratic practices
- Empowering citizens, civil society, and regulators with a tool for engagement, accountability, and advocacy

Inspired by international frameworks such as the Western Balkans Political Party Transparency Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, the African Peer Review Mechanism, and the United Nations Human Development Index, the PPPI has been thoughtfully adapted to fit Nigeria's unique political context, legal framework, and civic culture.

---

Democracy is not just about elections; it's about the quality of the institutions that sustain them.

---

## The PPPI Pillars - Explained

The PPPI is built on three critical pillars: Inclusivity Practices, Legal Compliance, and Public Outreach which together capture the essential attributes of democratic and well-functioning political parties. Each pillar consists of carefully selected indicators that reflect both global best practices and local realities.

**1. Inclusivity Practices:** A democracy cannot truly serve its people if its political structures exclude large segments of the population. When women, young people, and persons with

disabilities are marginalised in party leadership, candidate selection, and policy formulation, it creates a system that is unrepresentative, unresponsive, and inherently unjust.

This dimension assesses:

- The extent to which political parties promote inclusive participation in their internal structures and decision-making processes.
- While recognising intersectionality, the PPPI examines how parties integrate women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWDs). It considers not only token representation, but the depth of inclusion reflected in leadership positions, candidacy selection processes, and opportunities for meaningful participation at both national and sub-national levels.

---

A political party that ignores women, youth, and persons with disabilities is ignoring the majority of its nation.

---

**2. Legal Compliance:** Laws and regulations exist to guide and standardise how political parties operate within Nigeria's democratic framework. Yet, legal infractions and non-compliance remain. When parties ignore electoral laws, constitutional requirements, or INEC regulations, the consequences are profound, ranging from internal crises and judicial battles to disqualification, factionalism, and public distrust.

This pillar evaluates how well political parties adhere to the legal and regulatory frameworks that govern their operations in Nigeria. Compliance with the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Electoral Act 2022, and INEC regulations is non-negotiable in a functioning democracy.

PPPI tracks whether parties:

- Maintain a membership register in both hard and soft copies and provide it to INEC not later than 30 days before the date fixed for their primaries, congresses, or conventions.
- Conduct timely conventions and congresses
- Operate in line with their constitutions and manifestos
- Report finances as required by law – specifically, reporting detailed annual statements of assets and liabilities, including sources of funds and expenditures, to INEC between January 1st and March 30th of the succeeding year. Also, audited reports of parties' election expenses within six months after election, detailing all expenditures and contributions received and publishing this in at least two national newspaper and on the party's website.
- Avoid practices that incite or condone political violence

---

Compliance is not just a legal checkbox—it's a test of integrity and institutional maturity.

---

**3. Public Outreach:** Political parties are not meant to function in isolation, they are vehicles for citizen engagement. A key role of any democratic party is to inform, educate, and mobilize the electorate. However, many parties in Nigeria remain disconnected from the people they are meant

to serve. Poor communication, weak voter education, and limited grassroots presence foster political apathy, misinformation, and low voter turnout. This pillar assesses how political parties engage with their members, supporters, and the broader public, particularly through communication and mobilisation.

It examines the use of:

- Traditional media (radio, newspapers, TV)
- Digital platforms (websites, social media)
- Direct community engagement (town halls, rallies, voter education programs)

A party's ideology, clarity of communication, and ability to educate voters and recruit new members all reflect its commitment to democratic engagement and relevance in public life.

---

Parties that fail to engage the public, fail at the most basic democratic task—listening.

---

## Why these three dimensions?

While political parties can be assessed through many lenses, such as internal disputes, electoral success, or financial capacity, the PPPI focuses on three core dimensions: Inclusivity Practices, Legal Compliance, and Public Outreach. These were deliberately selected because they represent the fundamental building blocks of party institutional health, democratic legitimacy, and citizen trust.

Each of these dimensions has a direct and measurable impact on the quality of democracy. Rather than evaluating surface-level outcomes or temporary political gains, the PPPI goes deeper, measuring the internal systems, values, and behaviours that shape how political parties function in a democratic society.

## Why Not Other Dimensions?

Other areas, such as electoral performance, internal conflicts, or fundraising strength, were considered during the design of the PPPI. However, these are often consequences of strong institutional structures, not indicators of democratic health themselves. For instance, a party may win elections without being inclusive or legally compliant or may raise significant funds without transparency. These indicators may reflect short-term success but not long-term democratic value.

The PPPI intentionally prioritises dimensions that shape outcomes, not just reflect them. Focusing on inclusivity, compliance, and outreach, the index targets the foundational qualities that make political parties viable contributors to democracy, not just electoral machines.

---

PPPI doesn't reward popularity—it rewards principles, participation, and performance.

---

## Why the PPPI matters?

The Political Party Performance Index (PPPI) emerges as a timely and necessary response to this historical and institutional context. It aims to shift the discourse around political parties from mere electoral performance to their democratic performance—how well they reflect and promote democratic values in structure, behaviour, and engagement.

The PPPI offers an answer by creating a standard for measuring internal party performance. It focuses on the *practices that shape leadership, determine representation, and engage citizens* instead of waiting to judge parties only after elections or crises.

---

If political parties are the foundation of democracy, then their commitment to democratic values must be measurable.

---

Take the issue of inclusivity, for instance. If political parties remain elite-driven and closed to diverse voices, they perpetuate social exclusion and miss the opportunity for transformative leadership. Legal compliance is another crucial area; when parties flout electoral laws or operate outside legal norms, they contribute to a culture of impunity. When parties neglect outreach, citizens lose interest and disengage from politics, and democracy begins to decay from within.

So, what does the PPPI measure, and why does it matter?

- It measures how inclusive parties are and shows whether they truly represent the people they seek to govern.
- It measures whether parties comply with the laws and reinforces a political culture based on transparency and accountability.
- It measures how well parties engage with citizens and helps deepen the relationship between political institutions and the public.

Doing this will help highlight areas of strength and weakness in party operations forming a baseline for reform, it will also produce actionable recommendations and insights for improvement: actionable insights for increasing transparency, participation, and accountability.

## Scope of the PPPI Pilot Phase

The PPPI assessment covered all 19 registered political parties in Nigeria, as recognised by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The study spanned three tiers of party structure: national headquarters in Abuja, state party chapters across Nigeria's 36 states and the FCT, and the citizen base at the grassroots level.

Stakeholders engaged in the process included:

- Party executives (national and state levels), to evaluate internal policies and compliance mechanisms

- INEC's core departments (EPM, VEP, Gender, and Legal), to validate data and offer regulatory perspectives
- Party members, to assess intra-party democracy, participation, and perception of leadership
- Citizens, to gauge public trust in parties and assess visibility and civic engagement

The geographic coverage was nationwide, ensuring representation across Nigeria's six geopolitical zones. Data was collected at national, state, and sub-state levels, capturing both urban and rural party dynamics.

---

This is not just a snapshot of party performance; it is a diagnostic tool to understand where Nigerian political parties stand—and how far they must go to build democratic institutions worthy of public trust.

---

## PPPI Methodological Approaches

The PPPI employs a robust mixed-methods research design, combining quantitative and qualitative data to evaluate the institutional health and democratic commitment of Nigeria's 19 registered political parties. The methodology draws on national and sub-national datasets, triangulated across stakeholder categories and validated through both internal review and external engagement.

**Study Design and Approach:** The PPPI utilised a convergent parallel mixed-methods approach, where qualitative and quantitative strands of data was collected simultaneously, analysed independently, and then merged during interpretation to enrich insights. The decision to adopt this approach stemmed from the complexity of measuring political party performance—an area where perception, institutional practice, and regulatory data must be weighed together to produce credible outcomes.

On the quantitative side, the study deployed performance checklists administered to two categories of respondents: political party executives and INEC's Election and Party Monitoring (EPM) officials, while the structured surveys were administered to political party members and ordinary citizens. The qualitative component featured focus group discussions (FGDs) with INEC national departments, debriefing sessions with enumerators and consultations with national party leaders to validate findings and gather recommendations.

---

The PPPI is designed not just to measure what parties claim to be doing but to compare those claims with institutional records and citizens' lived experiences.

---

**Sampling Strategy and Respondent Distribution:** A stratified purposive sampling strategy was employed to ensure even distribution of responses across parties, states, and stakeholder types. Although all 19 registered political parties were included in the sampling frame, and each state was expected to contribute proportionally to the total responses, certain limitations impacted the final response numbers.

The study targeted 703 political party executives (one per party per state and FCT), 37 INEC officials (one per state and FCT), 2,109 party members (three per party per state and FCT), and 3,515 citizens (five per state and FCT). The final dataset comprised 317 party executive responses, 23 INEC official responses, 1,639 party member responses, and 3,462 citizen responses, culminating in a robust sample size of 5,441 completed instruments across all respondent categories.




Figure 1 Distribution of response by political party members






Figure 2 Gender distribution of party member's respondents




**Figure 3** Disability status of party member's respondents




**Figure 4** Age distribution of party member's respondents







**Figure 5** Distribution of the number of responses from citizens assessing each political party



**Figure 6** Gender distribution of citizen respondents



**Figure 7** Disability status of citizen respondents



**Figure 8** Age distribution of citizen respondents

While the citizen response rate exceeded expectations, challenges were encountered in data collection from political party executives and INEC officials in specific states due to institutional bottlenecks and hierarchical approval processes. In states such as Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bauchi,

Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Edo, FCT, Jigawa, Katsina, Kogi, and Oyo, state INEC offices either deferred responsibility to the national headquarters or withheld data pending official directives.

Where gaps in state-level data appeared, the national institutional perspective filled in, offering clarity and consistency, particularly on issues like party registration, gender policies, and finance regulations.

Based on the PPPI methodological approaches on data collection, the table below gives additional information about each stakeholder group from which data was collected concerning their function and role in the assessment, considering both the 'on paper' and the 'in reality' insight:

Stakeholder Group	Definition "On Paper"	In Reality A / B
<b>Political Party Executive (One per party per state and FCT)</b>	A designated member of a party's National and or State Executive Council ( <i>Chairman, Secretary, Publicity Secretary, Research Officer</i> ), typically tasked with leadership responsibilities such as managing internal party administration, ensuring compliance with party constitution, coordinating congresses/conventions, and serving as a liaison with external regulatory bodies like INEC.	<i>In Reality A:</i> These individuals were instrumental in facilitating access to party membership data. They acted as gatekeepers, providing the list of card-carrying members for contact. While they possess substantial knowledge of internal processes and structures, their direct involvement in party policy development as of the time it was done remains unclear or limited.
<b>Party Members (1,639 across all parties)</b>	Officially registered, card-carrying members who are expected to participate in party activities, engage in internal elections, and contribute to the growth and visibility of the party at ward, LGA, and state levels.	<i>In Reality A:</i> The party executives largely determined access to this group. Most members interviewed were validated as genuine party members based on their possession of party ID cards. Their responses provided insight into internal party democracy and operational procedures. However, their level of active participation in shaping party direction was minimal. Many identified primarily with campaign

		mobilization and routine party meetings.
Citizens (3,462)	Non-partisan or independent respondents selected based on their civic engagement and political awareness. They are external to the internal structures of the parties but serve as critical assessors of party visibility, public communication, ideology awareness, and inclusivity.	<i>In Reality B:</i> These citizens assessed parties based on external perception; media visibility, messaging, campaign language, inclusion rhetoric, and general behavior during elections. Their interaction with the parties is indirect, shaped largely by public engagements and media consumption rather than internal knowledge.

**Table 4** Definition and function of stakeholder groups within the PPPI

The relationship above reinforces the triangulation logic at the heart of the PPPI methodology: while executives provide the '*official story*', members describe the '*internal experience*', and citizens offer the '*external judgment*'. Each group enriches the assessment by representing distinct vantage points; leadership, lived participation, and public perception, which together present a more holistic and credible picture of party performance in Nigeria.

**Enumerator Recruitment and Deployment:** Data collection took place between December 2024 and March 2025, following a comprehensive training and deployment phase. Enumerators were responsible for engaging directly with political party structures at the state level and with INEC officers. A debrief session was held post-deployment to document field experiences and gather feedback on the political landscape, the accessibility of stakeholders, and the responsiveness of party institutions.


Parallel to fieldwork, national-level interviews with political party leaders were conducted to validate preliminary findings, explore key policy positions, and gather reform recommendations directly from party leadership.

