External Evaluation of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy: Political Party Assistance

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List of abbreviations

ALN   Africa Liberal Network
CEO   Chief Executive Officer
CPP   Convention People’s Party (Ghana)
DA    Democratic Alliance (South Africa)
DFID  Department for International Development (UK)
EU    European Union
FCO   Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
GIP   Ghana Integrated Programme
IRI   International Republican Institute (US)
LibDem Liberal Democrats (UK)
MENA  Middle East and North Africa
MP    Member of Parliament
MPO   Multi-Party Office
NDI   National Democratic Institute (US)
NDC   National Democratic Congress (Ghana)
NGO   Non-governmental organisation
NIMD  Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
NPP   New Patriotic Party (Ghana)
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPO   Political Party Office (WFD)
SD    Social Democratic (Parties)
SNP   Scottish National Party
TOC   Theory of Change
UK    United Kingdom
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
WAFA  The Women’s Academy for Africa
WFD   Westminster Foundation for Democracy
Executive Summary

Introduction

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) is the main source of British expertise for international political party and parliamentary assistance. The aim of this evaluation is to assess the processes and outcomes of WFD’s political party assistance between April 2015 and March 2018.

The evaluation is based on field work in Ghana and four desk-based case studies: Argentina, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Africa and Western Balkans. It compares WFD’s main approaches to party assistance: supporting ‘sister’ parties (from the same ideological family), networks, thematic projects and multi-party assistance, including integrated programmes that bring together WFD’s party assistance with its parliamentary support.

Party assistance is provided by WFD through four UK Political Party Offices (PPOs) based inside political party headquarters or in parliament. The largest three parties have their own offices while other parties operate through the Multi-Party Office (MPO). Political party assistance represents a quarter of WFD’s entire budget. It covers 22 countries and several regional networks, with 43 live projects in late 2017.

Relevance

The Theory of Change (TOC) behind WFD’s party assistance can be summarised as follows. WFD supports democratisation mostly by sharing experiences from the UK political system (with some south-south exchanges). PPOs provide capacity building support (in particular training and peer support from UK politicians and party staff) which is meant to generate improved skills. Political party networks are meant to support both individual and organisational objectives. Together, stronger, more accountable, representative and policy-based parties are assumed to offer more choice to citizens in elections. This should contribute to multi-party democracy.

This TOC is based on the belief that: training, peer-to-peer support and networks will develop capacities (input level); political parties will change in response to the training or technical advice received, which will make them more relevant to their electorate (outputs/outcomes); and political systems will allow more capable parties to operate (system-wide level). However, the academic evidence does not fully support these assumptions: capacity building rarely influences the behaviour of politicians. UK political experiences, based on the Westminster parliamentary model, often has little relevance in the countries where WFD operates.

At a strategic level, WFD’s overall strategy and PPOs strategies for 2016-2020 are consistent. All PPOs are committed to WFD’s overarching objective of multi-party democracy, constituted by representative, inclusive and accountable parties competing on a more level playing field. The Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats (LibDems) set out to support like-minded ‘sister’ parties and networks that share their ideology and values, while the MPO and Scottish National Party (SNP) highlight the importance of smaller parties and regional experiences. The main strategic effort at alignment between WFD and PPOs since 2015 has been the
development of “integrated programmes” that bring together PPOs (in multi-party activities) and WFD’s parliamentary assistance. The case studies showed how PPOs themselves were also moving towards multi-party work: the SNP by supporting a thematic network of women parliamentarians in MENA and Plaid Cymru raising awareness on violence against women in politics initially in Argentina which evolved into a global multi-party conference in 2018.

Strategic alignment between the UK government and PPOs could be strengthened. PPOs are not required and do not often explicitly set out how they will contribute to specific objectives from the Department for International Development (DFID) or Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). There are no clear criteria to prioritise the countries in which PPOs work. While the FCO values political party assistance to further foreign policy objectives, DFID remains less comfortable with ideological sister-party assistance than, for example, political participation for marginalised groups across political parties.

The case studies showed that projects were more relevant when they clearly responded to a demand for a partnership with a UK political party; targeted the specific needs of the sister-party identified over time as a result of a longer partnership; or addressed the need for greater women or youth participation in politics. For example, the Lib Dems have an ongoing partnership with South Africa’s Democratic Alliance (DA) and are assisting an effective youth leadership programme and the development of the African Young Liberals, the youth wing of the African Liberal Network. Projects were somewhat less relevant when they focused too quickly on sister-parties in a supply-driven way (i.e. starting with the UK expertise they could offer) or without considering the shortcomings of the political system in which they operated. In Argentina, Plaid initially targeted a sister-party in a province with a Welsh-speaking community, which turned out to already have capable youth and women’s wings. The project stopped.

The quality of the context analysis in the design of political assistance projects was not always high. Joint visits between PPOs and WFD as part of integrated programme led to higher quality and broader analyses, drawing on independent experts. For example, the joint scoping mission for the design of the Ghana Integrated Programme produced a Political Economy Assessment, which carefully analysed the context.

**Effectiveness and efficiency**

Contextual factors influenced WFD effectiveness. Case study projects were delivered in countries where political systems were mostly stable and allowed political parties to operate with few constraints. MENA, a region with restrictions on political and civic activities, has been the most challenging. The SNP has chosen to operate through a network of women parliamentarians with whom it can engage more easily. Clientelism and the patronage culture that exist in many partner political parties have been a challenge for all projects (e.g. influencing who benefits from UK support). UK political developments have also had a significant influence on the overall WFD party assistance portfolio; the 2015 elections changed the allocation of funding between the third parties (the Lib Dems saw their budget reduced while the SNP’s increased).
In terms of collaborations, the relationship between PPOs and WFD’s core staff has clearly been improving since 2015, with demonstrable benefits (such as sharing information on the different costs of external experts used by PPOs). However, it is an ongoing process. Political competition in the UK seems to translate into competition in overseas projects and can limit collaboration between PPOs and with WFD. UK government officials are not always well informed nor engaged in PPOs projects, even though the case studies show how FCO posts or DFID advisers can improve PPOs projects (e.g. by facilitating contacts with relevant stakeholders in Argentina). While some PPOs coordinate projects with other democracy assistance organisations, there are opportunities for more systematic collaboration.

Looking at management systems, WFD has most influence at the design stage of PPOs projects but less influence during project implementation. SharePoint, WFD’s main programme management tool, is not fully functional.

WFD’s political party assistance faces reputational, governance, accountability and transparency risks, which are heightened at a time of ever greater aid scrutiny in the UK. Ideological sister-party support is seen by some sections of the public and aid community as crossing the line and interfering in the domestic affairs of countries. WFD is already managing this risk through more multi-party work which can have more visible results and can be less controversial. There is also limited public accountability for PPOs work, as ultimately UK political parties report mostly to themselves through the WFD Board. There is little information in the public domain.

WFD’s project management system is multi-layered and does not facilitate M&E. At the same time, PPOs do not appear to be delivering the M&E proposed in their project plans. There seems to be very little use of independent monitoring, which would provide more credible evidence. Lesson learning is constrained by poor internal communication, and there is also usually a limited use of academic and other evidence to justify the approach used in a project.

The greatest structural challenge from a value for money perspective is that WFD financial resources for political party assistance are not allocated on a performance basis. Budgets are dependent on UK elections, rather than in-country needs or opportunities to achieve results, as would be the case for other grant-making democracy assistance.

**Impact and sustainability**

Some projects are a continuation of ongoing partnerships and are therefore more likely to show results, for example assistance to the Ghana parliament. Overall, the projects’ expected changes were often realised only to a limited extent. This was at times because objectives were too ambitious. Training-based projects delivered their outputs but could not always demonstrate progress towards their outcomes. For example, in Ghana both the Conservatives and Labour trained women candidates ahead of the 2016 elections but there is little indication that women performed better in 2016 than in previous elections. When objectives were realistic, targeted and well tracked, projects could make good progress towards their outputs and outcomes. For example, the DA provided evidence of how it was developing a new cadre of active
young politicians. We could find no evidence of impact (or potential impact) at the level of an entire political system.

In Ghana and South Africa, some outputs appeared sustainable as there was evidence some practices had changed and there were incentives to sustain those changes. However, networks and organisations fully dependent on PPOs in MENA, the Western Balkans and Africa did not appear sustainable and are unlikely be so the next ten years.

Comparing approaches

The evaluation examined the different forms of technical cooperation and approaches to party assistance used by PPOs.

Stakeholders provided positive individual feedback on their participation in study tours to the UK. However, across the board, it was hard to trace individual or organisational effects of UK study tours or European conferences.

One of the main comparative advantages and perceived resources of PPOs is that they can draw on UK party politicians, staff or other party experts in order to provide peer-to-peer support. This assistance was appreciated and could lead to interesting two-way exchanges (e.g. learn from Argentina’s ruling party digital campaign skills). However, the case studies show peer-to-peer support could only contribute to small improvements in parties’ capacities. Supply is very limited, activities are small-scale and quality is not always guaranteed. Continuity over time is important to build trust.

South-South technical expertise or exchanges are particularly appropriate as lessons are learned across contexts with shared characteristics. The DA Young Leaders Programme in South Africa and its cross-Africa support drew on South African expertise tailored to meet well researched needs, not just through standard courses.

PPOs can be very stretched when they directly implement activities in several countries at the same time. Implementers provide extra capacity. For example, the Labour Party funds the meetings of a network of Western Balkans youth leaders, coordinated by the Slovenian Social Democrats, and women leadership trainings by an Africa-wide network. Providing resources for partners to deliver their own activities can be more efficient (e.g. DA leadership programme). However, partners need to demonstrate why external UK funding is required. Embedded experts can add value, such as in the Ghana parliament integrated programme, which funds in-country implementing staff, who can build relationships and calibrate activities.

Across all the approaches used, the sustained commitment of partner organisations, with the incentives and capacity to make use of UK support, is a critical success factor. This requires continuity on the part of both beneficiaries and UK providers.

Sister-party assistance (bilaterally or through networks) is the main approach used by PPOs. The most critical success factor was trust. However, the case studies could not provide concrete examples of how long-term trust was used to help parties overcome particularly challenging issues, such as to improve policy-making or internal democracy. One of the assumptions of the sister-party model is that trust is
based on membership of ideological networks, but we did not find this was a necessary nor sufficient condition for good collaboration in the case studies.

PPOs support networks in very different ways: from being directly involved in the network itself to staying at arms-length and restricting themselves to funding. Networks, whether ideological or thematic, are best considered a means to achieve a wider objective. Otherwise it can be difficult to identify progress with capacity development and an exit strategy for UK funding. Regional networks could in theory deliver benefits through their very existence such as trust-building following violent conflict (such as the SD9 network in the countries of the former Yugoslavia). Networking between established organisations may be more effective: one of the main challenges facing Ra’edat in MENA is that it is a network of individual women politicians, not of organisations. Finally, PPOs and WFD need to reflect on how many different networks they can all sustain.

The reviewed thematic projects focused on women or youth political participation. They can be delivered through sister-party, networks or multi-party projects. They did not generate any unique lessons beyond the ones already covered.

Integrated programmes (combining WFD and PPOs expertise) or multi-party projects (across PPOs) shared a number of benefits. At a substantive level, they could deliver a powerful demonstration effect to show UK politicians collaborating across the political spectrum in contexts where trust was limited (e.g. in Sierra Leone). Multi-party projects can also be less controversial and deliver visible benefits. In terms of processes, they could also improve collaboration between WFD and PPOs. However, integrated programmes do not at present appear to be delivering on their full potential. Some PPOs are naturally evolving towards multi-party projects (SNP, MPO) which WFD could incentivise further.

**WFD’s comparative advantage**

The evaluation has confirmed many of WFD’s strengths in the area of political party assistance, including the value sister-parties place on learning from the UK’s long democratic tradition. However, strategic choices are not always made about when and how to deploy party assistance. The weaknesses of the overall theory of change limit the contribution of UK political parties to democratisation, in particular the assumptions that capacity building (training, networking) and sharing the UK model will contribute to transforming political parties and thereby strengthen democracy. Starting from the realities of these contexts, developing credible strategies of how political change may happen and could be supported, could lead to a more effective use of limited UK political expertise.

Peer organisations and well-informed experts in the field of party assistance considered that the ‘Westminster brand’ was known, associated with the British political system. WFD was still most well-known for its parliamentary assistance, not its party assistance. Its growing research and evidence capacity was appreciated and WFD may therefore play an important knowledge production and information sharing role, regardless of its size.
WFD is becoming a professional democracy organisation which means that the share and influence of its direct political party assistance may be reducing. It faces the same challenge that some of its peers have not fully resolved: how to manage both sister-party and multi-party assistance, associated with different relationships. WFD does not appear to have seriously tried a characteristic of some of its peers: greater geographic concentration of WFD and PPOs party assistance projects which would be a potentially more efficient and effective use of public resources.

**Recommendations**

**R1. Improve strategic focus**: Continue efforts towards closer strategic alignment between the UK government (FCO and DFID), WFD and individual PPOs. For example, improve geographic criteria for political party assistance.

**R2. Manage risks**: Manage differently some of the corporate risks associated with political party assistance, with more explicit criteria to select sister-parties to manage reputational risks; deeper collaboration between WFD and PPOs on the effective monitoring of projects to manage governance risks; and better stories of what UK party assistance is achieving to manage accountability and transparency.

**R3. Develop more realistic interventions**: Improve the methodology for context analysis and needs assessments. Collaborate on an overall TOC for political party assistance for the next phase of FCO-DFID funding. This would provide the evidence base to test or challenge some of the assumptions made in current projects.

**R4. Deepen internal collaborations**: WFD and PPOs should continue their efforts at improved collaboration, coordination and communication, including in-country collaboration (focusing on fewer countries to have more significant impacts overall); training for PPOs staff; and an improved SharePoint programme management tool.

**R5. Continue to improve monitoring, evaluation and learning**: Undertake quality and proportionate M&E of all PPOs projects. Simplify the WFD reporting format. Facilitate internal lesson learning on political party assistance.

**R6. Improve collaboration with government**: UK departments should interest in-country colleagues in PPOs activities and encourage feedback. In turn PPOs should always inform in-country DFID or FCO teams of their planned visits.

**R7. Learn from other political party assistance organisations**: WFD should facilitate collaboration and lesson sharing between peer organisations and all PPOs.

**R8. Obtain greater results from political party assistance projects**: Consider how to reward good project performance to improve value for money (e.g. accessing pooled resources against set criteria rather than pre-allocating all PPOs funds on the basis of UK election results). Test new ways of providing party assistance that combines sister-party, multi-party or integrated elements.
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Political party assistance is a relatively small field of international assistance. It is also under-researched, though recent evaluations are starting to generate more evidence and demonstrate how providers can improve their approaches.\(^1\) This evaluation contributes to this growing knowledge base by assessing the political party assistance provided by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD).

