Review of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy

February 2010
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Executive Summary

This report details the findings of a review of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), commissioned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and conducted by Global Partners and Associates (GPA). The purpose of the review was to evaluate the WFD’s performance against its strategic objectives, assess the structure and procedures of the organisation and make recommendations on its strategic direction in the coming years. The report reflects the ‘light-touch’ approach that the FCO and WFD requested, and thus focuses more on broad strategic questions than on issues of detail.

The report highlights a number of tensions that exist within the WFD’s structure and strategy. At the core is the tension between the work of the political parties and the work of WFD’s project and programmatic activities, led by WFD staff. In short, the political parties have a clear vision in seeking to support their sister parties in their political, ideological and policy goals. In contrast, the programme activities of the WFD have wider objectives in the promotion of democracy, particularly through the recent focus on parliamentary strengthening projects. The two sets of objectives are not necessarily in conflict – party assistance may have a wider democratic impact, and parliamentary assistance may have benefits for political parties. But they rest on fundamentally different conceptions of purpose, which require different strategies, activities and tactics.

The WFD has sought on previous occasions to co-ordinate better the work of the political parties with that of the main office. However, these efforts appear to have overlooked the fundamental difference in purpose of the two parts of the organisation. This has resulted in (or been exacerbated by) a tendency towards silo activity within the WFD, a lack of clarity over roles and procedures, poor communication between projects and programmes, and limited attention to monitoring and evaluation.

The terms of reference for this review stated that the WFD needs to find additional sources of funding and seek to expand its work in party and parliamentary assistance. The field of political and party assistance is changing, and is placing a greater emphasis on integration and co-ordination of projects. In seeking to diversify its funding base, the WFD is in competition with other players in the field, and will need to demonstrate that it is an effective organisation that is able to respond to emerging challenges in the field. Our analysis suggests that the WFD has a number of disadvantages in comparison with other organisations, who have significant in-house expertise, a long record of managing big projects and offices in many countries around the world.

In this context the challenge for the WFD is four fold.

First, the WFD needs to take a strategic decision about what sort of organisation it wishes to be. At present it appears unable to reconcile a number of objectives such as whether it wishes to;

- Be an active contributor to HM Government and FCO diplomatic objectives or emphasise its independence from government;

- Be the government’s vehicle for delivering international democratic support or simply another contractor supplying services to many clients

- Build thematic expertise or geographic expertise or both;
- Develop context-specific strategies for parliamentary support or develop a model which can be applied in many countries;

- Be a vehicle for convening others or delivery organisation in its own right;

- Focus on short-term project work or undertake longer-term, strategic programming.

None of these options are mutually exclusive, but our discussions with stakeholders suggested that the WFD was trying to be all of these, and more. And that this was happening more by accident than by design. In other words, this range of approaches was the result of the WFD’s failure to confront its explicit organisational purpose and close off certain options. The small size of the organisation, compared with most others working in the field, means that it runs the constant danger of doing too much, failing to deliver and risking its reputation.

Second, it needs to identify and build on its institutional strengths. If it is to compete, the WFD needs to make itself distinctive. Our discussions with stakeholders suggest there are five characteristics which provide the basis for a distinctive WFD approach to party and parliamentary strengthening, namely:

- The Westminster brand. Identifying the appeal of ‘Westminster’ in emerging democracies and using this as the basis of its pitch.

- Using the WFD’s networks. The WFD potentially has access to a large reservoir of expertise and insight in the politicians and parties they have supported in the last 20 years. If it can harness its networks of contacts it could be at the forefront of developing models which allow politicians from developing democracies to learn from each other.

- The work of the UK political parties. The international work of the political parties provides the WFD with a high level of expertise and experience. Yet, the WFD is failing to fully draw on this expertise in the development and delivery of its parliamentary projects.

- Multi-party projects. The changing emphasis in donor support for political parties suggests that the WFD should make multi-party projects an integral and prominent feature of its approach. This should not be limited to multi-party cooperation on parliamentary strengthening projects, but should also encompass work to bridge the narrow interests of the individual political parties with the wider interests of the party system as whole.

- Integrating party and parliamentary strengthening. There is an opportunity for the WFD to capitalise on the current donor interest in integrating international support to parliaments and parties, but this rests on the extent to which it can resolve its own internal structural challenges.

Third, it needs to address the internal tensions in its structure. This means acknowledging the very different objectives of the political party work and parliamentary strengthening work. But it also means seeking to build on the strengths of the constituent parts of the organisation and looking for projects of mutual interest, such as multi-party projects or those which integrate party and parliamentary support.

Fourth, as part of that process the WFD needs to improve its own internal procedures and processes. Progress is being made in this area, but monitoring and evaluation remains an outstanding area of concern. The WFD needs to be able to show that it can deliver in its core areas.
of activity, but our analysis suggests that recording processes and monitoring and evaluation records provide little evidence that the organisation is having significant, long-term and sustainable impact.

In conclusion, the WFD is currently doing some good work through discrete projects and programmes in different countries. However, it could be doing more. It is struggling to define itself internally and externally. Our analysis suggests it will need to acknowledge and address the tensions in its organisational structure and purpose if it is to realise its potential fully.

Chapter 8 of the report includes some ‘points for reflection’ which are grouped according to the four sets of challenges.
1 Introduction

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) commissioned Global Partners and Associates (GPA) to conduct a ‘light-touch’ review of the work of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) in November 2009. The WFD asked us to complete the review by mid-February 2010. The desire for a short review means that it has thus been carried out quickly in order to meet the needs of both WFD and FCO. While we believe that this has not significantly affected the quality of our analysis nor the substance of our recommendations, it obviously limited the scope of investigation. We sought to focus our resources on specific issues and areas of WFD activity where we could develop meaningful conclusions, rather than engage in a thorough-going analysis at every level of performance. At points in the report we highlight where we believe further investigation may be useful for WFD, or where we were unable to generate enough evidence with which to support firm conclusions. We have sought to make the report as succinct as possible, in line with the wishes of WFD and the FCO.

The evaluation comes at an opportune time for the WFD. The organisation recently appointed a new Chief Executive, and is seeking to extend its reputation as a deliverer of projects to assist political parties and build its capacity in the parliamentary strengthening field. The most recent corporate plan (2009-12) highlights its desire to expand its activities in these key areas and secure additional sources of revenue. In addition, the organisation is growing through developing stronger partnerships with others, for example with the parliamentary strengthening work of The Westminster Consortium unfolding in several countries.

We recognise that the WFD is going through a process of change and development. We realise that some of the documentation that we were assessing has already been superseded by changes implemented by the new Chief Executive. Many of the challenges we highlight in this report are the source of ongoing discussions within WFD. But, short of having a permanent presence in the WFD office, it is impossible to keep track of every possible development in a project of this scope. We have tried to take this into account as far as possible, but we have referred to existing strategic documents which we believe highlight continuing sources of tension for WFD, and should inform the strategic planning process.

The terms of reference for the review asked us to assess the WFD’s performance to date and its capacity to meet future demands and changes. In particular, it requested evaluation of:

- The strategic direction of the WFD, including its complementarities with UK government objectives and its comparative advantages in the democracy support field.
- The WFD’s past performance, including the planning, implementation and impact of projects and programmes.
- The WFD’s internal structures, including governance, accountability and communication procedures.

This report has six sections. The first section looks at the work of the WFD in its two areas of activity, examining first its parliamentary strengthening projects and second the work of the political parties. The second section assesses the structure of the organisation, and the extent to which the parliamentary and political party work informs and shapes the other. The third section examines the extent to which organisational strategy reflects, and is reflected in, the work of the Foundation. The fourth section examines internal procedures and systems, with a focus on internal communication and monitoring and evaluation. The fifth section assesses the wider field of assistance to parties and parliaments, and how WFD might seek to build a distinctive approach that differentiates it from its competitors. The final section provides some general conclusions.
Our evaluation was conducted through interviews with over 30 people including WFD staff, partners and external stakeholders. This was supplemented through analysis of a cross-section of WFD’s internal and external planning and reporting documents. The review also included one field trip to the WFD’s programme in Macedonia to interview local stakeholders and observe a workshop conducted as part of the programme.
2 WFD’s Strategic Objectives

Our evaluation sought to measure organisational effectiveness in three main ways. First, assessing impact and outcomes against internally set objectives and targets. Second, testing the levels of congruence between overarching goals, strategic objectives, corporate planning and project and programmatic activities. That is, whether activities are well suited to meeting broader organisational goals. Third, using external assessment, to consider whether organisational plans and activities are sufficiently adapted to wider political, economic and social context, and are coordinated with the work of other organisations.

The WFD’s corporate objectives were taken as the starting point for assessment. These are outlined in Box 1, below. The first objective describes the WFD’s commitment to being effective in its chosen thematic focus areas, party and parliamentary strengthening. The following two objectives relate more to how the WFD sees itself developing into the future, with the emphasis on partnership and collaboration with donors designed to contribute to the envisaged growth of the organisation as outlined in the 2009-10 Business Plan.

Box 1: WFD’s 2009-12 Corporate Objectives

- Achieving demonstrable changes that have improved democracy in each of the parliaments and political parties with which we work
- Becoming a strategic partner for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development
- Strengthened collaboration with UK and international donors and partners


The next section of this report focuses on the first of these objectives, assessing whether the WFD is achieving demonstrable changes in parliaments and parties, and what contribution it is making to wider democratic development. Subsequent sections focus on prospects that the WFD has for enhancing its impact in these areas in the future, and for achieving its second two objectives of organisational growth through partnership and collaboration. The analysis considers whether current organisational structures, strategy and procedures are conducive for achieving these objectives.
3 Achieving Demonstrable Change: The WFD’s work with parliaments and parties

3.1 The WFD’s work with parliaments

A 2005 review of the WFD found that the range of issues that the organisation worked on was too broad considering the limited resources available to it. This prompted the WFD to narrow its thematic focus. Following consultation with core stakeholders and experts, the decision was made to concentrate on parliamentary strengthening in addition to its more long-standing focus on political parties. The WFD’s focus on parliamentary strengthening programmes is thus relatively recent compared to other organisations working in the field. WFD is therefore still trying to consolidate its experience and reputation in this area, and it is perhaps too early to gauge impact. This section therefore provides only a top level analysis of the WFD’s approaches, and its prospects for achieving demonstrable change.