**Index and Data Analysis Approach:** Upon completion of fieldwork, data analysis was guided by a multi-step strategy involving weighted scoring, aggregation methods, and normalisation techniques to construct composite indexes and generate fair, comparable party performance scores across states and nationally.

At the core of the analysis was a triangulation approach, where responses from party executives, INEC officials, party members, and citizens were compared and validated against each other. This helped identify inconsistencies, confirm areas of agreement, and highlight performance gaps between what political parties claimed and what institutional records or public perception revealed.

The scoring system rewards institutional behaviour over electoral success—emphasising compliance, inclusion, and engagement as core indicators of democratic value.

**Review and Validation Processes:** The results were subjected to a two-tiered review process. First, an internal peer review was conducted by KDI’s research team and WFD to examine methodological consistency, detect outliers, and test data integrity. Following this, an external stakeholder validation session was convened. Participants included INEC officials, CSO leaders, political party representatives, academics, media analysts, and election experts. This session provided both technical feedback on the data methodology and political insights into how parties interpreted their scores and rankings. It also allowed for clarification of findings that might appear controversial or misunderstood by stakeholders.



**Figure 9** Visualisation of the data collection process

## Limitations to the study

Despite the comprehensive design and robust implementation of the Political Party Performance Index (PPPI), several structural, institutional, and contextual challenges limited the study’s scope in certain areas. These limitations do not invalidate the findings but rather illuminate systemic barriers to transparency and accountability in Nigeria’s party system. Below are key limitations encountered during the pilot phase:

**1. Disparity Between National and State-Level Party Activities:** One of the most significant challenges was the inconsistency in party structures and practices across different governance tiers. While national party headquarters often had more organised documentation, communication protocols, and programmatic visibility, many state-level chapters functioned with minimal institutional frameworks. This disparity created data variations, as performance indicators (e.g., inclusivity metrics, public outreach, or compliance records) varied not just by party but also by location, thereby complicating efforts to standardise analysis across all states and parties.

**2. Lack of Physical Offices and Operational Infrastructure:** The study found that a considerable number of registered political parties lacked functional offices, particularly at the subnational level. In some instances, parties shared facilities, operated remotely, or simply existed on paper. This limited direct observation and on-site validation of party activities which are critical components of performance evaluation under the PPPI framework. Furthermore, the absence of consistent physical presence hampered meaningful citizen interaction and outreach, one of the core pillars assessed under public engagement.

**3. Limited Autonomy of State-Level Party Chapters:** In many cases, state-level party executives were unable to provide substantive responses without prior approval from the national headquarters. This centralised control mechanism led to delays in data submission and hindered transparency. The tendency for tightly held communication protocols meant state chapters were hesitant to speak on issues such as compliance, inclusivity, or membership structures, especially when discrepancies existed between practice and policy.

**4. Political Sensitivity and Perceived External Critique:** Given Nigeria's politically charged environment, we believed some party officials viewed the PPPI as an audit rather than a developmental tool. This perception bred resistance and, in some cases, total non-cooperation. In most cases, this happened at the state level – the research team leveraged the National officer to get some general information regarding the party and also sought they send a word out to the state office, which was largely helpful.

**5. Social Desirability Bias or Loyalty Bias:** In a study of this nature, studies have shown reasons to believe that the party respondents may overstate positive attributes of their party or underreport negative aspects to conform to perceived expectations or avoid criticism<sup>30 31</sup>. This bias can inflate ratings of party inclusiveness, compliance, or outreach. Party officials or committed members may evaluate their political party more favourably due to personal allegiance or emotional attachment. To mitigate these biases, the PPPI methodology incorporated multiple strategies. First, data was gathered from diverse respondent categories: party executives, INEC officials, party members, and ordinary citizens. This triangulation allowed cross-validation, reducing the influence of individual biases. Second, anonymity was assured to respondents, encouraging candid responses free from fear of reprisal or judgment. Third, structured and standardised survey instruments with clear, objective criteria minimised subjective interpretation. Finally, data cleaning and validation involved identifying inconsistent or outlier responses for further review, ensuring the final dataset better reflected genuine party performance. These measures enhanced the robustness and credibility of the PPPI results despite inherent bias risks.

**6. Bureaucratic Hurdles and Limited Access at INEC:** While INEC remains the constitutional and legal regulatory authority on party operations, bureaucratic bottlenecks significantly impede

---

<sup>30</sup> Springer. (2023). Could vote buying be socially desirable? Exploratory analyses of a 'failed' list experiment. Available at <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11135-023-01740-6?>

<sup>31</sup> GSDRC. (n.d.). Social desirability bias and reported vote preferences in African surveys. Available at <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/social-desirability-bias-and-reported-vote-preferences-in-african-surveys/>

data access. The Commission's internal communication policy restricts external engagements to a select few personnel, which often excludes the very departments responsible for political party monitoring or compliance.

**7. Frequent Leadership Changes and Institutional Memory Loss:** INEC also witnessed frequent transfers and rotations of key officials, especially at the state level. These administrative changes contributed to the loss of institutional memory, affecting the consistency and responsiveness of the data collection process.

# Chapter 3: The performance: State of the Political Parties in Nigeria


The PPPI in this report presented a multidimensional assessment (weighted and normalised) of political party performance in Nigeria based on three critical pillars: Inclusivity Practices, Legal Compliance, and Public Outreach. The index was data-driven and sourced primarily from:

- National Party Executive Members (*official party position or “On Paper”*), with INEC data cross-validating the Legal Compliance score.
- Data from party members (*Ground-level “In Reality A” perspectives*)
- Data from citizens (*Public sentiment on public outreach “In Reality B” perspectives*).

Methodological Note: Each score was normalised to 100% using a weighted aggregation method to enable comparability across dimensions.

## State of Political Parties – “On Paper”

This viewpoint draws on structured data reported directly by national executive members of the 19 political parties, and, in the case of the *Legal Compliance* pillar, being validated with INEC records.



Score Range (%)	Rank Category	Color Code
90 ---- 100	Mostly Compliant	<span>●</span> Green
70 ---- 89	Compliant	<span>●</span> Yellow
50 ---- 69	Partially Compliant	<span>●</span> Orange
20 ---- 49	Weak Compliant	<span>●</span> Red
0 ---- 19	Non Compliant	<span>●</span> Black


This is based on weight scoring and aggregation method with a total of 300 points distributed among three core dimensions: Inclusivity, Legal compliance and Public outreach to ensure fairness and compatibility. A weight average analysis was done to normalise all scores to 100%. The index is based on data from national executive members of political party. While INEC data was used to validate the legal compliance validation where necessary scores were arranged between party responses and INEC records. **Importantly, perception surveys were not included in the ranking conclusion but were used for broader surveys. The approach ensures that the PPPI ranking remains objective, data driven and methodologically sound.**

Figure 10 State of political parties – inclusivity practices



**Inclusivity Practices:** Inclusivity practices capture how well political parties integrate women, youth, and persons with disabilities (PWDs) in leadership roles, internal structures, and candidate selection processes. Here, *Zenith Labour Party* (88%), *Young Progressive Party* (87%), *Social Democratic Party* (85%), and *All Progressives Grand Alliance* (85%) emerged as *inclusive*, based on their executive self-reporting. These parties appear to institutionalise inclusivity norms and make structural room for marginalised groups on paper. ZLP and SDP, among other things, have clear provisions in their constitutions as well as manifestos that are supposed to enhance women’s participation in the activities of political parties. YPP has declared commitments to 51% affirmative action on political appointments for young people at all levels of government and to engage in a constant transformational leadership drive to sponsor visionary, innovative and selfless young Nigerians without greed for elective offices. In contrast, parties like the *Peoples Redemption Party* (30%), *the Action Alliance* (37%), and *the All Progressives Congress* (49%) demonstrated significantly lower inclusivity scores. The implication here is either a lack of internal frameworks to support inclusivity or a weak implementation culture. It’s noteworthy that major legacy parties, particularly *PDP* (68%) and *APC* (49%), showed middling to poorer scores, possibly pointing to entrenched elite dominance or tokenistic inclusion efforts.

## State of Political Parties-Legal Compliance




Score Range (%)	Rank Category	Color Code
90 ---- 100	Mostly Compliant	<span style="color: green;">●</span> Green
70 ---- 89	Compliant	<span style="color: yellow;">●</span> Yellow
50 ---- 69	Partially Compliant	<span style="color: orange;">●</span> Orange
20 ---- 49	Weak Compliant	<span style="color: red;">●</span> Red
0 ---- 19	Non Compliant	<span style="color: black;">●</span> Black

This is based on weight scoring and aggregation method with a total of 300 points distributed among three core dimensions: Inclusivity, Legal compliance and Public outreach to ensure fairness and compatibility. A weight average analysis was done to normalise all scores to 100%. The index is based on data from national executive members of political party. While INEC data was used to validate the legal compliance validation where necessary scores were arranged between party responses and INEC records. **Importantly, perception surveys were not included in the ranking conclusion but were used for broader surveys. The approach ensures that the PPPI ranking remains objective, data driven and methodologically sound.**

**Figure 11** State of political parties - legal compliance

**Legal Compliance:** Legal compliance reflects adherence to INEC reporting, congress/convention timelines, membership registers, financial disclosures, and conformity with internal constitutions. Here, most parties scored relatively high on paper, *ZLP* (95%), *ADC* (95%), *APGA* (93%), *NNPP*

(93%), and PDP (90%) are top performers, suggesting robust institutional knowledge of legal responsibilities and a deliberate focus on procedural correctness. On the lower end, APM (74%), AA (74%), APP (76%), and PRP (79%) trailed behind, which is still relatively above average. Interestingly, APC (95%) matched smaller parties in legal rigour, reaffirming that institutional legacy parties, while seemingly less inclusive, still maintain legal formalities.



Score Range (%)	Rank Category	Color Code
90 ----- 100	Mostly Compliant	<span style="color: green;">●</span> Green
70 ----- 89	Compliant	<span style="color: yellow;">●</span> Yellow
50 ----- 69	Partially Compliant	<span style="color: orange;">●</span> Orange
20 ----- 49	Weak Compliant	<span style="color: red;">●</span> Red
0 ----- 19	Non Compliant	<span style="color: black;">●</span> Black

This is based on weight scoring and aggregation method with a total of 300 points distributed among three core dimensions: Inclusivity, Legal compliance and Public outreach to ensure fairness and compatibility. A weight average analysis was done to normalise all scores to 100%. The index is based on data from national executive members of political party. While INEC data was used to validate the legal compliance validation where necessary scores were arranged between party responses and INEC records. **Importantly, perception surveys were not included in the ranking conclusion but were used for broader surveys. The approach ensures that the PPPI ranking remains objective, data driven and methodologically sound.**


**Figure 12** State of political parties – public outreach

**Public Outreach:** Public outreach reflects how well parties communicate their ideology, engage the electorate, educate voters, and maintain public visibility. On paper, standout performers include SDP (100%), ZLP (96%), AAC (97%), and Boot Party (95%), all surpassing the 90% threshold. These results suggested either significant online or offline mobilisation efforts, ideological clarity, or vibrant branding.

However, PRP (45%), APM (51%), APP (65%), and Accord (66%) showed weaker outreach scores. This may reflect poorly developed communication strategies or minimal electoral visibility. Interestingly, AAC, despite lower inclusivity scores, performed strongly here, potentially due to its online activism base.

# State of Political Parties (Perspective of Party Members) – “In Reality A”

This second viewpoint captured how members themselves rate their parties on the three PPPI pillars. While still internal, these perspectives are distinct from party executives and more reflective of middle and grassroots tiers.



**Figure 13** State of political parties – what party members think


**Inclusivity Practices (Party Member View):** Among members, PDP (74.4%), PRP (71.9%), Youth Party (73.8%), and YPP (66.3%) are perceived as inclusive. This suggests that, within the rank and file, there is a relatively strong belief in participatory structures. On the lower end, NRM (48.1%), Boot Party (50.6%), APM (42.5%), and APP (65%) reflect lower satisfaction with internal inclusion efforts. APC, AAC, and LP all score between 63% and 66%, indicative of moderate internal perceptions of inclusion.