Political parties are found in every democracy, even though they are not given a formal role in many democratic constitutions.\(^2\) Views differ on their appropriate role and functioning. Proponents of ‘direct’ or ‘deliberative’ democracy regard political parties with circumspection, arguing that people should determine public priorities ‘uncontaminated’ by partisan bias. This perspective can be traced back to Rousseau and Madison, who saw political parties as ‘sinister interests’, prone to undermining, perverting, and usurping the will of the majority.\(^3\)

In reality, direct forms of decision-making can only ever play a limited role in determining public policy and governing societies. Certainly, at country-level, “political parties are indispensable to the practical workings of government”\(^4\). Without political parties, modern representative democracy is simply unworkable.\(^5\) Their potential functions can be summarised under five headings: (1) the integration and mobilisation of citizens; (2) the articulation and aggregation of interests; (3) the formulation of public policy; (4) the recruitment of political leaders; and (5) the organisation of parliament and government.\(^6\)

Data from the World Value Survey, a global research project, suggest political parties are among the least trusted public institutions. With few exceptions, confidence in them is lower today than it was 25 years ago, and they are less trusted than the press, the army and the judiciary. In 1993, 42% of the population, in a cross-section of countries, had either ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in political parties. In 2014, this figured had dropped to 27%. By comparison, 63% had confidence in the army, while 52% had confidence in the courts. Trust in opposition parties appears to be particularly low; certainly, in Africa. In 2016-2017, 49% of the

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\(^4\) P. Norris (2005), Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspective (Washington DC: NDI), p. 3.


population in Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe said they trusted the ruling party ‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’, while only 36% said they trusted the opposition parties.\textsuperscript{7}

Table 1 shows that the pattern generally holds also in countries where WFD provides political party assistance at the country or regional level. With a few notable exceptions, such as Argentina, Kyrgyzstan and Morocco, confidence in political parties is lower today than it was a decade ago. It is consistent and substantially lower than confidence in the press, the army and the judiciary.

Table 1: Confidence in political parties in WFD party assistance countries/regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of population with ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in:</th>
<th>Political parties (%)</th>
<th>Press (%)</th>
<th>Army (%)</th>
<th>Courts (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The figures represent the share of the population with ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in political parties, the media and the army. Some WFD countries are missing, as the World Value Survey does not cover all countries. Instead we have included countries that may have comparative interest as they are in regions where WFD provides party assistance.

\textsuperscript{7} Data from the Afrobarometer. Part of the variation is probably caused by social desirability bias; people who are reluctant to share their views of the government and the ruling party.
1.2 Purpose of evaluation

The aim of this evaluation is to assess the processes and outcomes of WFD’s political party assistance.

WFD is the main source of UK expertise for political party and parliamentary assistance abroad. It was founded in 1992 when UK parties started providing direct assistance to their sister-parties in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 2009, WFD moved from being a grant-giving organisation to starting to implement its own programmes. It now has an annual budget of £10 million.

WFD’s vision is the universal establishment of legitimate and effective multi-party, representative democracy. Its mission is to support inclusive and effective governance that strengthens policy-making, accountability, representation and citizens participation.

The period covered by the evaluation is 2015-2018, during which WFD received a core grant from the UK government. Its strategic objectives were to “support developing and transition countries in establishing or strengthening inclusive and effective democratic governance for their citizens by delivering political party, parliamentary and integrated (parties in parliament) programmes” as well as “to contribute to public knowledge about effective democracy strengthening, including democracy assistance for parliaments and political parties, in developing and transition countries”.8

The focus of the evaluation is to examine the range of approaches adopted by WFD to party assistance, from ideologically-related ‘sister’-parties projects to some of its innovations over the last few years, in particular ‘integrated’ programmes, which aimed to make the most of WFD’s party and parliamentary expertise. It is a learning evaluation, drawing conclusions and recommendations for future programmes.

It is one of three evaluations WFD has commissioned for learning purposes, to inform the preparation of its next core UK government grant.9

1.3 Methodology

The evaluation focuses on a limited number of case studies rather than providing an overview of WFD’s entire party assistance portfolio. The research was undertaken by a team of two evaluators during November 2017-February 2018. It is based on:

- An evaluation matrix prioritising questions in line with the OECD’s evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

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• A theory of change developed for WFD’s overall approach to party assistance, to serve as a basis to evaluate the extent to which anticipated changes are taking place at the individual or organisational levels.
• A review of WFD and Political Party Offices (PPOs) strategies and systems in order to understand the specificities of the 2015-2018 grant cycle (through London-based or Skype/WhatsApp interviews and document review).
• An in-depth case study of WFD’s Ghana Integrated Programme, one of the new approaches promoted under the latest WFD strategy, as well as Conservative and Labour political party assistance activities in Ghana.
• Desk-based research on four other countries or regions where WFD has adopted other approaches: Argentina (with a few in-person interviews), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Africa and the Western Balkans.
• Comparison with other providers of party assistance, to enable WFD to confirm its added value and identify how it could further develop its approach.
• Peer review by Professor Nic Cheeseman, University of Birmingham, currently collaborating with WFD on a wider research project.

The evaluation faced the following challenges:

• Little information is available in the public domain about political party assistance in general and UK assistance in particular. The team had to rely on WFD’s financial and programme management systems, as well as PPOs’ own documentation. Due to PPOs staffing changes and some reluctance to share what may be sensitive information, this resulted in a limited evidence base.
• Political party assistance is best researched through face-to-face interviews with beneficiaries. Because of resource constraints, few such interviews were completed, beyond the Ghana and Argentina case studies. Moreover, beneficiaries were generally identified by WFD and the PPOs. This may have biased the data, if WFD and the PPOs consciously (or unconsciously) chose beneficiaries with more positive views of the projects.
• The evaluation was undertaken during the last 5 months of the core grant; some projects were still underway or recently completed. It could therefore only partially comment on impacts and sustainability.
• WFD is piloting an outcome-mapping approach to help monitor its results. We found little evidence that this approach had been adopted by PPOs at country-level and therefore decided not to use it in the case studies.

1.4 Report outline

The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents how WFD provides party assistance and gives background information on the case studies. Chapter 3 reviews the relevance of WFD’s party assistance, at a strategic level and in the case studies. Chapter 4 examines effectiveness and efficiency, including the systems WFD uses and the quality of the collaborations between PPOs and other stakeholders. Chapter 5 summarises findings on impact and sustainability. Chapter 6 sets out conclusions and lessons learned around WFD’s main approaches to party assistance and from peer organisations providing party assistance. Finally, Chapter 7 sets out recommendations for future WFD programmes.

The list of interviews is at Annex A and documents reviewed is at Annex B.
2. WFD political party assistance

2.1 Overview of WFD political party assistance

WFD is constituted of ‘two wings’. WFD in Artillery Row, London (WFD for short in the rest of this report) manages WFD’s parliamentary, elections, civil society and other assistance and provides management core functions.

*The four PPOs deliver almost the entirety of WFD’s political party assistance.*

PPOs activities cover 22 countries and several regional networks. There were 43 live projects as of November 2017.*

PPOs are relatively small (two to four staff members each in London, plus some project-funded staff). PPO-led programmes currently represent a third of WFD’s core funding from the UK government, and a quarter of WFD’s total budget. (See table 2 below for budget overview).

**Table 2: WFD budgets over the last three financial years.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015-16 actual</th>
<th>2016-17 actual</th>
<th>2017-18 actual*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WFD overall funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO / DFID grants</td>
<td>£5,864,218</td>
<td>£7,720,388</td>
<td>£6,986,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional sources</td>
<td>£931,642</td>
<td>£2,625,899</td>
<td>£3,437,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total WFD</td>
<td>£6,795,860</td>
<td>£10,346,287</td>
<td>£10,424,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PPO funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>£692,232</td>
<td>£1,075,984</td>
<td>£899,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>£972,813</td>
<td>£1,076,074</td>
<td>£958,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td></td>
<td>£199,846</td>
<td>£173,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LibDems</td>
<td>£307,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Party Office</td>
<td>£103,367</td>
<td>£306,986</td>
<td>£278,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>£2,075,812</td>
<td>£2,658,890</td>
<td>£2,309,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated programme PPO admin (from WFD budget)</td>
<td>£85,395</td>
<td>£137,124</td>
<td>£139,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other PPO funding</td>
<td>£21,351</td>
<td>£47,565</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PPO</td>
<td>£2,182,558</td>
<td>£2,843,579</td>
<td>£2,448,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of core funding allocated to PPO</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total funding allocated to PPO</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Data provided by WFD Finance Department, February and May 2018. * subject to audit.

PPOs are either based inside political party headquarters (for the Conservatives and Labour) or in parliament. The largest three parties have their own offices and other parties operate through the Multi-Party Office (MPO). PPOs receive a funding allocation based on electoral results (the modified Short formula). The 2015 general election results have meant that the Liberal Democrats (LibDems) were replaced by the Scottish National Party (SNP) as the third largest party in

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10 The evaluation does not cover political party assistance outside the core grant managed by WFD.
12 See www.briefing-papers/SN01663/short-money.
Westminster. As a result, the SNP now has a separate PPO and the LibDems’ projects are managed through the MPO.

PPOs have a great deal of independence from WFD. They set their own strategies, deliver their projects directly or through implementers, and monitor their results. They have a contractual relationship with WFD to account for the grants they receive. They report within their own party structures and also to the WFD Board (where the majority of Governors represent political parties) but do not have a line management relationship to WFD’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO).

As a Non-Departmental Public Body, WFD is subject to UK government Triennial Reviews of its business model. The 2014-2015 review made a number of substantive recommendations to improve ways of working between PPOs and the rest of WFD. While not all were agreed by WFD, some of the main expected shifts included:

- Clearer strategic direction from government and information sharing across WFD’s constituent parts (including the UK government, WFD and PPOs).
- Greater alignment between WFD, PPOs, UK government priorities and beneficiaries needs.
- A more integrated organisation, able to leverage and link the contribution of PPOs to wider democracy objectives.
- Improving programme impact, including by addressing the limited availability of MPs and under-skilled staff on party assistance in WFD headquarters.
- New funding structure to incentivise more collaboration between WFD and PPOs on multi-party work and giving more visibility and impact to sister-party assistance.

2.2 Case studies overview

WFD selected Ghana as the in-depth case study with field work for this evaluation to review its new integrated approach, which combines WFD parliamentary assistance with political party assistance. A secondary focus of the visit was the Conservative and Labour Party assistance to their sister-parties. Additional desk-based case studies were selected using the ‘diverse case method’, based on the following six criteria:

1. **Across all four PPOs**: Conservative, Labour, SNP, MPO (including the LibDems as the previous third party and Plaid Cymru, a smaller party).
2. **Across all main approaches to political party assistance**: beyond the integrated approach in Ghana, the sample includes sister-party work (which may cover policy, organisational development, campaigns/elections and inclusion of women and youth) and networks (thematic, and either multi-party or sister-party networks).
3. **Across all main regions** – Africa, Western Balkans (where there is the longest WFD presence), Latin America and MENA, but not Asia where there are few political party assistance projects. Argentina was selected for Latin America given the possibility of in-person interviews.
4. **Across both long- and short-running programmes** – half of the activities would have been ongoing for 10 years or more (as they are likely to have
developed more solid relationships and evidence base); and half only would be new from this funding cycle (with enough activities to evaluate at least processes if not results).

5. **Across programmes with both smaller and larger budgets** – at least half with larger budgets, as they are more likely to demonstrate results, and the rest with small budgets more typical of PPO projects.

6. **Across all WFD strategic objectives**: policy, accountability, representation and participation.

The diverse case method prevents us from making any claims of representativeness. If there are more short- than long-running programmes in WFD’s portfolio, and we choose an equal number of each, the resulting sample will not be representative. That being said, Seawright and Gerring argue that “the diverse case method probably has stronger claims to representativeness than any other small-N sample”. ¹³

Table 3: case studies summaries and approaches used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Scoping visit and Capturing and Strengthening the Politico-institutional Transition</td>
<td>Sister-party</td>
<td>Policy Citizen Participation</td>
<td>Scoping: Nov-Dec 2016 Project: March-Nov 2017 New project</td>
<td>Total for both £32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaid - MPO</td>
<td>Party Strengthening - Chubut Somos Todos</td>
<td>Sister-party</td>
<td>Representation Citizen Participation</td>
<td>August 2016-March 2018 New project</td>
<td>£17,395</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaid - MPO</td>
<td>Violence Against Women in Politics in Wales and Argentina</td>
<td>Thematic (women) multi-party</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>November 2017 - March 2018 New project</td>
<td>£18,590</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>WFD Africa</td>
<td>Ghana Integrated Programme</td>
<td>Parties in parliament integrated programme</td>
<td>Policy Accountability</td>
<td>October 2015-March 2021 New approach</td>
<td>£491,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Support to the National Democratic Congress and the Convention People’s Party through the Women’s Academy for Africa</td>
<td>Thematic (women) sister-party network</td>
<td>Representation Citizen Participation</td>
<td>January 2015-December 2017 Workshops in Ghana in 2016 and 2017 Continuation</td>
<td>Total for WAFA: Approximately £240,000 For Ghana £24,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MENA</th>
<th>Scottish National Party</th>
<th>MENA Arab Women's Parliamentarians Network - Ra'edat</th>
<th>Multi-party thematic (women) network</th>
<th>Representation Citizens Participation</th>
<th>August 2016 to March 2018 New project</th>
<th>£150,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>MPO - LibDems</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance Young Leaders Programme and Cross-Africa Youth Development</td>
<td>Thematic (youth) sister-party and regional network</td>
<td>Citizens Participation Accountability</td>
<td>August 2016 to March 2019 Continuation</td>
<td>£70,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>SD9 as component of Western Balkans Strengthening the Social Democratic Left</td>
<td>Sister-party thematic (youth) network</td>
<td>Policy Representation</td>
<td>July 2014 to July 2017 Continuation</td>
<td>£271,210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Information taken from PPOs project plans approved by WFD and shared with the evaluation team (which may not be up to date). Actual spend data not included as not available for all projects.

**Argentina: Conservative Party and Plaid**

The case study examined four projects of two UK parties. The focus was how PPOs develop new partnerships and how these evolve through small-scale projects.

**Conservative Party and Argentina’s Republican Proposal (PRO).** This was a new sister-party partnership through a scoping visit and a short-term project to support the political and institutional transition in Argentina, with a combined budget of £32,000. The PRO was founded in 2005 as an alliance ahead of legislative elections and in 2010 as a party. It won the 2015 Presidential elections as part of the Cambiemos (Let’s change) coalition. The 2016 Conservative Party scoping visit was combined with an assessment by the International Democrat Union (the centre right, conservative international network) of the PRO’s suitability to join it. The follow-on nine-month project established a new sister-party relationship, including through the preparation of a ‘Stories of Change’ publication as a new tool to survey opinions and communicate to the public; a training of vote count staff; and a visit of Conservative Party staff to observe the 2017 Argentina mid-term elections. PRO officials also attended inwards visits to the UK (such as to observe the 2016 elections or 2017 Party Conference).

**Plaid Cymru, Chubut Somos Todos and Violence against Women in Politics.** This case study illustrates the evolution from a traditional sister-party approach to a more innovative multi-party global project. About 10% of Argentina’s Chubut province in Patagonia are of Welsh descent and Wales has a number of activities to maintain language links. A Plaid scoping visit in 2016 decided to establish a sister-relationship with the provincial ruling party, Chubut Somos Todos. During a 2017 follow-up visit, the Plaid delegation concluded that a partnership was not suitable and instead decided to focus on an area of shared interest with some Argentine politicians: violence against women in politics. A seminar was held in Buenos Aires in November 2017 in collaboration with the British Embassy and an international conference was held in the UK in March 2018, supported not just by Plaid but also
with Conservative Party co-funding and all the other UK parties receiving WFD funds contributing. Both projects were initially under £20,000.

**Ghana: Integrated programme, Conservative and Labour**

The case study took a closer look at UK political party assistance in Ghana between 2015 and 2017, including the Ghana Integrated Programme (GIP); the Conservative Party’s support to the New Patriotic Party (NPP), provided under the Ghana NPP and the Ghana NPP Policy Forum projects; and the Women’s Academy for West Africa (WAFA) National Workshops project, funded by the Labour Party.