The WFD runs a number of parliamentary and cross-party support programmes, whose approaches and objectives vary. For example, the WFD has both country and regional programmes in the Middle East which aim to increase the participation and representation of women in parliament, whilst the focus in Kenya has been on fostering better engagement between elected representatives and their constituents. Interviewees suggested that the quality and impact of these projects varied according to their design and management, and local political dynamics outside the control of the WFD. On the whole, stakeholders felt that programmes have been more successful when the WFD has had a long term presence in the country it is operating in, and where they have had support from senior politicians and staff, not only within parliament, but also within the parliamentary political parties. These points were confirmed during our field visit to Macedonia. Here, high level political support from both Macedonia and the UK, coupled with programming over three years that has been responsive to local dynamics, have contributed to the development of a programme that is perceived as useful and effective by a range of local political and civil society stakeholders.

In addition to country-specific programming, the WFD is working with its partners to develop a model for parliamentary support, based on convening and coordinating UK-based organisations with expertise in distinct areas of parliamentary process and business, and facilitating the provision of training in developing country parliaments. The WFD was part of a successful bid to the DFID Global Transparency Fund to develop and implement this model in six developing democracies between 2008 and 2013. The resulting project is known as The Westminster Consortium (TWC), consisting of a partnership between the WFD, the National Audit Office, The Thompson Reuters Foundation, the University of Essex, the UK Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the International Bar Association and the House of Commons Overseas Office. The WFD also works with the same network of partners to run a similar programme in the non-TWC country of Macedonia, and plans to do the same in other regions.

The WFD’s main role within the Consortium model is facilitation and programme management, bringing UK partners together with local partners in target countries to develop and deliver a curriculum for training sessions. This approach is intended to ensure sustainability through building

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2 WFD Corporate Plan 2009-2012
3 The project is currently operating in five countries. The original programme proposal included Yemen, however, it was withdrawn due to local political conditions and a replacement has yet to be identified.
the capacity of local stakeholders to engage with parliament and deliver training. It is also designed to ensure that training programmes are tailored to local political contexts and needs.

Whilst it is too early in the development and implementation of the TWC approach to assess impact, a number of strengths and weaknesses can be discerned in the model. On the positive side, all TWC partners feel that it is the right approach to be taking to parliamentary strengthening, believe that it is important for the UK to have developed its own model for parliamentary assistance and are positive about prospects for future impact. Interviewees reported that the model suffered from teething problems, including a lack of communication between TWC and the WFD’s staff in other programmes, an underestimation of the amount of work required to coordinate the programme, and a failure to adapt programme implementation to electoral and political cycles within the UK and in recipient countries. However, evidence suggests all are in the process of being resolved.

The evaluation team was only able to speak to local stakeholders in Macedonia, a country which is not part of the TWC programme but in which the same model has been applied. They reported that they would have been unable to run such a programme themselves without international support. The programme has both helped these organisations to engage with parliament, and also parliament to engage better with civil society. For example, the lack of engagement of Macedonian parliamentary committees with external experts has been identified as a significant weakness within the parliament. However, the National Audit Office’s local partner in Macedonia was invited to testify in committee hearings following the delivery of its training curriculum on Financial Oversight to parliamentary staff. The UK partner organisations’ high profile and expertise were commended by both local partners and recipients of training, with the latter group commenting that learning from international experiences and comparative analysis was invaluable. Whilst some training courses were described by trainees as interesting but rather theoretical in nature, most were declared to be of practical value, with some citing examples of how they had used lessons learnt in their own work.

The TWC model has thus worked effectively in Macedonia, and there are indications that similar successes will be achieved in other countries. However, there are a number of concerns associated with the consortium approach that the WFD needs to address if it is to continue to pursue it as a primary model for parliamentary strengthening work. First, more attention needs to be given to building local capacity and ensuring sustainability. In our interviews with TWC members, it was reported that the quality of local partners varies considerably in each country that the TWC works in, but the consortium does not appear to have a strategy for adapting its approach when appropriate local partners cannot be identified. There also does not appear to be a common approach to building the capacity of local partners amongst the UK partners or between countries, with some partners placing more emphasis on ensuring sustainability than others.

A second, related point is that the TWC/WFD needs to think more carefully about how best to ensure that parliamentary support is designed to meet specific needs in specific country contexts. The WFD’s non-TWC parliamentary support programmes have been relatively successful in tailoring projects to meet local needs. In contrast, the TWC model provides less scope for programmatic flexibility. Whilst local partners are supposed to provide a vehicle for ensuring that training is relevant to the local context, the TWC model is still based on the delivery of a broadly similar curriculum of training in all countries. Questions arose during our interviews as to whether this approach enables enough local flexibility or the development of context-specific support. The TWC model is based around a classic training approach, in which a limited number of discrete training sessions are delivered to recipients. This limits scope for ongoing mentoring, adapting support to changing needs and developing innovative programming which addresses the political roots of parliamentary weaknesses rather than just their technical dimensions.
Third, our interviewees suggested that the WFD needs to develop clearer criteria for selecting which countries to work in. They reported that the TWC approach has so far had less impact in some countries as a result of a lack of local political support. For example, in Ukraine, Soviet-style politics dominates, and there is little interest within the political leadership to deepen and strengthen democracy. Less senior politicians therefore have few incentives to participate in training sessions, perceiving them as irrelevant for their career development. In contrast, prospective EU accession provided a clear incentive for the Macedonian parliament and its parties to cooperate with the WFD. WFD staff argue that political conditions in Ukraine have deteriorated since it was initially selected as a TWC country, and maintain that the decision to include it in the original programme design was sound. However, TWC partners and a number of external observers do perceive that selection criteria are lacking, suggesting for example that greater focus on Commonwealth countries would make more sense than the current more ad hoc approach.

Finally, it is not clear what the TWC offers to the field of parliamentary support that other organisations cannot provide. Some interviewees questioned whether the WFD should simply be playing a convening role, asking whether this represented good value for taxpayer money when it would not necessarily build WFD’s internal expertise in the parliamentary strengthening field. In addition, others pointed out that although the Westminster brand was powerful, the TWC may not be the only organisations in Westminster seeking to exploit it, and that it may not continue to provide a unique selling point.

In conclusion, the TWC represents a new and innovative approach to parliamentary strengthening for the UK. It is helping the WFD to harness expertise that it does not have in-house to deliver a comprehensive parliamentary strengthening training package in a range of countries. However, the model has a number of weaknesses that may undermine impact as the programme rolls out. The primary concern is that adherence to the TWC model will prevent the WFD from being able to respond to emerging best practice in the parliamentary strengthening field, such as designing projects according to local context and ensuring that support is provided over the long term.

### 3.2 The WFD’s work with political parties

WFD currently provides support for political parties through bi-party projects led by the UK political parties. The overall aim is for the UK parties to help their counterparts develop their internal organisation and campaign skills, so that they are capable of shaping the political debate and policy agenda, and ultimately forming a government or becoming part of a ruling coalition. The main activities thus focus on i) internal organisation, internal structure and democratic procedures, ii) campaigning techniques, media and communication skills, iii) provision of materials such as leaflets or technical equipment and iv) exchanges between politicians from the sister parties. The political parties work mainly in the WFD’s programmatic areas of Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa. However, they have a 20% opt-out which allows them to work in countries that do not have WFD programmes.

The obvious advantage of the sister-party model is that it facilitates access to, and influence over, parties in developing democracies. The UK parties have in many instances built up high-level and lasting relationships on a basis of trust. As one interviewee put it, ‘it’s difficult to put a value on this sort of soft power’, the argument being that the FCO gets a potentially huge return for relatively little cost. The relationships built up by the UK political parties can provide support to the UK government’s diplomatic objectives by providing insights and access to parties that may form the government in priority countries in the future.
Party work also has the potential to create openings for more extensive WFD programming further down the line. In addition, the UK parties can apply political pressure on developing parties to ensure they abide by basic democratic standards and prevent them engaging in inappropriate behaviour such as corruption, overly-aggressive campaigning, and physical attacks on opposition parties. The threat to withdraw bilateral support or of exclusion from the international group of parties can have powerful influence on emerging parties which are aspiring to international acceptance and support.

However, assessing the long-term impact of the WFD’s party-to-party work is complex, for a number of reasons.

First, the purpose of party support - strictly defined – is not to show demonstrable improvements in the functioning of democracy. The parties engage in an overtly political set of activities, designed to help their ideological counterparts in other countries. This is a strength of the model. It was part of the original rationale around which WFD was built, in that it allows the parties to engage in activity that would be impossible for the FCO to undertake. But there appears to be an underlying assumption within WFD that by helping to develop well-organised, internally democratic and ideological parties that have a wide membership base, this will, in turn, improve the quality of multi-party politics as a whole. This may be the case. But it is not the primary purpose of such activity, neither is it an inevitable result. It could be argued that any such effect is by accident rather than design; there is no guarantee that their work will have this indirect effect as broader democracy promotion is not the primary objective of their projects. The work of the parties to support their political allies should be regarded as a distinct and important feature of the WFD model. But conflating political party support with democracy strengthening work creates ambiguities and tensions in the organisation’s strategy and activities.

Second, we could find no sources which demonstrated the long-term impact and effect of political party support. Most party-led projects are short-term, with reports submitted immediately after events; we were not shown any reports which attempted to gauge the longer term impact of projects. For example, one project helped a sister party to develop a strategic campaign plan. The report states that “it is intended that the strategic plan drawn up during the seminar should be used”, but there are no details provided about follow up activities or ongoing engagement to assess whether it was used in practice. In addition, reports tended to be based on descriptions of activities that took place, rather than assessing impact against clear indicators of success. For instance, reports claimed that understanding amongst stakeholders was improved as a result of activities, but with no accompanying evidence or analysis to reinforce this conclusion.