**Legal Compliance (Party Member View):** Here, PDP (91.2%), APC (85.3%), PRP (86.8%), AAC (80.9%), and AA (80.9%) receive high scores, showing that members acknowledge clear internal governance processes. Interestingly, ADC (60.3%), NRM (58.8%), and Accord (57.4%) fall below 60%, suggesting weak alignment between leadership procedures and member awareness or involvement.

**Public Outreach (Party Member View):** From the party member lens, PDP (84.9%), PRP (79.7%), YPP (75%), and APC (74.5%) are seen as strong performers in public engagement. These scores suggest robust party branding, electoral visibility, and mobilisation from the ground up. Weaker perceived outreach is observed in ADP (45.8%), NRM (46.9%), and APP (60.4%), pointing to internal dissatisfaction or missed opportunities to connect with broader audiences. Despite high external citizen rankings, AAC ranks slightly lower internally (70.3%), possibly indicating that internal stakeholders feel outreach could be better targeted or more inclusive.

# State of Political Parties (Citizen Perception on Public Outreach) – “In Reality B”

This segment presents an entirely external view: what citizens across the country think about the public outreach capacity of political parties. The ratings were normalized to ensure comparability.



**Figure 14 State of Political Parties – What Citizens Think about Public Outreach**

The African Action Congress (AAC) leads dramatically at 100%, suggesting that despite being smaller in national structure, it has successfully built a strong public presence, most likely through digital mobilisation and clear issue advocacy. PDP (75.5%) and Labour Party (63.3%) follow, likely due to their visibility during recent election cycles and national discourse engagement.

Mid-tier perceptions fall to parties like APGA (59.2%), PRP (57.1%), SDP (57.1%), YPP (57.1%), and ADC (55.1%), parties often visible regionally or among niche electorates. Their national resonance appears moderate.

Lower-ranked parties include AA (6.1%), BP (6.1%), and ZLP (6.1%), suggesting they are virtually unknown or fail to reach the public effectively, despite strong scores from their executives on other dimensions (ZLP, for instance, had 96% in public outreach according to executives). This contrast underscores a perception-reality disconnect.

Notably, the APC, despite being the ruling party, scores only 42.9%, a surprisingly low perception of outreach possibly rooted in communication fatigue, elitism, or dissatisfaction among citizens with its engagement style.

Each data source presents a different angle of the current **State of Political Parties in Nigeria**:

- **Party executives** reported high performance across dimensions, possibly overestimating progress or based on formal indicators.
- **Party members** offer a more nuanced middle-ground, where satisfaction levels fluctuate depending on dimension and party, suggesting that structural issues may vary between leadership and grassroots.

- **Citizens**, however, offer a contrasting lens on **Public Outreach**, often diverging significantly from executive scores, underscoring gaps in citizens' perception and how political parties see themselves.

While many parties claim high inclusivity or compliance, the perception among citizens and even internal actors tells a different story. These three viewpoints provide a rich, triangulated picture of Nigeria's political party system, one that reflects both strengths and serious challenges.

# Chapter 4: Comparative Analysis: What Political Parties Claim vs What Actually Exists

PPPI proceeded to conduct a cross-comparative analysis of the state of political parties in Nigeria, systematically breaking down the three pillars: Inclusivity Practices, Legal Compliance, and Public Outreach through the three lenses of (a) what parties report “on paper” (executive data), (b) what party members say (“in reality A”), and (c) what citizens perceive (“in reality B” for public outreach). Firstly, PPPI cross-compared the data from the *party executive claims (“on paper”)* and data from *party members (Ground-level “In Reality A”) on inclusivity practices and legal compliance solely to see the level of variance, if they exist.*

## Pillar 1: Inclusivity Practices

Data Source	Average Inclusivity Score (%)
On Paper (Party Executives)	63.1%
In Reality (Party Members)	61.9%
Variance (Gap Between Policy and Practices)	-1.2%

Table 5 Overall average inclusivity scores


While political parties, on average, report a 63.1% inclusivity rate, party members perceive actual inclusivity practices to be just slightly lower, at 61.9%. This shows a 1.2% gap. Even though this is encouraging and maybe an indication that inclusivity policies are generally reflective of what members feel. However, expert reflection shows it may be due to the Majority overestimation bias<sup>32</sup> and social dominance<sup>33</sup>, considering that there are more male (67.1%) respondents than female (32.9%). Male respondents may believe that their parties are inclusive because their personal experiences align with existing party structures that already favour them. Their high ratings may be to legitimise the narrative, not necessarily an objective view of inclusion.

<sup>32</sup> Plaut, V. C., Thomas, K. M., & Goren, M. J. (2009). Is Multiculturalism or Color Blindness Better for Minorities? Psychological Science, 20(4), 444–446.


<sup>33</sup> Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. Cambridge University Press.

Nevertheless, the slightly lower perception of party members on inclusion compared to the party executives is not uniformly so across parties. But it seemingly hides some significant party-level disparities, where the gap varies widely. Some parties were even overreporting, and others were underreporting.

**Inclusivity Practices (on paper)**



**Inclusivity Practices (in reality)**



Score Range (%)	Rank Category	Color Code
90 ---- 100	Highly Inclusive	Green
70 ---- 89	Inclusive	Yellow
50 ---- 69	Moderately Inclusive	Orange
20 ---- 49	Weak Inclusive	Red
0 ---- 19	Non Inclusive	Black

The inclusivity practice termed as “On Paper” is primarily the data from national executive members of political parties while the inclusive practice termed as “in reality” is the weight score of responses from the party members survey, and the score was normalized to standardised the result range to 0% -100%

**Figure 15** A comparative look from the party members lens (on paper vs reality/implementation)



**Figure 16** Variance score of political parties based “on paper vs. “in reality a” data (inclusivity practices)

**Narrow Gap Exists but Varies Widely by Party:** There are parties that showed higher perceived inclusivity in practice than what is claimed on paper. This is a situation where members perceive the party to be more inclusive than leadership claims. This suggests that *grassroots actions may exceed formal policies* and may indicate internal trust and credibility. Also, it may be because of modesty in reporting.

Party	On Paper (%)	In Reality (%)	Difference
PDP	68	74.4	<b>+6.4</b>
AAC	49	63.8	<b>+14.8</b>
YP	65	73.8	<b>+8.8</b>
APC	49	65.6	<b>+16.6</b>
APP	48	65	<b>+17</b>
AA	37	61.9	<b>+24.9</b>
PRP	30	71.9	<b>+41.9</b>
LP	62	63.8	<b>+1.8</b>

*Table 6 Political parties with higher perceived inclusivity practices than ‘on paper’*

### Specific Party Patterns:

- **PRP and AA** show a dramatic gap (+41.9 and +24.9). This could suggest significant informal inclusion efforts or strong localised structures not matched by policy development at the national level.
- **PDP and LP**, with much narrower gaps, reflect more consistency between policy and practice. That might be due to better institutionalisation or more centralised policy dissemination.
- **APC and AAC**, while showing notable gaps, signal under-documented progress, but the moderate-to-low policy scores also hint at a risk: gains may not be enduring without formal backing.

This may be an indication that inclusion happens informally through unwritten norms, leader behaviour, or decentralized decision-making. This is especially important in Nigeria’s fragmented party system, where local structures often operate semi-autonomously. This also implies that party support programming must go beyond compliance checks and work with informal mechanisms, especially within parties like PRP, AA, and APC, to codify and sustain what is working.



## Valuable lessons from international best practices

**Key Challenge:** These parties have strong inclusivity policies on paper but face challenges in actual implementation, leading to a significant perception gap among members.

Country	Best Practice	Detailed Description
Senegal	<b>Gender Parity Law (2010)</b>	Senegal's Law No. 2010-11 mandates gender parity in all "totally or partially elected institutions." All political parties must submit candidate lists alternating male and female candidates (known as a "zipper" system). If a list does not comply, the electoral commission (CENA) rejects it outright. This created not only a legal obligation but a culture of compliance across parties. As a result, women gained 44% of seats in the National Assembly in 2012 and over 40% in 2022. Senegal also supports this policy through party-based capacity development programs and internal women's wings that influence candidate nomination.
Rwanda	<b>Gender Quota and Institutional Integration</b>	Rwanda embeds gender equality into its Constitution (Art. 9 & 76), which mandates at least 30% representation of women in all decision-making bodies. Political parties in Rwanda must demonstrate alignment with this constitutional requirement. The Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), for example, has internal party laws that promote the nomination of women across local and national positions, and female participation is mainstreamed in all leadership training programs. Rwanda's political culture and electoral law reinforce the implementation of these commitments. Women currently hold 61% of seats in Parliament—the highest in the world.
Guinea	<b>Law on Gender Parity (2019)</b>	Guinea's Parliament passed a law requiring equal representation of men and women in all electoral candidate lists. Although enforcement has been uneven due to institutional weaknesses, the law establishes a critical precedent. It requires parties to recruit, train, and support women from grassroots to national levels. Several parties, such as the UFDG, created women's desks responsible for screening lists and ensuring compliance. While compliance has been partial, the law's existence creates legal grounds for challenging exclusion in court and within electoral tribunals.

**Table 7** International best practices on inclusivity policy implementation

### Key Learning for Nigerian Parties:

- Legal parity frameworks must be backed by internal party enforcement structures.
- Candidate list rejections are effective levers for ensuring actual compliance.
- Inclusivity should not stop at aspirational statements; parties must redesign their internal electoral systems to reflect legal and gender parity goals.

Conversely, some parties have strongly reported inclusivity policies but weaker implementation or perceived internal exclusion. These parties report high inclusivity policies but don't match as strongly in perception.

Party	On Paper (%)	In Reality (%)	Gap
ZLP	88	65	-23
SDP	85	60	-25
ADC	80	56.3	-23.7
APGA	85	63.1	-21.9
YPP	87	66.3	-20.7
NNPP	76	63.1	-12.9
ADP	71	60	-11
BP	61	50.6	-10.4
NRM	49	48.1	-0.9
Accord	50	60.6	+10.6 (included here due to low base)

**Table 8** Political parties with stronger reported inclusivity practices than 'in reality'

The data suggests that this party's inclusivity is more rhetorical than substantive. Policies exist, but there is a policy-practice disconnect, tokenistic policy design or weak enforcement. For instance, ZLP may have a youth quota written into their constitution, promising at least 60% of all elective and appointive positions in the party to young people. However, when the party conducts its congresses or selects candidates, youth are either excluded from delegate lists or relegated to

non-influential roles. Women and PWDs, despite written commitments, might find it difficult. This results in a 23-point perception gap, as shown in the data do not feel the inclusion promised on paper is experienced in day-to-day party life.

In the political landscape, this disconnect speaks to the limitations of tokenistic policy adoption. Parties might include inclusive clauses to comply with INEC registration requirements or appeal to donor expectations, without internalising the values or institutional structures necessary for real implementation.

### Valuable lessons from international best practices

**Key Opportunity:** These parties exhibit higher inclusivity in practice than reflected in their official policies, presenting an opportunity to formalize and showcase their effective practices.

Country	Best Practice	Detailed Description
South Africa	<b>Voluntary Quotas and Zebra Lists (EFF, ANC)</b>	Political parties such as the African National Congress (ANC) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have adopted voluntary gender quotas and "zebra" listing systems—where male and female candidates alternate on lists. The ANC uses a 50:50 quota for all elected positions within the party. These measures are not legally required but are driven by party ideology and internal resolutions. In 2019, ANC's parliamentary list reflected 48% female candidates. The parties also run leadership schools and mentorship programs, especially for women and youth, preparing them for public office. These quotas are written into party constitutions, making them binding during internal primaries.
Tanzania	<b>Reserved Seats for Women (ACT-Wazalendo)</b>	Tanzania reserves 30% of parliamentary seats for women through a special seat mechanism. While this is a national policy, parties like ACT-Wazalendo go further by creating separate internal funds for training female candidates and introducing guidelines that allow women to contest regular (non-reserved) seats. They also invest in documenting women's political participation for public recognition and institutional memory.
United Kingdom (Labour Party)	<b>All-Women Shortlists (AWS) and Leadership Pipelines</b>	The UK Labour Party introduced All-Women Shortlists in the 1990s to address underrepresentation. Constituencies selected by the National Executive Committee (NEC) are mandated to field only female candidates. This system contributed to Labour electing 101 women MPs in 1997.