**Ghana Integrated Programme.** The GIP builds on a parliamentary development programme dating back to 2011, delivered by the WFD office in London and funded by the UK High Commission in Accra. In July 2015, a joint scoping mission was deployed to Ghana, including WFD representatives and representatives of UK political parties. The GIP was launched in November 2015 with a budget of £491,000. The overall aim is to "make the policy making and oversight process of the parliament of Ghana and its political parties more transparent, evidence-based, and rigorous". The programme is delivered by the WFD office in Accra, situated inside parliament, in collaboration with the parliamentary leadership and the research and information departments: Research, Library, ICT, Hansard, and Committees.

**Conservative Party’s support to the New Patriotic Party.** The Ghana NPP Project, launched in March 2016 with an initial budget of £159,340, built on the Conservative Party’s long-standing relationship with the NPP, dating back to 1995. Its aim is to strengthen the NPP in the run-up to the 2016 elections “through improved and increased representation of marginalised groups, greater professionalism in developing campaign activities and stronger engagement with the media”. Activities included training of professional staff, women candidates and youth at local level. The project culminated with the election of Nana Akufo-Addo as President in December 2016. Discussions about a continuation of the support started in February 2017. In November 2017, the Ghana NPP Policy Forum Project was launched with an initial budget of £90,4510. Its aim is to support the NPP in setting up internal policy groups that will emulate the structure of the Conservative Policy Forum and will start developing policy papers discussed at local and national levels.

**Labour - Women’s Academy for Africa National Workshops project.** The project was launched in January 2015 with an initial budget of approximately £240,000. It builds on previous Labour Party support to WAFA, dating back to 2011. The aim of the project is to “train and support […] women from WAFA member parties so that they have the motivation and ability to seek office in their party and in local, regional, or national assemblies and parliaments”. In Ghana, four activities were implemented: two workshops for NDC and CPP women candidates in August 2016 and another two in July 2017. The workshops covered five topics: the trainer’s role, assertiveness, leadership, lobbying and networking, media campaign techniques, and campaign strategy. In total, around 80 women received the same training package during the evaluation period.
MENA: Scottish National Party - Ra’edat, the Arab Women Parliamentarians Network for Equality

This network aims to increase women’s political participation in the region. It was launched with the support of UN Women in May 2015. In 2016, the SNP became its sole donor. It currently has 200 members in 14 Arab countries, both current or former women MPs across different parties. The network’s original objective was to unite efforts to achieve parity in decision-making positions in the Arab states region by 2030. It initially aimed to draft a model legislation for parliamentary, municipal and local council elections that provides for the representation of women by at least 30% in elected positions. The SNP is helping the policy and organisational development of the network, including funding a one-person secretariat, helping registration as an NGO, developing a database of members, conducting trainings, and a study tour to Scotland and Westminster in 2017. It is an example of a thematic, multi-party network approach, with an initial budget of £150,000 over two years.

South Africa: Liberal Democrats - Democratic Alliance Young Leaders programme

This three-year, £70,000 programme is the continuation of long-standing partnership between the LibDems and the Democratic Alliance (DA). It is an example of a sister-party thematic approach which is now managed through the MPO. It has two components: in South Africa, the DA trains up to 25 young leaders a year (the LibDems fund one out of five Young Leaders retreats in South Africa, as well as the participation of liberal experts). The programme also has an international component: it funds the participation of the top DA Young Leaders graduates to a liberal parties’ conference in Europe as well as the development of the African Young Liberals, the youth wing of the African Liberal Network (ALN).

Western Balkans: Labour Party - Social Democrat (SD9) network

As part of its long-standing support for the Social Democratic (SD) left in the Western Balkans, the Labour Party has resumed its assistance to this network of political youth organisations from across the former Yugoslavia. The four-year £270,000 programme is managed by a Slovenia-based foundation associated with Slovenia’s SD party. It has re-established the network (with new statutes, elections, congresses and their preparatory meetings) and organises a number of conferences (on women, tackling youth unemployment or nationalism) as well as campaigns (e.g. in support of Macedonia at a time of crisis or on violence against women).

3. Relevance

This section analyses the strategic relevance of WFD’s political party assistance during 2015-2018, in terms of its theory of change (TOC); overall PPOs objectives; and alignment with WFD and with their funders, FCO and DFID.

3.1 Theory of Change

Based on PPOs strategy documents, the evaluation team has developed a generic TOC to identify the logic and assumptions behind PPOs strategies and projects (see Diagram 1). In summary, WFD supports democratisation mostly by sharing experiences from the UK political system (with some south-south exchanges). PPOs provide capacity building support, in particular training and peer support, from UK politicians and party staff which is meant to generate improved individual skills and the organisational development of separate parties. Political party networks are meant to support both individual and organisational objectives. Together, stronger, more accountable, representative and policy-based parties are assumed to offer more choice to citizens in elections. This should contribute to multi-party democracy.

The TOC is based on a number of assumptions (summarised in box 1, drawn from PPOs own strategies unless noted as ‘implicit’): belief in the value of training, peer-to-peer support and networks to develop capacities (input level); that political parties will change in response to the training or technical advice received which will make them more relevant to their electorate (outputs/outcomes); and that the political system will allow more capable parties to operate (system-wide level).

There is limited academic evidence to support the assumptions in the TOC. First, capacity building through training or networking may not lead to better skilled staff or improved policy-making, as they rarely address the incentives that drive the behaviour of politicians or citizens (such as vote-buying or clientelism). This is one of the main messages of the comparative politics and political economy literature.15 Other support, such as facilitating local coalition-building, may be more effective and may not require UK technical expertise.16

Second, the UK political system may not be the most relevant for many democratisation contexts. The Westminster parliamentary system is far removed from Presidential systems which are found in newer democracies, where parliaments are much weaker and there is no ‘official’ opposition. In particular in Africa, political parties often do not have any real ideological basis and the political space is often


only partially free. Opposition parties are allowed to compete, but ruling parties exploit the advantages of incumbency and rig the elections in their favour. Regardless, political parties do not necessarily respond to the preferences of the electorate. Particularly, when party leaders are unrestricted, they tend to drift away from the median voter to the position that is closest to their own preferences.17

Finally, the TOC pays less attention to system-wide factors affecting all parties that could be addressed in order to ensure functioning multi-party democracies in the countries WFD assists (for example constraints on free and fair elections or cultural norms and values limiting women and youth political participation).

In summary, while the generic TOC provides a good starting point, it is important to carefully assess the underlying assumptions when applied to a specific context. Capacity building support for political parties does not always contribute to democracy and is not necessarily the best way to promote democratisation.

Box 1: assumptions made in the TOC

Peer-to-peer assumptions
- Trust has to be built before peer support or technical expertise can be useful
- Capacity-building activities are needed to build trust and later engage in more sensitive activities, such as policy development or internal party democratisation (implicit)
- Discussing real challenges with peer and experts is the best way to learn
- UK experts are available and will commit to a project over time
- Role models are available from UK, region or partner countries
- Parties learn better from ideologically similar parties than through multi-party processes (implicit)
- Parties can learn from the UK regardless of differences in political systems (parliamentary vs presidential) or levels of development (implicit)

Network assumptions
- Ideologically-similar parties can better learn / share experiences than across ideological lines (implicit for Conservative, Labour and LibDem ideological networks)
- Women share common challenges; Youth share common challenges
- Networks can generate support and solutions

Project assumptions
- Parties and their leadership have the will to change and will take action following assistance
- Participants will share lessons learned with their parties
- Parties will involve and not bypass individuals trained / empowered by the projects
- Parties will create room for new leaders

Political system assumptions
- Political space is free, and parties can compete
- Sisterparties are relevant actors, remain intact / do not split over time
- Parties govern and function according to their manifestos / policies
- Parties need to offer practical solutions to engage with citizens
- Parties’ capacities (non-financial means) limit their ability to compete
- Incumbents advantage and access to state resources limit competition

Diagram 1: Theory of Change for WFD’s political party assistance.
3.2 PPOs strategies

The evaluation reviewed the 2016-2020 strategies for WFD’s new integrated programme approach and for the five PPOs: Conservative, Labour and MPO as well as for the two third parties during the period: LibDems and SNP. Strategies set out visions for 2020, as well as programme outcomes, outputs, ways of working and geographic focus. (See Table 4).

**Strategies offer different but consistent long-term visions**, which can be summarised as support for multi-party democracy constituted by representative, inclusive and accountable parties competing on a more level playing field. PPOs programme outcomes put forward a similar focus on their sister-parties and international networks. Outputs usually cover sister-parties’ organisational development, policy-making, campaigning, and the participation of women, youth and other marginalised groups.

The main difference between PPOs strategies are statements of parties’ ideological values and the policy or partnership priorities that derive from these (such as a focus on religious freedom and cultural minorities for the Conservatives, Trade Union partnerships for Labour or human rights as the LibDems’ third priority). Membership of ideological networks differentiate the Conservatives, Labour and LibDems from the other parties (respectively centre-right, socialist and liberal international or regional networks).

The MPO and SNP both highlight their comparative regional experiences (such as advice on regional decision-making or devolution; sharing lessons from Northern Ireland on conflict and reconciliation; or SNP experience with mass political participation in the wake of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum). The MPO focuses on ensuring “smaller parties, regional and minority interests are fairly represented within the national political” (presumably because its member parties are smaller by virtue of WFD funding criteria).

Across the strategies, there are no clear geographic or exit criteria. The spread of activities reflects the original WFD focus on the Balkans, with an extension into sub-Saharan Africa and MENA following the Arab Spring. There are relatively fewer Latin American, Caribbean or Asian projects. The SNP follows the Scottish Executive priorities, including historical link with Malawi and Zambia while Plaid attempted to prioritise Welsh-speaking communities in Argentina. For a brief period, the Conservative Party attempted to give priority to countries with large diasporas in the UK (such as Nigeria, India or Pakistan). However, it was difficult to identify sister-parties requiring support and this prioritisation was abandoned. Overall, geographic criteria were not obvious and there was no discussion of how to decide to end a project partnership funded by WFD and move to other forms of collaboration (in other words, an exit strategy for funding).

Table 4: Summary of long term vision statements from PPOs Strategies (2016-2020)

| Conservatives | Establish and strengthen the rule of law. A better understanding of the role of political parties in emerging democracies. Improved democracy, increased diversity with the party and less corruption and nepotism. More skilled and better |
equipped party professionals to spread their message, develop policy platforms and reach out to voters.

**Labour**  
Well-functioning and accountable political parties in transitional democracies driven by values of fairness, equality and social justice and providing choice to the electorate and citizens. Issue based policies and programmes. Women playing an active role in politics. Young people participate. Strengthened regional cooperation. Meeting the direct needs of sister-parties.

**LibDems**  
An expansion of international multi-party democracy in which inclusive and representative liberal parties have the capacity to promote human rights and opportunity for everyone.

**MPO**  
Enhance legitimate and effective multi-party democracy. Ensure that smaller parties, regional and minority interests are fairly represented within the national political system. Enhance international political party networks.

**SNP**  
Enable enhanced policy development by working with citizens, other social democratic parties and bodies, using examples from devolved experiences in Scotland. Citizens will become more engaged in the features of multi-party representative democracy.

**Integrated programmes**  
Together, the improvement of parliaments and parties […] should enhance their capacity, legitimacy, and influence, making them more effective institutions increasingly able to deliver good governance, reduce corruption, satisfy a wider range of citizen needs, protect human rights, encourage peaceful deliberation of public policy, and strengthen the democratic culture of their societies.

### 3.3 Alignment between PPOs and WFD

PPOs prioritise strengthening their sister-parties and ideological networks. In contrast, WFD has a broader interest in a country’s overall democratic governance. However, interviews and document review show that since 2015 there have been efforts to improve strategic coherence between PPOs and WFD.

**All PPOs are committed to WFD’s overarching objective of multi-party democracy.** PPOs’ 2016-2020 and annual strategies set out how they will contribute to WFD’s four core strategic outcomes, with each PPO setting out annual key progress markers against these outcomes. The four strategic outcomes are broad enough to enable PPOs to capture the range of objectives and activities set out in their PPOs strategies. A complete coding of the PPOs projects against the outcomes would require more detailed data. However, our analysis suggests more resources are allocated towards representation and citizen participation. We found only five projects with a substantial policy component, and none with an explicit accountability component, which are both more challenging objectives for party assistance.

#### Table 5: WFD 2015-2020 Strategic Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Representation</th>
<th>Citizen participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The extent to which public policies are formulated, drafted, scrutinised by parliaments or political parties based on evidence and an open, transparent and consultative process.</td>
<td>The extent to which parliaments or political parties hold other government institutions or actors to account or enhance their own accountability to their constituents and stakeholders.</td>
<td>The extent to which parliaments or parries represent effectively their specific constituencies and are representative of the interests and needs of their citizens as a whole.</td>
<td>The extent to which citizens, particularly women, youth or other marginalised groups, have greater access to and a more active role in parliamentary or political processes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The main strategic effort at alignment since 2015 has been the development of ‘integrated programmes’ that bring together political party and parliamentary assistance. These are managed by WFD and involve PPOs to different degrees. Party strategies show varying support for this new approach, with one committing “to develop and deliver these where we think they can give added value” – lukewarm support. The integrated approach is evaluated through the Ghana case study and interviews with PPOs and WFD staff (see Chapter 6).

The 2017-22 Strategic Framework continues WFD’s aspiration to offer more than sister-party and international party network support through PPOs. It explicitly proposed to use “Multi-party, non-partisan models to improve the wider political system, stimulate multi-party competition based on policies rather than identity or patronage, and encourage reform on difficult issues such as campaign finance and reform of political party laws. This could include working with those unlikely to receive sister party support [...] or want to tap into UK skills even if ideological positions do not coincide”.

During 2015-2018, WFD developed some capacity to work in such a way beyond integrated programmes. This included the creation of a Senior Gender and Politics post and seeking funding beyond the core UK government grant for WFD multi-party projects which did not significantly involve PPOs. Some PPOs themselves have been moving into multi-party work, in particular the MPO and SNP. The SNP MENA network and Plaid Argentina case studies illustrate this strategic shift (see box 2).

**Box 2: SNP strategic choices**

The SNP did particularly well in the 2015 UK general elections, winning 56 out of the 59 Scottish seats and 50% of the popular vote, thus becoming the UK’s third party in Westminster. As a result, it became entitled to a greater WFD budget and stand-alone office in 2016. Given that Labour had already developed partnerships with centre-left parties and networks, the SNP had fewer options for sister-party relationships beyond those developed under the MPO and in line with Scottish government priorities (such as Malawi and Zambia). It decided to avoid a focus on nationalist or independentist parties as these could indirectly lead to violent conflict. Instead, it has prioritised cross-party work which aligns with its foreign policy objectives, for example in the Middle East, and domestic policy, such as on gender representation. The MENA women’s parliamentarians network is a good match against both and absorbs almost half the SNP’s WFD budget.

### 3.4 Alignment with UK government priorities

Given PPOs relative independence, there is a risk of non-alignment with overall UK priorities. The UK government, through FCO and DFID grants to WFD, fund PPOs. PPOs are not required to explicit set out how they will contribute to specific DFID or FCO global, regional, country or thematic objectives. These are assumed to be cascaded through the WFD overall strategy and core grant.

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18 Examples include WFD collaborating with NDI in delivering multi-party candidates training in Lebanon or participating in IRI’s Leadership Training School in Myanmar.
Interviews confirmed that FCO values and is comfortable with political party assistance. As a Non-Departmental Public Body, WFD is accountable to the Foreign Secretary; that is to say an arms-length body that reports to the FCO. British diplomats regularly engage with overseas political parties and parliamentarians. They value peer-to-peer relationships to further foreign policy objectives, such as seeking new trade partnerships or strengthening the Commonwealth.