As the evaluation only looked at one in-country project, we were only able to speak directly to the UK parties’ sister parties in Macedonia, where Labour and the Conservatives run projects. The two recipient sister parties reported that they were grateful for the support that they had received, with election campaign activity particularly valued. The Labour Party’s help in using new digital and communication technologies, for example, was seen as having improved campaigning techniques. However, it was not clear how the UK parties’ work differed from support offered by others, notably the German Stiftungen – although it was clearly valued by the recipients.

Third, the ability of the WFD to co-ordinate programme work with that of the political parties to develop truly multi-party projects so far appears very limited. There have been moves recently within the WFD to increase multi-party programming in some countries. The 2009-12 Corporate Plan states that the WFD recognises that more funding is now available for multi-party projects, and the organisation’s work in Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Bangladesh takes a multi-party approach. Yet, multi-party projects are in general limited to the parliamentary strengthening domain, for example.
with UK parties cooperating to deliver dialogue and training programmes to parliamentary parties. The aim of these programmes is to improve inter-party dialogue within parliament, which is likely to have wider effects, but does not address directly the wider challenges of the party system.

This lack of co-ordination reflects a fundamental tension within the WFD – recognised by every stakeholder that we spoke to – between the work of the political parties and that of the programme staff. As described in more detail below, this is partly due to the way in which projects are initiated and developed by the parties and WFD staff. However, its principal result is that it limits the WFD’s capacity to develop multi-party projects which draw on the expertise of the political party staff and the programme staff. In Macedonia, this weakness appears to manifest itself in a lack of buy-in, with local stakeholders suggesting that the UK parties were not always fully engaged in local multi-party activities.

Given the WFD’s desire to secure more funding to run multi-party projects, the co-ordination of political party work with programme work appears to be an imperative. WFD, in theory, has the capacity to develop projects which combine support to individual political parties to further their policy and campaign objectives, with wider support to strengthen the party system and parliament. As noted in section six of the report, there is a growing interest within the donor community in the integration of party and parliamentary support programmes. WFD should be seeking to take advantage of this opportunity, but will need to acknowledge and address the differing priorities of their party work and parliamentary work in order to do so.

### 3.3 Conclusions and recommendations

The evaluation of WFD’s work with parties and parliaments is generally a positive one. The opinions of staff and stakeholders were favourable, reflecting the fact that WFD is providing useful support and services, valued by the participants and beneficiaries. Anecdotal evidence from our interviews suggests that the WFD is having a desirable effect in both areas. However, there are weaknesses in the way the work is planned, undertaken and measured over the long-term, which is constraining the organisation’s overall impact and effectiveness. We return to issues of monitoring and evaluation in section five, but deal here and in the next section with issues of structure and programme development.

As highlighted in Box 1 (p. 6) the WFD’s corporate plan suggests that one of its key objectives is to achieve demonstrable improvements in the functioning of democracy. The underlying assumption is that this objective informs all of its activities. This certainly appears to be a guiding principle for the programme work with parliaments. It is also unlikely that any of the political party staff we spoke to would disagree with the principle. But it does not have the same bearing on their approach to their work. The premise on which party-to-party support is built is in the UK parties helping their ideological counterparts pursue the same ideological objectives, by helping them with internal organisation, membership, policy development and campaigning.

Both sets of objectives are wholly legitimate and provide a basis from which WFD can work. However, WFD needs to acknowledge and address the distinction between them. Previous attempts to draw the political parties more fully into the work of WFD programmes appear to have been based on the assumption that their work could be driven primarily by a concern for wider democratic improvements. Rightly or wrongly, this was perceived as a challenge to the parties’ core work, which would prevent them from pursuing their political objectives.

Various stakeholders inside and outside the organisation identified the work of the political parties as a particular strength of the WFD during the course of the evaluation. Specifically, the party work
allows the creation of long-lasting relationships with other parties, built around political trust and mutual interests, provides high levels of political insight and gives the WFD significant political expertise. However, much of WFD’s official documentation seems reticent about recognising the overtly political nature of their work, preferring instead to concentrate almost entirely on the broader democracy promotion function.

We believe that WFD can combine the strengths of its parliamentary and party support work. However, in order to ensure that the two spheres of work complement each other first means recognising, and making explicit, the distinction between them. For as long as WFD’s planning is based on the assumption that two areas of work have the same underlying objective there will continue to be a tension between them. Acknowledging them as separate, but complementary programmes will better to develop projects which seek to achieve the objectives of both. That is, the potential to develop projects which promote individual political parties’ interests in the context of programmes that aim to strengthen the party systems, and the functioning of parliament.

The next section examines in more detail how WFD’s strategic planning and internal processes might facilitate that objective.
4 Strategic Planning

Our review of the WFD’s internal documentation suggests that there are four main levels at which strategic thinking and planning takes place within the WFD:

- At the top level, the WFD is guided by the organisation’s overall aims laid out in its 1992 mission statement (see Box 2). These are broad statements which divide the WFD’s work into three focus areas of supporting democratic practice and institutions, electoral processes and political parties. These objectives formed the basis of the Memorandum of Association upon which the WFD was founded, and are repeated in the WFD’s most recent Management Statement.

- At the second level, Corporate Objectives are set every three years in the WFD’s Corporate Plan. The first of the WFD’s most recent set of Corporate Objectives (2009-12) state that the WFD aims to achieve “demonstrable changes that have improved democracy” through its work with parliaments and parties. The remaining two objectives are more procedural and business-oriented, relating to improving partnerships and collaboration with others.

- At the third level, the WFD details how it will work towards its Corporate Objectives in its annual Business Plan. This contains a breakdown of political party project and regional programme objectives, indicators and activities for the year, laid out within a common template for all programme areas.

- Finally, the political parties and WFD staff produce plans for the individual projects and programmes for which they are responsible.

Box 2: Aims and Objectives of the WFD

Overall Aims of the WFD
- To assist, support and encourage the peaceable establishment and development of pluralistic democratic practices and political institutions;
- To provide advice, guidance and practical assistance in support of pluralistic democratic electoral processes; and
- To assist in the formation, organisation and management of democratic political parties committed to non-violent policies and programmes.

Source: Management Statement for the WFD, p3; WFD Annual Report and Accounts 2008/9, p5.

Corporate Objectives (2009-12)
- Achieving demonstrable changes that have improved democracy in each of the parliaments and political parties with which we work
- Becoming a strategic partner for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development
- Strengthened collaboration with UK and international donors and partners


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Management Statement for the WFD, signed July 14th, 2004 to replace the prior Memorandum of Understanding.
4.1 WFD’s Management Statement

The guiding document which determines the relationship between the FCO and WFD is the ‘Management Statement’ which sets out: the organisation’s overall aims, objectives, and targets; the mechanisms for accounting to parliament; the role of the board and chief executive; and the planning process.

The terms of reference for this evaluation asked us specifically to comment on the suitability of the Management Statement. The document contains the standard provisions for arms-length bodies such as the WFD, and none of the stakeholders that we interviewed referred to the document. Therefore our comments are limited in scope and can be made in three brief points.

First, the WFD needs to tighten and clarify its strategic aims and planning process. The results of that process should be included in the Management Statement. The organisational objectives contained in the Management Statement are outdated and do not adequately reflect the WFD’s current priorities. For example, owing to its decision to narrow its thematic priorities to focus on parties and parliaments, the WFD currently does very little work to support election processes directly. Supporting “pluralistic democratic electoral processes” should therefore not be specified as an overarching organisational goal. In other words, the same strategic aims, priorities and objectives should be employed in a consistent fashion across all of the WFD’s management documents and plans.

Second, those documents should employ language consistently. At various points, the Management Statement suggests that the WFD should ‘complement’ the FCO’s objectives (p. 2), ‘contribute to the FCO’s wider strategic aims and current PSAs’ (p.4) or be ‘helping to achieve FCO’s policy objectives’ (p. 8). This may seem like a semantic point, but as we note elsewhere in this evaluation, there is a degree of ambiguity in the relationship between FCO and WFD – namely the extent to which WFD strategy is tied to the achievement of the FCO’s objectives. Clarity in the nature of this relationship would help to improve the WFD’s organisational understanding of its own mission and goals and facilitate effective strategic planning.

Third, although no stakeholders mentioned the Management Statement explicitly in our interviews, a number did refer to the composition of the board, and its role in providing specific expertise to the programmes and projects. Several suggested that members of the Board should be appointed according to their ability to provide specific expertise and knowledge that complements WFD’s internal expertise and programmatic objectives. This may be something that the Management Statement could specify.

4.2 The need for strategic clarity and meaningful planning

In the past year, the WFD has thought more seriously about its strategic orientation, and internal procedures have been reviewed. However, in the interviews that we conducted as part of this review, a number of stakeholders commented that the WFD would benefit from greater strategic clarity. At present, the organisation does not have a strategy, and there is a notable gap in strategic thinking between its top level mission statement and its corporate objectives. Firstly, as noted above, the 1992 Mission Statement and organisational objectives contained in the Management Statement do not adequately capture the WFD’s current areas of work.
Secondly, the corporate objective that relates to the WFD’s thematic work is vague. Beyond the definition of broad principles to guide its work and more discrete areas of focus within its broad thematic specialisms of party and parliamentary support\(^5\), there has been little strategic thinking about what exactly the organisation is aiming to achieve within the wider fields of parliamentary and political party strengthening. Party and parliamentary work are referred to together within the Corporate Plan as part of the same objective, despite in practice having different goals and being led by different stakeholders (the UK parties and WFD staff respectively). As discussed in the previous section, the work of the UK political parties is fundamentally political in nature, designed to help certain political actors compete better within elections. The Corporate Plan does not explore how the WFD will ensure that its work with parliaments and parties will contribute to the wider goal of "improved democracy", or elaborate what "achieving demonstrable change" actually means in practice.