		The party also has the Labour Women’s Network, which provides political training, mentoring, and policy advocacy, supported by the Jo Cox Women in Leadership Program. While AWS has been controversial, it forced structural change and reshaped candidate recruitment strategies.
--	--	---

**Table 9** International best practices on showcasing effective inclusivity practices

**Key Learning for Nigerian Parties:**

- Legal parity frameworks must be backed by internal party enforcement structures.
- Candidate list rejections are effective levers for ensuring actual compliance.
- Inclusivity should not stop at aspirational statements; parties must redesign their internal electoral systems to reflect legal and gender parity goals.

**Some Parties Over-reported while others Under-reported:** For example, AAC and APC both reported low inclusivity scores on paper (49%) but had relatively high "in reality" scores (63.8% and 65.6%, respectively). This may suggest either underrated internal practices or poor documentation of informal mechanisms that promote inclusivity. Expert review also positioned that it could mean that members are thinking that there have already been enough positive actions taken to increase inclusivity in the party, and this claim is also backed up by different cross-cultural studies where men believe that efforts to promote equality have gone too far<sup>34</sup>.

Type	Definition	Parties
Overreporting	High policy claims but lower practice	ZLP, SDP, ADC, APGA, YPP, NNPP, ADP
Underreporting	Low policy claims, higher internal perception	PRP, AA, APP, APC, AAC, YP, PDP

**Table 10** Breakdown of parties based on over and under reporting of inclusivity practices

When party members believe more in the system than the system claims, it shows internal legitimacy. But when leadership overstates inclusivity without delivery, it risks internal disillusionment and public scepticism.

<sup>34</sup> Ipsos. (2024). IEI 2024 Global Charts. Available at [https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2024-05/IEI\\_2024\\_Global%20Charts.pdf](https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2024-05/IEI_2024_Global%20Charts.pdf)

## Valuable lessons from international best practices

These parties show alignment between policies and member perceptions, whether high or low. For those with high alignment, this indicates successful integration of inclusivity values into practice. For low-alignment parties, it reflects a consistent culture that might require reform.

Country	Best Practice	Detailed Description
Kenya	<b>Women's League and Candidate Training (ODM)</b>	The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) established an active Women's League that directly influences candidate selection and election campaign strategy. Women aspirants participate in ODM's leadership academy, which prepares them for both electoral and party leadership roles. ODM's nomination guidelines also provide for reduced fees for women, youth, and persons with disabilities, ensuring equitable access. While Kenya's "two-thirds gender rule" is not fully enforced, ODM has taken steps to align its structures to anticipate full legal compliance.
Ghana	<b>Gender Desk Units and Youth Caucuses (NPP, NDC)</b>	Major parties like the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC) operate formal gender desks and youth wings with designated leadership. The NPP, for instance, holds training conferences for young and female party members, including electoral campaign simulation. These wings also influence internal policy resolutions during national congresses. Though quotas are not binding, inclusion is nurtured through cultural investment and targeted leadership grooming.
Norway	<b>Gender Equality Law in Parties (Labour Party, Conservative Party)</b>	Norwegian parties often operate under voluntary commitments to maintain gender balance, with most major parties using internal quota systems of 40–50% for all leadership and candidate lists. The Labour Party enforces this through their nomination committees and local branches. The Conservative Party does not use formal quotas but monitors gender balance actively and provides support structures such as mentorship, campaign financing for women, and family-friendly political participation measures.

**Table 11** International best practices of successful integration of inclusivity values into practice

### Key Learning for Nigerian Parties:

- Consistent alignment requires institutional memory, regular audits of party composition, and member feedback systems.
- Investing in political education and reducing entry barriers helps normalize inclusivity practices.
- Internal party structures (like women's or youth wings) should be empowered to influence real decision-making, not operate in ceremonial roles.

### Tailored and evidence-based recommendations based on the analysis of the Inclusivity (On Paper vs. In Reality – Party Members) data.

#### 1. For Political Parties: Tailored Reforms Based on Inclusivity Gaps

**a. Parties with Over-reported Inclusivity (Watchlist):** *These parties claim high inclusivity but fall short in member perception.* (ZLP, SDP, ADC, APGA, YPP, NNPP, ADP, BP).

##### Recommendation:

- Conduct internal audits of inclusion policies versus actual participation of youth, women, and PWDs, with an emphasis on listening to the views of members in a way that removes hierarchical barriers and self-censorship.
- Develop or update internal compliance frameworks and robust actions, to ensure that inclusion is not only a manifesto promise but also a lived experience.
- Publicly clarify and institutionalise inclusive and merit-based rules for candidate selection, with deliberate emphasis on women's, youth, and PWD representation. Selection processes should ensure fairness, transparency, and enable access to winnable seats for underrepresented groups.
- Desk review almost revealed that one of the issues is Violence against Women in Politics (VAW-P) – so it is important to develop and institutionalise VAW-P prevention and response frameworks that are party-wide. This should include a zero-tolerance policy, internal sanctions against perpetrators, and public disavowal of violence. Publish these frameworks online and include them in party codes of conduct. Establish independent, confidential, and responsive reporting mechanisms for victims, and allocate resources to enforce protections.
- Facilitate access to both partisan and non-partisan networks for women and youth, including those with caring responsibilities. Ensure that networks are free from harassment and offer women safe platforms for engagement.
- Identify and mentor talented women, youth, and PWDs through formalised talent-pipeline initiatives. Provide access to party networks, subsidized or waived nomination fees, tailored leadership training, and visibility platforms.

- Institutionalise measures such as internal quotas, all-women shortlists, and inclusion targets. Empower beneficiaries of such measures by assigning them to influential party committees and leadership roles.
- Establish meaningful inclusivity task forces within party leadership structures.
- Engage with civil society organizations and INEC for technical support on gender/youth/PWD inclusion strategies.

**b. Parties with Underreported Inclusivity (Best Practice Candidates):** *These parties deliver more inclusivity in practice than they claim on paper.* (PRP, AA, APP, APC, AAC, YP, PDP)

**Recommendation:**

- Proactively publish internal practices that have yielded high perception scores. For example, if candidate selection processes have led to equitable gender outcomes, they should be documented and shared as replicable models.
- Parties should initiate or participate in inter-party dialogue on inclusivity, particularly engaging women and youth leagues across party lines to collectively advance inclusive reforms.
- Leverage positive perception for political branding and external communication (especially for parties like PRP and APP).
- Collaborate with INEC and CSOs to host experience-sharing roundtables with other parties.
- Encourage them to revise manifestos and party constitutions to reflect actual practices and structures.
- Keep monitoring to ensure policies reflect reality

**c. Parties with Balanced Inclusivity:** *Where policy and perception scores are closely aligned (positive or negative)* - LP, NRM, Accord

**Recommendation:**

- Where both scores are high; Continue and strengthen inclusive practices. Consolidate gains by entrenching internal party rules that mandate inclusion benchmarks in all levels of party operations and representation, including nominations and campaign management.
- Where both scores are low; Provide targeted support to initiate inclusion reforms, particularly in internal elections and decision-making processes. Launch foundational party reforms focusing on inclusion-sensitive candidate recruitment, codes of conduct that protect vulnerable groups, and targeted outreach to women and youth.



## **2. For Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)**

### **Recommendation:**

- Offer technical capacity building on inclusive party structuring and host periodic inclusivity audits of political parties. Provide technical assistance to parties on drafting and implementing anti-violence codes, nomination equity frameworks, and inclusive candidate support programs.
- Engage in national campaigns to expose party-based violence against women in politics. Collaborate with women's rights groups to monitor compliance with party-based VAW-P frameworks.
- Facilitate inter-party women and youth dialogues, focused on peer learning, solidarity building, and agenda setting.
- Organize state-level dialogues bringing together political party reps and marginalized groups (e.g., youth, women, PWDs) to co-develop action plans for closing inclusivity gaps.

## **3. For INEC (Election and Party Monitoring Department)**

### **Recommendation:**

- Include a detailed assessment of the parties' candidate selection procedures in pre-election party audits. Require reports on how women, youth, and PWDs were nominated and the rationale for placements in either winnable or marginal positions.
- Integrate inclusivity perception indicators into the annual Party Compliance Assessment Reports.
- Require political parties to report on inclusivity implementation, not just policy existence, during party registration renewals or pre-election assessments.
- Partner with CSOs to monitor and verify internal party elections and conventions, focusing on the participation of women, youth, and marginalized groups.
- Partner with CSOs to create a VAW-P monitoring index within political parties. Include compliance with protection mechanisms, availability of redress structures, and outcomes of sanctioning processes.
- Make it mandatory that registered parties maintain active women's and youth wings with constitutional powers and budgetary provisions.

## **4. For Donors and International Development Partners**

### **Recommendation:**

- Prioritize funding support to parties with:
  - High inclusion gaps, but the willingness to reform
  - Promising best practices that can be scaled or shared.



- That focus on preventing violence against women in politics. Fund protection strategies within political parties and community-based protection networks.
- Support projects that test and scale internal quota systems, women-focused candidate academies, and financial support mechanisms for aspirants from underrepresented groups.
- Fund policy dialogues that bridge research, party reforms, and electoral legal reforms—especially on candidate selection regulations and anti-VAW-P legislation.
- Design political party strengthening programs that offer tailored capacity-building for parties based on inclusivity performance tiers.
- Support a national political inclusivity index updated biannually using citizen perception and party performance metrics.

## 5. Cross-cutting and General Recommendations

### Recommendation:

- Political parties and CSOs should lobby the National Assembly to pass specific laws regulating internal candidate selection processes. These laws should embed gender parity clauses, inclusivity benchmarks, and criteria for nomination fees, access to resources, and complaint handling.
- Every political party should have a functional and resourced women's and youth's wing, integrated into national, state, and local structures. These should not be ceremonial bodies, but strategic platforms for mobilization, advocacy, and candidate support.
- Advocate for legal frameworks that reinforce affirmative action, such as placement of women, youth and PWDs in winnable positions and access to state-provided resources and media time during campaigns.
- Encourage political parties to support women, youth and PWDs engaging across party lines on non-partisan issues such as education, health, and women's rights. Such engagement strengthens solidarity and drives issue-based politics.

---

**Final thoughts:** Inclusivity is not just a manifesto clause; it must be a structural culture. When the grassroots perception of inclusion lags behind leadership claims, it reveals a party's weakest link — credibility.

---

## Pillar 2: Legal Compliance

Despite very high claims of compliance (average of 86.42%), party members perceive actual legal compliance as significantly lower at 72.38%. The 14-point gap suggests that formal compliance mechanisms may exist but can be less well implemented, communicated, or enforced internally.


Data Source	Overall Average Legal Compliance Score (%)
On Paper (Party Executives + INEC Validation)	86.42%
In Reality (Party Members)	72.38%
Variance (Gap Between Policy and Practices)	-14.04%

**Table 12** Overall average legal compliance scores


Parties claim to follow the law, but members experience something different—this credibility gap may damage internal trust and long-term democratic strengthening.

Nevertheless, looking at it on a party-by-party basis, we discovered that:

- Some parties met legal standards despite leadership claims.
- Parties that it's “on paper” details are at variance with “in-reality”.



**Figure 17** A comparative look from the party member lens (on paper vs reality/implementation)



**Figure 18** Variance score of political parties based on “on paper” vs “in reality a” data (legal compliance)

- Parties That Meet or Exceed Legal Standards Despite Leadership Claims:** These are the parties with positive variance, i.e., members perceive higher legal compliance than is claimed or documented by the leadership. These represent understatements or modesty in official reporting, but a strong internal structure.

Party	Variance	Implications
<b>PRP</b>	+7.8	Strong credibility and trust among party members; potential best practice model for compliance
<b>AA</b>	+6.9	Internal compliance mechanisms are working and should be better communicated externally
<b>APP</b>	+3.4	Solid internal structure not yet captured on paper – may need to update documentation
<b>PDP</b>	+1.2	Accurate self-representation; opportunity to leverage trust for party brand and regulatory credibility

**Table 13** Political Parties With Higher Perceived Legal Compliance Than ‘On Paper’

By implication, these parties should showcase compliance mechanisms publicly, increasing their credibility with voters and regulators. Also, they should be encouraged to participate in experience-sharing across party platforms, positioning themselves as compliance champions in INEC or development programmes.