By contrast, DFID only recently started to fund PPOs activities through the 2015 core grant (it was excluded from the DFID share of the 2012 grant). DFID supports democratic governance objectives in most of its partner countries, through civil society, elections and parliamentary assistance. There is a high-level strategic alignment in terms of open, inclusive and accountable governance. During the grant period, DFID’s policy team assisted country offices that manage democratic governance programmes and prepared a guide on assistance to parties and parliaments. However, interviews showed that DFID remains less comfortable with ideological sister-party assistance than, for example, programmes supporting objectives such as political participation for marginalised groups across political parties. Beyond Africa and MENA, there is also limited overlap between DFID’s priority countries, among the world’s poorest, and some PPOs partner countries.

Strategic alignment can be further improved. WFD strategy and project plan templates ask PPOs to provide a consultation record, including feedback from FCO and DFID. Reviewed forms showed this was not done or recorded on a systematic basis. When consultations did take place, they could clearly improve the relevance and quality of a project during design or implementation (see box 3). In reverse, a lack of consultation meant that some sister-party activities might not be in line with DFID or FCO objectives.

Box 3: Benefit of collaboration between UK parties and Embassies

The February 2017 Plaid Cymru delegation to Argentina met with the British Embassy which organised a series of additional meetings. As Plaid concluded its provincial sister-party partnership was no longer appropriate, it decided to collaborate with the Embassy on a new project on Violence Against Women in Politics. A senior delegation returned to participate in seminars in Buenos Aires in November 2017. Given the global relevance of the theme, the planned small-scale return Argentine visit to the UK has been transformed into an international conference in the UK in March 2018 with 54 speakers from over 20 countries. All UK parties receiving WFD funding participated, as well as three others: Sinn Fein, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and the Women's Equality Party.

3.5 Projects relevance

The reviewed projects tended to be relevant. They were more relevant when they clearly targeted the specific needs of parliaments or of the sister-party identified over time as a result of a longer partnership (e.g. Ghana NPP and parliamentary projects were assessed as the most relevant in our sample). They were also relevant when they responded to a demand for a partnership (SD9, Ra’edat, PRO) or addressed

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the need for greater women or youth participation in politics (WFA, DA). Some objectives, if realised, could eventually have an effect on the wider political system (e.g. Ra'edat’s ambitious goal toward greater parity of women in decision-making position in the Arab region).

**Parties are considering a range of new approaches to ensure their activities are demand-led.** The Conservative Party is for example using Memoranda of Understanding as a condition of support, to ensure stakeholders’ feedback in the design of projects (tested in the Caribbean and Southern African networks).

**In general projects were aligned with their PPO and WFD strategies, as these are broad frameworks.** Some were particularly good matches, with Scottish Executive or FCO priorities for a region or DFID-FCO promotion of women’s political participation. More systematic engagement with FCO and DFID at the stage of project selection would be beneficial to ensure strategic alignment of the entire PPOs portfolio, including on a geographic basis.

**Projects were somewhat less relevant when they focused too quickly on sister-parties in a supply-driven way or without considering the shortcomings of the political system** as a whole beyond the need to identify a sister-party (see Plaid experience in box 4). PPOs are not incentivised to consider alternative approaches beyond sister-party or network assistance to address the challenges the design processes may identify (e.g. opportunities for a multi-party thematic approach or targeting system-wide issues such as party finance or electoral reform).

**The quality of context analysis was not always high.** PPOs present a political context analysis as part of their project proposal. These tend to be brief and focus on the sister-party or organisations, formal political system and past PPO support. A few proposals did not provide sufficient detail to assess the context or the country-specific challenges. Not all PPOs shared their analysis with the evaluation team.

**PPOs undertake scoping visits when they initiate new programmes which offer opportunities for a deeper assessment.** PPOs have developed their own political assessment tools (e.g. LibDem partner identification check list, needs assessment and political ideology barometer). Reviewed scoping reports showed the focus tends to remain narrow - on the proposed sister-party rather than on the wider party system or wider challenges faced by democracy such as patronage, personality-based politics or corruption. Scoping missions did not always include interviews with opposition parties or independent experts to challenge PPOs views (for example to understand the relevance of a party in a wider context or access informal information). The evaluation only identified one visit report which led to the closure of a project in Argentina. Further analysis by Plaid concluded that Chubut Somos Todos, its new sister-party, did not require the proposed assistance, as it already had well-developed youth and women branches.

**By contrast, the design of integrated programmes creates opportunities for a broader and higher quality analysis.** WFD has been developing a broader political economy analysis approach. PPOs do not appear aware or trained in the approach, which seems to be a missed opportunity to improve the quality of their analysis.
Box 4: Broader assessments can lead to more relevant projects

**Ghana:** WFD fielded a joint scoping mission for the design of the Ghana Integrated Programme, which included representatives of the PPOs and independent experts. One of the outputs of the mission was a Political Economy Assessment, which carefully analyses the context, including the formal and informal rules of parliament and the political parties; the incentives facing MPs, parliamentary candidates, and other politicians; public perceptions of parliament and political parties, etc. The assessment draws on consultations with key stakeholders and some analysis of quantitative data, including the Afrobarometer and different democracy indices.

**Argentina:** The Plaid Chubut assessment involved three assessors: from Plaid, the MPO and an Argentine expert. However, it was not deep enough to identify that the proposed activities with Chubut Somos Todos were not appropriate given the party’s capacities. It was focused on the Chubut parties and on selecting a partner amongst three options. A wider assessment, not starting from the objective of establishing a sister-party relationship in a province, might have led to a more innovative project from the start.
4. Effectiveness and efficiency

4.1 Contextual factors

Contextual factors (such as the political context or unexpected events which are beyond the direct control of PPOs or WFD) have influenced project performance.

Projects were delivered in countries where political systems were mostly stable and allowed political parties to operate with few constraints. In almost all the case study countries, parties can function with few restrictions and offer a choice to the electorate. Beyond MENA, the case study sample did not include extremely fragile or authoritarian regimes which would have constrained party activities.

MENA, a region with restrictions on political and civic activities, has been the most challenging context. The SNP project does not directly support political parties, but instead women parliamentarians. Across the region, it has become harder to register NGOs with international funding which was one of the contextual challenges faced by the Ra’edat Arab network. Political instability in Lebanon during 2017, the MENA country identified as the most suitable to register a multi-country NGO, further delayed its registration status.

Clientelism and the patronage culture that exist in many political parties have been a challenge. In most projects, we saw examples of participants who were chosen not because of their knowledge and experience, or because of their party position, but as a reward for their loyalty to the party leadership. In some cases, this completely undermined the activities. PPOs have put in place selection criteria to ensure the right participants take part in activities, but these cannot always be implemented. PPOs may not have the knowledge or influence to manage this.

UK political developments have had a significant influence on the overall WFD party assistance portfolio and the capacity of PPOs (see box 5). For example, the 2015 UK general elections resulted in a change in funding, which most affected the LibDems and the SNP. The LibDems undertook a process of project assessments and closures, and as result developed a reduced portfolio managed by the MPO. Staff expertise was lost as the LibDems’ office closed. In contrast, the SNP had to review their portfolio and develop a strategy to scale up their interventions. Similarly, the 2016 referendum and 2017 general elections also drew attention away from the programmes. Some PPOs whose staff are co-funded by parties (e.g. for a period the Conservatives) or the collaborators PPOs rely on for projects would have had to spend less time on international work. In 2017 it was also harder for MPs to travel outside recess as the practice of pairing MPs for votes was not followed.

Resulting changes within UK parties also affected PPOs capacities. The Conservative PPO has had three team leaders over the period with poor handover each time, leading to a loss of institutional memory. Over the last six months of 2017, under a new international director, it has established new ways of working and a new strategic direction. There were delays in hiring a new SNP head of office which also affected the SNP portfolio. This evaluation reviews both their relatively new interventions to assist current teams.
4.2 Quality of collaborations

This section reviews the quality of collaboration, communication and coordination between WFD, PPOs, FCO and DFID. Improvement in these areas was one of the priority recommendations of the 2014-15 Triennial Review.

WFD and PPOs

WFD’s model is unique in that PPOs are based inside political parties. While this means that PPOs have direct links to their parties and their networks, it creates some distance from WFD Artillery Row staff and systems, and well as local WFD teams. One of the interviewees described a “double loyalty” to, on the one hand, their party (responsible for their strategy and line management) and, on the other, to WFD (which pays their salary and funds their projects).

The need to improve collaboration between WFD and the PPOs was identified in a number of past reports. The Triennial Review noted a deterioration of the relationship between WFD and PPOs “beyond the professionally acceptable into one of mistrust and animosity”. It also noted the WFD Board’s structural composition was reinforcing this “deep division” and recommended that “the new CEO and the Board look to rebuild interpersonal relationships and to reexamine the mechanisms for the sharing of information, resolving personal and professional differences in an appropriate and constructive manner and engendering a spirit of ‘one team’.” Without continued improvement, WFD would not be able to deliver one of its self-identified comparative advantage: combining party support with its parliamentary and other expertise.

The relationship between PPOs and WFD’s core staff has clearly been improving since 2015. Most PPOs interviews provided positive feedback: “Things are getting better over time”, “excellent relationship”, etc. There has been a great deal of staff turnover in the last few years, which is contributing to a new culture, with changes in WFD senior management as well as several PPOs leadership positions. Some PPOs staff even now see themselves as part of WFD rather than from separate organisations. WFD and the MPO appeared closer, probably due to staff rotations between WFD and the MPO and because the MPO is not based inside one party.

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Box 5: Political developments affecting Ghana programme implementation

The Ghana Integrated Programme was launched in late 2015. The ‘integrated’ element of the programme (supporting parties in parliament through the party caucuses) was initially postponed until after the 2016 Ghana elections. However, in the first part of 2017, when the Ghanaian parliament was ready to start implementation, the British Prime Minister called a UK general election. By December 2017, when the evaluation field work took place, no activities had been realised under this component, two years after the programme had been launched.

21 Ibid.
WFD-PPOs collaboration operates at several levels. PPOs heads have direct relationships with WFD senior managers, including the CEO and programme, research, finance or regional directors. Project officers might have direct relationships with the finance team or regional counterparts. WFD-PPOs now hold quarterly meetings, chaired by WFD’s senior gender and politics adviser. They provide operational updates from WFD and PPOs teams rather than strategic discussions and are seen by all stakeholders as a positive step. Other efforts to improve internal communication include newsletters and blogs.

PPOs and WFD can see the benefits of greater collaboration. For example, a recent internal audit has helped PPOs become aware of the different rates paid to consultants and experts. WFD staff welcome collaboration with PPOs, such as on research, communications, joining scoping or other overseas visits and sharing in-country contacts (see box 6).

Box 6: PPOs collaboration with the WFD Research team

As a result of the FCO-DFID core grant, WFD has been investing in research and M&E, with a view to becoming a thought leader. PPOs reported positive interactions with the M&E team which they found supportive. The M&E team has noted improvements in the quality of PPOs quarterly reports. The MPO has collaborated with the WFD Research team on a number of projects, such as on decentralisation or on violence against women in politics. It has invited the Research team to its evaluation events.

While collaboration is clearly improving, it is an ongoing process. Continued efforts towards better mutual understanding is needed. PPOs feedback included: “WFD staff don’t understand PPOs domestic challenges” while some WFD staff felt PPOs were “secretive” or with “their own agenda”.

Amongst PPOs

The evaluation did not identify regular substantive collaboration among PPOs, even when they work in similar countries, on related thematic issues (e.g. youth or women’s political participation) or using the same tools (training, study tours, technical assistance). Formal interactions are often mediated through WFD (e.g. quarterly meetings). One exception was the MPO’s coordination of cross UK party support for the Plaid-initiated Violence Against Women in Politics research and international conference, which has led to all PPOs being involved in a March 2018 event. The Conservatives funded most of the event and other UK parties used their own budgets to fund participants from their sister-parties.

Political competition in the UK seems to translate into competition in overseas projects, where PPOs might be supporting rival parties which will compete against one another at elections time or in parliaments. However, WFD’s overall objective is to strengthen democratic governance abroad, and this will often require a look across a political system as well as individual parties. A number of PPOs projects rely on more generic support which does not require an ideological slant. At an operational level, it is possible for political party assistance organisations to work in a non-competitive way overseas. WFD’s peer organisations manage multi-party
projects which can include both activities with separate parties or involving several parties (see box 7).

**Box 7: Other approaches to political party assistance**

DemoFinland and the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) are the most similar organisations to WFD as they were founded by political parties which make up their boards. They fund political parties to implement party-to-party activities or collaborate in multi-party projects abroad. DemoFinland only undertakes multi-party projects, while this is half of DIPD’s budget. Their electoral systems’ proportional representation often leads to coalition governments. This means Danish or Finnish parties are used to collaborating, trust one other and often share similar views.

The German political foundations mostly work with sister-parties but in some countries, they have adopted multi-party approaches. In all countries, they meet regularly, including with the German Embassy, to share views and management experiences (how to ensure workshop participation, how to get the most out of study tours etc.).

The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and US National Democratic Institute (NDI) do not work with sister-parties but manage sensitive multi-party activities. NIMD supports both multi-party dialogues (e.g. at times of political crisis) and thematic work (e.g. on women or youth participation across all its partners). NIMD and NDI might undertake similar bilateral organisational development activities with a range of parties across political ideologies.

In all these examples, organisations are able to maintain the trust of their partners despite often working across a political spectrum or in the case of German foundations regularly sharing information with other foundations or embassies.

**Collaboration with FCO and DFID**

**UK government officials are not always well informed nor engaged in PPOs projects.** WFD’s strategy and project approval process requires consultation with FCO and DFID. The document review and interviews indicated this was not always systematic. Day-to-day collaboration with DFID and FCO seems patchy and vary from country to country. This could be due to limited information from WFD/PPOs or to internal challenges within government departments, such as poor internal communication or in-country priorities which do not include political party assistance. The evaluation sought feedback from DFID/FCO on all the case studies but only obtained responses during country visits (Ghana and Argentina), demonstrating limited interest or awareness. By contrast, in Kosovo, the British Embassy is directly funding political party assistance with WFD through a CSSF project.

**The case studies show how FCO posts or DFID advisers can improve PPOs projects,** by providing advice on the general political situation as well as on sister-parties with which PPOs are or plan to work. In the absence of a WFD / PPOs presence in partner countries, this feedback is invaluable and complements PPOs’ own sources of information which might be more limited (see box 3 on Plaid).
Collaboration with other democracy assistance organisations

Some PPOs coordinate projects with other democracy assistance organisations. For example, the Labour Party and other centre-left political development organisations, such as NDI in the US or Olof Palme in Sweden, meet regularly and coordinate projects. The Conservatives have collaborated with NDI and the International Republican Institute (IRI).

There are opportunities for more systematic collaboration and lesson sharing. For example, representatives of the German political foundations interviewed for this evaluation expressed an interest in engaging more with ideologically like-minded UK PPOs at country-level (e.g. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung with the Conservative Party). This would enable a clearer division of labour, co-funding or the avoidance of duplication. PPOs could also come together to share experiences with peer political support organisations that do not just work in a partisan way, such as DemoFinland which works with domestic party organisations and DIPD which works with both Danish parties and in a multi-party way. WFD could facilitate such events.

4.3 WFD and PPOs management systems

Since 2015, WFD’s new leadership has invested in strengthening WFD systems to improve performance. This section reviews changes in design, implementation, risk management and M&E systems.