Thirdly, two out of three of the WFD’s Corporate Objectives relate to business development and growth, rather than to its actual work on the ground. This is understandable, given that they are part of a corporate plan, rather than part of an organisational strategy intended to inform programming. However, the WFD’s growth strategy needs to be based upon a clear definition of the WFD’s position within the wider democracy support field and of the organisation’s relative strengths (discussed further in section 5). The WFD needs to develop a strategy that defines the specific goals of its party and parliamentary work, and that ensures that these are complementary and, where possible, shared. Growth strategy should then flow from this.

The lack of strategic clarity at the organisational level filters down to affect the WFD’s programmes and activities at the regional and country level. The planning documentation seen by the evaluation team is based on standard templates which are filled in by staff. These ask for staff to define the objectives of their work, planned outcomes and indicators to gauge success, as well as detailing potential risks and mitigation strategies. Our analysis of these documents suggests that, on the whole, not enough thought is given to ensuring that these forms are filled out with meaningful and realistic information. Objectives are vague and unclear, project outputs are mistaken for outcomes, and indicators are often unspecific and ill suited for measuring impact. In the Business Plan for 2009-10, many of the UK political parties’ objectives and expected risks are exactly the same, suggesting that they were cut and pasted from a standard template. The WFD’s plan to implement a log frame approach for programme management\(^6\) might help to address some of these issues. However, the danger still remains that planning will be a primarily box ticking, bureaucratic exercise rather than a meaningful process designed to ensure that the WFD’s activities are coordinated, strategic, meet needs and have impact.

4.3 Reconciling thematic and geographic objectives

The WFD’s strategic thinking primarily takes place along thematic lines, with emphasis being placed on achieving “demonstrable change” in its focus areas of parliaments and parties, rather than geographic regions. There seems to be an assumption that thematic objectives will automatically be relevant to the regions and countries in which WFD works. This is not necessarily the case. For example, some interviewees commented that if the WFD’s focus is parliamentary democracy and political party strengthening, it is not clear why MENA is a priority region, where opportunities for meaningful democratic reform are limited. If parliamentary and political party strengthening are the

\(^5\) Corporate Plan 2009-12, p7-8.
\(^6\) Update on Programme Monitoring and Risk Management, Document 8
primary concerns of the WFD, it would seem logical to choose countries where the organisation has realistic opportunities to achieve demonstrable change. Alternatively, if the WFD wants to work in specific regions and countries, programmes should address local needs.

An additional concern is that the WFD’s decision to operate in certain countries appears to be guided primarily by the emergence of ad hoc openings for work and the existence of prior relationships with local stakeholders. The WFD should be flexible enough to exploit windows of opportunity when they arise, and it does make sense to utilise existing contacts when building up programmes of work. However, these factors should be carefully balanced with the need to retain strategic coherence in the selection of programme countries. For example, one interviewee questioned the WFD’s decision to develop extensive programming in Egypt, which has deeply entrenched political systems and culture that are unlikely to change over the short time scales involved in WFD programming, and where a number of other organisations are already working with parliament.

The WFD’s current emphasis on expanding financially and geographically is also a concern, presenting the risk of the organisation spreading itself too thinly. The WFD does not have the internal staffing or resources to compete for work in every region of the world. The WFD’s objectives are not narrowly enough defined to allow the organisation to claim to be building a specific expertise in regions such as the Middle East. Given that it is a relatively young and small organisation, the WFD may wish to consider strengthening the depth of its geographic and thematic expertise, rather than aiming to cover broad thematic areas in a large number of countries.

4.4 Clarifying the WFD’s relationship with strategic partners

The final area in which greater strategic clarity is required is in the WFD’s relationship with the UK government. During our interviews, it emerged that staff and stakeholders were not always clear about the nature of the relationship, with some stating that the WFD needs to align its priorities better with those of the FCO, and others stressing its independence. The WFD was initially established by the FCO as an independent, private company with the purpose of strengthening pluralist democratic institutions. The WFD’s Management Statement, signed by the FCO and WFD, states that its objectives should contribute to those of the FCO, and the FCO is consulted on WFD plans. However, in our interviews, staff commented that the organisation is not obliged to follow the FCO’s direction, and does not always act upon its suggestions. The WFD’s relationship with the FCO is thus complex. This complexity has its advantages, for example allowing the FCO to undertake politically sensitive work at an arms-length from government. But, one of the WFD’s corporate objectives is to become a strategic partner of the FCO, and its Management Statement stresses the inter-relationship between FCO and WFD objectives. The implications of this for the status of the WFD as an independent organisation were not entirely clear during the course of the evaluation.

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7 Management Statement for the WFD, signed July 14th, 2004 to replace the prior Memorandum of Understanding.
8 Ibid.
9 WFD Annual Report and Accounts, 2008/9
10 Discussion has also been ongoing amongst Board members concerning how to ensure that FCO comments are fed into programme and project proposals in a timely fashion, and how to involve the FCO earlier in project development. See: Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors, 15th July 2009; Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors, 15th October 2009; Minutes of the Meeting of the Programmes and Projects Committee, Wednesday 1st July 2009.
The WFD’s relationship with other UK-based democracy support vehicles is not clear. These include DFID – with whom it wants to be a strategic partner - as well as organisations based in Westminster itself such as the CPA, IPU and House of Commons Overseas Office. DFID currently channels parliamentary and party support through a wide range of international organisations, and our research suggests that staff within DFID are not clear about what relationship DFID does, and indeed should, have with the WFD.

The rationale for the WFD’s desire for strategic partnerships needs to be clearer. A number of key questions need to be addressed in this regard. First, the FCO needs to clarify whether it regards the WFD as the vehicle for democracy promotion by the British Government. If so, the implications of this for the WFD as an independent agency for democracy support need to be assessed. In addition, if the WFD is the “British brand” for democracy promotion, it needs to be more strategically aligned with the work of DFID, for whom democracy support is an increasing priority. These issues are not of sole concern to the WFD, and need to be addressed by all relevant UK stakeholders. However, greater clarity within the WFD about its own strategic vision and goals is a necessary starting point, before it can begin to define its external relationships with donors and partners.

4.5 Conclusions and recommendations

In order to increase its size and reputation and show demonstrable impact, the WFD needs to be clearer about what sort of organisation it wants to be. Greater strategic clarity has been achieved since the previous organisational review in 2005, with the decision to develop thematic focus and expertise in two focus areas of parliamentary and political party strengthening. However, further progress is needed in terms of having a clearer vision of mission and strategic goals. The WFD is a small organisation with limited resources. It is therefore all the more important that it ensures that these resources are put to work effectively to contribute towards achieving change, developing expertise and strengthening reputation.

First, clear goals need to be set for the WFD’s work with parliaments and parties. The planning process needs to be built around distinct goals and work plans for each strand, but as discussed in Section 3 of this review, their goals and work plans should be complementary, building on each other and feeding into common overarching goals.

Second, there is still scope for the WFD to further narrow its focus within the broad areas of party and parliamentary support. To this end it needs to strengthen its strategic thinking and planning around the geographical dimensions of its work, and then work to create an integrated strategy that encompasses geographic and thematic objectives.

Third, more clarity is needed concerning the WFD’s relationship with strategic partners in the UK. In particular, joined up thinking needs to be done by the WFD, FCO and DFID concerning the UK’s overall approach and priorities concerning democracy strengthening overseas, and the roles that each organisation plays within it. This will not only help the WFD to develop a stronger identity and better sense of its own mission, but would also help to improve the effectiveness of the UK’s democracy promotion work.
5 Internal Structures and Procedures

Our interviews suggest that the WFD has recently made good progress in improving and standardising internal procedures. Some of these changes have been driven by necessity. For example, as the organisation has grown and attracted new funding streams such as the Governance and Transparency Fund, it has been necessary to develop effective and rigorous accounting and project management procedures. The organisation’s move towards developing longer term presence in WFD countries through opening country offices has also driven change in a number of areas. WFD previously had little experience of knowing what procedures and systems need to be in place in order to open new country offices, and suffered some teething problems as offices opened. However, the organisation appears to have learnt from these experiences and has developed appropriate internal systems and guidelines for use in the future.

Other changes have been driven by a growing recognition within the WFD that better systems and procedures needed to be put in place in order to enhance effectiveness. For example, the organisation’s human resources policies have been reviewed; new network-based platforms for sharing procedural information amongst staff being developed; new reporting systems and standardised planning documents have been developed; and corporate and governance systems have been reviewed, including a redefinition of the roles of the Projects and Programmes Committee.

Owing to the light touch nature of this review, the evaluation team was unable to conduct a thorough analysis of these organisational changes, or of the systems that are currently being implemented. However, three broad clusters of issues came to light from our interviews and review of internal documentation that should receive particular attention.

5.1 The role of the WFD’s Projects and Programmes Committee

The WFD’s Board of Governors is supported by three Sub-committees, namely the Audit, Projects and Programmes and Terms and Conditions Committees. The role of the Projects and Programmes Committee was a common theme that emerged in a number of our interviews with WFD staff and stakeholders.

The role of the committee is to assess proposals for new projects and programmes, to monitor progress, to maintain oversight and to advise the Board on relevant issues. There was a general feeling amongst interviewees that the committee could play a stronger role in activity planning and monitoring processes, helping to make the WFD more effective and responsive to emerging challenges and lessons learnt. Committee members themselves felt that they spent too much time discussing process rather than assessing the outcomes of the WFD’s field work. There is a desire on the part of members to engage more closely with projects and programmes, but it was generally felt that internal procedures and reporting structures lead to a focus on bureaucracy rather than meaningful engagement.

The WFD is aware of these issues, and it has recently agreed changes to the committee’s Terms of Reference to give it stronger powers to approve projects and programmes, and greater capacity to engage in the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of activities. Suggestions put forward during the course of our interviews for improving the quality and impact of the committee included: reducing

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11 Programmes and Projects Committee Terms of Reference, revised January 2010.
12 WFD Draft Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors, 27th January 2010.
the number of members to facilitate more focused working; more interim reporting from field work rather than the current focus on end of project/programme reports; more systematic reporting from the field, with greater focus on what hasn’t worked rather than the current focus on success stories; and the development of mechanisms for feeding committee-level discussions back to the board level to ensure that all members are informed about current processes, remain motivated and are working towards common goals.