## Valuable lessons from international best practices

Party Category	Best Practice	Detailed Description
PRP, AA, APP, PDP (Positive Variance)	Publicize Compliance Frameworks	These parties should formally document and publish their internal compliance units, sanction processes, and financial controls to improve external trust, in line with the Council of Europe Code of Good Practice <sup>35</sup> .
	Institutionalize Volunteer Compliance Units	Existing informal compliance mechanisms should be embedded in party constitutions to enhance transparency and align with Venice Commission recommendations <sup>36</sup> .
	Utilize Peer Learning Platforms	By sharing compliance strategies at INEC or CSO-led forums, these parties promote knowledge exchange and support, consistent with OSCE/ODIHR guidance <sup>37</sup> .

**Table 14** International best practices of successful integration of inclusivity values into practice

**2. Parties where, on paper, details are at variance with reality:** About the variance between party executives and members, some parties showed large negative variance, indicating a policy-practice disconnect. Leadership claims are high, but grassroots members disagree, pointing to credibility gaps, possible elite control, or poor communication. Also, there are some parties that showed low variance (between  $\pm 0$  and  $\pm 0-10$ ), indicating a reliable and consistent self-assessment:

Party	Variance	Implications
ADC	-34.7	Severe disconnect – members don't experience the compliance promised. Needs internal reforms urgently.
ADP	-31.2	Suggests over-reporting and possible lack of structure at grassroots. Needs internal reforms urgently.

<sup>35</sup> Council of Europe. (2009). CDL-AD(2009)021. Available at <https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282009%29021-e&utm>

<sup>36</sup> Ibid

<sup>37</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe & Council of Europe Venice Commission. (2023). Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, Second Edition. Available at <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/1/538473.pdf>

<b>BP</b>	-30.6	Leadership expectations not matched in reality; transparency and decentralisation needed.
<b>ZLP</b>	-27.4	High ambitions, low delivery – perception gap may affect grassroots loyalty.
<b>NNPP</b>	-26.8	Emerging party still building structure – needs institutional strengthening.
<b>NRM</b>	-27.2	Leadership may be out of sync with field realities; internal communication overhaul required.
<b>APGA</b>	-22.4	Established party but slipping in internal trust; compliance audits necessary.

**Table 15** Political parties with stronger reported legal compliance than ‘in reality’

These parties on this list need legal and compliance restructuring support. It is imperative for them to conduct a party compliance audit that should be facilitated independently by CSOs or INEC. Also, they must use the reality from party members as a scorecard to assess the implementation of internal guidelines, while INEC should consider closer scrutiny in pre-election compliance checks.

Party Category	Best Practice	Detailed Description
ADC, ADP, BP, ZLP, NNPP, NRM, APGA (Large Negative Variance)	Commission Independent Compliance Audits	These parties should engage CSOs or INEC to conduct third-party audits before elections, reinforcing internal and external accountability in line with Venice Commission standards <sup>38</sup> .
	Decentralize Compliance Training	Offer regular training to state and ward-level leaders to ensure policies reach grassroots members, as recommended by OSCE for effective internal party structures <sup>39</sup> .
	Publish Transparent	Parties should clearly define and document disciplinary procedures, including timelines and

<sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup> Council of Europe Venice Commission & OSCE/ODIHR. (2010). Draft Joint Guidelines on Political Party Legislation (CDL-AD(2010)024). Available at <https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282010%29024&utm>

	Sanction Procedures	appeal processes, aligned with OSCE/ODIHR best practices <sup>40</sup> .
	Enhance Member Feedback Mechanisms	Introduce formal channels for members to report policy failures, reinforcing transparency and accountability, per Venice Commission guidance <sup>41</sup> .
	Strengthen Financial Reporting	Regular financial audits should be published, following models like Ireland's SIPO and IFES standards <sup>42 43</sup> .

**Table 16** International best practices of successful integration of inclusivity values into practice

Party	Variance	Implications
YP	-2.5	Stable party with reliable legal processes
AAC	-5.1	Shows coherence between leadership and members
LP	-5.6	Modest gap; compliance mechanisms may be improving
APC	-9.7	Large party with minor internal disagreements; needs communication improvements
YPP	-9.1	Good alignment with room for improvements

**Table 17** Political parties with alignment between policy and practice

The parties are ideal candidates for technical capacity strengthening – CSOs can support them with advanced training on legal compliance documentation.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe & Council of Europe Venice Commission. (2023). Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, Second Edition. Available at <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/1/538473.pdf>

<sup>42</sup> Transparency International Ireland. (n.d.). Submission on standards for the Public Office Commission (SIPO) draft political-party account guideline. Available at <https://transparency.ie/resources/submissions/submission-standards-public-office-commission-sipo-draft-political-party-account-guideline-0>

<sup>43</sup> International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). (n.d.). Oversight: Part One. Available at <https://www.ifes.org/oversight/part-one>

Nigeria's political parties are not failing for lack of policy—they are failing because they stop at policy.

Party Category	Best Practice	Detailed Description
YP, AAC, LP, APC, YPP (Moderate or Small Variance)	Update Internal Compliance Documentation	Parties should revise constitutions and internal documents to reflect actual practices, reinforcing transparency, inspired by Ireland's Electoral Commission strategies <sup>44</sup> .
	Schedule Periodic External Audits	Regular oversight by CSOs, following OSCE/ODIHR frameworks, helps sustain accountability over time <sup>45</sup> .
	Expand Legal Compliance Training	Continued education for all members on compliance responsibilities, as encouraged by OSCE guidance on party regulation <sup>46</sup> .
	Pilot Random Audit Systems	Implementing audits similar to risk-limiting audits used in US elections can confirm internal electoral integrity <sup>47</sup> .

**Table 18** International best practices of successful alignment between policy and practice

Based on the Legal Compliance (On Paper vs. In Reality – Party Members) data, several important patterns emerge about how Nigerian political parties *present* themselves versus how *their members experience* their adherence to legal standards. Below are some actionable recommendations for parties to align what they claim with what their members experience to build trust, retain membership, and meet INEC regulatory thresholds.

**1. Strengthen Internal Compliance Systems (For Over-reporting Parties):** For parties like ADC (-34.7 variance), ADP (-31.2), BP (-30.6), ZLP (-27.4), NNPP (-26.8):

<sup>44</sup> Election Observation & Democracy Support (EODS). (2025). Campaign Finance Update – EU EOM Political Party Group (March 2025). Available at <https://www.eods.eu/template/default/files/EU%20EOM%20PG%20-%20Campaign%20finance%20Update%20Mar25%20Final.pdf>

<sup>45</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe & Council of Europe Venice Commission. (2023). Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, Second Edition. Available at <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/1/538473.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> Ibid

<sup>47</sup> Verified Voting. (n.d.). What Is a Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA)? Available at <https://verifiedvoting.org/audits/whatisrla/>

- **Conduct Internal Audits:** These parties should initiate third-party compliance audits to identify why grassroots members feel disconnected from the stated legal structures.
- **Decentralise Compliance Structures:** Develop state and LGA-level compliance cells to support national legal documentation with real-time implementation.
- **Train Party Leaders at All Levels:** Include ward, LGA, and state coordinators in legal training sessions, not just national executives.
- **Public Disclosure:** Begin publishing compliance milestones and reports to improve transparency and rebuild trust.

**2. Leverage Positive Deviance (For Underreporting or Aligned Parties):** For PRP (+7.8), AA (+6.9), APP (+3.4), PDP (+1.2):

- **Capture and Document Best Practices:** Work with CSOs or INEC to document their model of legal compliance and internal trust-building.
- **Showcase Models in INEC/CSO Platforms:** These parties can serve as *model case studies* for other parties.
- **Build Party Brand from Within:** Emphasize member trust in external communications to boost credibility during elections or INEC reviews.

**3. Tailored Support for Emerging or Transitional Parties:** For Labour Party (-5.6), AAC (-5.1), YP (-2.5) and others with low variance:

- **Develop Customized Legal Compliance Roadmaps:** These parties are well-positioned to transition from basic to institutionalized compliance mechanisms.
- **Introduce Digital Compliance Tools:** Mobile dashboards, internal scorecards, and WhatsApp-based tracking could be introduced for scalable monitoring.
- **CSO & INEC Mentorship:** Pair with more experienced parties or institutional mentors to help refine their compliance culture.

**4. Create a Standardized Party Compliance Tracker (for INEC & CSOs)**

- **Develop a Public-Facing Compliance Scorecard:** INEC and civil society can jointly create an annual Party Legal Compliance Scorecard based on perception and documentation audits.
- **Institutionalise Member-Based Reviews:** Encourage parties to adopt *annual internal reviews* where members assess compliance and leadership responds.
- **Tie Funding/Recognition to Compliance Performance:** INEC can make certain recognitions, resources, or support conditional on compliance performance or positive member feedback.



## 5. Policy Recommendations for INEC and the National Assembly

- **Revise Monitoring Frameworks:** Expand INEC's Election and Party Monitoring (EPM) framework to include member perception tracking.
- **Mandate Compliance Reporting Beyond Paperwork:** Legal compliance assessments should not be based solely on forms or submissions but include verification from the base.
- **Support Continuous Party Development Funding:** Legal compliance training and system building should be eligible for external support under electoral reform programming.

---

**Final Thought:** Compliance is not just a checklist. It is a culture. And that culture must be consistent from the top of the party to its grassroots.

---

## Pillar 3: Public Outreach

Data Source	Overall Average Public Outreach Score (%)
On Paper (Party Executives)	81.68%
In Reality A (Party Members)	62.07%
In Reality B (Citizens)	45.91%

**Table 19** Overall average public outreach scores

There is a massive drop from reported efforts (81.7%) to what party members (62.1%) and citizens (45.9%) observe. The 35.8-point perception gap between what is reported and what the public experiences suggests that outreach efforts may be performative rather than participatory. This reveals a dual disconnect:

1. The vertical disconnects between the national party structure and grassroots members – This refers to the gap between the national party leadership and their grassroots members. If nothing is done, this can weaken internal party cohesion. It means policies or communication strategies designed at the top either do not reach the bottom or are poorly implemented. It limits internal buy-in, undermines mobilisation, and reduces effectiveness in party building.
2. Horizontal disconnect between the political parties and the public: This refers to the gap between the party (as a whole) and the public or citizens. It can lead to **distrust, disengagement, and electoral disadvantage**. Citizens are either unaware of party activities or find them unconvincing, suggesting poor visibility, weak messaging, or misplaced priorities.

---

The biggest challenge isn't policy—it's perception.

---


Type of Gap	Gap Size	Interpretation
On Paper → Party Members	~19.6%	Parties over-report outreach efforts: members don't feel the effect. This may be due to implementation weakness or lack of inclusion.
On Paper → Citizens	~35.8%	National claims are not connecting with the public at all. The outreach is disconnected from citizen needs.
Members → Citizens	~16.2%	Insider-outsider perception divide: Even when members feel involved, citizens remain unconvinced or unaware.

**Table 20** Summary of type and size of gaps

The steep drop from executive perception to public perception implies that public outreach mechanisms are either non-existent, non-inclusive, or poorly designed for the broader electorate. Citizens feel disconnected from the ideological positioning and activities of parties, which undermines both civic engagement and informed voting.

### Breakdown of Alignment and Discrepancy Patterns

This three-tier analysis exposes a critical credibility gap for political parties. Their outreach strategies are likely centralised, event-based, or elitist and fail to reach rural populations, non-partisan citizens, and marginalised groups. If this persists, political apathy and voter alienation will deepen, further weakening Nigeria's democratic fabric.



**Figure 19** Comparative look from the party members lens (on paper vs reality/implementation)

Party	On Paper	Members	Citizens	Key Insight
PDP	86	84.9	75.5	Strong internal cohesion and public trust. Reflects robust structures and engagement.
AAC	97	70.3	100	Citizens resonate strongly. May need to align internal structures to match external traction.
APGA	89	56.3	59.2	Fair balance. Both members and citizens perceive moderate outreach.
SDP	100	61.5	57.1	While internal rating is moderate, external perception holds, reflecting message clarity.
LP	91	68.8	63.3	Above-average performance on all fronts. Room to deepen internal outreach.