Design

WFD has most influence at the design stage of PPOs projects. Since 2015, proposals have to be approved by the WFD CEO and receive comments from WFD teams. A number of PPOs welcomed this assistance which they felt had improved their projects. The evaluation identified CEO feedback on more than 10 projects across PPOs that have required changes to proposals before they were approved. No proposal has been rejected to date. Reasons for changes included:

- Meeting WFD strategic priorities; respecting the scope for sister-party projects; or improved risk management (e.g. development of sister-parties’ policy-making capacity rather than the development of new policies which is not seen as appropriate; avoiding assistance at election time perceived as risky).
- Meeting WFD financial rules (e.g. fees instead of honorariums; respecting the share of project budget to be spent on M&E).
- Improvements to programme design (e.g. logframe revisions such as clarifying outcomes, outputs and indicators; more realist objectives).

Implementation

WFD, FCO and DFID have less influence on PPOs during project implementation, though the 2015 DFID Business Case for its support to WFD indicated WFD should find entry points to influence PPOs project beyond design. As shown above, activities are often undertaken independently of WFD and DFID/FCO teams are not always kept up to date. Quarterly meetings between WFD and PPOs provide operational updates rather than opportunities to shape implementation. M&E
reports are still of insufficient quality to track progress during implementation. The evaluation team did not find evidence in the case studies that WFD management took action on the basis of quarterly reports which would influence how the PPOs projects operated.

**SharePoint, WFD’s main programme management tool which could improve information sharing during implementation, is not fully functional.** PPOs are struggling to keep the information up to date for two reasons. At a technical level, IT systems are not always compatible; PPOs staff do not have easy access to WFD systems; and staff are overstretched. More importantly, not all PPOs feel that confidential information will not be seen beyond key WFD staff. As a result, SharePoint information is not always complete nor up to date. It could not be used to provide a full description of WFD’s PPOs portfolio over the evaluation period.

**Risk management**

PPOs now use the same risk management policy as the rest of WFD. The WFD risk register monitors risks over time and not just at the start of projects. PPOs strategies and project proposals use WFD’s risk template and risk categories. The main risks identified by the evaluation case studies are:

**Governance risk:** The Triennial Review referred to this risk as ‘cabalism’ as PPOs reported to the WFD Board dominated by political parties (the Chair and five other Governors are MPs alongside four independent board members). Some reforms have been implemented since the Triennial Review, including to make the Board more strategic; improve ways of working between WFD and PPOs; and give greater operational influence to WFD’s CEO. WFD’s CEO and Finance Director sit on the Board, and [edited board minutes](#) are available on WFD’s website.

However, there remains a risk of limited public accountability for PPOs work, as ultimately UK political parties report mostly to themselves. Oversight by WFD, DFID and FCO is therefore extremely important. The Netherlands provide a useful warning of what could happen if checks and balances are inadequate (see box 8).

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**Box 8: Risk associated with political parties on the board of party assistance organisations**

The WFD board structure is similar to its peer organisations. DIPD’s board is constituted by a majority of party representatives (9 out of 15 board members) with the other board members representing other Danish sectors (such as youth organisations). The DemoFinland board is constituted by parties; members are elected for two years and it has a rotating Chair. However, lessons can be learned from the Netherlands. A governance crisis in 2011 ended the presence of political parties on both NIMD’s board and staff, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered this provided insufficient checks and balances. Dutch parties now receive funding from the Dutch Interior Ministry and sit on NIMD’s advisory, not supervisory, board. Similarly, NDI is not related to the Democratic Party in the US and does not undertake sister-party support. It is affiliated to three international networks. The drawback is that, as a result, Dutch and US politicians are less involved, respectively, in NIMD and NDI programmes.
Reputational risk: The Triennial Review described this risk as the perception of political lobbying by PPOs in countries or regions where they assist their sister-parties. Ideological work with sister-parties is particularly risky as it could be perceived a form of interference in domestic sovereignty. Current concerns of potential foreign involvement in the UK referendum, or French, US and other recent elections show how alive this risk is. The approach can also appear inconsistent with the relatively small amount of state funding for political parties in the UK.

The criteria to select in-country partners do not seem as strong as for some of WFD’s peers. PPOs selection is often based on membership of an ideological network. This will not be sufficient to address risks of corruption or extreme views not aligned to some core WFD/DFID/FCO values, such as the inclusion of marginalised groups. By contrast, NIMD has a set of principles for its work, such as political impartiality, and criteria to select its partners, such as working with all parties in parliament.

At a time of ever greater aid scrutiny in the UK, sister-party assistance is even more controversial and requires proactive management. WFD is already managing this risk at a corporate level, through more multi-party work. Equally benefiting all the main parties in a country or at least working with both ruling and opposition parties (including through a series of PPOs sister-party partnerships for example) and / or addressing system-wide issues would be less sensitive.

Box 9: Reputational risks management

A number of interviewees expressed concern over the Democratic Unionist Party’s and, more recently, the Conservative Party’s partnership with the African Christian Democratic Party in South Africa, whose views were considered too extreme and not compatible with WFD’s inclusion agenda. Some of WFD’s peer organisations did not wish to be associated with this party. It is not clear how these concerns have been communicated to, and managed, by the PPOs.

Anglo-Argentine diplomatic relations are dominated by disputes over the Southern Atlantic Islands. In order to manage this risk, the Conservative Party collaborated with a think tank for the Stories of Change publication and attempted to partner with a German Foundation.

The ‘cost of politics’ study, which was commissioned by WFD Artillery Road, had an unexpected local impact. In Ghana, the study was initially seen by some as a ‘corruption witch hunt’ by the UK government, and it threatened to undermine the reputation of the Ghana Integrated Programme. At the time of data collection, the programme manager was still engaging with Ghanaian MPs and political party leaders to explain the nature of the study and minimise misunderstandings.

Transparency risk: WFD respects UK freedom of information and its website provides accessible information (http://www.wfd.org/management-information/). However, there is little transparency and accountability to the UK public about the use of public funds for PPOs activities. Project proposals are required to provide standard communication lines. Some PPOs avoid providing such lines in proposals and require requests to be re-directed to them. They also keep details of beneficiaries outside the public domain. This seems excessive considering the nature of most activities, especially those taking place in countries in which political
parties can operate freely. While there will be pros and cons with proactive communication given growing aid scepticism in parts of the UK media, positive examples of multi-party activities are likely to be better received.

**Political, security or conflict risks in partner countries.** These are risks that WFD shares with other international programmes and are not specific to party assistance. The case study countries do not appear to have been particularly badly affected by any such risks during the period under review. Slovenia was selected as the location for the SD9 facilitator as it is a neutral country in the Western Balkans. Restrictions on external support for political party assistance in a number of MENA countries has been built into the design of the SNP programme, which operates on a regional basis and will aim to establish the network as an NGO in Lebanon from where it can operate legally. Nonetheless, conflict risks did not appear systematically assessed at the design stage (though the DFID Business Case had made a commitment on conflict analysis and ‘do no harm’ principles).

**Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning and Adaptation**

**WFD’s corporate project management system is multi-layered and does not facilitate M&E.** PPOs have their internal M&E systems and also have to report to WFD on an annual and quarterly basis at the level of their projects, programmes and WFD strategic outcomes. WFD corporately prepares an annual report and DFID undertakes annual reviews following its standard format. “M&E feels taxing for the party” said one PPO interviewee.

**PPOs do not appear to be delivering the M&E proposed in their project plans.** Project-level M&E reports were not always available or sometimes of poor quality. Staffing gaps and turnover has hindered some PPOs M&E capacity. M&E tools which PPOs are meant to use include:

- Baseline or needs assessment prior to an event. Often planned in project proposals, they are not always undertaken.
- Feedback forms immediately following training events or seminars are easier to administer and seemed more regularly used. However, they can have an inbuilt positive bias, as participants are usually pleased to have attended an event. The review of project documentation revealed several such examples.
- For evaluations, a more useful tool would be surveys following a certain period to see how the learnings or decisions have been put into practice and with what effects, capturing progress towards outputs or outcomes. Again, although often planned, this does not seem to be systemically done by PPOs.
- Survey of participants on the overall partnership at inwards UK events provide useful insights and are a cost-effective way of gathering feedback (e.g. UK Conservative Party Conference used to seek feedback on partnerships).
- Monitoring is also done by PPOs staff when they visit projects. PPOs would like to see their trainers undertake more M&E responsibilities. This has not always been possible, as trainers may lack the incentives or skills to do so.
- There seems to be very little use of independent monitoring, which would provide more credible evidence (without beneficiaries’ positive bias in order to continue to receive assistance). Some PPOs, such as the Conservative Party in 2018, have commissioned their own external independent evaluations.
PPOs quarterly reporting is improving. The evaluation reviewed all quarterly reports from the last quarter of 2015-16 until the second quarter of the 2017-18 financial years. The WFD quarterly reporting form is not user nor reader friendly. It is difficult to track activities, progress made against the annual plan, challenges or other information. Some sections are often left incomplete. Parties struggle to complete the forms - both due to their complexity and the data required, which PPOs may not have generated through their projects. As an incentive, the WFD M&E team scores not just the reported progress but also the quality of the completion (e.g. timeliness and comprehensiveness of reports). It has identified an improvement over time, consistent with our assessment, but stronger incentives would be essential.

WFD has adopted an outcome mapping approach which was not evident in the reviewed projects. Each PPO has developed an outcome matrix at the level of their entire portfolio, identifying indicators and progress markers for the results they would ‘need’, ‘expect’, ‘like’ and ‘love’ to see against WFD’s four strategic outcomes. However, the relationship between these outcome matrix progress markers, the annual plan targets and indicators, and PPOs’ own programmes outcomes/outputs and project-level results is far from clear. At project level, PPOs or project implementers continue to say they will report against standard quantitative indicators (such as numbers of participants in events or policy positions adopted).

Lesson learning is constrained by limited internal communication. Quarterly reports now require PPOs to identify lessons, but this is not always systematically done nor in a way that would be useful for others. Given that projects often share similar objectives and methods, there is a great deal that could be learned across PPOs, thus improving the quality of PPOs’ and WFD’s overall portfolios.

There is also usually a poor use of academic and other evidence to justify the approach used, as demonstrated by a review of project proposals. PPOs are stretched delivering projects and may not have time to keep up to date with the latest evidence. This limits programme innovation. Mistakes can easily be repeated.

Adaptation takes place in the transition between projects, given that most reviewed projects are very short or small-scale. Follow-on projects are justified by quoting past results (e.g. Ghana integrated programme, South Africa DA). However, they do not always clearly draw lessons learned to explain how they would adapt the new phase of the project (e.g. Western Balkans, WAFA).

Value for Money

WFD has introduced new rules which limit excessive costs and provide greater accountability for payments (e.g. receipts for use of funds). PPOs reported this approach was not always easy to implement but that it meant that only committed partners would travel or take part in activities. Some beneficiaries criticised WFD for some inflexibility and poor-quality hotels or long flight connection times, as a result of this more rigorous approach. PPOs face a difficult balance between delivering projects in ways that satisfy partners in order to make progress with activities and meeting WFD’s rules.
The main project cost drivers are experts. The quality of different expert inputs could not be assessed. An internal audit identified a wide scale of expert costs, from experts providing their time for free to others charging commercial rates. The WFD Finance Director and PPOs are taking forward changes to respond to the 2017 audit finding of “moderate controls”, which are not repeated here.

PPOs projects benefit from in-kind support. Political parties hosting PPOs contribute to some of their operational costs (e.g. office, corporate support). Collaboration with Embassies can make a difference for small budget projects. For example, the British Embassy provided a venue and interpretation for the Plaid Violence Against Women seminar in Buenos Aires.

WFD sets limits on the administrative share of PPOs budgets: 16% for Labour and Conservatives and 25% for SNP and MPO. A large proportion of this relates to staff salaries. PPOs can receive added admin funding to reflect their collaboration on integrated programmes. As several PPOs directly deliver projects without charging their time from their admin budget, it was not possible to assess cost efficiency or effectiveness. Other peer organisations’ staff costs are usually high, as relationship-building or peer-to-peer support is also their main method. Donors should accept these higher staff costs, if they are to invest in political party development.

The greatest structural challenge from a value for money perspective is that WFD financial resources for political party assistance are not allocated on a performance basis. The PPOs funding allocation is based on the share of the votes in UK elections (combination of votes and parliamentary seats gained). Budgets are thus dependent on UK elections, rather than in-country needs or opportunities to achieve results, as would be the case for other grant-making democracy assistance organisations. Good performing projects may be scaled down or cut as a result, while some teams face a pressure to spend which can undermine a demand-driven approach or attention to cost in planning activities. The Triennial Review made recommendations about the funding formula which were not accepted at the time but these or new ones could be discussed by the WFD Board and considered for the new core UK government grants, in order to improve the value for money of WFD’s political party assistance.
5. Impact and sustainability

5.1 Impact

This evaluation examined WFD’s funding cycle over FY 2015-2016 to 2017-2018. A number of projects started in 2017 and/or have not been completed. Several are also very small-scale with only a couple of events, which are unlikely to have broader effects. PPOs M&E approaches have often not generated sufficient information to assess a project’s progress. Reports are either missing or incomplete; they often do not provide updates against the projects’ logframe.

The evaluation can therefore only comment on the extent to which outcomes are likely to be realised and whether the theories of change are credible enough to show how the outputs would contribute to outcomes and impacts.

Some projects are continuation of ongoing partnerships and are therefore more likely to show results because they lasted longer. The Ghana Integrated Programme built on past WFD parliamentary assistance. It could show the supply and quality of research outputs has increased. The Inter-Departmental Research and Information Group has been established, meets regularly, and has made progress towards better coordinating the research process in parliament. There are some early indications that the demand for research products has increased, although they are rarely cited in parliamentary debates.

Expected changes were often realised only to a limited extent. This was at times because objectives were too ambitious (at output or outcomes levels). For example, the set of activities undertaken as part of the new Conservative support to the PRO contributed to developing a new partnership with a young party which recently gained political power in Argentina. The scoping visit contributed to the PRO joining the International Democrat Union in 2017. A one-off research project and publication showed how citizens could be consulted differently but it cannot be said it contributed to new issue-based policies (output). UK MPs could not travel to Argentina to observe the elections so the objective of improving perceptions of the UK amongst legislators could not be achieved. However, Conservative Party staff visits to Argentina and PRO visits to the UK enabled both parties to learn about one another, setting the basis for future collaboration.

Training-based projects delivered their outputs but could not always demonstrate they made progress towards their outcomes. Several outputs describe the delivery of training events which were held (e.g. number of women candidates under WAFA in Ghana). However, the contribution of the activities to the higher-level objectives could often not be demonstrated. For example, in Ghana both the Conservatives and Labour trained women candidates ahead of the 2016 elections but there is little indication that women performed better in 2016 than in previous elections. The share of NPP candidates that are women and the share of NPP seats that are held by women has increased only slightly since 1996. While 90% of all women CPP parliamentary candidates received WAFA training, they were not randomly picked for training and already had political aspirations or at least an interest in politics. In other words, the correlation does not prove any causal effect.
Some networks supported by PPOs could demonstrate they were being institutionalised, meeting regularly or planning policy actions, but it was more difficult to show how they influenced outcomes. SD9 was re-established during the period, with new Statutes and a first Congress. It met on a regular basis and organised campaigns, for example a resolution condemning violence against women in the region. However, while a number of SD9 youth network leaders were elected to office, it does not mean that this was a project achievement: they probably participated in SD9 because they were already active in domestic politics. Interviews with SD9 youth leaders did not show an explicit objective to influence mother parties, and therefore progress towards strengthened social democratic parties in the region (regional programme objective).