Our analysis suggests that, in addition to improving the overall strategic coherence of the WFD through monitoring the planning and implementation of activities, the Projects and Programmes Committee could also help to address the current lack of integration between the WFD’s programmatic and party-led project work. The committee is in effect the main point of coordination between the UK political parties and the rest of the WFD as it is responsible for commenting on and approving every political party project. The political parties need to justify their projects and the associated costs before to the committee. However, several interviewees suggested that the committee rarely offers any opposition or constructive input into party project plans. This is partly due to the internal structure of the committee and partly due to the planning process within the parties. In particular, the ability of the committee to intervene is limited because the proposals have to go through a long process of discussion and debate within the political party. Often such projects require approval at the highest level of the party and WFD-funded work must form part of the political parties’ own wider international strategy. However, it means that projects have significant momentum and political will behind them by the time the Project and Programme Committee receives them.

The parties have suggested they would welcome more input. However, they do not help themselves in this regard, in that they are sometimes unwilling to reveal the detail of plans. There is, perhaps understandable, reluctance at times to share information designed to help opposing parties in the same country. Whilst on the whole, the UK political parties collaborate well together, particularly on multi-party projects, they are naturally guarded when it comes to political strategy.

The recently adopted set of recommendations aimed at facilitating better input from the Projects and Programmes Committee into project and programme design, implementation and monitoring could help to co-ordinate the work of the political parties better with the WFD’s longer term programmatic work. All stakeholders that we interviewed suggested that the issues could be resolved through better communication between the WFD and the political parties, and through formalisation of the relationship between them. However, some argue that the structures are already in place for this, but that they are not being used effectively. This suggests that changes in organisational procedure and structure alone are unlikely to resolve the disconnect between the WFD’s programmatic and party-led work.

The implication is that shifts in working culture are needed. Both the political parties and the WFD leadership and staff need a shared understanding of the nature of the relationship between these two strands of the organisation, and what the other is responsible for, coupled with an appreciation of the importance of integration. In our interviews, the parties still complained that they are not consulted about WFD staff-led projects run in countries in which they are working. However, WFD staff feel equally alienated from the bi-party work conducted by the parties and have little knowledge of what activities are being undertaken in their programme countries. As already discussed, improved strategic clarity at the organisational level would help to overcome some of these issues.

5.2 Internal Communication and Coordination
A common complaint from our interviews with WFD staff and management was that there is currently insufficient coordination between the WFD’s geographic programmes. Until recently, programmes have tended to be run in relative isolation from each other, with limited coordination in terms of planning and programme design and irregular reporting procedures. This has undermined the cohesiveness of the WFD, and hampered processes of organisational learning and development. Staff have had limited opportunities to learn from each other, and to incorporate lessons learnt into their own fields of work. Our interviews reveal that many staff do not feel the reports they submit to WFD management are fed back into the organisation’s strategy, planning and policy, giving them no sense of contributing to organisational development and little incentive to adhere to internal planning and reporting procedures.

The relationship between the TWC, which is effectively its own programme of work, and the WFD’s geographic programmes has also lacked clarity. According to our interviews, communication between TWC staff and partners and staff on other programmes has not always been effective, leading to misunderstanding and confusion in programming. However, staff report that these problems have largely been resolved as the TWC has developed. Similarly, new initiatives and procedures are being implemented across the WFD to improve reporting and communication. It is too early to make an assessment of these, but we suggest that work to improve internal communication should continue.

In addition, coordination between management level staff and field staff has often not been as effective as it should be. This issue was highlighted in the recent evaluation of the closure of the Parliamentary Media Training Programme in Egypt13. The evaluation report states that a lack of appreciation within the WFD of the importance of engagement between headquarters management and field programme staff contributed to the breakdown of the relationship between the WFD and the British Embassy. The decision has now been taken to base all regional programme managers at the WFD’s headquarters in London to ensure that effective relations between regional managers and senior management, and between these managers and the WFD’s main donors, are maintained. During our visit to Macedonia, country programme staff reported good relations with the regional management team in London, with communication occurring on an almost daily basis. Steps may need to be taken to ensure that similarly good relations are maintained between country and regional staff in other programmes, rather than being left to the discretion of individual staff members.

The WFD’s experience with project closure in Egypt also highlights the importance of communication between the WFD and its stakeholders in its programmatic countries. Senior politicians and parliamentary staff in Macedonia emphasised the importance of having good relations with senior figures in the UK who they perceive as their counterparts, in addition to maintaining good relations with local programme staff. Our analysis has also highlighted the importance of maintaining good relations with the local Ambassador and embassy staff. For example, the close relationship between WFD country staff and the local embassy in Macedonia has clearly contributed to the success of the programme, with embassy staff playing a significant role in programme design and implementation.

5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

The second, related cluster of issues concern the WFD’s internal procedures. These include planning, risk assessment, programme design, human resources and operations procedures. The WFD appears to be aware of its weaknesses in these areas and is currently taking steps to remedy

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them\textsuperscript{14}. However, one important issue that has yet to be addressed is that of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The WFD plans to review its internal systems in this area during the course of this year\textsuperscript{15}.

The WFD has recently undertaken a review of its monitoring and risk assessment systems and is currently implementing changes\textsuperscript{16}. Naturally, given the focus of the work, the emphasis has been placed on monitoring for risk management rather than evaluative purposes. Risk management and M&E are closely related and can feed into each other, but systems designed to manage risk are not a substitute for rigorous M&E. The log frame approach developed by the WFD should not be simply adapted for evaluation purposes. Log frames can help to ensure that project outputs (for example, that a training session has been held) are clearly distinguished from outcomes (for example, changes in political behaviour that result of a politician attending the training session). However, by themselves, log frames are unable to provide accurate measurement of impact. The WFD needs to be monitoring the impact and effectiveness of activities, projects and programmes on an ongoing basis, with systems and indicators for doing so being specifically designed and built in at the conceptual stage in the project and programme cycle.

M&E of democracy intervention programmes is notoriously difficult. Democratic development is about changes in political behaviour which are not only difficult to measure, but are also long-term in nature, occurring across decades rather than quarterly project cycles. It is also difficult to assess causality, with political dynamics the result of a wide range of exogenous factors. Despite these difficulties, WFD’s reputation and diversification of its funding base will depend on its ability to demonstrate the impact of its work. Project and programme managers will need to be creative in developing ongoing systems to gauge changes in stakeholder capacity and behaviour and in political culture over long time periods which may span across projects. These systems are likely to combine qualitative with quantitative assessment, and include tools to assess the perception that different stakeholders have of the political system and changes occurring with it.

Our interviews and review of party project materials suggest that monitoring and evaluation of the political parties work has been particularly weak. As we have argued throughout this report, the WFD needs to make a better connection between the bi-party support work conducted by the UK political parties and its longer term programming designed to address weaknesses in democratic institutions and systems. Assessment of the contribution that the UK political parties are making to changes in the wider democratic development of countries is a crucial component of this. Projects should therefore not only be evaluated individually, but should also be thought of as a longer programme of work. The reasons for this are twofold. First, lessons learnt should be fed back into project design to enhance their long term impact. Second, such assessment would help to identify opportunities for better integrating the WFD’s bi-partisan and multi-party work, and for designing projects to strengthen multi-party systems as well as political parties themselves.

\textsuperscript{14} See for example: Minutes of a meeting of the Terms & Conditions Committee, 13th January 2009; Minutes of a meeting of the Terms & Conditions Committee, 14th October 2009; Draft Minutes of meeting of the Audit Committee, 14th October 2009; Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors, 15th July 2009

\textsuperscript{15} Source: interviews with WFD Management. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors (15th July 2009) suggest that a Monitoring and Evaluation Task Group was established to develop strategic objectives and indicators for the WFD and to link these into the WFD’s wider M&E framework. However, the evaluators have not seen any further documentation relating to this process.

\textsuperscript{16} Update on Programme Monitoring and Risk Management, Document 8
5.4 Conclusions and recommendations

The WFD is making good progress in reviewing its internal procedures and systems, driven in part by necessity as its programmes have developed and expanded, and in part by the new Chief Executive who is keen to improve the effectiveness of the WFD. This ongoing procedural review is important for two main reasons. Firstly, effective internal systems are vital for building effective organisations that are internally cohesive and capable of responding to new internal and external challenges. Secondly, in order to build its reputation and diversify its funding base, the WFD needs to be able to demonstrate the impact that it is having through its projects and programmes.

Our analysis suggests that there is currently a notable gap in the WFD’s ability to demonstrate impact. Attention needs to be paid to developing systems to assess the contribution that the political parties’ longer term series of short term projects are having on political and democratic development. This would help to address the problem of the current misalignment between the objectives of the WFD’s political party work and its wider goal of improving democracy. It is also important because party-led projects are a significant component of the WFD’s work, and are one of the work streams that makes the organisation distinctive from others in the field.

In order to be successful, new systems and procedures need to be fully owned by staff and stakeholders, meet their needs and fit smoothly into working practice and culture. This will not only help to ensure that the systems themselves are effective and sustainable, but will also help to ensure that they make the WFD as a whole a more effective organisation that is responsive to external political change. Investing time and energy in building internal systems from the bottom-up will yield significant gains for the organisation in terms of enhancing effectiveness and professionalism.

It is also important that the WFD’s internal systems and procedures form part of an integrated project and programme management cycle. The WFD needs to take care to identify the strengths and clarify the roles of different parts of the organisation, and then build internal systems and procedure around these. Strategic thinking should build on a clear understanding of organisational strengths; project and programme planning should flow from organisational strategy; project and programme implementation needs to refer back to objectives set during the planning process; ongoing monitoring should allow for the identification of lessons learned during implementation; lessons learned should feed back into strategic planning.