**Table 21** Parties showing alignment across the board

Party	On Paper	Members	Drop (%)	Key Insight
ADC	93	47.9	-45.1	High ambition but poor internal communication or follow-through.
BP	95	54.2	-40.8	Almost no translation of claims into internal engagement.
ZLP	96	56.3	-39.7	Severe disconnect. Could reflect either top-down communication gaps or inactive structures.
ADP	85	45.8	-39.2	Suggests more paper-based performance than on-ground reality.
NRM	79	46.9	-32.1	Possible organisational weakness or lack of operational structures.
APM	51	56.3	+5.3	Interestingly, it was perceived better by members than leadership claimed.

Accord	66	56.3	-9.7	Mild drop but worth strengthening internal feedback loops.
--------	----	------	------	--

**Table 22** Parties with a major drop from ‘on paper’ to ‘party members (reality A)’

Party / Organisation	Best Practice	Detailed Description
PDP, AAC, APGA, SDP, LP (Alignment across all levels)	1. Integrated media strategy across multimedia and grassroots platforms	Employ combined TV, radio, social media, town halls, and community forums to reinforce consistent messaging across national, member, and citizen audiences. Nigeria’s 2016 “Change Begins With Me” campaign used multimedia and community engagement to build trust <sup>48 49</sup> .
	2. Feedback loops through town halls and digital channels	Implement structured community forums and social media to solicit citizen input and adjust outreach based on public needs <sup>50</sup> .
	3. Transparent reporting of plans and impact	Regularly publish outreach program outcomes, audience metrics, and progress reports online to build credibility. Transparent reporting has proven successful in improving public perception in other governance contexts <sup>51</sup> .
ADC, BP, ZLP, ADP, NRM (Major	1. Internal communications enhancement	Strengthen internal communication by ensuring party officials share outreach plans and updates with local chapters and members promptly.

<sup>48</sup> Impact Hub Nigeria. (n.d.). Public relations (LIFE Service). Available at [https://impacthub.com.ng/lif\\_service/public-relation/](https://impacthub.com.ng/lif_service/public-relation/)

<sup>49</sup> Spokespersons Digest. (2024). Good Governance. Available at <https://spokespersonsdigest.com/2024/09/good-governance/>

<sup>50</sup> Centre for Ethics and Public Policy Studies (CEPPs). (via Web Archive, 2025). CEPPs in Nigeria. Available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20250324062329/https://cepps.org/associate-awards/cepps-in-nigeria/>

<sup>51</sup> Alleo.ai. (n.d.). Strategies for City Officials to Improve Public Perception of Social Programs. Available at <https://alleo.ai/blog/public-relations-experts/crisis-response/strategies-for-city-officials-to-improve-public-perception-of-social-programs/>

drop from paper to members)		Assign dedicated communications staff in each unit <sup>52</sup> .
	2. Grassroots capacity-building workshops	Train local members on outreach tactics, media engagement, and community mobilisation to drive national strategies to grassroots levels <sup>53</sup> .
	3. Regional pilot programs before national rollouts	Test outreach initiatives in select wards or LGAs, gather member feedback, refine strategies, and only then scale up nationally <sup>54</sup> .

**Table 23** International best practices for political parties on public outreach

Party	On Paper	Citizens	Drop (%)	Key Insight
ZLP	96	6.1	-89.9	Severe outreach failure. National presence doesn't translate to public recognition.
BP	95	6.1	-88.9	Alarming collapse. Visibility crisis.
AA	68	6.1	-61.9	Serious public invisibility. Needs external engagement tools.
YP	88	22.4	-65.6	Youth focus not converting to public recognition. Revisit youth messaging and branding.
NNPP	89	38.8	-50.2	Outreach doesn't match the profile. Suggests ineffective messaging.
ADP	85	—	—	No citizen perception data—potential blind spot.

<sup>52</sup> RSIS International. (n.d.). The Use of Public Relations in Political Campaigns in Nigeria. Available at <https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/articles/the-use-of-public-relations-in-political-campaigns-in-nigeria/>

<sup>53</sup> Standard Times Nigeria. (via Web Archive, 2024). Shift from Media-Driven to Community-Based Political Evaluation in Nigeria. Available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20240617184953/https://standardtimesng.com/shift-from-media-driven-to-community-based-political-evaluation-in-nigeria/>

<sup>54</sup> Ibid

APC	85	42.9	-42.1	Weak citizen connection despite strong party machinery. Needs trust-building.
-----	----	------	-------	---

**Table 24** Parties with a major drop from ‘on paper’ to ‘citizens’

No matter how well you plan, if citizens don’t see it, it didn’t happen. If citizens don’t feel the party’s presence, then the outreach is ineffective—regardless of what’s on paper.

Party	Members	Citizens	Gap	Implication
AAC	70.3	100	+29.7	Citizens are more impressed than insiders. Suggests strong external messaging.
PRP	79.7	57.1	-22.6	Internally confident but not translating externally. Needs rebranding or wider reach.
NRM	46.9	61.2	+14.3	Members disengaged, but citizens still notice efforts. Suggests top-down success.
YP	60.4	22.4	-38.0	Youth-centric brand not reaching young people effectively.
APC	74.5	42.9	-31.6	Institutional strength not matched by citizen confidence.

**Table 25** Parties with a gap from ‘members’ to ‘citizens: (insider vs. outside perception)

**Final Thought:** Parties must become platforms, not just paper institutions. Outreach must be lived, not just claimed.

Party / Organisation	Best Practice	Detailed Description
ZLP, BP, AA, YP, NNPP, APC (Major drop to citizens)	1. Broad-based visibility campaigns	Use targeted PR campaigns with town halls, community influencers, and visual messaging to raise public awareness. Leverage public relations in

		campaigns—e.g., PR agencies advise integrating community relations to reach diverse populations <sup>55</sup> .
	2. Multi-lingual and culturally resonant messaging	Communicate in Pidgin and major local languages across all media. Align visual branding (logos, posters) with cultural symbols to improve recognition <sup>56</sup> .
	3. Community leader partnerships	Recruit community leaders as party ambassadors to endorse, validate, and publicise outreach efforts—an approach supported in urban policy frameworks <sup>57</sup> .
AAC, PRP, NRM, YP, APC (Members > Citizens)	1. External amplification via co-hosted events	Organise events on non-partisan issues (health, education, youth empowerment) with CSOs and media partners to raise public-facing credibility <sup>58</sup> .
	2. Public showcase of internal programs	Invite community members and press to party education or training events—such visibility increases transparency and public trust <sup>59</sup> .
	3. Digital storytelling of member activities	Share member testimonials and localized stories on social media to bridge the insider-outsider perception gap by making internal work visible externally <sup>60</sup> .

<sup>55</sup> RSIS International. (n.d.). The Use of Public Relations in Political Campaigns in Nigeria. Available at <https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/articles/the-use-of-public-relations-in-political-campaigns-in-nigeria/>

<sup>56</sup> Veqta. (n.d.). How Localization Shapes Political Campaigns in Multilingual Nations. Available at <https://veqta.com/how-localization-shapes-political-campaigns-in-multilingual-nations/>

<sup>57</sup> Standard Times Nigeria (via Web Archive, 2024). Shift from Media-Driven to Community-Based Political Evaluation in Nigeria. Available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20240617184953/https://standardtimesng.com/shift-from-media-driven-to-community-based-political-evaluation-in-nigeria/>

<sup>58</sup> National Democratic Institute (NDI). (2006). Political Party & Civil Society: Citizen Concerns. Available at [https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/PoliticalParty\\_CivilSociety\\_CitizenConcerns.pdf](https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/PoliticalParty_CivilSociety_CitizenConcerns.pdf)

<sup>59</sup> National Democratic Institute (NDI). (n.d.). Political Party Manuals. Available at [https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1930\\_polpart\\_manuals\\_010105\\_5.pdf](https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1930_polpart_manuals_010105_5.pdf)

<sup>60</sup> Political Media. (2025). Winning Voters with Instagram Stories: A Guide for Political Campaigns. Available at <https://politicalmedia.com/articles/winning-voters-with-instagram-stories-a-guide-for-political-campaigns>

All parties	1. Strategic public relations planning	Develop media plans with objectives—awareness, trust, mobilisation—and track outcomes using metrics like audience engagement and sentiment <sup>61</sup> <sup>62</sup> <sup>63</sup>
	2. Crisis and reputation management protocols	Adopt crisis communications strategies and media-monitoring tools to counter misinformation and maintain public trust during sensitive moments <sup>64</sup> .
	3. Ethical outreach and compliance	Adhere strictly to campaign finance laws, limit expenditures, avoid negative campaigning, and prioritise issue-based engagement <sup>65</sup> .

**Table 26** *International best practices for political parties on public outreach*

**Core Recommendations from the Outreach Data Analysis:** These recommendations are rooted in the three-layered discrepancy we observed between leadership claims (on paper), internal experience (party members) and public visibility (citizens).

**1. Address Vertical Disconnects (National Party Structure vs. Grassroots Members):** This is evident in ZLP, BP, APM, Accord, and ADC, where leadership claims and grassroots feedback don't align. These parties show large differences between On Paper vs Reality A, and since members are at the frontline of outreach. If they don't feel involved, the message dies internally.

**Recommendation:**

- **Strengthen communication channels** between national party headquarters and grassroots levels and implement structured internal communication systems that cascade decisions and outreach plans from the national to the ward level.

<sup>61</sup> SociallyIn. (2025). Social Media Strategy for Politicians. Available at <https://sociallyin.com/resources/social-media-strategy-for-politicians/>

<sup>62</sup> Determ. (2022). 5 Political PR Metrics to Monitor During a Campaign. Available at <https://determ.com/blog/5-political-pr-metrics-to-monitor-during-a-campaign/>

<sup>63</sup> National Democratic Institute (NDI). (n.d.). Module 8: Building a Communications Strategy. Available at [https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Module%208\\_Building%20a%20Communications%20Strategy\\_EN.pdf](https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Module%208_Building%20a%20Communications%20Strategy_EN.pdf)

<sup>64</sup> Tench, R., Jones, B., & Sun, W. (2016). Crisis Communication in Political Campaigns: The Literature. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 18(2), 213–234.

<sup>65</sup> International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). (n.d.). Oversight: Part One. Available at <https://www.ifes.org/oversight/part-one>



- **Regular internal assessments:** Conduct internal audits on outreach strategies at both national and local levels in ways which remove hierarchical barriers and self-censorship to reflect real views
- **Local leadership empowerment:** Ensure that local chapters are better equipped and aligned with the broader goals set by the national leadership.
- **Training and development:** Increase training and capacity building for grassroots members to align their perceptions with national leadership expectations.

**2. Tackle Horizontal Disconnects (Political Parties vs. General Public):** This is most prominent in ZLP, BP, and AA, where the outreach efforts on paper significantly differ from what citizens perceive.

**Recommendation:**

- **Revamp external communication strategies** to ensure that party messages resonate with the public.
  - **Increase media presence:** Utilise both traditional and social media more effectively to reach a wider audience.
  - **Community engagement initiatives:** Parties must restructure outreach strategies to prioritise citizen-facing activities. Organise town halls, meet-and-greets, and citizen engagement sessions to break the barrier between party leaders and the general public.
  - **Storytelling and branding:** Parties should refine their messaging and make it more relatable to citizens by focusing on real-life impact and results rather than party-centric rhetoric. They can use local champions to humanise the party story. Also, deploy contextual, culturally sensitive content in local languages.

**3. Identify and Mitigate Member vs Citizen Perception Gaps:** The gap between members' perception (Reality A) and citizen perception (Reality B) points to an insider-outsider divide in how outreach is perceived. For example, AAC, PRP, and NRM show significant divergence.

**Recommendation:**

- **Improve transparency:** Ensure that members are not only involved in the decision-making process but are also encouraged to share their experiences with citizens.
  - **Internal feedback loops:** Parties should create channels where feedback from members can inform broader citizen outreach programmes. Utilise WhatsApp polls, SMS-based check-ins, or brief exit surveys during party events.
  - **Public accountability:** Publicise party initiatives and achievements more widely. Transparency in internal activities fosters credibility among citizens.

**4. Focus on Bridging Gaps in Outreach Efforts:** Outreach (On Paper) vs Reality A (Party Members) shows a ~19.6% discrepancy. This indicates that parties have strong policies on paper,

but their internal outreach efforts aren't reaching members effectively. The gap from On Paper to Citizens (~35.8%) reflects disconnection from the actual needs and perceptions of the public.