When objectives were realistic, targeted and well tracked, projects could make good progress towards their outputs and outcomes. For example, the DA provided evidence it was developing “a new generation of diverse and politically aware change makers in South Africa”: almost 50% of its Young Leaders graduates are active in DA as staff or politicians: 36 alumni are in elected positions and 20 as staff (4 out of 12 DA department heads are YLP graduates) as well as party volunteers. YLP graduates include South Africa’s youngest MP elected aged 23.

We could find no evidence of impact (or potential impact) at the level of the entire political system. This is not surprising: activities are in general short-term or small-scale; no project was designed to have such an impact in our sample; sister-party relationships or international/regional networks do not directly address incentives across a national political system. In South Africa, the DA is becoming a more powerful electoral force which could challenge the ANC dominance. However, WFD support through the LibDems is unlikely to have made a significant contribution given the small scale of the assistance. Similarly, in Ghana, the NPP surprisingly won the 2016 presidential election and secured 171 of 275 seats in parliament. However, this overwhelming electoral victory can hardly be attributed to the Conservative Party’s support. In any case, it does not qualify as a change of political system. Integrated programmes that worked over a significant period of time on both structural party system issues (e.g. political funding) and with all the main political parties might have a greater chance of making such a contribution.

The case studies did not identify significant unexpected changes taking place in partner countries that could be plausibly linked to the projects. A number of projects generated learnings for UK political parties rather than solely for beneficiaries in partner countries, such as the Plaid-Argentina exchange on how to tackle violence against women in politics. The LibDems, Plaid and Conservatives could also learn from their relatively strong sister-parties in South Africa and Argentina. For example, the Argentine PRO has particularly strong digital capacity and the Chubut province ruling party (as most Argentine parties) has strong youth structures.

5.2 Sustainability

This section summarises the sustainability of the projects under review, in terms of both processes and outcomes as well as organisational or financial sustainability.
Projects in Argentina were simply too new or too small-scale to be assessed as sustainable.

**In Ghana and South Africa, some outputs appeared sustainable as there was evidence some practices had changed and there were incentives to sustain those changes.** The supply and demand for research in parliament has increased and appeared to have reached a new equilibrium. The NPP has a strong incentive to professionalise its campaign given the closeness of the elections. The DA Young Leaders programme appears well established and trained young leaders appear to have benefited in a long-lasting manner from the intense support, given the number that remain active politically.

**Networks and organisations fully dependent on PPOs in MENA, Western Balkans and Africa did not yet appear sustainable, and are unlikely be so the next ten years.** Ra’edat is still very new and establishing a legal structure so it can diversify its funding. However, it is fully dependent on the SNP for now, including on the SNP’s electoral fortune in UK elections. As it is not based on member organisations in partner countries, this makes it a more fragile organisation dependent on individuals across very different Arab countries. SD9 has re-established itself but remains fully dependent on Labour funds for now as its member organisations do not contribute financially. It was disbanded for a couple of years before Labour funding resumed. It is not clear from the reviewed documentation how lessons were learned when the network was re-established. WAFA also appears financially dependent on Labour. Certainly, in the case of Ghana, it seems unlikely that the network would exist and that activities would be implemented without the financial backing of the Labour Party.
6. Comparing approaches

This chapter draws some lessons learned by comparing WFD’s approaches to political party assistance, in terms of how technical and other assistance is delivered and whether the focus is on sister-parties, networks, themes or integrated activities. The analysis integrates comparative experiences from peer organisations also providing party assistance.

6.1 Delivery instruments

PPOs assistance focuses on capacity development, in particular organisational party development (in areas such as campaigning, communications, use of digital tools but less on party structure, governance, internal democracy), and individual leadership development (especially for women, youth and other minorities). Collaboration is mostly through technical assistance (including tactical advice from UK experts), training, mentoring/coaching, study tours, and other peer-to-peer learning approaches, including South-South learning through international networks. Some PPOs provide resources directly to parties or networks.

UK study tours

Stakeholders provided positive individual feedback on their participation in study tours to the UK for example from Argentina, MENA and Ghana to UK parliaments, elections or party conferences. They felt these contributed to building general goodwill and personal relationships between politicians from partner countries and in the UK (e.g. a better understanding of the SNP policies by the executive committee members of the MENA network it supports). Visits provided new insights (e.g. new fundraising strategies for PRO staff), inspiration (e.g. success in increasing women’s political representation; accountability through parliamentary questions) and opportunities to engage in new political debates (e.g. with youths from different countries or on new strands of conservative, labour or liberal politics).

However, across the board, it was hard to trace individual or organisational effects of UK study tours or UK / European party conferences. Partners’ domestic contexts were often too different from the UK to lead to direct replication or even adaptation of models (e.g. while there is no need for voter ID verification in the UK, most other countries could not imagine not using ID cards to prevent fraud). Individuals may not have much scope to influence their party or parliamentary structures on return. Unfortunately, this is particularly the case with women and youth politicians, who were often the beneficiaries of PPOs study tours.

Lesson learned: The use of UK study tours needs to be built as an input into a broader project, with support for follow-up activities on return, to make sure it is an effective instrument. (See box 10).
In-country delivery of UK technical assistance or training

One of the main comparative advantages and perceived resources of PPOs is that they can draw on UK party politicians, staff or other party experts in order to provide peer-to-peer support. A few projects involved UK experts sharing experiences with their counterparts. In Ghana, NPP representatives expressed appreciation of the technical assistance provided to them by the Conservative Party in the run-up to the 2016 elections. The NPP developed a more effective online campaign and thought more strategically about marginal seats and target constituencies, though our research could not attribute these changes to UK support.

UK assistance could lead to high quality discussion with two-way exchanges, for example in Argentina. The Conservatives were impressed by the PRO digital campaigning capacity. The November 2017 Plaid delegation included one MP, one Welsh Assembly Member and a Wales Police Commissioner who shared Wales’ experience with combating violence against women. They also learned from politicians and civil society in Argentina where advanced public debates and campaigns against ‘femicide’ are taking place (e.g. *Ni una menos* campaign).

However, interviews confirmed some constraints on the peer-to-peer approach:

- **Supply is limited.** UK elected representatives do not have much time to travel abroad. It can be a challenge for PPOs to develop relationships with a wide range of contacts within UK political parties, some of which may not wish to travel to difficult countries. A few beneficiaries complained that they were not able to meet with sufficiently senior UK counterparts. Political developments in the UK over the period made MPs exchanges even more difficult (see section 4.1).

- **Peer-to-peer activities can be very small-scale.** The projects did not include long term embedded experts, an approach used in other capacity development interventions. One off-seminars on their own will not lead to broader change. For example, due to the small-scale nature of the project, the exchange on violence against women in politics was designed without Argentine follow-up. The impact on Argentine audience could not be assessed, beyond strengthening Embassy networks in Argentina.

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**Box 10: The benefits of the Ra’edat UK study tour**

Five members of Ra’edat executive committee selected by the SNP travelled to Scotland and London in October 2017. This visit contributed to trust building between the network leadership and the SNP, essential given that this is a new partnership which only started in 2016. In the context of restrictions on foreign aid in some MENA countries, participants understood and valued SNP policy towards the Arab world. As executive committee members are based in different countries, the visit was also useful to develop their own relationships. They observed the SNP party conference and parliamentary questions in both Holyrood and Westminster, providing new insights on democratic policy and accountability processes. They discussed shared challenges faced by women politicians and strategies towards gender parity. The visit was reported on through Facebook and a newsletter distributed to 1,500 persons. It was designed as one input towards the project’s objective of developing a model gender parity policy.
• **Quality is not always guaranteed simply because the trainer is a peer expert from a UK party.** For example, some stakeholders would like to see better consultations and preparations before trainings are delivered to make sure the content and approaches are the most appropriate (e.g. interactive techniques, use of trained trainers, etc.).

• **Continuity is important to ensure UK inputs lead to sustained relationships of trust across shorter-term projects.** This could be achieved when PPOs staff directly engaged in project delivery over time, beyond the initial scoping visit (such as the LibDems delivering well received presentations on liberal politics in South Africa, Conservative Spanish-speaker directly involved in research or the SNP fund-raising training for the MENA network members).

**Lesson learned:** The case studies show peer-to-peer support could contribute to small improvements in parties’ capacities or relationship-building over time. However, UK supply is very limited, activities are small-scale and quality is not always guaranteed. Continuity over time is important to build trust.

**Technical assistance from in-country or regional experts**

**Drawing on in-country technical expertise can be particularly relevant as experts will know the context and may be more trusted by parties or politicians.** In Argentina, a centre-right think tank, Fundación Nuevas Generaciones, led on a ‘Stories of Change’ publication, to seek independent views on the first two years of the new PRO administration. Research was undertaken by a well-respected journalist as well as the Conservative Party project lead. The most sensitive research findings were then shared directly with the PRO leadership, as the Fundación was seen as a more trusted source of feedback. However, there is no evidence on how the PRO leadership reacted to or used these findings, or if they were new.

**South-South technical expertise or exchanges are, in theory, particularly appropriate as lessons are learned across contexts with shared characteristics.** Activities support both regional networking and project objectives. For example, South Africa DA provided tailored training for the new Young African Liberals leadership responding to their priorities (see box 11).

**At the same time, stakeholders may prefer UK support to learn from further afield.** In Ghana, there was a sentiment among programme beneficiaries that the country is democratically, politically, and institutionally more advanced than its neighbours, and that technical assistance therefore would have to be provided by experts outside the African continent. This view was not entirely shared by other informants, who pointed out that Ghana can still learn a lot from other countries in Africa; for example, about the use of technology.

**Lesson learned:** It is important to start from what will be most relevant to achieve the project’s objectives, rather than focus on the supply of expertise. In-country, regional or UK technical assistance have different strengths and costs.
Direct vs indirect project delivery

**PPOs can be very stretched when they directly implement activities in several countries at the same time.** PPOs’ main business model is to directly manage projects (including through in-person delivery or by sourcing relevant experts). As PPOs teams are small (two to four staff), manage a large number of projects and have a wide range of responsibilities (strategy, monitoring, reporting to WFD as well as their internal party responsibilities), they can get over-stretched. They also may not have the technical or country/language skills needed for each project.

Providing resources for partners to deliver activities can be efficient and effective. These local organisations can identify what is required and will be committed to the activities. In-house or in-country resources can be cheaper and more appropriate. In Argentina, the PRO trained their own vote count officials for the 2017 elections. The DA’s high-quality youth leadership programme was delivered with mostly South African experts through a combination of training, coaching, mentoring and support for individual youth leaders’ projects. However, in such cases, PPOs would need to demonstrate why external UK funding was required.

Implementers provide extra capacity to deliver a project objective and embedded experts can add value – technical skills or facilitation (e.g. see box 12). WFD’s integrated programmes are large enough to fund in-country implementing staff. Some PPOs also use project implementers, for example the Kalandar Foundation to manage the SD9 youth network or WAFA for Africa women’s leadership workshops. However, this approach can be relatively more expensive than direct delivery by the partner organisation (due to overheads) and needs to be designed with a clear objective to be achieved (rather than ongoing activities) and with an exit strategy for funding in mind to ensure sustainability.

**Lessons learned:** Providing partners with resources to deliver their own activities might be the most efficient approach, when there is sufficient local capacity. When partners do not have sufficient capacity, WFD and PPOs can also fund activities through project managers or technical units, which can be more relevant and flexible - but also more expensive and not sustainable.

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**Box 11: Using local expertise for leadership development**

The DA Young Leaders programme follows good practice in leadership development. It starts with a highly competitive selection process (up to 25 participants selected from 650 to 1000 candidates). Over the course of a year, it includes five retreats (covering personal and political skills), mentoring from senior politicians and professional coaching, written exercises and a special project. Trainers are involved over time, providing continuity. LibDems funding enabled the top performing young leaders to attend events of the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe. The DA and LibDems offered tailor-made training for the DA Young Leaders and ALN Youth Council members attending ALN events. Young leaders write thoughtful reports following each event demonstrating their learning. LibDems support is small (three events a year and some technical inputs) but it is valued.
Cross-cutting delivery factors

Regardless of the approach used, success factors include:

- **Selection of partner organisations that have both the interest and capacity** to engage in the project’s activities and remain committed to it over time. PPOs partners need to have credible and sustained incentives to demand and then make use of PPOs support. This was clearly the case in South Africa, where the DA is a capable party running a well-established leadership programme. Domestic incentive will often be the desire to win elections and draw on PPOs expertise to update approaches and re-tool staff, such as in Ghana. Local incentive can include the desire to be recognised internationally, as part of an international ideological network, as with the PRO’s application to join the International Democrat Union in 2017. This was part of Argentina’s re-engagement with Western governments after the 2015 elections.

- **Continuity**: Projects that are able to target the same counterparts over time are more likely to show they achieve results. The DA Young Leaders programme selects a cohort that are supported throughout the year and then as part of an alumni network. Continuity of engagement beyond stand-alone projects was also considered a key factor in trust-building by UK stakeholders and their country/regional partners. The relationship is seen as between two political parties, rather than through WFD-funded projects.

**Lessons learned**: The sustained commitment of partner organisations, with the incentives and capacity to make use of UK support is a critical success factor. This requires continuity on the part of both beneficiaries and providers of this assistance.

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**Box 12: Benefits of delivery led in the country or region**

The SD9 network is managed by a social democrat foundation based in Slovenia and coordinated by the Slovenia SD youth wing. Slovenia is both now an EU member state but also a former Yugoslav state. It supports regional events involving youth organisations linked to political parties across the former Yugoslavia. Regional exchanges and advice amongst Balkans-based participants enable more context-relevant solutions and joint actions than if these had been designed in the UK. Youth collaborate despite nationalistic tensions between member countries. Events include SD9 leaders’ meetings, SD9 Congresses, conferences on women, migration and nationalism. The evaluation did not identify any direct UK involvement in the activities.

The Ghana Integrated Programme demonstrates the value of embedded experts. It is delivered by a small team situated inside parliament. In itself, this is testimony to the parliamentary leadership’s commitment to the GIP. This has enabled the programme manager to build relations through daily, informal interactions with the parliamentary service and the leaderships of the political parties in parliament. One of the advantages is that activities can sequenced and calibrated according to the needs and developments of parliament. On several occasions, activities have been rescheduled or relocated to a different venue to make sure the GIP is fully aligned with the parliamentary agenda. This would not be possible if the programme were implemented out of London.
6.2 Approaches to political party assistance

This section compares the approaches adopted by PPOs and the extent to which they contributed to project successes. It begins with the most established approaches of sister-party and network assistance. It continues with the newer multi-party and integrated approaches.

Sister-parties

Sister-parties can be supported through bilateral projects that target organisational capacity development (e.g. Conservative support to NPP in Ghana or the PRO in Argentina), youth or women participation (e.g. Labour in Western Balkans or Africa, LibDems in South Africa) or through regional / international networks (e.g. LibDems with the African Liberal Network).

For interviewees, the most critical success factor was trust that could be built over time between parties (bilaterally or through networks), by sharing personal experiences with peers, such as fellow politicians or party staff. Institutional relationships meant that these would continue regardless of the individuals deployed in project activities.