Our interviews with staff and stakeholders and our review of internal planning documentation suggest that there are currently gaps in the stages of the cycle. At present there are particular weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation, and in procedures for feeding findings back into strategic and programmatic planning. We suggest that the WFD’s forthcoming review of its M&E systems takes an overarching view of the organisation’s programme management cycle as a starting point to ensure that new systems and tools feed into and strengthen other internal processes such as communication, risk management, planning and strategy.
6 Challenges for WFD in expanding its party and parliamentary assistance work

As has been noted elsewhere in this report, the WFD is seeking to expand its work, identify new sources of income and become a more significant actor in certain areas of democracy support. Previous sections have highlighted some of the internal factors that the organisation needs to address to improve its delivery and effectiveness. This section looks briefly at the challenges posed by the external environment and the issues that WFD will need to consider when developing its medium to long-term strategy. It starts by providing an overview of the main organisations engaged in party and parliamentary support, and the way in which the field of party and parliamentary assistance is changing. It then looks at the relative strengths and weaknesses of the WFD model, and identifies the potential for WFD to develop a distinct presence in the field.

6.1 The changing dynamics in party and parliamentary support

In a report of this length it is necessary to generalise about the organisations working on party and parliamentary assistance, and the activities they undertake. In broad terms, the variety of actors working on international support to parties and parliaments can be divided into five categories.

- International agencies: These include USAID, DFID, SIDA and CIDA. Although each of these agencies may deliver support directly to parties and/or parliaments, they tend to work by contracting the work to third parties, either by funding multi-lateral bodies, organisations or individuals.

- Multi-national bodies: The UNDP and EU are the biggest organisations funding and delivering these sorts of programmes. International IDEA, as an Inter-Governmental Organisation has developed a specialism in party assistance and is developing its parliamentary work.

- Party-affiliated organisations: Traditionally the field has been dominated by the German Stiftungen, which engage in bi-party support to their ideological counterparts around the world. The NDI and IRI can also be described as party-affiliated, however, their work is not confined to working with specific parties, and they often engage in multi-party projects.

- Multi-party organisations: The most recent arrival in party support is the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, which was established in 2000, specifically to work on a multi-party basis. It is controlled by the Dutch political parties and engages in projects designed to bring parties together in partner countries, especially in post-conflict situations. This model is being considered as an option by others, such as the Danish Foreign Ministry, as a way of channelling their political party assistance.

- Networks: The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Inter-Parliamentary Union and Parliamentary Network of the World Bank all engage in projects designed to support parliaments and politicians. The IPU is the most extensive and has in recent years sought to develop a range of tools, indicators and analyses for parliamentary development. At their best the networks can be a useful way of identifying and disseminating best practice.

The work of these various organisations then fits, generally, into four main categories.
• First, technical support. Providing a parliament or party with equipment, staffing, publications, and resources to carry out their work.
• Second, organisational support. Helping the parliament or party develop its internal organisation and processes. This might mean developing internal structures, establishing new procedures or defining job descriptions for staff.
• Third, functional support. Support and training to help the parliament or party fulfil its roles more effectively. For parliaments this might include training in budget oversight, constituency outreach or law-making. For parties it would mean help with campaign techniques, representation and electioneering.
• Fourth, system support. That is, developing the legal and regulatory framework within which political parties operate, including election laws, party regulation and party finance laws.

These four categories obviously encompass a wide range of activities and approaches. However, several recent analyses of donor support have been strongly critical of the mechanisms, modalities and impact of traditional party and parliamentary programmes\(^{17}\). The criticisms highlight a preference for limited technical support, short-term interventions, a lack of strategy and an over-reliance on training. Frequently programmes were built around the pre-conceptions of the programme designers rather than the needs of participants, and reflected models of politics unsuited to the local context. As such, the impact and effectiveness of such programmes is questionable at best.

The strategic approach to parties and parliaments is though changing. This is partly in recognition of the fundamental weaknesses of the traditional approach to support. But it also reflects a wider desire amongst donor agencies to improve aid effectiveness. Specifically the Paris principles for aid effectiveness and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action spelt out the need for donor interventions to be characterised by the search for meaningful results in-country, based on a strategy of mutual accountability, local ownership and context-specific intervention.

The implications of this changed approach can be split into three broad categories.

**Parliamentary support.** The desire to improve parliamentary support can be seen in three main ways. First, since 2007 there has been much greater strategic co-ordination between the main donor agencies. The initial meeting of donors, convened by DFID, UNDP and WBI in May 2007, sought to identify key issues, share insights and develop complementary strategies. Second, there is an increased donor interest in finding universal benchmarks and indicators against which parliaments can be judged, in an effort to improve support. (This will be the subject of the next donor meeting in Paris in March 2010.) Third, there is growing interest in the application of a political economy perspective to parliamentary support, particularly a desire to understand the incentive structures which shape parliamentary performance.

**Party support.** There is a lower degree of co-ordination between donors working on political party support. It is still regarded as a sensitive area for donor intervention, with the possibility that donors may be accused of interfering in the domestic politics of another sovereign nation. Partly to overcome these accusations, there is a growing interest in projects that engage in multi-party

politics, an area of work which has been led by the NIMD, emphasising the need for the local political parties to design and deliver their own support programmes. Donors are also recognising that support to individual parties is likely to have only a limited effect on the quality of the party system, and support to parties is increasingly being combined with efforts to buttress the political system, such as improving party regulation and tackling illicit party finance.

**Co-ordination and integration of projects.** Finally, the desire for greater impact on the ground is forcing donors to think about the overlap between various aspects of governance and how projects might seek to improve the over-arching quality of democracy. The focus in recent years on post-conflict environments and fragile states has emphasised the interdependent nature of projects to support the polity, civil society and the media. DFID, in particular, is concerned about the development and maintenance of ‘inclusive political settlements’.

More specifically, there is a growing interest in the way in which programmes to support parliaments and political parties can be integrated at an earlier stage, with USAID and International IDEA seeking to develop strategies on that basis. Political parties are, of course, central to the quality of parliamentary performance. In the first instance, they usually provide MPs with the principal way of being re-elected and the means to a political career. Therefore MPs look primarily to their political party for advice and guidance on how they should behave in parliament, which way they should vote or where their support will be expected. Perhaps more significantly, parties provide the bases for parliamentary organisation, providing the vehicles for negotiation between government and opposition over legislation and parliamentary business. In short, they ensure the smooth functioning of parliament, or not.

The quality and character of the political parties will therefore have a significant impact on the effectiveness of parliament. For example, strong disciplined parties may mean that parliament is entirely dominated by the government. At the other extreme, a multiplicity of parties which have little discipline or internal cohesion makes parliament unpredictable and difficult to organise. Where a party has no control over its MPs, the legislature will struggle to organise its business, let alone take decisions over legislation or government policy.

Given such overlaps it would seem obvious that support to parties and parliaments should be integrated, but there has been remarkably little activity which does so effectively.

### 6.2 The challenges for the WFD model

The WFD’s ability to extend its activity in the field will need to be based on a consideration of its strengths and weaknesses in relation to other organisations working in this area, and then how well it is able to respond to the changing priorities in party and parliamentary support. When compared to its immediate competitors (listed above) it has three main disadvantages.

i. **Lack of in-house expertise**

First, by comparison with every other actor working in the field WFD has very limited in-house expertise. Staff working for organisations such as the NDI, IRI and UNDP will have usually spent several years working in a parliament or political party, and often have a specific skill set, for example in legislative drafting, electioneering or ICT. In contrast, the WFD is relatively young, and has only recently evolved from a grant management to a service delivery organisation that runs programmes on the ground. Its experience in the field of parliamentary strengthening is therefore limited compared to competing organisations, especially as it only recently defined this field as a core area of work.
WFD needs a broader base of expertise if it is to fulfil its aims of building its reputation and expanding its funding base, either by recruiting staff with specific skills, partnering with other organisations or making better use of its close relationship with Westminster and the political parties. The WFD has started to address this issue, for example through growing via its partnership with other organisations as part of The Westminster Consortium (TWC). However, many of the TWC partners have thematic expertise outside of the immediate area of parliamentary politics, and have limited direct experience of working within political structures.

ii. Size

WFD is an extremely small organisation in comparison with others listed above. One interviewee suggested that its funding needs to be dramatically increased if it is to be regarded as a significant player or to be seen as the ‘British version of NDI/IRI’ or the UK equivalent of NIMD. The WFD’s small size limits its capacity to undertake large, long-term projects which involve parliamentary and party development interventions at a number of levels, for example from providing resources, to developing procedures, training and induction. Such projects often require a permanent or semi-permanent presence in the partner parliament. WFD simply does not have the capacity to offer these sorts of services in the same way as the bilateral donors or as organisations such as NDI or IRI.

WFD’s size also means that its ‘reach’ is less extensive than the global players in the field. It simply does not have the internal staffing or resources to compete for work in every region of the world. This is apparent when compared with NDI or IRI, and especially UNDP. But even by comparison with NIMD or IDEA, which have built multi-country programmes by starting in a specific region, its potential to deliver projects on the ground in different parts of the world, is extremely limited. Their work is too unfocussed for WFD to claim to be building an expertise around Middle East democracy support (for example) in the way that IDEA was able to build a political parties programme off the back of its specific Latin American expertise.

One interviewee from a donor agency questioned why they would give, “a six-figure project to WFD when I can get the NDI or IRI to do it. I know that the NDI/IRI do this sort of project all the time.” In short, WFD will need to convince potential funders that it can compete on that basis, or sell its services in an entirely different way.

WFD is currently trying to address this issue through its growth strategy, and is also working to increase its long term presence in programme countries. However, the organisation needs to balance this desire for growth against the need to build a solid reputation for delivery and base of expertise.

iii. A distinct WFD approach?

Although WFD might struggle in terms of size, it should be able to distinguish its activity from others when competing for work. However, our interviews with stakeholders revealed no sense that WFD offers a distinct approach or unique set of services. WFD does have a number of distinctive characteristics (which are examined in more detail below), but it is failing to harness these as part of its strategic plan.