**Recommendation:**

- **Refine outreach strategies** to cater to both members and the public:
  - **Empathetic Listening:** Parties need to understand the needs of their grassroots members and citizens to craft relevant outreach strategies.
  - **Localise messaging:** Ensure that outreach methods are region-specific and tailored to the concerns of local communities.
  - **Feedback and adjustment:** Parties should make their outreach programmes **adaptive**. Collect feedback regularly, assess gaps, and adjust messaging, content, and platforms accordingly.

**5. Develop Comprehensive Outreach and Training Programs:** Internal Party Structure needs training to align expectations with real-world outreach efforts. Some parties, like SDP, AAC, and PDP, show stronger performance in member outreach but still struggle to reach citizens effectively.

**Recommendation:**

- **Training Programs for Outreach:** Provide training for both party members and leaders on how to better engage with citizens. Emphasise the importance of **active listening** and **community engagement**.
  - **Leadership buy-in:** Leadership needs to model effective communication and engagement practices that encourage grassroots involvement.
  - **Collaboration with civil society:** Parties should engage with civil society organisations (CSOs) to build more inclusive platforms for citizen engagement.

Category	Key Focus Areas	Actionable Steps
Internal Disconnect (On Paper vs Party Members)	Improve internal communication and feedback mechanisms.	Implement internal audit systems, empower local chapters, and invest in grassroots leadership training.
Public Disconnect (On Paper vs Citizens)	Strengthen public engagement through community-driven outreach.	Amplify media presence, host public events, and create relatable messaging.
Perception Gap (Party Members vs Citizens)	Build trust and transparency between insiders and outsiders.	Publish party progress and reforms, encourage member-citizen interaction, and establish feedback loops.

General Outreach	Targeted, localised campaigns.	Leverage tailored content for specific demographics and focus on citizen concerns.
------------------	--------------------------------	--

**Table 27** Strategic focus areas for political parties based on key data gaps

Perception is political capital. Parties must not just plan outreach; they must feel it in their base and see it in the public’s eyes. Data like this helps them do both better.

# Chapter 5: Overall Conclusion of the Comparative Analysis

Dimension	Leadership View (On Paper)	Member View (Reality A)	Citizen View (Reality B)	Key Gap
Inclusivity	63.1%	61.9%	N/A	Low (1.2%)
Legal Compliance	86.4%	72.4%	N/A	High (14%)
Public Outreach	81.7%	62.1%	45.9%	Very High (35.8%)

**Table 28** Summary table of gaps in perspective for the three PPPI dimensions

Political parties in this analysis face substantial challenges in bridging gaps between leadership, members, and the public. However, these gaps present significant opportunities for growth, especially in communication, transparency, and public engagement. By focusing on improving internal communication, ensuring that public outreach resonates with citizens, and aligning party members’ perceptions with broader public interests, these parties can foster more inclusive, impactful political movements.

# Chapter 6: Recommendations

In the earlier pages, this report has already provided targeted recommendations based on the findings of the cross-comparative analyses of *inclusivity practices*, *legal compliance*, and *public outreach*. Nevertheless, there are other recommendations to address other strategic components that affect political party development, effectiveness, and perception. Below is a structured list of specific recommendations:

**1. Leadership Accountability and Responsiveness:** A party's ability to remain internally democratic and publicly accountable is a major factor in building citizen trust and long-term party sustainability.

## Recommendations:

- Institutionalise performance reviews for party executives at all levels, linked to deliverables on inclusivity, compliance, and outreach.
- Set up party ombudsman systems or internal ethics panels to handle grievances from both members and the public.
- Publish quarterly progress reports on party activities, reform, and civic engagement.

**2. Digital Readiness and Online Engagement Strategy:** Many parties still lack a robust digital infrastructure for member mobilisation, civic education, and countering misinformation.

## Recommendations:

- Audit and strengthen digital infrastructure: Ensure party websites, social media accounts, and databases are up-to-date and secure.
- Create a dedicated digital engagement team: tasked with managing real-time citizen interactions, virtual town halls, and content strategy.
- Use analytics to monitor which demographics the party is reaching or missing online.

**3. Civic Education and Political Literacy Programming:** An informed electorate and active party membership are crucial for democracy to thrive, and parties must be at the centre of this.

## Recommendations:

- Establish a civic engagement and education department within parties to train members and educate the public on the party's ideology, constitution, and national issues.
- Deploy mobile civic education units in rural or underserved areas.
- Integrate civic education with community service to build relational trust with citizens.

**4. Youth, PWDs and Women Political Mobilisation Strategy:** Inclusion without a targeted strategy leads to tokenism. Marginalised groups need structured entry points, not just symbolic gestures.

**Recommendations:**

- Establish quotas or dedicated structures for youth, women, and PWDs in all decision-making bodies.
- Fund grassroots mobilisation programmes that specifically support these groups (e.g., seed funding, leadership academies).
- Create parallel youth and women parliaments to feed into the main party decision-making architecture.

**5. Internal Democracy and Candidate Selection Processes:** Internal democracy ensures legitimacy, promotes fairness, and avoids factionalism, especially during primaries or congresses.

**Recommendations:**

- Publish transparent guidelines for internal elections, including candidate eligibility, dispute resolution, and delegate lists, with robust and authoritative internal compliance and dispute resolution mechanisms.
- Digitalise party congresses and primaries to reduce manipulation and increase transparency.
- Include INEC or civil society observers in internal electoral processes where possible.

**6. Collaboration between Political Parties and Electoral/Regulatory Institutions:** Parties are often reactive, not proactive, in their engagement with oversight institutions like INEC, which weakens their regulatory credibility.

**Recommendations:**

- INEC needs to continue quarterly consultative meetings to resolve issues on financing, compliance, and reforms.
- The INEC EPM department should train the political parties' compliance officers within each party chapter to ensure ongoing adherence to INEC guidelines.
- Advocate collectively for electoral reform, rather than leaving it to CSOs or opposition parties.

**7. Conflict Resolution and Party Cohesion Mechanism:** Factions and parallel party structures are destabilising and reducing voter confidence.

**Recommendations:**

- Establish internal conflict resolution structures (e.g., mediation councils) with binding authority.
- Promote leadership succession planning to reduce personality cults and transition crises.
- Conduct annual party unity retreats, bringing leaders, members, and dissenting voices into facilitated dialogue.

**8. Incorporate Standard Monitoring and Evaluation Framework:** Political parties rarely evaluate their strategies, making learning and adaptation impossible.

**Recommendations:**

- Create a MEL unit within each party to track inclusivity, outreach, compliance, and performance.
- Conduct annual internal reviews and stakeholder perception surveys.
- Publish a Party Performance Report Card, benchmarked against the PPPI framework

# Annex 1. List of state-based Enumerators

	NAME	STATES
1.	Ogbonna Priscillia	ABIA
2.	Ibrahim Mohammed Ibrahim	ADAMAWA
3.	Satina Harry	AKWA-IBOM
4.	Nwanokwara Ncheta Augusta	ANAMBRA
5.	Chiroma Mohammed Hassan	BAUCHI
6.	Tare Maureen Amananaghan	BAYELSA
7.	Agagbe Kelvin	BENUE
8.	Aisha Adamu abdullahi	BORNO
9.	Efanga Etim	CROSS RIVER
10.	Orugbo Endurance	DELTA
11.	Chima Ajah	EBONYI
12.	Peter Aguebor	EDO
13.	Funsho Benjamin	EKITI
14.	Peggy Chukwuemeka	ENUGU
15.	Jeremiah Micheal	GOMBE
16.	Prince Chimezie Okoro	IMO
17.	Farida Muhammed	JIGAWA
18.	Venantius Asogo Torkuma	KADUNA
19.	Ali Sabo	KANO



20.	Yahaya Saidu Lugga	KATSINA
21.	Nafiu Sani Gulumbe	KEBBI
22.	Attah Solomon	KOGI
23.	Ogundele Raphael	KWARA
24.	Adeniran Mayowa	LAGOS
25.	Ejegwoya Peter Ogah	NASSARAWA
26.	Umar Muhammad Faruk	NIGER
27.	Folashade Bamigboye	ONDO
28.	Abimbola Otegbade	OGUN
29.	Tolu Lagbenro	OSUN
30.	Gboyega Tokunbo	OYO
31.	David Isaac	PLATEAU
32.	Eunice C. Okam	RIVERS
33.	Yakubu Abubakar	SOKOTO
34.	Yahuza A. Magaji	TARABA
35.	Muhammad Ibrahim	YOBE
36.	Abdullahi Lawali	ZAMFARA
37.	Musa Yakubu	FCT

## Annex 2: PPPI Indicators

Political Party Inclusivity Practices							
	Indicators	Question	Scale	Points	Description (for Expert/Enumerator)	Source	Justification/comments (Reserved for Expert/Enumerator)
1.1	Party constitution/Manifesto	a) What is the level of diversity of participation during the development and review of your party's constitution/manifesto?	a) One (1) Group only = 1.7 b) Two (2) Groups only = 3.4 c) All Groups = 5.0		Evidence within the party meeting archive	Party official	
		b) Does the party have constitutional leadership provisions for underrepresented groups? <i>(Under-represented here means women, youth, and persons with disabilities).</i>	a) Provision for 1 Group only = 1.7 b) Provision for 2 Groups only = 3.4 c) Provision for all Groups = 5.0		Evidence within the party constitution	Desk research. To be disaggregated by group.	
1.2	Women Participation	a) Is there a party gender policy in the party?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Evidence of Party Gender Policy	Party official/Desk research	
		b) Does the composition of the National Working Committee/National Executive Committee of the party include women?	a) Less than 10% = 0 b) Between 10% and 19% = 1.7 c) Between 20% and 34% = 3.4 d) 35% and above = 5.0  <i>If there are difficulties calculating a percentage – ensure you get the total number of compositions and the number of women.</i>		Evidence of composition of Committee*	Party official	
		c) Does the party have a policy provision against violence and harassment of female party members?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Evidence of provision	Party official	
		d) Does the party have an anonymous reporting mechanism for harassed female members?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Evidence of mechanism	Party official	

		<p>e) Does the composition of party delegates include Women?</p> <p>a) Less than 10% = 0 b) Between 10% and 19% = 1.7 c) Between 20% and 34% = 3.4 d) 35% and above = 5.0</p> <p><i>If there are difficulties calculating a percentage – ensure you get the total number of compositions and the number of women.</i></p>		Evidence of a record of delegates during the recent General Election *	Party official	
		<p>f) What is the percentage of women employed in the Party Secretariat?</p> <p>a) Less than 10% = 0 b) Between 10% and 19% = 1.7 c) Between 20% and 34% = 3.4 d) 35% and above = 5.0</p> <p><i>If there are difficulties calculating a percentage – ensure you get the total number of compositions and the number of women.</i></p>		Evidence of % of women *. No personal records should be reviewed/shared.	Party official	
1.3	Youth Participation	<p>a) Is there a party Youth Policy?</p> <p>Yes = 5 No = 0</p>		Evidence of Party Youth Policy	Party official/Desk research	
		<p>b) The composition of party delegates includes young persons.</p> <p><i>Please stay with INEC age disaggregation of youth (18-35).</i></p>	<p>a) Less than 10% = 0 b) Between 10% and 19% = 1.7 c) Between 20% and 34% = 3.4 d) 35% and above = 5.0</p> <p><i>If there are difficulties calculating the percentage – ensure you get the total number of compositions and the number of youths.</i></p>	Evidence of record of delegates during recent General Election*	Party official	
		<p>c) Does the party have a policy on youth mentorship to encourage youth leadership within the party?</p> <p>Yes = 5 No = 0</p>		Evidence of Youth Mentorship Policy	Party official	
		<p>d) What is the frequency of party youth-focused activities? E.g. Mentorship programmes</p> <p>a) Monthly = 5 b) Quarterly = 4 c) Bi-annually = 3 d) Annually = 2 e) During election period = 1</p>		Evidence of youth-focused activities	Party official	
		<p>e) How many young candidates did the party field in the last elections?</p> <p><i>Last election may mean general or off-cycle elections as it applies</i></p>	<p>a) Less than 10% = 0 b) Between 10% and 19% = 1.7 c) Between 20% and 34% = 3.4 d) 35% and above = 5.0</p>	Evidence of mechanism	Party official	