However, the case studies we reviewed could not provide concrete examples of how long-term trust was used to help parties overcome particularly challenging capacity development issues, one of the important assumptions in the TOC. Parties appear less interested in technical assistance to improve policy-making or internal democracy, highly sensitive issues. Youth or women training, or the provision of tactical campaign advice, was easier to offer and accept, as the former are less threatening to a party leadership and the latter seen as useful to win elections.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Box 13: Supply and demand in sister-party assistance</th>
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<td>The relationship between the UK Conservative Party and the NPP in Ghana dates back to 1995. It has included training and capacity building and opportunities to exchange best practices. NPP delegations have attended Conservative Party conferences and monitored UK elections. The long-standing relationship has created strong ties between the two parties, both at institutional level as well as between individual members of the parties. There is a high degree of trust and the NPP naturally look to the UK and the Conservative Party for inspiration. For example, the Ghana NPP Project provided social media and other campaign training. Social media was an important factor in the NPP winning the elections but cannot be attributed to the small UK support. There is also little evidence it contributed to strengthening the party long-term. The NPP Project illustrates some of the dilemmas of sister-party assistance. On one hand, there is no doubt the project was demand-driven. The NPP asked for help in developing its campaign. On the other, political party demands are often short-term and focused on elections, which means sister-party projects risk being reduced to campaign support vehicles, rather than wider democratisation goals.</td>
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Sister-party projects are constrained by a number of factors. In some cases, they are supply-driven, which means they are limited to the expertise UK political parties can offer and have to follow their timelines (UK elections, parliamentary sessions,
financial year, etc.). In other cases, they are demand-driven, but then tend to become short-term, focused on winning the elections. One such example is the Ghana NPP Project (see box 13), which according to our informants left little in terms of long-term capacity building.

**One of the assumptions of the PPOs’ approach is that ideological partnerships are the main basis for trust.** Sister-parties are selected on the basis of belonging to the same ideological family. Membership of an international network as well as in-country visits are used to assess suitability. There is indeed good ideological alignment with the LibDem’s sister-party. The DA was an influential member of the African Liberal Network and DA politicians valued LibDem presentations on liberalism or participation in European events with other liberal parties to explore different ideological variations and common challenges.

However, membership of ideological networks does not seem a sufficient nor necessary condition for good collaboration (see box 14). Parties within the same network can have different ideological leanings. For example, in Denmark, the centre-right Liberal Party and the centre-left Social Liberal Party are both members of Liberal International but work with different parties through the DIPD. Trust and the sister-parties’ commitment to change through international assistance will be the main driver of success.

**Box 14: Argentina and the limits of ideological similarities**

The projects were based on the assumption that ideological alignment between UK and Argentine parties can contribute to good partnerships. For Plaid, capacity was a more critical success factor than shared centre-left values. For the Conservative, the PRO’s desire to be part of the International Democrat Union was a strong motivator. However, Argentina’s party system is not simply defined on a right to left spectrum due to the influence of Peronism which cuts across traditional ideological divisions. The PRO-led Cambiemos coalition won the 2015 elections by defining itself in opposition to the previous Peronist President as well as setting out more liberal economic policies. However, one of its ruling coalition partners, the UCR, is a member of the Socialist International. The PRO also collaborates with like-minded Peronists in parliament (where it has no majority). In a federal presidential system very unlike the Westminster model, provincial parties are also extremely important. They are often based on personalities rather than simply ideology.

Finally, it is important to be clear on the criteria to select sister-parties and decide whether or not support is appropriate at a specific moment in time. UK support to only one party in a fragile context could potentially do some harm if it deepens ethnic or other divisions in society that are considered conflict risks.

**Lessons learned:** Sister-party projects are built on trust which can be based on ideological alignment or long term institutionalised relationships. However, these trust-based relationships are not always able to deliver more transformational

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22 There are several examples, where ruling and opposition parties belong to the same ideological network; for example, the Rally for Mali and the Alliance for Democracy in Mali, who are both members of Socialist International; the Party for the Democratic Revolution and the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, who are also members of Socialist International; and the Centre Party and the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, who are also members of Liberal International.
objectives, such as internal democracy, as demand may be for short term tactical support. The sister-parties’ commitment to change through international assistance will be the main driver of success, rather than ideological alignment.

Networks

WFD appears to be one of the few organisations that consistently supports political parties international/regional ideological or thematic networks.

**PPOs support networks in very different ways: from being directly involved in the network itself to adopting an arms-length relationship, restricting engagement to mainly funding network activities.** The SNP is probably the most hands-on, as it is helping a new network establish itself in the MENA region. The SNP project lead is in regular contact with Ra’edat and contributes directly to some of its activities (e.g. developing a membership database). The SNP funds a one-person secretariat and assists the NGO registration process by funding lawyers, in addition to network activities such as regional meetings and UK study tours. This is a high staff investment, high-risk strategy which accounts for almost half of the SNP budget, in case the network does not take off. The Conservatives fund a staff member based in the region in order to manage its Caribbean network activities.

By contrast, the Labour case studies involved working through regionally-based organisations: SD9 activities are managed by the Kalendar Foundation based in Slovenia and Africa women trainings by WAFA. It is not clear if the networks would sustain themselves independently of Labour funding for activities and management. The LibDems fund part of the ALN coordinator position and office running (with the DA hosting the office). They are trying to shift these costs to the ALN members.

**Networks are best considered a means to achieve a wider objective,** otherwise it can be difficult to identify progress with capacity development and an exit strategy. PPOs are likely to be better able to manage networks that have a clear objective which focuses the attention of its members, such as Ra’edat’s legislative proposal. Otherwise, there is a risk that PPOs will fund ongoing activities, such as expensive regional meetings which, beyond building personal links, will not advance their objectives in an easily measurable way or with an end date.

Some studies have found that networks are cost-effective, for example to deliver regional trainings or reaching beneficiaries across several countries (e.g. 2015 WFD evaluation). This claim could not be assessed given the limited financial information available to the evaluation team. It could be calculated by WFD if needed. Methodologies can indeed be developed for a region and used across countries (e.g. WAFA training modules in Africa). However, international / regional travel costs can be high, and there is a risk that network members mostly want to meet, rather than focus on a specific shared policy objective. Internet-based communications can be cheaper and facilitate more ongoing contact (e.g. SD9 in between meetings; Ra’edat is restructuring itself in order to operate through country committees, not cross-

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23 Dodsworth and Cheeseman (2016) reached a similar conclusion on the need to be more strategic and go beyond election campaigns.
country work streams whose members cannot meet. It has also set up WhatsApp groups to facilitate communication).

Regional networks could in theory deliver benefits through their very existence such as trust-building following violent conflict. The SD9 network is improving collaboration on specific issues between countries of the former Yugoslavia which broke up violently in the 1990s. The governance of networks and the skills of its chairpersons/facilitators are key, to ensure tensions can be managed fairly. It cannot be assumed that shared political objectives (such as youth or women’s political participation) will overcome personal or cultural differences, let alone a legacy of ethnic violence.

Networking between established organisations may be more effective. One of the main challenges facing Ra’edat in MENA is that it is a network of individual women politicians, not of organisations, and who may not be supported in their objectives by their parties or parliaments. In contrast, one of the Conservatives’ partners in Argentina is a think tank which is a member of the regional Latin America IDU network (UPLA). It argues that networking through thinks tanks can provide better continuity than parties that may come and go with individual members that may be too busy. In the western Balkans, SD9 is a network of youth organisations. It faces an ongoing challenge as youth leaders move on regularly. It was also difficult to track how individual participants bring learnings and policies to their home organisations, beyond shared new tools or one-off crisis responses actions.

Finally, PPOs and WFD more generally need to reflect on how many networks they can collectively sustain, given shared objectives and the limited pool of partners in a region. For example, WFD, SNP and Labour support three women politicians’ networks in MENA; while each has a different objective and membership, there is the potential for overlap and a need for greater collaboration.

Lessons learned: It is difficult to assess the benefits of networks for political parties’ capacity development. Networks are best seen as a means of achieving an objective, otherwise it will be hard to assess progress and set an exit strategy.

Thematic projects

One of the incentives for moving beyond ideologically-based sister-party projects is that some UK parties are not affiliated with international networks. These parties are developing thematic sister-partnerships based on shared interests (e.g. interest in devolution or post-conflict resolution from Northern Ireland).

The PPOs thematic projects reviewed in this evaluation focused on women or youth political participation. They contribute to WFD’s strategic outcome on representation. This approach can be delivered through sister-parties, sister-party networks, multi-party networks or multi-party projects, as well as through integrated programmes (e.g. WFD’s Bosnia integrated programme on women’s representation). Such thematic projects may be seen as less controversial, as they benefit more vulnerable sections of society and could be more clearly aligned to DFID and FCO objectives on gender or inclusion, and to the ‘Leave No One Behind Agenda’ of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.
Activities range from individual leadership training (WAFA in Africa, DA in South Africa), amending party bylaws or structures to create opportunities for women and youth voices and candidacies (the new YAL structure as part of the ALN), regional networks to stimulate collaboration and create peer support for individual parties (SD9 in Western Balkans) to even regional cross-party system objectives, such as new model laws for Arab states (Ra’edat in MENA) or global advocacy to combat violence against women in politics (Plaid in collaboration with all the other PPOs).

The strengths and challenges faced by these varied approaches have already been reviewed. To demonstrate the benefits of training-based approaches for women and youth inclusion, it is important to select participants and monitor their progress during and after the training, including the organisational-level effects of activities. As the 2016 evaluation of DIPD found, these are harder to trace (see box 15). The DA Young Leaders programme does systematically trace and engage with its alumni. However, activities may target women and youth who have already been selected as candidates without increasing their performance. There is an assumption that women and youth will have shared interests, when they may not.

**Box 15: Lessons from Danish youth-focused party assistance**

The DIPD 2016 evaluation focused on its youth interventions. It found that activities could support active youth learn and exchange (through multi-party networks or as party members). The application of the knowledge to shape a national youth agenda or build youth organisations within parties was harder to trace and appeared less well defined. There were not enough details on how youth would put in practice what they learned. Results depend on the selection of potential leaders in activities, their continued participation, and willingness to bring lessons learned back to their parties. This was not always easy when party leaderships were reluctant to have active youth in their parties.

**Multi-party projects**

Our case studies covered two types of PPO-led multi-party projects which both target women’s political participation (Ra’edat across MENA or the global project against violence Against Women in Politics). The first project is led by one UK party working across parties in a region, whereas the second now involves all four PPOs. Thematic projects are well suited for multi-party work, as they can focus on shared issues that affected every party or citizens seeking better representation and accountability.

WFD’s integrated programmes are another multi-party approach, as they combine WFD’s parliamentary assistance with the expertise of several UK parties. To avoid duplication, findings on integrated programmes and multi-party work are combined.

**Integrated approach**

WFD developed an Integrated Programmes strategy for the period 2016-20 to test how it could bring together its parliamentary and party assistance, traditionally managed separately. The portfolio includes six integrated programmes, either working with parties in parliament or on thematic issues. Only one integrated
programme was covered in this evaluation, Ghana. However, integrated ‘parties in parliament’ activities in Ghana started too late to be reviewed.

The benefits of integrated programmes identified through interviews included:

- **At a substantive level, a powerful demonstration effect of UK politicians collaborating.** In Sierra Leone a former Conservative MP and a Labour journalist delivered joined activities, which led to collaboration from across the political spectrum.
- **In terms of process, integrated programmes led to more regular communications between WFD and PPOs staff.** Joint assessment missions with some PPOs improved the quality of the analysis. PPOs have received additional administrative resources in order to take part in these projects (up to £42,000 which have to be claimed).

However, based on our limited review, integrated programmes do not at present appear to be delivering on their full potential of drawing on both WFD and PPOs strengths. Challenges raised by PPOs during interviews include:

- PPOs feel they are in “responsive mode”, managing WFD demands, and not able to influence WFD’s approach. One PPO considered the design of an integrated programme had already been decided before the mission took place. These perceptions need to be addressed.
- Integrated programmes face logistical challenges to coordinate dates for MPs or other political party representatives across parties to take part in activities (MPs can only travel during recess).
- One PPO felt integrated programmes might raise expectations of access to UK parties though it may not in fact lead to a sister-party relationship.

Given the potential benefits of multi-party work identified from other peer organisations, and anecdotal WFD evidence, WFD and PPOs should consider how best to pursue the approach in the new WFD core grant period. Some lessons from peer organisations include the following:

**Multi-party work can be more visible and less controversial.** This is the emerging evidence from a number of evaluations of European party assistance (see box 16). Ideological sister-party support is seen by some sections of the public and aid community as crossing the line and interfering in the domestic affairs of partner countries. They are more likely to accept multi-party work, that either benefits all major parties or improve citizens participation in politics, regardless of their political views.

**The integration of multi-party work and sister-party support requires transparency and diplomacy.** Peer organisations have been able to work fairly with a range of parties. This has required a great deal of trust building and transparency. NDI or NIMD are able to provide the same technical support to different parties because of the reputations they have built, and the transparent criteria they apply. Organisations that combine sister-party and multi-party work, such as DIPD, need to be very careful that sister-party interventions in the same country are not seen as favouring one party over the other. Some Danish parties even combine their support,
including with DIPD’s multi-party work: in Malawi, the ruling Danish Liberal Party runs a joint project with the Danish Socialist People’s Party, and in Kenya, the Liberal Party and DIPD are jointly supporting the Centre for Multi-party Democracy, also an NIMD core partner on both party and parliamentary assistance.

**Logistical challenges can be addressed once there is a commitment to more integration.** DemoFinland, made of Finnish parties, ensure it plans activities several months in advance to ensure availability. It pays attention to the parties’ external engagement on a rotational basis (i.e. if they cannot all take part in one event, those left behind will be given priority later). Multi-party aid organisations that do not rely on sister-parties, such as NIMD, find it easier to support integrated activities between political and parliamentary assistance, as they can draw on a local or international expert most relevant for the activity (regardless of sister-party affiliation).

### Box 16: Multi-party results can be more visible than party-to-party support

The 2015 NIMD country programme evaluation found that its direct party assistance results were hard to identify, even the more systematic and sophisticated party-to-party assistance in Georgia. It identified small strategic benefits from multi-party dialogue activities (e.g. in Mali in response to a coup in 2012) and wider results from facilitating engagements between political and civil society (e.g. democracy schools). NIMD had started to engage with parliaments from its multi-party platforms (as in Guatemala). Assistance to parties in parliament was not straightforward, as, once elected, some parties or individuals behave separately from their main parties. Multi-party political reform activities with parliament in Mali, such as support for the role of the opposition, provided clear results towards democratisation (Piron, 2015).

The 2016 DIPD evaluation also concluded that “most successful in terms of results are the multi-party projects aiming at preparing the ground for the development of mutual respect among political adversaries and capacities to communicate across party lines”. It found “less intensive and more sporadic interfaces between partner parties in the parties to parties projects” and that “sustainable and dynamic working relations party-to-party have been difficult to achieve” (Holm-Hansen and Haug 2016).

**Lessons learned:** Integrated and multi-party projects can deliver a powerful demonstration of collaboration across the political spectrum in contexts where trust is limited. Multi-party projects can also be less controversial and deliver visible benefits. Some PPOs are naturally evolving towards multi-party projects, which is also a trend found in other organisations such as DIPD. However, WFD integrated programmes do not at present appear to be delivering on their full potential.
7. Conclusion and recommendations

7.1 WFD comparative advantage and strategic choices

WFD’s 2015-2020 Strategy identifies several elements of its comparative advantage in relation to its political party assistance:

- Access to British democratic experience. It notes that “No other actor is able to mobilise British political party expertise to the same degree as WFD”.
- Facilitating South-South and regional exchanges through UK political parties’ networks with like-minded parties in other countries.
- A unique structure which combines both parliamentary and party assistance. This means that WFD can fill a gap in international assistance of working with parties in parliaments (whereas other donors may provide parliamentary assistance but avoid political groupings in parliament).
- The ability to undertake both sister-party work and multi-party work that encourage negotiation and compromise on major public policy issues (whereas other peer organisations either work in a multi-party way (e.g. NDI, IRI) or only provide sister-party assistance (e.g. German foundations).