A point of comparison lies in the experience of the NIMD, whose success has been largely rooted in it filling a particular gap in party support programmes, namely the delivery of multi-party support projects. These have proved particularly important in post-conflict environments and thus provided a distinct set of programmes which, at the time of the NIMD’s formation, no one else was doing in any coherent way. In short, NIMD competed for work by identifying a niche area and a distinctive approach to a widely-recognised issue in democracy support programmes. Moreover, its pitch for projects was based on its organisational structure and strengths, as well as a distinctive Dutch
approach to politics. It provided the answer to commonly-acknowledged problem. In contrast, the WFD has not thus far created a niche for itself within the party and parliamentary support fields.

6.3 Developing a distinctive WFD approach

The way in which WFD establishes its strategic direction in the next few years will depend on how it addresses some of its internal structural tensions, not least the way in which it co-ordinates its parliamentary support work with its party support work. However, as part of that process WFD also needs to identify where it possesses distinct characteristics and potential advantages over the other organisations working in the field.

The WFD's Annual Reports and Accounts (2008/9) identify four key strengths that the organisation believes makes it stand out, namely: its ability to work on a multi-party basis; its status as an independent agency sponsored by the FCO; its geographic and thematic expertise; and its relationship with partners. Subsequent discussions with both internal and external stakeholders suggest that there is little belief that these truly represent WFD’s distinctive strengths. Few, if any, of these characteristics are unique to WFD and they do not represent a strong basis on which to build strategy. Rather our discussions revealed five factors where WFD might seek to exploit its institutional characteristics, which may provide the basis on which to differentiate a WFD approach to party and parliamentary strengthening.

i. The Westminster brand
Although the specific insights from the Houses of Parliament may only be applicable to countries running a Westminster-style parliament, the appeal of this model appears to go some way beyond those countries. Several interviewees mentioned the fact that ‘Westminster’ has a resonance which extends beyond the Commonwealth as it implies tradition, stability, clear rules of procedure and commitment to a multi-party system. Elements of the committee system, parliamentary questioning, legislative process and administration of Westminster provide standards which other parliaments seek to emulate. The challenge for the WFD is to identify the traits of ‘Westminster’ that it wishes to utilise and develop these as part of the WFD approach to parliamentary and party support work.

ii. WFD’s networks
Over the course of its history WFD has provided support to a wide variety of political parties, not least in central and eastern Europe, facing the difficult transition to democracy. Although we did not have the opportunity to speak to any previous recipients of WFD projects as part of this evaluation, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a large pool of sitting or former politicians in recently democratised states who are grateful to the WFD, and inclined to support its activity. This presents a potentially large reservoir of expertise and insight on which WFD could draw as part of its programmes. Many donor agencies are seeking to develop new models which allow politicians from developing democracies to learn from each other. If it can harness its networks of contacts it could be at the forefront of developing new ways of promoting such models.

iii. The work of the UK political parties
As mentioned elsewhere in the report, the international work of the political parties provides WFD with a high level of expertise and experience in the development and delivery of overtly political projects. The fact that the parties build up relationships with their counterparts in other countries on the basis of shared political beliefs means that relationships are built on a high level of trust, and the parties can potentially exercise significant influence. In addition, because they are plugged in to international networks of sister parties, their confederations (such as the Socialist International) and have regular contact with other party assistance providers (such as the Stiftungen), they have a very
good sense of how political change is unfolding in many regions of the world. However, as noted elsewhere, WFD is failing to fully draw on this expertise in the development and delivery of its parliamentary projects. (This relates to the next two points, iv. and v.)

iv. Multi-party projects
WFD has the capacity to engage in projects on a multi-party basis, and its parliamentary projects involve cooperation between the UK political parties on projects designed to improve working relations between parliamentary parties. However, the changing emphasis in donor support for multi-party projects suggests that WFD should make this an integral and prominent feature of its approach. Multi-party work should not be limited to parliamentary strengthening projects, but should also specifically focus on addressing weaknesses in the multi-party system. The international work of the UK political parties seems to be the most obvious place from which to build. Their expertise and experience means that they can provide access to political parties in specific countries which can then be used as the basis for a project designed to strengthen the political party system as a whole. It could position itself as the organisation capable of bridging the narrow interests of the individual political parties with the wider interests of the party system as a whole, dealing with issues that affect every party such as electoral law or party finance. It also has the potential to work with political parties in parliament, arguably strengthening the capacity of both ...

v. Integrating party and parliamentary strengthening
... and according to a respected and senior figure in the democracy assistance world there are, in his opinion, only two organisations that have the capacity to integrate support to parliaments and support to political parties, namely the NDI and the WFD. Leaving aside the NDI, our evaluation suggests the opposite - that currently WFD is structurally unsuited to integrating support to parliaments and parties. Effective parliamentary strengthening programmes involve changing political behaviour as much as (if not more than) changing parliamentary rules or structure. It means that parliamentary strengthening becomes a more overtly political exercise which engages political parties as active partners in the process of reform. WFD’s difficulties in co-ordinating parliamentary and party support reflect the fact that the WFD’s work to support political parties seems to be based on a different rationale and strategy to its parliamentary strengthening work. If the WFD can draw on the expertise of the political parties and build its reputation in parliamentary strengthening work, it has the potential to deliver projects which engage with the politics of parliamentary reform, respond to the concerns of many donors and develop new models of integrated international political support.

Conclusion
In short, the WFD’s growth strategy needs to be based on a realistic assessment of where it sits in the field of party and parliamentary strengthening, how the priorities of donors and other funding agencies are changing, and where it possesses institutional advantages over other organisations working in these areas. As should be evident from the above, we believe that WFD does have a set of characteristics on which it can develop a distinctive WFD model. This though depends on the organisation addressing many of the inherent tensions which run to the heart of the organisation.
7 Conclusions

The WFD has undergone a number of changes over the past five years, including changes in leadership and organisational structure. Most significantly, it has evolved from a grant giving organisation to a service delivery organisation, running projects and programmes in the field. In terms of its current structure and approach, the WFD is therefore relatively young. It is in the process of developing effective programme management procedures, recognising the need to develop long-term in-country programming, and understanding the importance of developing expertise and focus in specific areas of work, in this case party and parliamentary strengthening.

Our analysis suggests that, in order to enhance its effectiveness, expertise and reputation, the WFD needs a clearer sense of purpose, organisation and goals. Given its size, it is currently attempting to do too much. A number of organisational tensions and areas of confusion have become apparent during the course of our review of internal literature and our interviews with key stakeholders. At present, the WFD seems to be unclear as to whether it wishes to:

- Be an active contributor to HM Government and FCO diplomatic objectives or emphasise its independence from government;
- Be the government’s vehicle for delivering international democratic support or simply another contractor supplying services to many clients;
- Build thematic expertise or geographic expertise or both;
- Develop context-specific strategies for parliamentary support or develop a model which can be applied in many countries;
- Be a vehicle for convening others or delivery organisation in its own right;
- Focus on short-term project work or undertake longer-term, strategic programming.

None of these options are mutually exclusive, but our discussions with stakeholders suggested that WFD was trying to be all of these, and more. And that this was happening more by accident than by design. In other words this range of approaches was the result of WFD’s failure to confront its explicit organisational purpose and close off certain options. The small size of the organisation, compared with most others working in the field, means that it runs the constant danger of doing too much, failing to deliver and risking its reputation.

WFD needs to address these organisational tensions, developing a comprehensive strategy that clearly sets out its vision, approach, goals and objectives. In its current Corporate Plan (2009-12), the WFD’s vision is stated to be “to be known as an effective organisation in supporting countries around the world to be democratic” (p3). This says very little about what the WFD is working to achieve.

Its three strategic objectives are also very broad. Two are focused on the development and growth of the organisation, leaving only one relating to its thematic work. This states that the WFD aims to be “achieving demonstrable changes that have improved democracy” in the parties and parliaments that it works with (p10). There is very little elaboration of what this means in practice. The Corporate Plan’s section on work in the geographical regions reads more like a broad description of the work that is being undertaken, rather than a strategic application of organisational objectives to
regions and countries. In short, there is a need for more in-depth, sharper strategic thinking to clarify the organisation’s objectives and guide project and programme work.

We recognise that the WFD is in a process of transition, and that many of these issues are already in the process of being addressed. However, there are fundamental tensions within the organisation which need to be considered as it is defining its strategy. As an organisation it needs to identify what it believes to be its distinctive characteristics, its institutional strengths and where necessary separate out discrete organisational goals for its party and parliamentary support work.

Although the scope of this review has meant that we only had limited engagement with staff and internal procedures, it appears that this process of defining what sort of organisation it is – and wishes to be – is as important for internal purposes as for external purposes. In other words, programme staff and party staff need a shared sense of purpose, built around complementary objectives. Donors and other funding agencies need a sense of what it is that WFD offers that they cannot get from other organisations.

The last section of this report set out what we believe to be the institutional characteristics and strengths on which the WFD should build, namely; the Westminster brand; the WFD’s historical network; the expertise of the political parties; the potential to deliver multi-party projects; and the ability to integrate party and parliamentary support.

However, institutional strategy needs to acknowledge the fact that the political party work is motivated by different factors than the parliamentary and broader democracy support work. The overtly political nature of the WFD’s party support is a potential strength, as it allows the organisation to engage in forms of support about which many other organisations are nervous, and provides valuable insight and expertise. It should inform and support the parliamentary strengthening work, but the objectives of both must be understood as complementary and not as synonymous.

This means, first, providing corporate objectives which include a political component that better applies to the work of the political parties. Second, at the process level, it requires greater co-ordination of activity through improved monitoring and evaluation; the joint initiation of multi-party projects; projects that integrate party and parliamentary strengthening objectives; and better communication between the political parties and WFD staff, DFID, the FCO and the wider democracy development community.