			<i>If there are difficulties calculating a percentage – ensure you get the total number of candidates and the number of youth candidates.</i>				
1.4	Persons with Disability Participation	a) Does the party ensure implementation of the 5% employment slot for Persons with Disability within the party's secretariat	Yes = 5 No = 0		Evidence of parties secretariat including at least 5%	Party official	
		b) The composition of party delegates includes Persons with Disability.  (PWD include persons with physical, visual, and hearing impairment, albinism, etc)	a) Less than 10% = 0 b) Between 10% and 19% = 1.7 c) Between 20% and 34% = 3.4 d) 35% and above = 5.0		Evidence of a record of delegates during the recent General Election*	Party official	
		c) Does the party have guidelines to ensure accessibility for a range of disabilities within party activities?	a) Provision for no disabilities = 0 b)Provision for 1 type of disability = 1.7 c) Provision for 2 types of disability = 3.4 d) Provision for 3 or more types of disability = 5.0		Evidence to include guidelines, as well as which type of disability, e.g. visual impairment, hearing impairment, physical impairment	Party official	
		d) Does the party have a dedicated policy for the inclusion of Persons with Disability?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Evidence of policy	Party official	
		e) Does the party have an anonymous reporting mechanism for discrimination against Persons with Disability?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Evidence of mechanism	Party official	
1.5	Cost of Participation	a) The party has a policy guidance for how to reduce the cost of participation for under-represented groups.  (Under-represented here means women, youth, and persons with disabilities).	a) Provision for no groups b)Provision for 1 Group only = 1.7 c) Provision for 2 Groups only = 3.4 d) Provision for all Groups = 5.0		Evidence of policy guidance	Party official	
		b) The party makes dedicated budget provisions for activities of under-represented groups	a) Provision for 1 Group only = 1.7 b) Provision for 2 Groups only = 3.4 c) Provision for all Groups = 5.0		Evidence of specific budget provisions	Party official	
			Total points:				
			Maximum points:	100			

## Political Parties Legal Compliance

	Indicators	Question	Scale	Points	Reference	Description (for Expert/Enumerator)	Source	Justification/comments (Reserved for Expert/Enumerator)
2.1	Membership Registration	a) Does the party have a register of members in soft and/or hard copy?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Electoral Act, 2022 part V (section 77 (2-3))	Request for the evidence of an updated membership register from the memo submitted to INEC	Party official	
		b) Is there a data security mechanism to protect the membership data?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Data Protection Act 2023 Electoral Act, 2022 part V (section 77 (2-3))	Evidence of mechanism confirmed by the researcher, as well as existing guidelines/procedures	Party official	
		c) Is the membership database updated and submitted at least 30 days before party conventions/congresses?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Electoral Act, 2022 part V (section 77 (2-3))	Evidence to include both the existence of communication to INEC of the register as well as an acknowledgement of receipt from INEC, or confirmation with INEC itself by the researcher	Party official/INEC	
		d) Is the membership data domiciled with the electoral management body?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Electoral Act, 2022 part V (section 77 (2-3))	Evidence to include both confirmation of submission by the party to INEC, as well as INEC confirmation of membership data	Party official/INEC	
		e) Does the party submit its membership list to the election management body annually?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Electoral Act, 2022 part V (section 77 (2-3))	Evidence to include both confirmation of submission by the party to INEC, as well as INEC confirmation of membership data	Party official/INEC	

2.2	Notice of Convention and Congress	a) Does the party comply with the electoral act in giving timely notice of conventions/congresses to INEC?  National-level notice is 21 days	Yes = 5 No = 0		Electoral Act, 2022 part V (section 82 (1-5))	Evidence is first to be provided by the party, and then to be verified with the INEC official	Party official/INEC	
		b) Did the party have parallel congresses/conventions/primaries in the last general election, at a national level?	Yes = 0 No = 5			Evidence is first to be provided by the party, and then to be verified by the researched via a desk review of media pieces	Party official/Desk research	
2.3	Political Violence	a) The Party has a code of conduct with provisions prohibiting the use of violence by its members, staff and candidates	Yes = 5 No = 0		Nigerian Constitution 226 (1-3), 227 Electoral Act 93(1-2), 78(1)	Evidence of existing party code of conduct with clear provisions within	Party official	
2.4	Party Constitution	a) The Party has registered all reviews of its constitution within the specified period to the election management body	Yes = 5 No = 0		Nigeria Constitution 222(d)	Evidence of submission to INEC	Party official/INEC	
		b) The party has provisions within its constitution to address the influence of money, in line with national constitutional guidelines on political expenses	Yes = 5 No = 0		Nigeria Constitution 222(d)	Evidence of provisions within the constitution	Party official/INEC	
		c) Does the party have a compliance officer/unit that ensures that the party constitution is adhered to?	Yes = 5 No = 0			Evidence of the existence of unit/office provided by party official	Party official	
		d) Does the party have a functioning internal mechanism which sanctions its members for breach of party constitutions?	Yes = 5 No = 0			Evidence can include both the internal guidance/policy of a functioning sanctions/constitutional breach process, as well as evidence that it has been enforced.  To note, a party which has a mechanism, however with no breaches to date, will not be penalised and should receive a full score for this question.	Party official	
		e) Does the party have a provision for members to appeal for a fair hearing?	Yes = 5 No = 0			Evidence to include internal guidance/policy	Party official	

2.5		f) Does the party have a clear process for the periodic election of principal officers?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Nigerian Constitution 223 (1)a	Evidence to include the corresponding section within the party constitution or other relevant party documentation	Party official	
		g) If yes, does the party comply with these processes?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Nigerian Constitution 223 (1)a	Evidence to include evidence of most recent internal elections	Party official/Desk research	
	Party Financing	a) Does the party submit audited election expenses to the election management body within 6 months of the last general election?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Electoral Act Section V 89 (1)-(3)	Evidence to include confirmation of submitted expenses to INEC, as well as validation from INEC of the submission	Party official/INEC N.B Question won't be asked to parties formed post-2023 General Election	
		b) Does the party submit audited financial records to the electoral management body as prescribed in the electoral regulations?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Electoral Act V 86(1)	Evidence to include confirmation of submitted reports to INEC, as well as validation from INEC of the submission	Party official/INEC	
		c) Does the party published its verified audited and submitted election expenses in at least 2 national newspapers and on the official website of the party for the recent General Election	Yes = 5 No = 0		Electoral Act V 89 (6)	Evidence to include confirmation from the party of publishing expenses, as well as confirmation of media reports	Party official/INEC/Desk research N.B Question won't be asked to parties formed post-2023 General Election	
		d) Does the party have a mechanism to ensure its candidates' compliance with campaign finance ceilings as prescribed in Electoral regulations?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Electoral Act V 88 (1) – (11)	Evidence to include confirmation of internal mechanism/policy/guidelines	Party official	
	2.6	Party Activities	a) The party submits its activities report to the election management body from the recent General Election.	Yes = 5 No = 0	Electoral Act V 83 (1)	Evidence of submission to INEC	Party official/INEC N.B Question won't be asked to parties formed post-2023 General Election	

		b) Does the party ensure that security personnel are informed of party campaigns and rallies?	Yes = 5 No = 0		Evidence to include communication to security personnel of party activities	Party official	
		Total Points:					
		Maximum Points:	100				

Political Parties Public Outreach							
	Indicators	Question	Scale	Points	Description (for Expert/Enumerator)	Source	Justification/comments (Reserved for Expert/Enumerator)
3.1	Party Ideology	(a) Is the party ideology clearly published and accessible to members?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence of party ideology displayed on party material or website	Desk research	
		(b) Does the party regularly communicate its ideology to party members?	a) Monthly = 4 b) Quarterly = 3 c) Bi-annually = 2 d) Annually = 1 e) During the election period = 0		Evidence of communication to party members on ideology	Party official	
3.2	Media engagement	(a) Did the party engage in media briefings in the last 12 months?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Media = Television, Radio, Social Media, Online media platforms, Written press. Recent examples of briefings to be provided as evidence.	Party official/Desk research	
		(b) Does the party extend invitations to a range of media during its media briefings? Television, Radio, Online media platforms, and Written press.	a) All = 4 b) Three = 3 c) Two = 2 d) One = 1 e) None = 0		One point per media type, with evidence shown	Party official/Desk research	
3.3	Voter Education	(a) Does the party have a guideline on voter education?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence is the production of the voter education guideline.	Party official	



		(b) How often does the party organise voter education activities?	a) Monthly = 4 b) Quarterly = 3 c) Bi-annually = 2 d) Annually = 1 E) During the election period = 0		List of recent and upcoming voter education activities	Party official	
3.4	Party Visibility	(a) Information and a description of the party logo is available to members?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence of logo description and information openly available to members	Party official/Desk research	
		(b) Is the party logo consistent with the vision/mission of the party?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Review of the logo and mission statement of the party by the researcher, as well as questions posed to party representatives on the link	Party official	
		(c) The Party has a functional webpage with accessible and up-to-date contact details	Yes = 4 No = 0		Contact details to be checked.	Desk research	
		(d) Party webpage is disability friendly and inclusive, through the use of special features	Yes = 4 No = 0		Special features can include; Closed captions on videos, colour contrast, text-to-speech, etc.	Desk research	
		(e) The party has functional and active social media accounts	a) Yes; functional and actively updated = 4 b) Yes; functional but not actively updated c) No; not functional		Social media accounts to be reviewed. 'Actively updated' to include pages updated within the last month, and periodically at least every month.	Desk research	
		(f) Party executives have official party email addresses for internal and external engagement	Yes = 4 No = 0		Official party email addresses = not Gmail, yahoo, etc.	Desk research	
		(g) Party use 'new media' as a platform for voter education?	Yes = 4 No = 0		New media = Social Media, email, online interfaces Evidence to include links to the above	Party official/Desk research	
		(h) Does the party have an active feedback and response mechanism for the public?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence should be focussed on an existing policy or guidelines for the mechanism	Party official/Desk research	

3.5	<b>Language of communication</b>	(a) Does the party use pidgin English and/or local languages when engaging with members and the public in face-to-face activities?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence of activity materials (printed materials, videos, etc.) in Pidgin/other local languages	Party official/Desk research	
		(b) Party have a version of its constitution in languages other than English?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence would be a constitution written in pidgin/other local languages.	Party official/Desk research	
		(c) Party use Pidgin English and/or local languages in external communication?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence could include TV/radio jingles and adverts, social media messages, YouTube videos, etc.	Party official/Desk research	
3.6	<b>Internal engagement</b>	(a) Does the party have a functional office in this location? Location could mean FCT, state or ward	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence would be physical addresses of offices or listed addresses on web pages.	Party official/Desk research	
		(b) How often does the Party update its members from its secretariat?	a) Monthly = 4 b) Quarterly = 3 c) Bi-annually = 2 d) Annually = 1 E) During the election period = 0		Updating can be through email, social media updates, mail, phone messages, etc.	Party official	
		(c) Party have active feedback and response mechanisms for its members?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence includes guidelines or policy documents for the mechanism, as well as available information to members about its existence	Party official	
		(d) Does the party have a list of activities which are clearly communicated to members?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence would be a physical and/or virtual calendar, or any other similar document outlining activities	Party official	
3.7	<b>Membership recruitment and retention</b>	(a) Party have a formal membership recruitment strategy?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence would be a guideline or policy document outlining recruitment strategy etc.	Party official	
		(b) The party has its leadership structure/organogram published for members and the public to see	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence of published organigram	Party official	

		(c) How frequently do parties conduct public outreach activities to drive up members?	a) Monthly = 4 b) Quarterly = 3 c) Bi-annually = 2 d) Annually = 1 E) During the election period = 0		Evidence of party outreach activities through documentation, calendars, etc, and their frequency	Party official	
		(d) Is the party membership procedure public?	Yes = 4 No = 0		Evidence to public presentation of membership procedure	Party official	
		<b>Total Points:</b>					
		<b>Maximum Points:</b>	<b>100</b>				

Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) is the UK public body dedicated to supporting democracy around the world. Operating internationally, WFD works with parliaments, political parties, and civil society groups as well as on elections to help make political systems fairer, more inclusive and accountable.

[www.wfd.org](http://www.wfd.org)



Scan here to sign up to WFD news



Westminster Foundation for Democracy is an executive Non-departmental Public Body sponsored by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office.



Foreign, Commonwealth  
& Development Office