This evaluation has confirmed many of WFD’s strengths in the area of political party assistance. PPOs have unique access to UK political party expertise (from politicians, volunteers and party staff) across the country, including devolved administrations and at the local level. The wide reach and potential of established international networks of the Conservative, Labour and LibDem parties provide stable entry points. Direct party-to-party relationships can manage some political risks better. PPOs have developed long-term relationships across the globe and can point to some successes through their activities. They have been innovating, for example through thematic networks or PPO-led multi-party projects.

However, strategic choice are not always made about when and how to deploy party assistance. Sister-parties value the UK’s long democratic tradition but often request short-term tactical support rather than long-term engagement towards reform. The relevance of the UK Westminster model is not always evident. Most countries where WFD and UK political parties work operate presidential or semi-presidential systems where the (parliamentary system) experiences of UK politicians or party staff may be less directly applicable. PPOs are able to draw on South-South learning but it is not their main tool. The skills and incentives to assist the transformation of political parties as part of democratisation processes include, but also go beyond, what UK parties can offer. Starting from the realities of these contexts; developing credible theories of how political change may happen and could be supported; and considering the benefits of a wider range of approaches and delivery options would lead to a more effective use of limited UK political expertise.

WFD has therefore not yet fully delivered on the potential of its combined expertise across parties, parliaments, elections and civil society. This is an ongoing process and this evaluation has shown that WFD has become a more coherent organisation in terms of its systems and relationships with PPOs. It remains a relatively small organisation compared to its American or German counterparts, or multinational programmes (UN, EU). However, it is more established than some of
its younger European peers in Denmark or Finland. Peer organisations and well-informed experts in the field of party assistance provided the following feedback on WFD’s comparative advantage:

- The ‘Westminster brand’ was known, associated with the British political system as well as with FCO and DFID.
- WFD was still most well-known for its parliamentary assistance. Several organisations did not know much about its party assistance. Overall, it was not always visible on the ground.
- Its growing research and evidence capacity was appreciated. This evaluation and the collaboration with the University of Birmingham demonstrate that WFD is serious about developing an evidence base on how to deliver better party and parliamentary assistance. It may therefore play an important knowledge production and information sharing role, regardless of its size.

WFD is seen as becoming a professional democracy organisation, with a reduced share and influence of its direct political party assistance. PPOs’ share of WFD’s total budget has indeed decreased from 32% in FY 2015-2016 to 23% in 2017-2018 (Table 2), as WFD seeks new funding beyond the core UK government grant, which is usually not for PPOs activities. WFD faces the same challenge that some of its peer organisations have not fully resolved: how to manage both sister-party and multi-party assistance, which are associated with different relationships. Yet, some PPOs found there was a natural evolution towards multi-party work.

WFD does not appear to have seriously tried a characteristic of some of its peers: greater geographic concentration of WFD and PPOs party assistance projects which would be a potentially more efficient and effective use of public resources. Apart from integrated programmes, which try to maximise the political expertise available through political parties and the rest of WFD, PPOs assistance is spread across the globe, at times very thinly and not always in line with FCO or DFID geographic priorities. The Ghana case study showed the benefits of a field-based team, which had good access to national partners and the Embassy, but this did not always extend to systematic collaboration with PPOs. There are opportunities to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 17: The value of a long term in-country presence</th>
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<td>The German Foundations have offices across the world, some of which have over 30 years presence. This enables them to be anchored in the local political scene develop a long-term relationship with key parties and individuals. Their senior staff can provide advice or use their offices as a neutral space to conduct sensitive discussions. German Foundations collaborate well together at a country level: they meet regularly to share points of views, and also formally with the German Embassies. Ideological differences do not create a barrier: they have often been active in countries for 30 years or more; they can identify shared challenges in the political and party system, even if they approach problems from different perspectives. One of the success factors is that they are clear on who their partners are in country; by law they are not allowed to co-fund activities with another Foundation. However, they can invite other foundations’ partners to events, but they make sure they keep them informed (e.g. the parties that compose the ruling Cambiemos coalition in Argentina collaborate with liberal and socialist affiliated German foundations) and might be invited to events or trainings organised by the conservative affiliated foundation (Konrad Adenauer).</td>
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experiment with some more concentrated presence in a few countries. The Conservative Party is now making a conscious effort to move towards fewer but larger programmes in order to improve impact. The SNP has also decided to limit the number of projects it could have developed under its increased budget.

7.2 Recommendations

Overall, WFD is making good progress in implementing some of the recommendations of the Triennial Review relevant for party assistance. The evaluation’s recommendations aim to assist WFD continue these shifts.

R1. Improve strategic focus. Continue efforts towards closer strategic alignment between the UK government (FCO and DFID), WFD and individual PPOs. For example, improve geographic criteria for political party assistance and prioritise countries where there is both the greatest need for democratic assistance and which are UK foreign policy and development priorities.

R2. Manage corporate risks. Manage differently some of the corporate risks associated with political party assistance.

- **Reputational risk**: more explicit criteria to select sister-parties, when to work with them, on what projects, with what goals, and when to exit support.
- **Conflict risk**: improvement to design should include conflict analysis and following the principles of ‘do no harm’ to avoid sister-party or network activities potentially reinforcing factors associated with violent conflict.
- **Governance risk**: continued collaboration between WFD and PPOs not just on the design and but also the effective monitoring of projects to show what they are achieving or encourage new approaches.
- **Transparency risk**: PPOs should work together to tell better stories of what UK political party assistance is achieving.

R3. Develop more realistic interventions. Improve the methodology for context analysis of party assistance projects. These should examine the wider country and political system and consult with a wider range of stakeholders. They should draw on political economic analysis approaches being developed by WFD. WFD should provide opportunities and tools for PPOs to analyse the wider political context with independent inputs. Multi-party mission with WFD could look at the wider system and separately at sister-parties.

WFD and PPOs should collaborate on an updated overall TOC for political party assistance for the next phase of FCO-DFID funding, drawing on academic evidence and lessons learned. This would provide the evidence base to confirm or challenge some of the assumptions made in current projects. It would help WFD and PPOs to:

- Move away from training projects, as training on its own has limited effects.
- Set out less ambitious objectives proportionate to the size and duration of projects that can be achieved or tracked.
- Ensure interventions are designed with sustainability and exit strategy in mind, in particular network interventions which appeared the less sustainable.
• Work to lower expectations among funders. Political party assistance projects potentially have a high impact but they also have a high probability of failing.

**R4. Deepen internal collaborations.** WFD and PPOs should continue their efforts at improved collaboration, coordination and communication.

WFD and PPOs should improve in-country collaboration:
- Consider narrowing the number of countries where WFD and PPOs work to increase overall knowledge, deepen relationships and maximise the use of UK resources to meet UK strategic objectives as set by FCO/DFID.
- At a minimum, always inform other PPOs, WFD and FCO/DFID teams of PPO in-country activities with enough notice.
- WFD could provide shared country hubs for the PPOs. A country presence enables peer organisations to build deeper relationships over time (e.g. NDI, German Foundations).

WFD should provide an induction process into WFD for new PPOs staff, as well as ongoing training on core systems. This would improve project quality, including on M&E. In addition, more time physically working together with WFD staff would strengthen working relationships at a personal level. As WFD plans to move to bigger offices, hot desking space could be created for PPOs staff.

SharePoint should be improved as a programme management tool:
- An IT solution to make SharePoint function for PPOs.
- Integration of WFD and PPOs financial systems to more easily track the flow of money between PPOs and WFD, for better WFD overview.
- Reassurances on the use of PPOs information and agreement on what is sensitive and what can be shared for good programme management and lesson learning (through SharePoint and other tools).

**R5. Continue to improve monitoring, evaluation and learning.**

Ways of strengthening M&E include:
- PPOs should undertake quality and proportionate M&E for all projects and incentivise better M&E reports from their partners. This will help PPOs adjust projects during implementation and better coordinate activities with WFD.
- WFD and PPOs should collaborate further on M&E, such as training of PPOs implementers or joint monitoring of PPsO/WFD activities.
- WFD should simplify its reporting format for PPOs for the next grant, to avoid duplication between projects, programmes and corporate objectives reporting.

WFD and PPOs should consider how to facilitate lesson learning on political party assistance. This could be through a better-resourced post within WFD to develop technical knowledge, follow the academic evidence and communicate internal lessons learned. The same post could also lead on WFD’s multi-party and integrated programme work, and facilitate WFD understanding of the work of PPOs.

To assess the impact and sustainability of its political party assistance projects, WFD could commission longitudinal research or an evaluation that would track individuals and organisations involved in PPOs projects over a period of time (5 to 10 years).
This would identify the share of project beneficiaries (individuals and parties) still active in politics and using the greater capacity and networks they might have gained through WFD support.

R6. Improve collaboration with government.

UK government departments can improve their collaboration with PPOs, with headquarter teams informing DFID and FCO in-country colleagues of PPOs activities and encouraging feedback.

PPOs should always make the time to inform in-country DFID or FCO teams of their planned visits and provide a debrief.

R7. Learn from other political party assistance organisations.

WFD could facilitate collaboration and lesson sharing with peer organisations providing political party assistance beyond existing PPOs relationships. This could start with peers that combine sister-party and multi-party assistance (e.g. across a range European political party / multi-party foundations). When it has an in-country presence, WFD could also improve coordination with other assistance providers.

R8. Obtain greater results from political party assistance projects.

The Triennial Review made some recommendations about the funding formula which were not accepted at the time. If appropriate, these or others should be discussed, including how to reward good project performance to improve value for money, rather than simply allocate funding in advance based on UK election results.24

The Board could consider whether a share of PPOs budget could be accessed in a different manner to incentivise better project performance. For example, some PPOs resources could be pooled, with PPOs accessing additional funding on the basis of a project plan that shows high quality design and innovation, or demonstrated past results through good M&E and learning which justify an extension.

WFD and PPOs should continue to test different ways of providing party assistance that combines sister-party, multi-party or integrated elements.

- Review in-house lessons learned with integrated programmes, as the Ghana integrated activities could not be evaluated as too new.
- Test different ways of designing and managing integrated or multi-party programmes, including PPOs working together without WFD mediation, for example pooling their funding; delivering shared activities through the MPO which is already skilled to work across UK parties; or by rotating management responsibilities across PPOs.
- As above, a mechanism to incentivise such work could be considered, such as a flexible fund that PPOs and WFD teams could access, with WFD setting some parameters (e.g. theme or country).

24 For example, Dodsworth and Cheeseman (2016) also recommend more flexible funding models so party assistance is more selective and thereby effective.
Annex A: interviews

WFD and PPOs in UK
WFD-political party officers meeting, 21 November 2017
Carlotta Redi and Marta Corti, Conservative Party office
Nabila Sattar, Labour Party office
Harriet Shone, Liberal Democrats office
Adele Poskitt and Ellen Shustik, Multi-Party Office
Emma Armshaw and Natasha Fox, Scottish National Party office
Anthony Smith, WFD CEO
Devin O’Shaughnessy, WFD Director of Programmes
Graeme Ramshaw, WFD Director of Research and Evaluation
Anja Berretta, WFD Learning and Evaluation manager

Other UK interviews
Bronwen Manby, former Independent WFD Board Member
Susan Dodsworth, University of Birmingham WFD researcher
Nic Cheeseman, University of Birmingham (evaluation peer reviewer)
Aisin Baker and Bea Parkes, former and current DFID senior responsible officers for WFD

Peer organisations
Karjın de Jong, Programme Director, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)
Rasmus Helveg Petersen, Director, Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD)
Hanne Lund Madsen Head of Global Programmes, Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD)
Anu Juvonen, Acting Executive Director, DemoFinland
Ivan Doherty, Director of Political Party Programs, National Democratic Institute
Kevin Deveaux, former head of Parliamentary Development and Political Party Strengthening, UNDP
Jonathan Murphy, Senior Parliamentary Advisor, UNDP Ukraine

Ghana Project partners
Bernadette Quartey, IDRIG Coordinator, Parliament of Ghana
Mohammed Muntaka, MP, Minority Chief Whip, Parliament of Ghana/NDC
Peter Mac Manu, Former National Chairperson/2016 Campaign Manager, NPP
Emmanuel Attafuah Danso, Director of International Affairs, NPP
Haruna Hamadatu, Regional Coordinator/National Vice Chairman, WAFA/CPP
Cephas Amevor, Donor Projects Coordinator, Parliament of Ghana
Mohammed Hardi Nyagsi, Director of Research, Parliament of Ghana

Ghana Political experts
Emmanuel Debrah, Lecturer, Department of Political Science/CDD
Joseph Ayee, Professor, Department of Political Science/IDEAG
Franklin Oduro, Deputy Director, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)
Ransford Edward Gyampo, Professor, Department of Political Science/IEA

Ghana Other donors
Burkhardt Hellemann, Country Representative, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Chika Charles Aniekwe, Political Parties Project Manager, UNDP
Mawena Hayibor, Senior Programme Officer, Embassy of Denmark

Ghana WFD and UK government
Majda El Beid, Senior Africa programme manager, WFD
David Appiah, Ghana Country Representative/WARR, WFD
Gavin Cook, Deputy High Commissioner, British High Commission
Abdul Razak Yakubu, Political Officer, British High Commission
Nic Lee, Senior Governance Advisor, DFID Ghana

Argentina case study
Gonzalo Turdera, National Mobilisation, PRO
Julián Obiglio, Executive Director, Fundación Nuevas Generaciones
Santiago Alberdi, Lawyer and Treasurer, PRO
Micaela Molinar, Comision Nacional De Finanzas, PRO
Michelle Webster, Head of Press and Political Affairs, British Embassy, Buenos Aires
Olaf Jacob, Resident Representative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation
Osian Lewis, Plaid International Office
David Thirlby, Senior Programme Manager for Asia and Latin America

South Africa case study
Lisa Walser, Director of Learning and Development, Democratic Alliance
Luke Akal, former ALN coordinator, Democratic Alliance
Ebrahim Fakir, former Political Party Programme Manager, EISA
Henning Suhr, Resident Representative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation South Africa
Barbara Groeblinghoff, Resident Representative, Friedrich Naumann Foundation South Africa

MENA case study
Islam Azzam, Ra’edat project officer, Jordan
Dr Rula, Ra’edat President, Jordan
Dina Melhem, Regional Director ASIA and MENA, WFD

Western Balkans case study
Peter Bohinec, Kalander Foundation, Slovenia
Manja Zorko, Social Democrats, Slovenia
Adnan Sobo, Social Democrats, Bosnia Herzegovina
Luka Bozovic, Social Democrats, Serbia
Chris Levick, Senior Europe Programme Manager, WFD
Annex B: documents reviewed

General documents

Cabinet Office Triennial Review (2015)
WFD Strategy (2015 – 2020)
WFD Strategic Framework (2017 – 2022)
WFD Integrated Programmes Strategy (2016 – 2020)
WFD Corporate Logical Framework
WFD Internal Audit Report - Political Party Controls (November 2017)
WFD, Financial Summary Political Parties and Integrated Programmes, February 2018
WFD, Project database (pre-SharePoint)
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Lucy Wheeler, Argentina Election Observation report, October 2017

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Plaid Cymru Project Plan, Violence Against Women in Politics in Wales and Argentina, 2017
Plaid Cymru Argentina Visit Report, February 2017
Plaid Cymru Argentina Visit Report, November 2017

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Ghana Integrated Programme Quarterly Report (January – March 2016)
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