Accountability and transparency

In the Western Balkans, Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) works towards the improvement of the social-political environment on a range of issues including the strengthening of participative processes and inclusion of marginalised groups in decision making, improving the work of the parliaments in the region and supporting political parties to become more professional and more democratic.

As part of Westminster Foundation for Democracy’s (WFD) eight-part series on financial accountability, this brief focuses on the role of the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO). The majority of the work of the PBO takes place during the budget formulation phase, although some of the PBO’s work could occur outside the regular budget cycle. Citing examples from WFD’s experience supporting PBOs, this brief examines:

When it comes to parliamentary oversight of government spending, Public Accounts Committees (PACs) tend to be viewed as the go-to committee for keeping an eye on government spending ex-post. PACs are viewed as the ‘final stop’ in the public financial management (PFM) cycle. PACs are essentially the last line of defence in the end-to-end public financial management process. As part of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy’s (WFD) briefs on financial accountability, this brief examines:

As part of Westminster Foundation for Democracy’s (WFD) eight-part series on financial accountability, this brief focuses on the role of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) and whether they are fit for purpose in the age of COVID-19 and beyond. This brief outlines how SAIs play an integral role during the ex-post oversight stage, as well as how SAIs can:

  • contribute to the implementation of national priorities;
  • increase their value-added role; and
  • work with parliament and the executive branch to strengthen their value-added.

The policy paper titled ‘Gender-sensitive post-legislative scrutiny’ examines the meeting point between post-legislative scrutiny and gender analysis.

The purpose of the case study is to assist parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, policy makers, parliamentary development practitioners and civil society activists to design or support processes that identify gender-based consequences in the implementation of legislation.

While there is a rich body of literature on parliaments and parliamentary development per se, and an increasing number of research outputs on anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), surprisingly little has been written on the relations between these two actors, neither in general nor on specific issues or case studies.

Given that ACAs have to be independent, particularly of the government, it is the parliament’s responsibility to provide them with a strong mandate, guarantees of independence, security of tenure, but also to hold them accountable for their activities.