In conclusion, the WFD is currently doing some good work through discrete projects and programmes in different countries. However, it could be doing more. It is struggling to define itself internally and externally. Our analysis suggests it will need to acknowledge and address the tensions in its organisational structure and purpose if it is to realise its potential fully.
8 Points for Reflection for the WFD

This report identified four main challenges for the WFD, namely:

1) It needs to take a strategic decision about what sort of organisation it wants to be.
2) It should identify and build on its institutional strengths.
3) It needs to address internal tensions in its structure.
4) It needs to improve its own internal procedures and processes.

We were asked to provide ‘points for reflection’ for WFD’s key internal stakeholders rather than make firm recommendations relating to each of these challenges. The following provides a basis for internal discussion on how best to respond to those challenges.

Taking a strategic decision about what sort of organisation the WFD wants to be

- At management level, WFD needs to develop and refine clear strategic priorities and goals for its work with parliaments and parties.
- Strategy needs to inform project and programmatic work. Organisational goals should feed directly into regional and country level planning.
- Those decisions should include how the WFD deepens its expertise, how thematic priorities link to the choice of priority countries, and where the boundaries to WFD’s work lie.
- WFD needs to clarify its relationship with its strategic partners, not least with the FCO and DFID. This requires consideration by WFD’s senior management and Board, as well as by strategic partners themselves.

Identifying and building on the WFD’s institutional strengths

- The WFD’s strategy for working with parliaments and parties needs to be built on a clear understanding of what makes it different from other organisations in the field.
- The WFD’s strategy and pitch should be rooted in its organisational strengths: the WFD should build projects and programmes that play to its strengths and differentiate it from competitors.
- In particular, consideration should be given to how the WFD can better integrate its work with parties and parliaments, and to developing multi-party projects that aim to strengthen party systems rather than just the parties themselves.
- At every level WFD should consider how to make greater use of political party expertise and experience in WFD-led programming.

Addressing internal tensions in the WFD’s structure

- The WFD’s strategy and work plan need to be built on an understanding that the objectives of the political party-led work are fundamentally different from other programme activity.
- Both sets of activities are potential sources of strength for WFD, and neither need compromise the other. But WFD should be explicit about these objectives. Identifying where the two complement each other is then more straightforward.
- Recognising the differences allows greater scope to identify areas of common interest and collaborative programme planning from an early stage. This is likely to mean identifying opportunities for parliamentary strengthening through the political party activity, and building party programmes which incorporate wider parliamentary development objectives. For both sides, this will rest on improved communication and coordination.
**Improving internal procedures and processes**

- WFD’s organisational strategy and planning should be built around long-term programmes, which foster sustainability and local capacity. An integrated programme management cycle would ensure strategy, activity planning, monitoring and evaluation all feed in to each other.

- A more effective planning process would need to identify the best points at which to engage the political parties in WFD programme activity, and offer opportunities for WFD programmes to feed into the parties’ own strategic planning at an earlier stage. This may require greater openness on the part of the political parties about their plans.

- Programme staff and political party representatives need a shared sense of ownership of objectives and outcomes, and in some cases of programme delivery. This will involve better internal communication and a common understanding of the planning process.

- Better monitoring and evaluation systems are needed across the organisation. These should gauge long term impact against shared objectives, and results should feed back into organisational strategy and programme design. The political parties in particular would benefit from developing a longer-term institutional memory, linking the lessons from discrete and disparate projects, and building networks of previous participants.
Annex 1: Documents Reviewed

Annual Reports and Accounts
• 2005-06
• 2006-07
• 2007-08
• 2008-09

Annual Reviews
• 2005-06
• 2006-07
• 2008
• 2009

Corporate and Business Planning Documents
• Management Statement for the WFD, signed July 14th, 2004 to replace the prior Memorandum of Understanding.
• Articles of Association of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy Ltd.
• WFD Corporate Plan, 2009-12
• WFD Business Plan, 2009-10

Procedural Documents
• Update on Programme Monitoring and Risk Management, Document 8
• WFD Operational Procedures Manual
• Draft Operations Manual Content List, November 2009

Board Meeting Minutes
• Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors, 15th July 2009
• Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors, 15th October 2009
• Draft Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors, 27th January 2010

Projects and Programmes Committee Documents
• Minutes of the Meeting of the Projects and Programmes Committee, Wednesday 1st July 2009
• Minutes of the Meeting of the Projects and Programmes Committee, Wednesday 14th October 2009
• Minutes of the Meeting of the Projects and Programmes Committee, Wednesday 13th January 2010
• Recommendations for Improving the Work of the Projects and Programmes Committee, 27th January 2010
• Projects and Programmes Committee: Terms of Reference (revised January 2010)
• Africa and ROW Team: Recommended for Approval, January 2010
• Europe Team Recommended for Approval, 13 January 2010
• MENA Team: Recommended for Approval, January 2010

Audit Committee Documents
• Audit Committee Terms of Reference
- Minutes of meeting of the Audit Committee, 1st July 2009
- Draft Minutes of meeting of the Audit Committee, 14th October 2009

**Terms & Conditions Committee Documents**
- Terms & Conditions Committee Terms of Reference
- Minutes of a meeting of the Terms & Conditions Committee, 13th January 2009
- Minutes of a meeting of the Terms & Conditions Committee, 14th October 2009

**Evaluation Documents**
- Silver Pebble International/WFD (2009) Report into the cancellation of the Parliamentary Media Training Programme in Egypt (Confidential)

**Conservative Party Documents**
- Belarus: Centre-Right Leadership Strategy Development Retreat, Proposal
- Belarus: Centre-Right Leadership Strategy Development Retreat, Final Report Form

**Liberal Democrat Documents**
- Serbia: Locally Elected Officials Training, Project Proposal
- Serbia: Locally Elected Officials Training, Final Report Form

**Labour Party Documents**
- Africa Women’s Workshop, Project Application Form
- Africa Women’s Workshop, Final Report Form
- Social Democratic Union of Macedonia: Party Organisation and Development, Project Proposal
- Social Democratic Union of Macedonia: Media Training, Project Proposal
- Social Democratic Union of Macedonia: Media Strategy Development, Project Proposal

**Smaller Parties Documents**
- FDD Recruitment Mobilisation Training (Zambia), Project Application Form (SNP)

**MENA Programme Documents**
- Women Political Leadership in the MENA Region, Project Proposal
- Women Political Leadership in the MENA Region, Workshop Agenda (15-16 May 2009)
• Women Political Leadership in the MENA Region WFD-OPAC Report, 2009
• Train a Pool of University Lecturers from Iraq on Parliamentary Systems, Project Proposal
• Train a Pool of University Lecturers from Iraq on Parliamentary Systems, Midterm Progress Report
• Train a Pool of University Lecturers from Iraq on Parliamentary Systems, Final Report
• Train a Pool of University Lecturers from Iraq on Parliamentary Systems, recommendations raised during the training
• Train a Pool of University Lecturers from Iraq on Parliamentary Systems, Evaluation.

Africa Programme Documents
• Support to East Africa Legislative Assembly, Project Application Form
• Report on Televising of EALA Conferences (November 2008)
• WFD Feedback Form samples from EALA visit to the UK

Europe Programme Documents
• Macedonia Project Progress Report October 2008
• WFD/GOF Macedonia Project Submission, Bidding Form, February 2009
• Macedonia Project Quarterly Project Progress Report from Implementer to Post, October 2008-December 2008
• Macedonia Project Quarterly Project Progress Report from Implementer to Post, January 2009 – March 2009
• Macedonia Project Quarterly Project Progress Report from Implementer to Post, April 2009 – June 2009
• Macedonia Project Quarterly Project Progress Report from Implementer to Post, July 2009 – September 2009
• WFD Macedonia Programme Overview, 2009
Annex 2: Interviews Conducted

Staff
1. Linda Duffield (CEO)
2. Marina Narnor (Head of Programme Africa)
3. Alex Romaniuc (Head of Programme Europe)
4. Dina Melhem (Head of Programme MENA)
5. Sian Dixon (Information and Communications Manager)
6. Paul Naismith (Finance Director)
7. Kathryn Haslam (Head of HR)
8. George Kunnath (Director TWC)

Parties
9. Paul Speller (Lib Dem)
10. Philippa Broom (Conservative)
11. David Thirlby (Smaller parties)
12. Nabila Sattar (Labour)

Governors
13. Meg Munn (Chair)
14. David Lidington (Vice)
15. Jo Swinson (Vice)
16. Myles Wickstead (Vice)
17. Sean Farren (Smaller Parties)
18. Tina Fahm

The Westminster Consortium
19. Andrew Tuggey (CPA)
20. Jo Weir (Thomson Reuters)
21. David Goldsworthy (National Audit Office)
22. Mark Hutton (House of Commons, Overseas Office)
23. Jenny Marsh (Human Rights Institute, International Bar Association)
24. Todd Landman (University of Essex, Centre for Democratic Governance)

Funders & Practitioners
25. Susan Loughhead (DFID)
26. Stefan Kossoff (DFID)
27. Alex Stevens (DFID)
28. Bjarte Tora (IDEA)
29. Leni Wild (ODI)
30. Ivan Doherty (NDI)

Macedonia staff and stakeholders
31. Emil Atanasovski (Programme Manager)
32. Irena Stevcovska (British Embassy, Skopje)
33. Marija Stambolieva (SDUM – Labour Party beneficiary)
34. Hristina Runceva (VMRO-DPMNE – Conservative Party beneficiary)
35. Parliamentary Party Coordinators: Cvetanka Ivanova (SDSM); Silvana Boneva (VMRO-DPMNE); Roza Topuzova (LDP); Imer Aliu (DPA)
36. Zaneta Trajkoska (Director of School for Journalism and Public Relations)
37. Zarko Hadzi Zafirov (Macedonian Young Lawyers Association)
38. Slavica Biljarska (Citizen Association MOST)
39. Nenad Markovic and Ivan Damjanovski (Political Science Department Faculty of Law Skopje)
40. Marjan Madzovski (Chief of Cabinet of the Speaker of Parliament)
41. Zarko Denkovski (Secretary General of Parliament)
42. Parliamentary staff beneficiaries of WFD training programme
43. Marjan Nikolov (Director Centre for Economic Analysis)